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Preface 
Semiotics has a long history. But it is only in recent years that it has 
become an important movement. Some people see in it a threatening, 
imperialistic theory. They see it as an ideology, a jargon-filled £ad, and as 
intellectual sham. Others see it as a scientific approach which might, if 
properly developed, serve as a unifying theory for the humanities and as 
a bridge between the humanities and the sciences. 
Though the roots of semiotics go back to the Greeks, Charles Peirce 
and Ferdinand de Saussure are generally acknowledged as the modern 
sources from which the contemporary movement springs. The movement's 
development has been somewhat different in the United States and in 
Europe. In both places, however, it has cut across traditional disciplinary 
lines and has influenced linguistics, anthropology, sociology, philosophy, 
literary, artistic and film criticism, communication theory, and architecture, 
among other fields. 
Semiotics has emerged on college and university campuses, sometimes 
as a recognized discipline, sometimes as an underground current. At the 
University of Kansas it became the focus of the first Faculty Development 
Seminar sponsored by the University's Center for Humanistic Studies and 
funded, by a grant from the Mellon Foundation. The essays contained in 
this volume were initially written in conjunction with that seminar. Not 
all the essays from the Seminar have been included here, and most that 
have been included appear in revised form. They represent the range of 
topics covered and the diversity of views, approaches, and conclusions 
present in the movement as a whole. 
Semiotics, despite its long history, is still a new and somewhat unproven 
theory and discipline. This volume is a contribution to its development. 
Richard T . De George 
Ferdinand de Saussure and the 
History of Semiotics 
W. Keith Percival 
The Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) has in many ways 
been the presiding genius of twentieth-century linguistics. His posthumous 
Cours de linguistique generale1 has attained the status of a classic, and 
several influential theoretical schools of the past fifty years consciously 
formulated their ideas in relation to his. Saussure is also a remarkable figure 
in that his theories have attracted the attention of scholars in other fields: 
the anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, the psychologist Jean Lacan, the 
philosopher Merleau-Ponty, and the literary theorists Roland Barthes and 
Jacques Derrida, to cite only a few examples. Indeed, it may be that his 
influence is now more perceptible outside linguistics than within. This is 
especially true in the newly established field of semiotics, where Saussure 
ranks along with the American Charles Sanders Peirce as one of the found-
ers of the discipline. 
The purpose of this paper is to present the fundamental features of 
Saussure's sign theory. Since much of what he wrote and taught on this 
topic was directed against traditional views, his theory will be viewed in a 
historical context. My aim is to put his ideas into sharper perspective and 
in this way to see their strengths and weaknesses more clearly. 
I shall proceed by sidestepping the familiar Cours de linguistique 
generale and concentrating my attention instead on Saussure's manuscripts 
and on the lecture notes taken down by students of his in the three courses 
on general linguistics which he gave at the University of Geneva between 
1907 and 1911. The Cours, it may be recalled, was not written by Saussure 
himself but compiled by his younger colleagues Charles Bally and Albert 
Sechehaye on the basis of students' lecture notes. In a real sense, therefore, 
the book is the work of Bally and Sechehaye as well as Saussure. Fortu-
nately, it is no longer our only source of information: the extant lecture 
notes and Saussure's own manuscripts have been made available,2 and a 
critical edition of the Cours has appeared in which the text is flanked 
sentence by sentence with the manuscript sources on which it was pre-
sumably based.3 
In addition to examining the manuscript sources of the Cours, scholars 
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interested in Saussure have in recent years begun to look into the ante-
cedents of his ideas. Not surprisingly, it has been discovered that many 
linguists and philosophers active at the end of the nineteenth and the 
beginning of the twentieth century expressed ideas similar in one way or 
another to those propounded by Saussure. But the extent of his indebted-
ness to these forerunners is still an open question. Perhaps the most inter-
esting hypothesis suggested so far is that he was influenced by the theories 
of the French philosopher and literary critic Hippolyte Taine (1828-1893).4 
However, I shall have little to say here about the fascinating question of 
Saussure's direct antecedents. 
The position of his theory in the history of semiotics is likewise a cloudy 
issue. While there is no doubt that the questions posed by signs and 
symbols have been an enduring preoccupation in Western philosophy from 
Antiquity to the present, the development of semiotic notions has not 
excited as much curiosity on the part of historians of ideas as it undoubtedly 
deserves.5 Indeed, for some periods basic research is still needed to find 
and interpret the primary sources. T o this extent we are still in the position 
of pioneer explorers constantly tantalized by the prospect of discovering 
new and uncharted lands. 
We commence our exploration with Aristotle's semiotic theory;6 spe-
cifically, with an extract from the opening chapter of the Peri Hermeneias 
{On Interpretation), since much subsequent discussion of semiotic ques-
tions was based on this passage. The English translation offered here is 
my own. 
"Spoken language symbolizes events which take place in the mind, 
while writing symbolizes spoken language. Just as men do not all use the 
same written symbols, so they do not all have the same language. How-
ever, the mental events which are primarily symbolized by language are 
common to all mankind, as also are the things of which these mental 
events are likenesses."7 
Aristotle's position may be summarized as follows: Speech symbolizes 
mental events just as writing symbolizes speech. Mental events are related 
to things in the extra-mental world by being similar to them. While 
mental events and things are the same for all mankind, speech is not. 
Languages vary in much the same way as writing systems vary. The rela-
tion between words and mental events is, therefore, not a natural one, 
and in this respect it parallels the relation between speech and writing. 
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Thu% the sign relation holds between words and mental events, and 
between speech and writing, but not between words and the things they 
refer to. Indeed, there is no mention of a direct relation between words 
and things in this passage. 
Elsewhere in the Aristotelian corpus, however, the relation between 
words and referents is discussed. Let us consider a passage from the first 
chapter of the Categories, of which I present the following English trans-
lation : 
"Things are said to be homonymously named if they share only the 
name (onoma) but have different definitions (logos) with regard to their 
essence (ousia). For example, the word zöion8 may refer either to a human 
being or a picture, and all that a human being and a picture have in 
common is the name zöion, while they differ as regards their definition. 
For if somebody were to specify what constitutes being a zöion for a man 
or for a picture, he would provide a different definition in the two cases. 
"Things are said to be synonymously named if they share the same name 
and also have the same definition with regard to their essence. Take, for 
instance, the word zöion in relation to a human being and an ox. Both 
of these have the name zöion, and their definitions are the same. If some-
body were to specify what constitutes being a zöion in these two instances, 
he would provide the same definition in both cases."9 
A distinction is drawn here between cases in which the same word is 
used to refer to things which have different essential defining attributes, 
like a human being and a picture, and cases in which a word is used to 
refer to things which share essential defining features, like a human 
being and an ox, which share the essential defining feature of being animals. 
The word used to refer to a thing is called its name (onoma). There is no 
mention here of the mental events symbolized by words, nor is the word 
sign (semeion) used. Thus, the theories presented in the Peri Hermeneias 
and the Categories differ from one another significantly. 
In a third work of Aristotle's, the Sophistic Elenchi, yet another theory 
is expounded. The passage reads as follows: 
"It is not possible for us to bring the actual things (pragmata) with us 
when we argue; we use names as symbols (symbola) instead of the things 
and assume, therefore, that whatever follows in the names also follows in 
the things, just as those who calculate do with regard to their counters." 1 0 
Here again words are referred to as the names of things, but the sign 
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relation is mentioned. Hence, in this theory there is a sign relation between 
words and the things they refer to. However, no mention is made of the 
relation between words and the mental events associated with them. There 
is no discussion either of essential defining attributes. 
We must conclude that, strictly speaking, Aristotle had three different 
theories of the linguistic sign. An adroit interpreter might perhaps be able 
to show that they are in reality different versions or facets of the same 
theory. Alternatively, one might concentrate on one of them and not try 
to reconcile it with the others. In fact, the second alternative was the more 
popular one, and the focus of attention was the passage from the Peri 
Hermeneias. But before considering Aristotle's commentators let us look 
at another major semiotic theory propounded in Antiquity, namely that of 
the Stoics. 1 1 
The passage we shall analyze is from a work by Sextus Empiricus, a 
Greek-speaking philosopher who lived in the early third century A.D. The 
Stoic school had been founded five hundred years earlier by Zeno of Citium, 
but since the works of Zeno and the other heads of the school have not 
come down to us we must rely largely on secondary sources for our knowl-
edge of Stoic philosophy. The work from which our passage is taken is 
entitled Adversus Mathematicos {Against the Professors) and is devoted 
to a criticism of the* prevailing philosophical systems of the day. The 
passage reads as follows (the English translation is my own): 
"The Stoics say that there are three things linked together, namely the 
signified, the signifier, and the referent. Of these the signifier is the sound, 
e.g. Dion; the signified is the state of affairs revealed by the signifier; and 
we grasp the signified as coexisting with our understanding, whereas bar-
barians do not understand the signified although they hear the sound. The 
referent is the object in the outside world, e. g. Dion himself. Two of these 
things are corporeal, namely the sound and the referent, and one is incorpo-
real, namely the state of affairs signified and expressible. This latter is 
either true or false." 1 2 
The Stoic theory clearly differs both in terminology and in content from 
Aristotle's. As regards the terminology, we note that two of the key terms, 
signifier [semainon) and signified {semainomenon)> are inflected forms of 
the same verb semainein 'to signify' (compare Saussure's terms signifjant 
and signifie), while the term for referent (tynchanon) is unconnected with 
the other two. 1 3 As for the content of the theory, two features dis-
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tinguish it from Aristotle's system. First, a distinction is drawn between 
meaning and referent; and second, meanings are not equated with mental 
events. In the Stoic view, the semantic content of a linguistic expression is 
its meaning; the referent, on the other hand, is whatever the speaker 
happens to be referring to when he uses the expression. Thus, if I say "It 
is night," when it is in fact day, what my statement means is at variance 
with the actual state of affairs, and it is this discrepancy which might lead 
my interlocutor to regard the statement as either factually mistaken or 
intentionally misleading. It is, then, the distinction between meaning and 
referent which enables the Stoics to account for the difference between 
true and false statements. All three components of Aristotle's sign situa-
tion—the sign, the mental event, and the referent—would be categorized 
by the Stoic as corporeal and as lying outside language; the incorporeal 
meaning alone resides within language.1 4 
Unlike Aristotle, the Stoics also speculated about the origin of language. 
The earliest words, in their belief, had a natural relation to their refer-
ents, i.e., were onomatopoetic creations (like the English word cuc\oo). 
This theory was, in fact, not new with the Stoics; similar ideas had already 
been aired in Plato's dialogue the Cratylus. Although the Stoics were quite 
aware that few words in contemporary Greek were clear cases of onoma-
topoeia, they believed that the whole vocabulary had been derived from 
an original core of imitative words. This assumption, unwarranted as it 
may seem to us nowadays, gave a powerful impulse to the study of 
etymology. But not only was the starting point—the onomatopoetic core 
vocabulary—a mere conjecture, no restrictions were placed on the proc-
esses of derivation. The result was unbridled speculation.15 But to many 
of the Ancients the bizarre explanations arrived at in this way were ac-
cepted at their face value. The Roman antiquarians, with their strong 
interest in the customs of their ancestors, were especially attracted by these 
ingenious word-origins, and we find them faithfully reflected in the com-
pendia and encyclopedias which late Antiquity bequeathed to the Middle 
Ages. 
Another important development was the rise of a grammatical tradition 
aimed at inculcating facility in reading and writing the language of the 
great writers of the Periclean age. The first full-scale grammatical textbooks 
were written in the first century B.C., and the Romans soon followed suit. 
These manuals contain elaborate prescriptions covering the facts of lin-
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guistic usage, but they seldom concern themselves with semiotic notions. 
It was the logicians and philosophers, not the grammarians, who continued 
an interest in these questions. For instance, St. Augustine (354-430 A.D.) 
enumerates the different types of signs in his De Doctrina Christiana, a 
work which was influential in later centuries. Also of interest is the fact 
that St. Augustine, in the same work, depicts words as signifying concepts 
in the mind: "In short, among men words have achieved the pre-eminent 
function of signifying whatever mental concepts anybody may wish to 
communicate."16 
A similar point of view is expressed by Boethius (died 524 A.D.) in 
his influential commentary on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias: "Thus, when 
I say stone, it designates both the concept 'stone' and the stone itself, i.e., 
the substance itself; but it signifies the concept first, and the thing secon-
darily."17 Boethius also translated several of Aristotle's works into Latin, 
and it was through these translations that the Latin-speaking Middle Ages 
first became acquainted with Aristotelian philosophy. In this way, Boethius' 
interpretation of Aristotle's ideas remained authoritative for many centuries. 
It is noteworthy, for instance, that he offered the following translation of 
Aristotle's definition of the noun in chapter II of the Peri Hermeneias: 
"The noun, therefore, is a sound which is meaningful by arbitrary choice 
{secundum placitum)."1S The Greek original of this definition contains 
the ambiguous phrase \ata synthe\en, meaning either 'in combination' or 
'by agreement.' If J . Engels is right, Aristotle is more likely to have had 
the first meaning in mind here, 1 9 but in choosing to translate the phrase 
by the words secundum placitum 'at will, by arbitrary choice,' Boethius 
caused the second interpretation to become the accepted one from then on, 
and he thereby reinforced the impression that for Aristotle the relation 
between words and meanings is not a natural one. 
Boethius' phrase secundum placitum carried another implication, which 
did not escape the attention of posterity, namely that an element of con-
scious choice was involved in the formation of words. It was by choice 
and general agreement that, say, the Romans called a horse equus while 
the Greeks called it hippos. The accepted view came to be that language 
was a conscious contrivance resorted to for the purpose of communicating 
thought. As late as the eighteenth century, language is defined in Ephraim 
Chambers' Cyclopaedia as "a set of Words which any People have agreed 
upon, in order to communicate their Thoughts to each other." 2 0 
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The notion that words primarily signify concepts did not go com-
pletely unchallenged, however. In his Peri Hermeneias commentary, the 
scholastic philosopher Duns Scotus (ca. 1265-1308) disputed the traditional 
view by appealing to the assertive function of factual judgments: what I 
assert to be the case is not itself a conceptual object, but an actual state of 
affairs. This led Scotus to argue that the meaning of a word is not the 
associated concept but the thing referred to, and that word and concept 
both signify the same thing, viz. the referent. It is interesting to note that 
he backed up his argument by citing the passage in Aristotle's Sophistic 
Elenchi which we have examined above. We are unable to take the objects 
with us to an argument, says Scotus, but we can take with us the associated 
concepts (what Scotus referred to as the species intelligibiles), "hence 
words are not signs of the latter but of things." 2 1 
The question as to whether words signify concepts or things continued 
to be discussed by William of Ockham (ca. 1280-1347), who in essence 
followed Scotus' lead, albeit with significant changes of emphasis.22 The 
controversy was still alive in the seventeenth century, when, for instance, 
the Polish Jesuit theologian Martin Smiglecki devoted a whole section of 
his Logica to the question of whether words primarily signify things or 
concepts ("An voces primo et immediate significent res vel conceptus"). 
Since Smiglecki approached the issue from a semiotic point of view it may 
be of interest to follow his argument closely. 
Signs are said to be of two varieties, which he terms "manifestative" 
and "suppositive." A manifestative sign is one which merely indicates a 
thing but cannot be used instead of it. For example, smoke indicates 
fire, a hanging sprig of ivy indicates that wine is sold within, and effects 
indicate their causes. A suppositive sign, on the other hand, signifies a 
thing in such a way that it can be used instead of it. Thus, counters in 
calculation signify what is being calculated in such a way that they can 
be used instead of it. Similarly, words signify things in the manner of 
suppositive signs since they are used instead of things. Being unable to take 
the things with us into a dispute we use words instead of things. Words 
are, therefore the signs of things. Concepts, on the other hand, signify in 
the manner of manifestative signs, words being the effects of concepts and 
proceeding from them in the same way as effects proceed from causes. 
Hence, words cannot be used instead of concepts, nor are they the names 
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of concepts but merely indicate concepts in the same way as effects indicate 
causes.23 
A similar view was stated at about the same time by the Cistercian 
bishop Juan Caramuel Lobkowitz, who argued that the relation between 
concept and word is parallel to that which holds between synonyms. As 
Caramuel puts the matter, "concepts, spoken words, and written words are 
all of them equivalent signs directly signifying things." 2 4 Both Smiglecki 
and Caramuel reflect the scholastic view that words primarily signify their 
referents. 
With the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) we return 
to the more traditional conceptualist position. In his Elements of Philoso-
phy (1655), Hobbes draws a distinction between "marks" and "signs." 
The purpose of marks, in his view, is to serve us as reminders of thoughts 
we have had previously. He defines them as perceptible things established 
at will the function of which is to recall, through their meaning, thoughts 
similar to those for which they were established. Signs, on the other hand, 
are "the antecedents of their consequents, and the consequents of their 
antecedents, as often as we observe them to go before or follow after in 
the same manner." 2 5 He then proceeds to classify signs in the standard way 
as either natural or arbitrary. Arbitrary signs are those which we choose 
deliberately, natural signs are non-arbitrary. Words are connected together 
in such a way that they become the signs of our thoughts. The result is 
speech, the separate parts of which are called names. Names function both 
as marks and as signs, as marks to remind us of our own thoughts and as 
signs to make known our thoughts to others. 
Note that Hobbes has so far not mentioned the things referred to by 
words. But he immediately changes his tack when he needs to demonstrate 
that words are arbitrary. This is so, he says, because words and things 
have no similarity to each other and hence no comparison can be established 
between them: "How can anybody imagine that the names of things were 
chosen on the basis of their natures?" But on the whole Hobbes emphasized 
the relation between words and concepts, and in this respect he seems to 
have been swimming with the current. 
This conceptualist perspective is reflected with particular clarity in John 
Home Tooke's The Diversions of Purley, a treatise on grammatical theory 
in dialogue form, first published in 1786. In the opening chapter of that 
work, one of the interlocutors states the traditional view thus: "Words are 
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the signs of things. There must therefore be as many sorts of words, or 
parts of speech, as there are sorts of things."2* Thereupon the other char-
acter counters: "You seem to forget, that it is some time since words have 
been no longer allowed to be the signs of things. Modern Grammarians 
acknowledge them to be (as indeed Aristotle called them, symhola pathema-
tön) the signs of ideas: at the same time denying the other assertion of 
Aristotle, that ideas are the likenesses of things. And this has made a great 
alteration in the manner of accounting for the differences of words." 2 7 
The earliest of the "modern grammarians" whom Home Tooke had in 
mind was the sixteenth-century humanist Julius Caesar Scaliger (died 1558), 
whose influential treatise on Latin grammar, De Causis Linguae Latinae, 
he is fond of quoting. It is significant that Scaliger, an avowed Aristotelian, 
defined the word as "a sign of notions in the mind." 2 8 We may conclude, 
therefore, that there was a swing of the pendulum in the modern period 
away from the predominantly referential theory of the scholastics in the 
direction of the conceptualist position ascribed to Aristotle. 
However, the conceptualist theory has not held exclusive sway up to 
the present time. In the nineteenth century, the English philosopher John 
Stuart Mill (1806-1873) strongly argued in favor of the referential view: 
"It seems proper to consider a word as the name of that which we intend 
to be understood by it when we use it; of that which any fact that we assert 
of it is to be understood of; that, in short, concerning which, when we em-
ploy the word, we intend to give information. Names, therefore, shall always 
be spoken of in this work as the names of things themselves, and not merely 
of our ideas of things." 2 9 
Another influential theory of meaning was propounded by the nine-
teenth-century logician Gottlob Frege in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 
published in 1893. Frege distinguishes between what an expression ex-
presses, which he calls its senset and what it stands for, which he calls its 
reference. For example, the arithmetical expressions 2 2 and 2 + 2 have 
the same reference, namely the number four, but different senses, i.e., they 
express different things. 3 0 This distinction has found widespread acceptance 
among twentieth-century analytical philosophers in the English-speaking 
world, many of whom distinguish between the theory of meaning, dealing 
with such relations as synonymy, and the theory of reference, dealing with 
the relation between utterances and the states of affairs they refer to. Akin 
to this is the distinction commonly drawn between the internal content of 
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a general term and the set of things to which it may apply, between its 
intension or connotation and its extension or denotation?1 
Before leaving the history of philosophical semiotics it might be well 
to consider for a moment the peculiar way in which philosophers have 
often used the word "name." As we have seen, Aristotle in his treatise the 
Categories refers to words as the names of their referents. Another example 
is furnished by John Stuart Mill, who expounds the basic structure of the 
proposition as follows : 
"Every proposition consists of three parts: the Subject, the Predicate, 
and the Copula. The predicate is the name denoting that which is affirmed 
or denied. The subject is the name denoting the person or thing which 
something is affirmed or denied of. The copula is the sign denoting that 
there is an affirmation or denial; and thereby enabling the hearer or reader 
to distinguish a proposition from any other kind of discourse. Thus, in the 
proposition, The earth is round, the Predicate is the word round, which 
denotes the quality affirmed, or (as the phrase is) predicated; the earth, 
words denoting the object which that quality is affirmed of, compose the 
Subject; the word is, which serves as the connecting mark between the 
subject and the predicate, to show that one of them is affirmed of the other, 
is called the Copula." 3 2 
Clearly, when Mill calls subjects and predicates "names," he is not using 
the term as the layman does, for not only does he refer to the single word 
round as a name, but he calls the word sequence the earth a name. More-
over, a quality such as roundness is not a perceptible object like the earth, 
yet Mill can in both cases call the words referring to them names. Notice 
too that the copula is does not qualify as a name, but is referred to instead 
as a sign. Obviously, we are dealing here with the technical mode of speech 
used by a particular discipline. 
Let us now turn our attention to the history of the grammatical tradition 
from Antiquity to modern times. 3 3 For most of this period logic and 
grammar developed separately arid in some isolation from each other. 
Semiotic notions were relegated to the logicians. Grammarians, on the other 
hand, were chiefly interested in imparting the rules of correct speech and 
writing; philosophical questions seldom concerned them. Even in the 
scholastic period, when an ambitious but short-lived, attempt was made to 
turn grammar into a universal demonstrative science, there seems to have 
been little interest in broadening the semiotic foundations of grammar. 3 4 In 
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any event, the grammatical theories of the scholastics were soon discredited, 
first by philosophers (notably by the followers of William of Ockham), and 
later by the humanist grammarians of the fifteenth century. 3 5 Scholastic 
logic itself began to lose ground and was abandoned by the end of the 
sixteenth century. Semiotic speculation continued in the seventeenth century 
in the work of Locke and Leibniz, and was maintained in the following 
century by such figures as Condillac. After an intermission, certain features 
of the Enlightenment tradition were revived by Hippolyte Taine, specifically 
in his De I'intelligence, first published in 1870. Taine's ideas created wide-
spread enthusiasm in France in the final decades of the nineteenth century, 
and it was within the intellectual environment SO' created that much of 
Saussure's early linguistic theorizing took place. Hence, although he may 
not have been aware of this himself, Saussure stood at the end of a long 
tradition of semiotic inquiry. 
The linguistic tradition, to which Saussure also had close ties, was an 
outgrowth of traditional grammar and etymology. It was born in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries when scholars discovered 
that it was possible to make a systematic study of the way grammatical 
systems develop through time. By the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury linguists considered their foremost task to be that of hypothetically 
reconstructing the unattested proto-language of the Indo-European language 
family. Their interests broadened to include the more recent history of the 
Indo-European languages and general questions concerning the nature 
of language. 
For most of the nineteenth century German scholars were in the fore-
front of the new discipline, but in the second half of the century scholars 
from other countries played an increasingly large role. Thus, Ferdinand 
de Saussure went from his native Geneva to the University of Leipzig to 
obtain professional training in linguistics. At the time he studied there the 
Leipzig linguistic fraternity was passing through a turbulent period. A 
group of young linguists, jocularly referred to as the Junggrammatiker, 
were propounding general theoretical views to which the older generation 
took violent exception. Saussure not only sided with the Young Turks, he 
outdid them. His Memoire sur le Systeme primitij des voyelles dans les 
langues indo-europeennes, published in late 1878, was a brilliant piece of 
inferential reasoning—so brilliant, in fact, that it failed to receive the atten-
tion that it deserved. 
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Saussure proceeded to obtain his doctorate with a rather conventional 
dissertation entitled De l'emploi du genitif absolu en Sanscrit, published in 
1880. and then went in the autumn of 1881 to take up a teaching post at 
the Ecole pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris, where he was entrusted with 
courses on Gothic and Old High German, Lithuanian, and the comparative 
grammar of Greek and Latin. 
In 1891, he was called to the University of Geneva to occupy the newly 
created chair for the history of comparison of the Indo-European languages. 
After the retirement of his colleague Joseph Wertheimer in 1906, he gave 
his famous courses on general linguistics (1907, 1908-1909, and 1910-1911). 
In the summer of 1912 he was obliged to retire for reasons of health; he 
died in early 1913 at the age of fifty-five. 
After the publication of his doctoral dissertation, Saussure's scholarly 
output was meager. It is not known for certain why this was so. As for 
the material he collected for his three courses on general linguistics, there 
is no evidence that he had any firm plans to publish it. After his death, 
his friends Bally and Sechehaye undertook this difficult task on the basis 
of notes taken down by students who attended the courses (Bally and 
Sechehaye had not themselves been among them). The book which re-
sulted, appropriately entitled Cours de linguistique generale, appeared in 
early 1916. 
It is strange that this modern classic on general linguistics was at first 
not warmly received. For example, it got two frosty reviews from Saussure's 
brilliant Paris student, the Indo-Europeanist Antoine Meillet. The situation 
did not markedly change until the 1930's, when the book became the rally-
ing cry of the new schools of "structural" linguistics which had emerged 
in Denmark and Czechoslovakia. This had the bizarre result that Saussure 
came to be regarded ex post facto as the founder of structural linguistics. 
In Germany and in English-speaking countries his ideas were either ignored 
or sharply criticized. In France, the general attitude continued to be cool 
until after the Second World War, when something in the nature of a cult 
grew up around his name in intellectual circles. 
Viewed as a linguistic theorist, Saussure challenged a number of notions 
which were widely accepted in the late nineteenth century: (1) the notion 
that linguistics should be primarily concerned with the study of linguistic 
change; (2) the notion that articulatory phonetics, the study of the physi-
ology of the speech act, provides the foundation on which all linguistic 
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research rests; and (3) the assumption that individual psychology is the 
superordinate discipline under which linguistics should be subsumed. 
As for the first point, Saussure believed that language is a sign system 
and as such functions at a particular point in time quite regardless of its 
previous history. The native speakers of a language communicate perfectly 
well without knowing anything about its history. Linguists should, there-
fore, focus their attention first and foremost on linguistic systems as they 
function at particular periods. Hence the famous distinction between 
synchrony, the study of language states at particular chronological stages, 
and diachrony, the study of the ways in which languages change through 
time. In Saussure's view, synchronic linguistics should be kept insulated 
from diachronic considerations. Thus, the linguist describing the French 
spoken in the reign of Louis X I V should abstain from allowing his analysis 
to be influenced by his knowledge of the earlier history of the language. 
However, as we shall see, Saussure also insisted that one cannot comprehend 
the phenomenon of natural language if one fails to take into consideration 
the diachronic dimension (le facteur "temps" as he called it) . 
As for phonetics, Saussure could see no utility in the minute articulatory 
analysis of speech sounds. In his view, the physical character of the signs 
in a sign system is not a primary consideration. The system functions 
regardless of the precise way in which the signs are distinguished physically. 
It follows, therefore, that phonetics is an ancillary discipline, not an integral 
part of linguistics. 
Finally, Saussure disapproved of the excessive reliance on psychological 
explanation characteristic of much linguistic theorizing in the late nine-
teenth century. If language is a sign system, it should be studied within 
the context of other sign systems, in a special discipline created for that 
purpose. Saussure seems to have been unaware that such a discipline had 
already been proposed by others (notably by C. S. Peirce), and suggested 
that it should be called semiologie. 
This science of sign systems would study the situations which result 
whenever human beings signify their thoughts by means of a necessary 
convention. Saussure envisaged that it would embrace not only linguistics, 
but also the study of writing systems, visual signals (sign language, military 
and maritime signals), Braille, all marks of courtesy, rites, and ceremonies. 
It would, in short, investigate all systems of arbitrarily fixable values, 
Saussure laid special emphasis on the social character of sign systems, 
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including language. It is in this context that his famous dichotomy between 
langue and parole may be placed. Langue is the social product of the 
semiological behavior of a speech community, while parole is the individual 
facet of the phenomenon, i.e., any of the concrete acts of speech performed 
by members of such a community. Saussure insisted on the centrality 
of langue, the pre-eminence of the .social over the individual. Indeed, he 
not only advocated separating the linguistics of parole from the linguistics 
of langue, he even denied that purely individual factors are of any impor-
tance in language. Just as ships are made to sail on the sea, languages 
exist for the social group and therefore need only be studied as something 
collective. 
After this brief introduction to Saussure's ideas, we are now ready to 
examine some of the primary sources. The first extract we shall con-
sider is from a set of notes for a projected book on general linguistics. 
Here as elsewhere, the translation is my own: 
"Three things are invariably missing from what philosophers believe to be 
true of language (langage). First, there is a fact which we scarcely need to 
emphasize, namely that language (langage') is not fundamentally made up 
of names (noms). It is an accident when a linguistic sign happens to 
correspond to an object perceptible to the senses, like a horse, fire, or 
the sun, instead of an idea like [Greek] et he {a che placed.' No matter 
how important these cases are, there is no obvious reason why they should 
be considered typical of language (langage). In fact, the opposite is true. 
In a sense, this is, of course, no more than a poor choice of examples on 
the part of those who look at the situation in this way. But, implicitly, there 
is an unmistakable tendency here, one which we cannot let pass, to take 
a stand on what language (langage) is, namely to regard it as a set of names 
for objects (une nomenclature d'objets); objects given first (d'abord 
donnes). 
"[In this conception] there is first the object, and then the sign. We 
are, therefore, given an external basis for the sign, a notion we shall always 
reject, and language (langage) is represented as involving the following 
relation: 
f* al 
objects — bj- names (noms) 
[* . C J 
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In reality the correct way to portray the matter is this: a — b — c, with 
no mention of a relation of the kind * a, centered on an object. 
"If it were possible for an object, wherever it might be, to be the factor 
(terme) on which the sign is based (fixe), linguistics would immediately 
cease being what it is, from top to bottom, and likewise the human spirit, 
as is clear from this discussion. But, as we have just said, this is merely 
an incidental reproach that might be leveled at the traditional way of 
approaching language philosophically. It is certainly unfortunate that people 
start out by making the objects referred to the main element (element 
primordial), when in reality they are nothing of the kind. But that is 
merely a result of choosing bad examples, and if one replaces helios, ignis, 
or Pferd by something such as [ . . . ] , one no longer is tempted to reduce 
language (langue) to something external. 
"The second mistake generally made by philosophers is much more 
serious, and that is to imagine that once an object has been designated by 
a name (nom), that combination will be transmitted in toto, and that no 
other phenomena need be taken into consideration. If some change should 
occur, it will be the name itself that is more likely to be affected, as when 
[Latin] fraxinus ['ash tree'] is assumed to have turned into [French] frene. 
But the idea is also subject to change. . . . Here we already have something 
which causes us to question the association between an idea (idee) and a 
name (nom), the minute that this unexpected factor completely ignored in 
the philosophical system (la combinaison philo sophique) enters the picture, 
namely TIME. But we should still have nothing really striking, nothing 
characteristic, nothing uniquely peculiar to language, if all we had were 
these two types of change and the first kind of dissociation by which the 
idea parts company with the sign, spontaneously, whether the latter changes 
or not. So far these two things are still separate entities, at least for a 
[lacuna], 
"What is characteristic are the innumerable instances in which the change 
of a sign causes a change in the idea itself and in which one immediately 
realizes that at any given moment there was never any difference between 
the set of ideas being distinguished and the set of distinctive signs. 
"As a result of phonetic change two signs become confused with each 
other, and the ideas will become confused to a certain extent; how much 
they will be confused will depend on all the other elements in the system 
(Vensemble des autres elements). 
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"When a sign becomes two different signs, by the same blind process 
a meaning will inevitably be attached to the difference which has just arisen. 
"Here are some examples, but let me immediately emphasize the futility 
of the approach which starts out from the relation between an idea and 
a sign with no regard to time or the process of transmission, for it is the 
factor of transmission that experimentally teaches us what the value of a 
sign is (ce que vaut le signe) ,"36 
Let us first examine Saussure's complaints against the philosophers. His 
main charge is that they regard language as a set of names for perceptible 
objects and believe that the objects referred to by words exist prior to the 
words themselves. Second, he accuses them of ignoring the factor of lin-
guistic change, which constantly alters the relation between words and 
meanings, at times creating new meanings and effacing old ones. 
To what extent are these strictures justified? As regards the first point, 
we have seen that the predominant tradition in Western philosophy has 
regarded words as primarily signifying mental concepts. No semiotic 
theory we have considered asserts that meanings are referents and nothing 
but referents. Even John Stuart Mill confines himself to the statement that 
he will always refer to words as the names of things, unot merely of our 
ideas of things," which clearly indicates that he did not deny the existence 
of ideas. Finally, the question of whether things existed before words was 
never raised. 
Moreover, one can reasonably ask whether Saussure's arguments are 
cogent. His main contention in the first paragraph is that reference to 
perceptible objects like horses and fire is not typical of language. He con-
trasts such cases of simple reference with what he calls "ideas," which he 
exemplifies with a Greek verb form. But it is not clear whether he is 
insisting that language consists of two types of words: names and ideas, 
or whether he thinks that the meaning of a word such as horse is the idea 
or concept of a horse (not a real horse), in which case all words would 
express ideas no matter whether they referred to perceptible objects or not. 
The choice of Greek ethe\a 'he placed' is also puzzling in that what one 
places is often a perceptible object, and in such a situation the action of 
placing is no less perceptible than the object being placed. In general, both 
subjects and predicates may refer to something perceptible (like horses or 
roundness) or to something difficult or impossible to perceive (like absence 
or meaningfulness). 
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When we move on to the second part of the extract, we may note first 
that Saussure is probably correct in asserting that philosophers have not 
paid attention to the factor of linguistic change. But does this factor need 
to be considered if one is interested in the way propositions are expressed 
in words, which is the main concern of logicians? Let us examine one of 
Saussure's strongest arguments in this regard, namely the contention that 
linguistic change often creates new semantic distinctions. What he has in 
mind here are cases like the French words chaise and chaire, both of which 
go back to Old French chaiere. The existence of two variant pronunciations 
of what was earlier a single word, has, according to Saussure, resulted in 
their acquiring different meanings, chaise being used in the concrete sense 
'seat, chair' and chaire in the more abstract meaning 'seat of authority, 
professorship.' This example illustrates, in Saussure's view, that the mo-
mentum of linguistic change in certain circumstances ineluctably creates 
semantic distinctions which did not exist before. In Old French there was 
one word and hence one idea, whereas in modern French there are two 
words and two ideas. 
But the only way one can be sure that no more than one idea was 
expressed by Old French chaiere is by invoking the general principle that 
the sum of ideas distinguished is always equal to the sum of distinctive 
signs. One suspects, in other words, that even if it could be shown that 
Old French chaiere (like modern English chair) was used in both concrete 
and abstract senses, Saussure would insist that it expressed a single idea. 
But 'although we may grant him his principle for the sake of argument, he 
is still not out of the wood, since examples of this kind involve a diachronic 
dimension. Why does the semantic analyst dealing with modern French 
chaise and chaire need to know that they were derived from the same word 
in Old French? The problem of how signs function in society can be 
studied perfectly well without introducing historical considerations. Hence, 
Saussure's argument that the philosophers have erred in ignoring the factor 
of transmission is valid only if one violates his injunction against mixing 
synchronic and diachronic analysis. 
The positive side of Saussure's argument in our first extract is the notion 
that words have important relations to one another which are worthy of 
scrutiny. This is certainly a fruitful idea, perhaps one of the most fruitful 
ones suggested by Saussure. But it is perhaps strange that he seems to 
regard the previous neglect of these interrelations as a by-product of the 
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referential theory of the linguistic sign. Whether this was really so is an 
interesting historical question which has not so far been looked into, but 
it seems clear that there is no necessary connection between adopting a 
referential view of meaning and neglecting the interrelations of words. 
After all, things have relations to one another no less than words: animals 
fall into species and genera, human beings into age groups, occupations, 
races, and nations, and so forth. A dedicated referentialist could logically 
derive many of the interrelations of words from such factual relations, if 
he so wished. 
Let us now examine the way Saussure presented his views of the 
linguistic sign to his students, specifically in his lecture of November 16, 
1908. The immediately preceding lecture had been concerned with the 
place of language among sign systems and the place of linguistics among 
the sciences, and Saussure had introduced the notion of semiology, the 
science devoted to sign systems in general. On November 16 he went on to 
ask why semiology had not yet gained the recognition it deserved. In 
answering this question he impressed on his auditors the idea that language 
had not hitherto been studied from the point of view of its true nature 
(sous son aspect essentiel). One of the manifestations of this failure, in 
Saussure's judgment, is the fact that language has been envisaged as a 
system of names. At this point, let us look at the notes taken down by 
Francois Bouchardy: 
"Psychologists and philosophers regard language as a nomenclature, at 
least when you look at the examples [they cite]. In this way, a crucial 
matter (une chose capitate') is left out of consideration, namely the way in 
which the values in language determine one another by their coexistence. 
Thus, the word judgment can only be defined by means of the terms 
which are close to it. This phenomenon is noticeable in translation: 
[French] craindre ['to fear'] and redouter [cto dread'] have no precise 
meanings other than in relation to each other. If one of them did not 
exist, the other one would have the meaning of the first in addition to its 
own. If one loses sight of the fact that all there is to study is a system of 
signs one runs the risk of not treating semiology in the correct way." 3 7 
Here again we encounter Saussure's attack against the referential theory, 
this time aimed at the psychologists as well as the philosophers. He states 
once more that there is a connection between regarding language as a 
nomenclature and neglecting the relations words have to one another. 
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This leads him to emphasize that a word cannot be defined in isolation, 
but only in terms of its near synonyms ("the terms which are close to i t " ) . 
The reciprocally determined meanings of related terms he calls "values." 
Thus, not only are the interrelations between words more important than 
their relations to the extra-mental world, they are the only ones capable 
of definition. To take an example cited by Saussure himself, words like 
"dog" and "wolf" cannot be regarded as isolated signs. Another student, 
Leopold Gautier, writes in his notes: 
"Let us go even further: if the word usolf ceased to exist, dog would 
immediately denote the wolf. The word depends, therefore, on the sys-
tem; there are no isolated signs." 3 8 
Clearly, the view being advanced here has much to recommend it. One 
recalls, for instance, that the term "buffalo" was extended to refer to the 
North American bison in spite of the fact that the latter belongs to a dif-
ferent genus from the old-world buffalo. Similarly, according to- one 
account,3 9 when the Romans first encountered the elephant they called the 
unfamiliar animal Luca bos, i.e., a type of bovine. 
But is it not the physical appearance of the animals in question that 
legitimizes such extensions of meaning? For when the speakers of a lan-
guage come upon an unfamiliar animal which bears no resemblance to any 
creature known to them, they will often borrow a designation for it from 
a language whose speakers are familiar with it. Thus, the word giraffe 
was borrowed into European languages from Arabic, \angaroo from a 
native Australian language, cockatoo from Malay, and so forth. Alterna-
tively, new descriptive terms are created from the resources of the language 
itself, as in the case of rhinoceros, a name coined by the Greeks. 4 0 It 
would seem, therefore, that semantic extensions and intra-linguistic crea-
tions are influenced to a great extent by the observable characteristics of the 
animal to be named. 
Another valuable notion is the idea that the meanings of near synonyms 
tend to define themselves in relation to- each other. One thinks of the recent 
neologism chairperson, which is being increasingly used in the sense of a 
"non-chairman," i.e. a female chairman. But Saussure surely goes too far 
when he suggests that the semantic relations between related terms would 
suffice to characterize their meanings exhaustively. For instance, to inform 
somebody unfamiliar with the word buffalo that it is closely related to the 
word ox and that whatever is referred to as an ox is not referred to as a 
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buffalo and vice versa, would clearly be an inadequate explanation. Without 
a knowledge of how oxen and buffaloes differ nobody would feel satisfied 
that he understood what buffalo meant. It is surely no accident that dic-
tionaries often contain pictures of many of the objects referred to in their 
pages. If the interrelations between words really sufficed to define them 
this procedure would be unnecessary. 
A more detailed discussion of the notion that the value of a word 
depends on the value of other related words occurs in the last lecture of 
the third course, given on July 14, 1911 : 
"To capture the idea of value we have chosen to start out from the 
system of words, not the isolated word. We could have started out some-
where else. Psychologically, what are our ideas considered apart from 
language (langue) ? They probably do not exist, or they exist only in an 
amorphous state. Philosophers and linguists have always believed that we 
would have no means of distinguishing two ideas from each other were 
it not for the help of language (internal language, of course). Hence, the 
purely conceptual mass of our thoughts, when considered in isolation and 
separate from language, represents a sort of amorphous cloud (nebuleuse 
informe) in which nothing could be picked out in the beginning. Analo-
gously, in language the various ideas do not constitute anything pre-
existent; there are no ideas completely established and completely distinct 
from one another, and there are no signs for such ideas. There is nothing 
distinct at all in thought prior to the linguistic sign. This is the crucial 
point. 
"Moreover, a question worth raising is whether this domain of com-
pletely nebulous ideas is matched by a domain of sound, considered in 
isolation from ideas, which does have distinct units. But as a matter of 
fact, sound has no determined units circumscribed in advance either. It 
is precisely between these two that the linguistic 'fact' mediates: 
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This linguistic 'fact' gives rise to values which are for the first time deter-
mined but which for all that remain values, in the usual sense of the term. 
"There is something which needed to be added to the bare fact: I 
return to this topic now. Not only are these two domains between which 
a linguistic fact mediates vague and amorphous, but the act which assigns 
a given acoustic stretch to a given idea, the choice of a link between them, 
this marriage which creates value, is completely arbitrary. If that were not 
the case, this idea of value would have to be restricted: an absolute element 
would enter the picture. But since this contract is completely arbitrary, 
values are relative. 
"Let us now return to the diagram representing the relation between 
the signified (signifie) and the signifier (signifiant): 
signified 
signifier 
Clearly, this diagram has its raison d'etre, but it is merely a by-product 
of value. The signified does not exist on its own—it is lost in the amorphous 
mass. The same thing is true of the signifier. But the signifier and the 
signified contract a bond by virtue of the precise values which arise from 
the combination of all the acoustic signs with all the countless segmentations 
(decoupures) that can be made in the conceptual mass (la masse de la 
pensee). 
"What would be necessary for the relation between the signifier and 
the signified to be given per se (donne en soi) ? Above all, the signified, 
the idea, would have to be a thing determined beforehand (d'avance), which 
it is not. Therefore, this relation is merely another manifestation of the 
values viewed globally (dans leur ensemble), of the way they contrast with 
one another (leur opposition). This is true of linguistic facts of all types. 
"A few examples: 
1) If ideas were predetermined in the human mind prior to being 
values in language (langue), terms in different languages would correspond 
exactly. Where French has eher ['dear'], German has lieb and teuer (also 
in the ethical sense). There is no exact correspondence. Similarly with 
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French juger and es timer as compared with German urteilen, erachten 
['judge']: the German verbs have a set of meanings which coincide only in 
part with those of French juger, estimer. We see that prior to languages 
(Ungues) there is no such thing as the notion "cb 
the diagram 
er" per se. Thus while 
has its uses, it is only a way of expressing the fact that there exists a value 
eher." circumscribed in the French system vis-ä-vis other terms. It is a 
combination of a certain quantity of concepts and a certain quantity of 
sounds : 
The diagram 
is, therefore, not basic in lan-
guage (langue). The contours of the idea are what give us the distribution 
of ideas among the words of a language. Once we have these contours the 
diagram can be used (entrer en jeu). 
"This example is from vocabulary, but the same is true of values of 
whatever kind. 
2) Take, for example, the idea of different tenses, which is foreign 
to some languages. In the Semitic languages—in Hebrew, for instance— 
there are no distinctions of this kind, not even a difference between present, 
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past, and future. That means that these tense ideas are not predetermined 
but exist solely as values in particular languages. Early Germanic had no 
special future form; it expressed the future by means of the present. But 
this is only a manner of speaking. In fact, the value "present" in early 
Germanic was not the same as it is in French. "Present" is, therefore, a 
value, not a predetermined idea. 
3) Likewise, in the Slavic languages, we find a pervasive distinction 
between the perfective aspect of the verb (action viewed apart from the 
notion of duration) and the imperfective action (action in the process of 
completion). This distinction makes these languages difficult for us to 
learn because we do not understand the aspectual categories. They are, 
therefore, not predetermined ideas, but values resulting from the opposition 
of terms in language (langue).... 
"In a later chapter we may, if time permits, express in a different way 
the ideas we have included in the term value, by laying down the following 
principle: in language (langue), in a language state (etat de langue) 
nothing exists but differences. A difference evokes in the mind the idea of 
the positive terms between which it holds. In language (langue) there are 
differences, nothing but differences, but without positive terms. This is a 
paradoxical fact. At any rate there are differences only so long as one has 
either the signifieds or the signifiers in mind. When one gets to the terms 
themselves which result from the relations between signified and signifier, 
one can then talk of oppositions. . . . 
"This finally brings one back to the fundamental principle of the arbi-
trariness of the sign. If the sign were not arbitrary, one would not be 
able to say that in language (langue) there are only differences. But the 
fact is that it is because of the differences between signs that they can be 
given a function, a value." 4 1 
This extract is of great interest in that it contains an attempt to justify 
the belief that there is a one-to-one relation between distinguishable ideas 
and distinctive signs. This takes the form of an ingenious Gedan\en-
experiment. Imagine yourself trying to think of an idea but having no 
words to express it. Obviously, says Saussure, you would be at a loss. Until 
an idea is clothed in language it has no clear outlines. Therefore, there are 
no concepts prior to language. Q.E.D. 
How convincing is this argument? There is at any rate this much that 
can be said in its favor. Language is an inestimable help in conceptualiza-
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tion. Even to be told, for instance, what an unfamiliar flower is called 
gives us a feeling of satisfaction. But the question of what our ideas would 
be like if language did not exist is as unrealistic as the question of whether 
things existed prior to the words we use to refer to them. A number such 
as thirty-five owes its manner of expression to the decimal system of num-
bering which we have used for millennia, but the number itself exists inde-
pendently of that system—it could equally well be expressed in some 
other number system. The speakers of languages which have no tenses do 
not in fact lack the concepts of time and temporal succession. In general, 
a concept can be referred to even if there is no single unanalyzable word 
appropriate to it, and whenever a special term is needed for such a concept 
one will be created. 
This is not to deny, of course, that the clarity with which we distinguish 
ideas is often influenced by the character of the terms we use to refer to 
them. But if the stranglehold of language were too tight we should have 
no means to overcome its restrictions. That we are aware of the power of 
language is surely a significant fact. Whether we are misled by language 
in ways which are in principle beyond our control is perhaps not an 
answerable question. We may concede that Aristotle was more confident 
of the universality of concepts than is warranted, but the opposite position— 
that concepts are a direct function of language—is equally unacceptable. 
Another facet of Saussure's theory which needs to be carefully scruti-
nized is the heavy emphasis placed on the notion of arbitrariness. When 
the philosophers said that the linguistic sign is arbitrary, they usually meant 
two things: first, that there is no natural relation between words and their 
referents; and second, that the particular set of sounds composing a word 
was chosen at will. While the first of these notions is valid (except, of 
course, for the few imitative words which all languages contain), the second 
is unacceptable to us nowadays. Speakers are not free to dispose of their 
language as they wish. The social character of language imposes a powerful 
constraint on the members of a linguistic community. The idea that the 
speakers of each language once established a contract regulating the sounds 
/ and meanings of every word is difficult to conceive. It would seem reason-
I able, therefore, to ^sjrict the term arbitrary to the notion "noii-natural." 
This Saussure does, of course, but since he has ruled out any mentior> 
of referents and regards concepts as a function of language, he arrives at 
a more radical kind of arbitrariness than his predecessors. The big difficulty 
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he encounters is, in a sense, of his own making: he cannot refer to that 
all-important relation between sound (signifier) and meaning (signified), 
since he has concluded that they have no independent reality. Strictly 
speaking, then, he could discuss the sign relation only by stepping outside 
his own system and viewing the two relata (the signifier and the signified) 
in positive terms. That is to say, he needed a pre-theoretical terminology 
to talk about the sign relation, but was averse to creating one for fear he 
would seem to contradict his own theory. 
Arrived at this point we are now in a position to examine the way in 
which Saussure set forth the basic properties of the linguistic sign in a 
lecture specially devoted to that topic given on May 2, 1911. This discussion 
is of special interest to us in that he begins by referring again to the tradi-
tional position of which he disapproved. 
"People have often made the mistake of imagining that all there is in 
language is a nomenclature {tree, fire, horse, sna\e). This is a childish 
procedure (une methode enfantine). If we adopt it for a minute, we shall 
have no difficulty in seeing what the linguistic sign does and does not 
consist in. One imagines oneself confronted with a series of objects and 
a series of names. [Drawing of a tree with the word arbos to the right of 
it, and beneath it a drawing of a horse with the word equus to its right.] 
There is an object outside the speaker (sujet) and the name, the other 
term, either vocal or mental, it is not clear which. (The word tree can be 
understood either way.) The connection (lien) between the two is unclear. 
"Now let us adopt a different conception, the rational one. We again 
have two terms, but now they are inside the speaker, they are both psycho-
logical (psychiques), concentrated in the same place by association. 
Arbos is the more material term, and tree the more psychological. Any 
attempt to link the terms differently from this we reject as a false trail in 
our search for the two terms which comprise the sign. 
"A very simple way to realize the psychological character of our auditory 
images is to observe our internal speech. Without moving our lips or 
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tongue we can, for instance, give a speech or recite a piece of poetry we 
have learned by heart, and we hear it internally. This is how we conceive 
of the linguistic sign; it is inside the speaker in the form of an auditory 
image. This is the material part of the sign. 
"We can talk legitimately of the sound of the syllables, but only as 
syllables, i.e., as the sound of the internal auditory image. It is advisable 
that we should avoid certain terms; for example, phoneme, since this term 
implies the notion of vocal action, of speech (parole). Vocal image is 
another term which must be used with extreme caution. 
"A general question which we admit we are unable to settle is whether 
to use the term sign to refer to the totality, i.e., the combination of concept 
and image, or only to the auditory image, the more material portion. In 
any event, if we call arbos a sign, we shall do so only to the extent that 
it conveys a concept. This is an unresolved terminological question. We 
really need two different words. We shall try to avoid misunderstandings, 
which could be serious. 
"First principle or primary truth: The linguistic sign is arbitrary. The 
bond which links a given auditory image to a certain concept (un concept 
determine) and bestows on it the value of a sign is a radically arbitrary 
bond (un lien radicalement arbitraire). 
"Nobody denies this truth, and it is not a difficult one to understand. 
However, it is important to enunciate it (constater) and place it in its 
proper position in the hierarchy of truths. This particular truth, which 
seems perfectly self-evident, is at the very top of the hierarchy. We cannot 
at first see all the hidden consequences that follow from this axiom. It 
will take us a great while to track them all down to the last detail. 
"The sign is arbitrary, that is to say that the concept 'sister' [soeur], for 
example, is not connected by means of any internal relation to the sequence 
of sounds s + ö + r which constitute the corresponding auditory image. 
This concept could equally well be represented by any other sequence of 
sounds whatever. All one needs to do is to recall different languages. If 
one goes from one language to another, one sees that the concept ox is also 
represented by the sequence of sounds bos [in Latin]. 
"Written signs have the same arbitrary character. Obviously, no pre-
existent connection forces us to choose the series of strokes which make 
up P to designate the sound p in preference to 1~1 or O • When semiology 
has been organized, it will have to decide whether it will concern itself 
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with arbitrary signs only, or also with other kinds. In any event, it will 
deal typically with arbitrary systems, of which language is the prime 
example. 
"One should have serious misgivings about using the term linguistic 
symbol. A symbol is never completely arbitrary or empty. There is the 
merest suspicion there of a connection between the idea and what serves 
as a sign for it. For example, the symbol of justice is a pair of scales, but 
it could not be replaced by a carriage without doing violence to it. 
"From the same point of view, one might perhaps object to the term 
auditory image, for an image always has some connection with what it 
represents. It must be understood that we conceive of image in the more 
general sense of a figure capable of evoking something. Later we shall 
observe this image becoming more precisely evocative, and it is by virtue 
of this fact, which is not primary, that we shall retain this expression. 
"Let us return to the word arbitrary. The sign is not arbitrary in the 
sense of depending on the free choice of the individual. It is arbitrary in 
relation to the concept inasmuch as it contains nothing which links it 
specially to that concept. A whole society could not change a sign once 
it had been established since the heritage of the past exerts a force upon it 
by virtue of the facts of [linguistic] development (evolution). 
"But now, is there really no objection to this principle [of arbitrariness] ? 
There is the vague issue of onomatopoetic words, i.e., words which are 
capable by their sounds of evoking (rappeler) the very concepts which 
they are supposed to represent. One might say that here there is indeed 
an inherent connection and that the choice is not arbitrary. 
"But, first of all, people in general greatly exaggerate the number of 
onomatopoetic words. It is sometimes said, for example, that Latin pluit 
['it is raining'] represents the sound of rain, but if one goes back in time 
a little (earlier forms are plovit or plevit), one sees that this is not the case. 
"But it is nonetheless clear that we have indeed some onomatopoetic 
words: tic\-toc\, glug-glug. But they are so completely lost in the mass 
that they are treated just like ordinary words. This is shown by the fact 
that we often take a word to be onomatopoetic which in reality is no such 
thing. 
"The extent of that part of the vocabulary is very limited. The same 
is true of exclamations. One might be tempted to claim that there is some-
thing there which is dictated by nature, and that in those words there is a 
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connection between the sound and the concept. But in the case of most 
exclamations this can be shown not to be the case. Thus, to compare one 
language with another, [French] die [an exclamation of acute pain] does 
not exist in German and English. Some exclamations have developed from 
oaths which we know to have had quite precise meanings originally. We 
shall, therefore, put onomatopoetic words and exclamations aside since 
they are of secondary importance and their status is questionable."42 
Here Saussure first draws a terminological distinction between "symbols" 
and other kinds of signs. In his system, a symbol is a non-arbitrary sign, 
i.e., a sign for which some connection exists between the idea conveyed 
and what serves as a vehicle for the idea. (Needless to say, this is not 
the way in which the word symbol is normally used.) Thus, for Saussure 
the balance is a suitable symbol of justice because it opposes equal weights, 
the task of the judge being to bring opposing interests into equilibrium. 
"True" signs, on the other hand, are arbitrary, i.e., there is no connection 
between the idea and what serves as a vehicle for it. The letters comprising 
any alphabetic writing system are signs in this sense, since there is no 
inherent connection between their shapes and the sounds which they 
designate. According to Saussure, linguistic signs also fall into this cate-
gory because they are arbitrary. But whether the future science of semiology, 
when constituted, will deal with both arbitrary and non-arbitrary types, 
both symbols and "true" signs, Saussure is not sure. 
Approaching the linguistic sign, he attributes two facets to it: a concept 
and an auditory image. He regards both facets as psychological in nature 
and excludes from consideration the referent, the articulatory movements 
responsible for producing the sound, and the sound itself qua sound. It 
is strange, however, that although he emphasizes that the concept and the 
auditory image are both psychological phenomena, he nevertheless refers 
to the auditory image as the more material part of the sign. We also see 
him in a terminological quandary with regard to the combination of con-
cept and auditory image. It is clear that he would prefer to call that total 
combination a sign, but he is aware that in ordinary parlance the word 
"sign" refers to the physical aspect only. Ideally, he says, two different 
terms should be created. 
He also feels uncomfortable with the word arbitrary, in that it connotes 
an element of conscious choice. But it is clearly not within the power of 
speakers to change their language at will. Arbitrariness must, therefore, 
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be understood to mean no more than that there is no necessary link be-
tween the concept and the auditory image. The only restriction Saussure 
will concede to the principle of arbitrariness is minor, namely the existence 
of a small number of onomatopoetic words and exclamations in all lan-
guages. But even in these marginal cases, the link between concept and 
auditory image is often not very close, and the status of many supposedly 
onomatopoetic words is open to question, according to Saussure. 
Comparing Saussure's system with the theories we examined earlier, 
we are struck by the following peculiarities. First and foremost, Saussure 
is alone in excluding all consideration of reference from the sign situation. 
The Stoics, we recall, banished reference from the domain of language 
proper, but they did not deny its ultimate relevance: without the concept 
of tynchanon, they would have been unable to explain why sentences may 
be either true or false. Saussure might argue, of course, that as a linguist 
he is not interested in the truth conditions of sentences and therefore does 
not need to account for them; but the role of reference is, after all, perva-
sive. For instance, all languages include a set of conventions to enable 
speakers to specify unambiguously the referents of the nominal expressions 
they use. If I utter the sentence The cat has not been fed yet, my use of 
the article the indicates that a definite cat is being referred to, and also 
that my interlocutor knows what cat I am referring to. Thus, reference 
is built into the basic grammatical texture of language. 
Saussure's censorious attitude to the philosophers on this issue seems 
also" inappropriate, for the notion that meaning is conceptual in nature 
puts his theory in the semiotic mainstream deriving ultimately from the 
key passage in Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias which we examined at the 
beginning of this paper. In this regard, therefore, Saussure can hardly be 
categorized as an innovator. Here, too, as elsewhere, he stated a position 
but failed to discuss carefully the arguments pro and contra. In general, 
he was ill-informed of the history of the questions he discussed: even in 
his manuscript notes, he theorized in a historical vacuum, often attacking 
positions which had never in fact been seriously maintained. 
Finally, one must conclude that the theory itself is not only deficient 
in according no place to important elements of the sign situation, but it 
also contains notions which are difficult if not impossible to conceptualize. 
Consider the way in which Saussure attempts to combine the notions of 
contrast and arbitrariness. We begin with the unarguable notion that the 
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relation between signifier and signified is arbitrary, i.e., non-natural. We 
are then told that the signifier and signified are in turn arbitrary in that 
the signifier is carved out of the raw material of perceptible sound in an 
arbitrary fashion and the signified is an arbitrary segment of conceptual 
material. Not content with that, Saussure will impute no positive features 
to either signifier or signified. Their mode of existence is purely negative— 
all that one can say about them is that they contrast with other signifiers 
and signifieds. But, as a former student of Saussure's trenchantly put it, 
"contrast pure and simple necessarily leads to chaos and cannot serve as 
the foundation of a system"** One might also add that chaos is impossible 
for human beings to conceive. 
Hence, while parts of Saussure's theory contain insights into the nature 
of language, the theory as a whole must be rejected. Semiotics will need 
to be based on firmer and broader foundations. Above all, nothing but 
good will accrue from a closer acquaintance with the rich semiotic tradition 
of the past two and a half millennia. This is an area in which the history 
of ideas may be in a position to perform especially valuable services. In 
that case, Saussure will have taught us a salutary lesson: that it may some-
times pay to be familiar with one's intellectual predecessors. 
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Peirce and Semiotics: 
An Introduction to Peirce's Theory of Signs 
Arthur Skidmore 
Semiotics may be characterized as the systematic study of signs or 
signification in general. I shall argue below that there probably cannot be 
a successful study, not to say a systematic science, of this kind. Yet there 
is a widespread supposition that a science of signs exists. And there is a 
great deal of writing which is based upon this supposition, as many papers 
in this volume testify. 
Two names are most frequently mentioned in discussions of the modern 
foundations of semiotics: Ferdinand de Saussure and Charles Peirce. I 
shall say nothing further about Saussure, but I shall attempt in this paper 
to give an account of some of Peirce's most characteristic doctrines concern-
ing signs and also to show in what respects Peirce's theory of signs is most 
obviously inadequate. I shall in passing take note of certain of Peirce's 
views which may shed some light on the feasibility of the semiotic enter-
prise. 
There is today within Western philosophy, those systematic investigations 
begun in ancient Greece of the most general questions concerning the world 
and human consciousness, a split so profound that typical members of the 
opposing standpoints find each other's work to be literally unintelligible. 
One side consists in the others' eyes of obscurantists wallowing in a fan-
tastic pseudo-scientific jargon (of which 'hermeneutic' is perhaps the best 
single example), while the others appear as strangely misguided mathema-
ticians who are satisfied with playing a symbolic logic game instead of 
engaging in the pursuit of vital questions. 
Both broad movements have roughly the same heritage, from the Pre-
socratics up to about the beginning of the nineteenth century. By about the be-
ginning of the twentieth century the divergent lines of inquiry have become 
rather clear. One path, through the great triad Hegel-Nietzsche-Husserl, 
what I shall call the continental movement, culminates in the work of 
contemporary phenomenologists and existentialists, typically writing in Ger-
man or French, and of whom Heidegger is the most prominent example. 
The other movement, which I shall call the analytic movement, virtually 
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rejects the nineteenth century (except possibly for John Stuart Mill) and 
bases itself on the great empiricist tradition of British eighteenth century 
philosophy and on the revolutionary developments in logic at the end of the 
nineteenth century beginning with the publication of Frege's Begriffssckrift 
in 1879. (This grand simplification omits Marxism altogether or con-
strues it as a wing of continental philosophy.) 
It may be said that philosophy has often wavered between being allied 
with art (especially literature and poetry) on the one hand and with science 
(especially mathematics and natural science) on the other. If this dichotomy 
has ever made sense, it would seem to apply with unparalleled force today. 
Nothing more dramatically expresses the tone or leading ideas of analytic 
philosophy than its close affinity for science, including the modern science 
of linguistics. And it appears that leading continental philosophers have a 
deep and significant regard for poetry and imaginative literature. 
The practitioners of analytic philosophy have for the most part achieved 
anonymity outside their field of research scientists. Can anyone besides 
a student of academic philosophy name or even recognize the names of 
as many as six important analytic philosophers? Quine, Dummett, Kripke, 
Putnam, Goodman, and Davidson are not exactly names to conjure with, 
even among the highly literate, and yet their bearers are six of the most 
renowned and distinguished philosophers in the analytic tradition. Their 
writings resemble scientific papers much more than they do literature, and 
it is hopeless to try to understand any of these thinkers without first develop-
ing a solid background in mathematical logic. 
Analytic philosophy seems, however, to share with the continental move-
ment an enormous preoccupation with language. It is hardly an exaggera-
tion to specify the question of meaning, understood as the question of the 
meaning of natural language, as the central question of analytic philosophy. 
There is accordingly a tantalizing possibility that the movements might 
converge around a genuine breakthrough in a general theory of signs. It 
is quite absurd to suppose that analytic philosophers would not be interested 
in a science of semiotics. The failure of analytic philosophers,to embrace 
the work of the semioticians is based upon something far deeper than a mere 
lack of interest. 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) was fundamentally oriented toward 
science. His only graduate degree was in chemistry. He was for a time 
a professional astronomer who made original contributions on the subject 
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of photometry. He worked as a physicist for the U . S . Coast and Geodetic 
Survey for many years. His father, Benjamin Peirce, was one of the leading 
American mathematicians of his time, and Charles Peirce was himself a 
gifted mathematician. 
Peirce had the intellectual credentials to have become the leading figure 
of the analytic movement in philosophy. He independently arrived at the 
fundamental mathematical basis of modern logic, modern quantification 
theory, in about 1883. The co-discoverer of quantification theory, Gottlob 
Frege, achieved his basic result in 1879, as noted above. 
Peirce is probably best known for his theory of meaning which came 
to be known as pragmatism. William James, Peirce's best and at times 
practically his only friend, is closely associated with something called prag-
matism for which he courteously indicated his indebtedness to Peirce. Peirce 
rather insultingly (but apparently quite characteristically) renamed his own 
doctrine pragmaticism so that it might not be confused with what he 
(rightly) thought to be a trivialization of his own ideas. 
It is very hard to avoid trivializing or at least simplifying Peirce's ideas. 
Very roughly, what Peirce meant by pragmatism is the view that the mean-
ing, or cognitive significance, of a proposition consists in a subjunctive 
conditional of the form "If A were to be done, then B would be experi-
enced." That is to say, even more roughly, that the meaning of a proposition 
consists in its testable consequences. An immediate consequence of this prin-
ciple is that if a proposition has no testable consequences then it has no 
cognitive significance. 
This idea is profoundly important, and it is quite characteristic of that 
branch of the analytic movement known as logical positivism. As is well 
known, the positivists asserted that entire domains of inquiry, most notably 
theology, ethics, and speculative metaphysics, did not admit of any testable 
consequences and were accordingly devoid of cognitive significance. 
There are few if any unregenerate positivists among analytic philosophers 
today. But the attitude toward unfounded speculation entailed by adher-
ence to the pragmatic theory of meaning is still prevalent and deep-seated. 
(This may explain at least in part why so much continental theorizing is 
viewed with such deep suspicion in analytic circles. The classic victim of 
pragmatism is Freudian or depth psychology, which is still viewed by many 
as devoid of cognitive significance, since it appears to have no testable 
consequences. One can easily find similar suspicions directed toward the 
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work and theories of the German triad Hegel-Nietzsche-Husserl and espe-
cially toward Heidegger.) 
The leading American analytic philosopher, Willard Van Orman Quine 
of Harvard, has provided the deepest and most important criticisms of 
Peirce's pragmatism. Quine points out (correctly, in my opinion) that 
strictly speaking the principle is inapplicable to single propositions (a point 
of which I think Peirce was eventually aware). That is, no single proposi-
tion has testable consequences all by itself, but only in conjunction with 
other propositions. The upshot of this is that only sets of propositions, and 
sometimes even whole theories, have cognitive significance. Given this 
revision, the spirit of pragmatism is maintained in its applications to whole 
theories such as Freudian psychology, General Systems Theory, and so on. 
Outside of his contributions to pragmatism, fundamentally in the form 
of two articles in the Popular Science Monthly, Peirce's work remained 
almost totally unknown, for reasons which are worth mentioning here. 
Peirce did not have a very high opinion of the leading American universi-
ties of his time. He thought of Harvard, for example, as an "eleemosynary 
institution" for the young and idle rich. But he was intrigued by the idea 
behind the founding of the Johns Hopkins University (in 1876), which he 
thought constituted something very much like an ideal community of 
inquirers, and he joined the faculty in 1879 as lecturer in philosophy. To 
his (and our) very great misfortune, he was dismissed from this position 
in 1884, and he never held another university position. The precise causes 
of his firing remain obscure, although they may come to light in Max 
Fisch's forthcoming intellectual biography of Peirce. (Peirce apparently 
had, intellectually and practically, an almost total disrespect for authority, 
and he was dealing at Hopkins with some monumental egos.) 
Although at the very height of his intellectual powers (recall that he 
had just invented modern logic, no less), he quickly and irreversibly lost 
touch with the philosophical community. Peirce was at that moment per-
haps the greatest philosopher in the world, but he retired into a rural 
obscurity. His work became progressively more speculative and progres-
sively more obscure. And this is just what one might expect, since he had 
no colleagues and no students to respond to his ideas. 
Peirce never published a book on philosophy. He supported himself in 
part by writing reviews and dictionary entries, and these are filled with 
wonderful ideas, but they are uncritically and unsystematically developed. 
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His unpublished manuscripts o£ this period give ample evidence of his 
continued titanic intellectual powers, but they are highly fragmentary and 
profoundly elusive. Much of his writings on signs belongs to this period. 
After his death, his manuscripts became the property of the philosophy 
department of Harvard University. In the 1930s two young academics at 
Harvard, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, who have since become two 
of the most distinguished philosophers in America, published six volumes 
of these manuscripts, and it has only been since then that the astonishing 
breadth and profundity of Peirce's philosophical achievements became 
widely known. Yet it was too late for the rapidly developing analytic 
movement to graft itself onto Peirce's foundation, and his works remain of 
interest primarily to Peirce scholars. As I shall attempt to show below, this 
is true of his writings on signs; they have become entirely superseded by 
contemporary developments in mathematical linguistics. 
There are periodic flurries of interest in Peirce's writings, and one appears 
to be going on now. But the systematic development of his ideas which he 
so ardently hoped for has not taken place. This is largely because those 
most likely to continue his work find that he failed to understand the 
significance of the set-theoretical paradoxes and other technical logical 
matters. As a result, his work cannot be built directly upon by a contempo-
rary analytic philosopher, but it would have to be reconstructed according to 
the prevailing paradigm. Anyone with a mind capable of both penetrating 
Peirce's thought and performing the necessary reconstructions would prob-
ably serve philosophy better by striking off on his own. This is, I think, the 
ultimate tragedy of Peirce's fate. 
Peirce himself thought that his most important contribution to philoso-
phy was his theory of categories. I want now to sketch a few features of this 
theory which are of special relevance to his theory of signs. For I do* not 
think that Peirce's writings on signs can be understood at all without some 
understanding of his theory of categories. 
Peirce's categories are a system of three general concepts, which he calls 
pirstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. These concepts in his opinion ex-
haustively describe or cover any field of experience or thought whatever. 
Peirce thought that his system of concepts would turn out to be as impor-
tant as Aristotle's well-known distinctions between potency and act and 
between form and matter, and indeed that it would supersede them. He 
thought that dichotomous distinctions were a sign of immature thinking, 
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and that thought and reality lent themselves best to his triadic analytical 
knife. What is more, he thought that he could prove the validity of his 
categories to be both universal and necessary. His argument runs somewhat 
as follows. 
Peirce supposed that all propositions could be fully analyzed or in-
terpreted in such a way as to reveal an ultimate logical structure. Further, 
every proposition contains one or more indexical parts, roughly names and 
definite descriptions. A logical predicate may be defined as that which 
remains when the indexical parts are removed from a fully analyzed propo-
sition. It might seem that fully analyzed propositions could contain any 
number of names and hence that there could be logical predicates contain-
ing any number of blank places. For example, suppose that the following 
propositions are fully analyzed: 
A is red. 
A is next to B. 
A represents B to C. 
A wants B to buy C from D. 
Then the corresponding logical predicates would be: 
is red. 
is next to 
represents to 
wants to buy from 
Now Peirce argues that the above sequence of logical predicates ends 
with the third entry. He does this by an argument wherein he purports to 
show that all polyadic (containing three or more blanks) logical predicates 
can be reduced to complexes of triadic ones (containing exactly three 
blanks), and further that triadic logical predicates cannot in this way be 
reduced to complexes of dyadic and monadic ones, nor dyadic logical 
predicates to complexes of monadic ones. There are thus exactly three 
irreducibly distinct classes of logical predicates. 
Peirce usually states his theory of categories in terms of relations. A 
relation is simply the object of a predicate, and hence the argument carries 
over directly to them: there are exactly three kinds of relations—monadic, 
dyadic, and triadic ones. Firstness is the concept of a monadic relation in 
general, Secondness is the concept of a dyadic relation in general, and 
Thirdness is the concept of a triadic relation in general. 
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It is extraordinarily difficult to understand the content of Peirce's cate-
gories. To understand what is meant by Firstness, we would have to under-
stand what it is that is common to all monadic predicates in general. 
Obviously, this cannot be anything very concrete, but something like a 
formal character. Peirce sometimes says that this abstract content is a 
quality of feeling. The content of Firstness is not an actual feeling, which 
would introduce the idea of passivity (Secondness) and consciousness 
(Thirdness), but a qualitative possibility of a feeling. 
Similarly, the content of Secondness would have to be that which all 
genuinely dyadic logical predicates have in common. Peirce thought that 
actual brute existence consisted sheerly in standing in dyadic relations to 
other things. So the content of Secondness is something like brute fac-
tuality. 
Finally, the content of Thirdness is generality or universality. Examples 
of irreducibly triadic predicates all seemed to him to go beyond mere 
qualitative possibility and actual existence and to introduce an element of 
the really general or universal. 
This may all seem terribly obscure, but the obscurity only arises when 
we try to arrive at intuitive content for Peirce's categories, which is after 
all only of secondary importance. What is important is that the concepts 
of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness as classes of logical predicates have 
been defined, in as clear and coherent a way as the most fundamental 
notions of any philosopher. 
Since all of our thought is through logical predicates, everything think-
able and everything which can become an object of our experience falls 
under one of the three categories. Thus, in what might be called a meta-
physical application of the theory of categories, everything must be thought 
of as a Firstness, a Secondness, or a Thirdness. For in order to be even 
a thinkable object, the object must be thinkable by means of a logical 
predicate. But there are exactly three kinds of these, and so the object must 
be one of exactly three sorts. Using the notion of the content of the 
categories, we may informally conclude that everything thinkable must be 
either a qualitative possibility, an actual existent, or a real general. 
This metaphysical application of the theory of categories is mind-bog-
gling stuff. For Peirce, if he is right, has succeeded in giving a rich, 
insightful, and highly non-trivial answer to the fundamental question of 
metaphysics in a relatively rigorous fashion. 
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An important epistemological application of the theory of categories 
stems from focusing upon the irreducibility of the categories. This bears 
directly on the possibilities of philosophical analysis. Again supposing that 
Peirce is right, it will not in general be possible to understand the world 
using only monadic and dyadic concepts. Peirce accuses most of his prede-
cessors of having attempted to do exactly this. The term he uses for such 
philosophies is nominalism, Peirce is adamant in his insistence upon taking 
the category of Thirdness, and hence real universality, as philosophically 
ultimate and irreducible. This is perhaps the chief novelty of Peirce's theory 
and the source of its continuing importance for philosophy. If Peirce is 
right, we are as philosophers ineluctably committed to the irreducible reality 
of universals. 
The paradigm of a genuine triadic relation for Peirce is the sign relation. 
The sign relation could also be called the representation relation, since it is 
expressed by: 
represents to 
We shall have a great deal more to say about the sign relation before long, 
but I should like now to remark on what has just been called the epistemo-
logical application of Peirce's theory of categories to the sign relation. Since 
the sign relation is irreducibly triadic, it is thoroughly an affair of Thirdness, 
and no account of signs, significance, language, or meaning can possibly 
succeed, if Peirce is right, which does not involve the reality of universals. 
Since naming or labeling is for Peirce a characteristically dyadic rela-
tion, language cannot be understood as a system of names. The referential 
or naming function of a word is but a degenerate Thirdness—it can be 
understood in terms of the triadic sign relation, but not vice versa. 
Even more important is Peirce's implicit attack on all ideational theories 
of meaning, as I shall call them. By an ideational theory of meaning I 
mean any theory which would attempt to account for the meaning of a 
sign in terms of an image or idea or mental picture in someone's mind. 
Suppose we say that person A has a mental picture and expresses this idea 
by means of a verbal sign which in turn causes to appear a similar idea 
in person B. If Peirce is right, this kind of account cannot possibly suffice, 
since it would attempt to explain the meaning of a sign in terms of two 
dyadic relations, between A's idea and the sign, and between the sign 
and B's idea. 
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From a slightly different perspective, we may make the same point by 
introducing another characteristic idea of Peirce's, that all thought is in 
signs. Even if we admit the function and relevance of A's and B's ideas 
in the above example, these ideas are themselves signs, and their meaning 
or significance needs in turn to be explained by any adequate theory of 
signs. 
It is time now to take a look at some of Peirce's concrete doctrines 
concerning signs. I shall begin with an examination of a frequently cited 
definition by Peirce of the sign relation: 
A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a 
genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable 
of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same 
triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same 
Object. The triadic relation is genuine, that is its three members 
are bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any com-
plexus of dyadic relations. {Collected Papers, 2.274) 
Most of this should, I hope, make some sense. The one terminological 
difficulty is that the terms 'First,' 'Second,' and 'Third' here do not in my 
opinion have anything especially to do with Firstness, Secondness, and 
Thirdness. The First in the sign relation is I think merely the first term. 
It may very well be a general or universal, as Peirce explicitly asserts, and 
consequently may be an example of Thirdness. This definition is well 
worth mulling over for a while before proceeding. 
One should be impressed by the extraordinary abstractness and general-
ity of Peirce's conception of the sign or representation relation. Peirce is 
almost saying that representation is any genuine triadic relation. What 
distinguishes the sign relation from just any triadic relation is that it is 
generative, in the sense noted. I suppose an example of a genuine triadic 
relation which is not generative is the giving relation, wherein A gives 
B to C. In this case, C need not in turn give the same thing to someone 
else C . But in the case of the representation or sign relation, when A 
represents B to C, it is always also true that C represents B to C in turn. 
As we see, Peirce takes this formal property of the representation relation 
to be the defining characteristic of signs or representation. 
A sign, for Peirce, is almost, but not quite, whatever is the first term 
of an instance of the representation relation. Peirce's strict usage is to call 
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a representamen that which represents something to something. A sign, 
strictly, is any representamen which represents something to a mental 
something. Consider the following instructive passage, where Peirce dis-
tinguishes signs from representamens and characterizes the representation 
relation according to the formal feature of the above definition: 
Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs. Thus, 
if a sunflower, in turning toward the sun, becomes by that very act 
fully capable, without further condition, of reproducing a sunflower 
which turns in precisely corresponding ways toward the sun, and of 
doing so with the same reproductive power, the sunflower would be-
come a Representamen of the sun. But thought is the chief, if not 
the only, mode of representation. (Ibid-) 
In somewhat more detail, consider any instance of the sign relation: 
A represents B to C. The first term, A, is called the representamen or sign, 
as we have seen. The second term, B, is called the object. And the third 
term, C, is called the interpretant. According to the definition of the sign 
relation, C itself becomes a sign of the same object for a new interpretant C. 
The definition does not specify anything at all concerning the nature 
of A, B, and C. However, C is typically something mental, and in these 
cases C is called by Peirce a mental interpretant. 
Thus for Peirce a sign is anything which stands in such a relation to 
its object that it is capable of determining a mental sign to stand for 
the same object in the same way. Accordingly, this mental sign is in turn 
capable of determining another sign, perhaps another mental sign in the 
same mind, perhaps an auditory verbal sign, perhaps a written sentence, 
perhaps a more elaborate sign. And any of these signs must in turn be 
capable of determining further interpretants. 
We may feel frustrated here not to find any essential reference being 
made to human purposes and intentions. All the virtue, so to speak, seems 
to be on the side of the sign and not on the side of the human sign inter-
preter or sign user. It is most characteristic of Peirce not to make reference 
to human purpose when talking of signs. He seems at times to hold almost 
mystical doctrines to the effect that when we think we become an instance 
of the sign thought, that the signs in which we think have more reality 
than we do, and that the essence of man is literally to be a sign. 
Yet one might fairly point out that it may well be precisely a matter 
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of intention which makes a triadic relation genuine. For consider the case 
of the giving relation, A gives B to C. Peirce takes pains to point out that 
this relation does not consist merely in the transference of B from A to C. 
What it involves in addition is a community and a set of conventions. Simi-
larly, human speech is not just an affair of uttering noises, but in addition 
there are intentions that the noises shall be interpreted in certain conven-
tional ways. 
What are we to make of Peirce's definition of the sign relation ? Peirce 
evidently does not think that his definition is obvious, but that we may 
become aware of its truth when we draw inferences from his fundamental 
conception. It does not seem possible to find counterexamples to his defini-
tion of the sign relation simply by finding examples of signs which do not 
satisfy Peirce's definition. 
The chief difficulty in following, much less evaluating, what Peirce 
has to say about signs stems from the obscurity of the term interpretant. 
To the best of my knowledge, the most coherent passage in which Peirce 
uses the term 'interpretant' i^the following: 
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody 
for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, 
that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or 
perhaps a more developed sign. The sign which it creates I call the 
interpretant of the first sign. (2.228) 
I gather that we may infer from this that the typical linguistic sign, 
say a sentence printed in a book, has the capacity to generate an equivalent 
sign in the mind of a reader of the book. This mental sign now has the 
capacity to be spoken aloud by the reader, and this sign in turn can generate 
a sequence of interpretant signs in the hearers, etc. 
The real difficulty at this stage seems to be that of imagining what it 
would be like for something not to be a sign. What is there in the world 
that cannot or does not stand in the representation relation? We might 
suppose that something which is not interpreted as a sign is not a sign. 
But this pretty clearly won't do. A sentence in a book which is never read 
is still obviously a sign, no doubt because it is capable of being interpreted 
as a sign. But if we allow a sign to have a merely possible interpretant, 
then what is there in the world which is incapable of being interpreted 
as a sign ? 
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When we consider Peirce's concept of iconic signs below, we shall 
discover that anything can be an .iconic sign of anything it resembles. But 
then anything which is not absolutely sui generis can serve as an iconic sign. 
Peirce is nevertheless prepared to accept this consequence of his defini-
tion: anything can be a sign. So our search for counterexamples cannot be 
expected to succeed. 
Peirce's theory of signs proceeds by drawing a number of trichotomies 
which divide signs into classes. These trichotomies are more or less direct 
applications of Peirce's theory of categories discussed above. In the most 
common or basic formulation of his theory of signs, Peirce draws three such 
trichotomies: 
Signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first, according as the 
sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general 
law; secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its object 
consists in the sign's having some character in itself, or in some 
existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an interpretant; 
thirdly, according as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of possi-
bility or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason. (2.243) 
According to the first division, a Sign may be termed a Qualisign, 
a Sinsign, or a Legisign. (2.244) 
According to the second trichotomy, a Sign may be termed an 
Icon, an Index, or a Symbol. (2.247) 
According to the third trichotomy, a Sign may be termed a 
Rheme, a Dicisign or Dicent Sign (that is, a proposition or quasi-
proposition), or an Argument. (2.250) 
The first trichotomy of signs is drawn according to the nature of the 
sign. This is clearly just the metaphysical application of the theory of cate-
gories applied to the first term in a representation relation. That is, every-
thing that is is either a qualitative possibility, an actual existent, or a general 
or universal. Accordingly, every sign is either a qualisign (a qualitative 
possibility which is a sign), a sinsign (an actual existent which is a sign), 
or a legisign (a general which is a sign). It is worth pointing out that all 
linguistic signs fall into the third category. That is, words and sentences 
are construed by Peirce to be real generals. In this, Peirce is pretty clearly 
correct, and it is important to note this feature of linguistic signs. A test 
for something's being a general is whether it is repeatable as opposed to 
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being a unique individual. It is fairly obvious that words of a human 
language are repeatable, that the very same word can be spoken or written 
many times. 
The second trichotomy of signs is drawn according to the nature of 
the relation between the sign and its object. This trichotomy is probably 
the most widely discussed and referred to portion of Peirce's writings on 
signs. Again applying Peirce's theory of categories, we have found that 
there are just three possible sorts of relations. A sign may be related to its 
object, Peirce says, merely in a degenerate sense in which it resembles 
its object. Thus a diagram can represent something merely by virtue of 
its having certain properties which its object also has. Similarly, a sample 
represents the other things which resemble it. A sign which thus merely 
resembles its object is called an icon. 
Secondly, a sign may stand in a real physical relation to its object. Signs 
which are connected thus to their objects are called indices by Peirce. 
Examples of indices are such things as weathervanes, shouts, and pointing 
fingers. 
Finally, the relation between a sign and its object may be a conventional 
one. That is, a sign may represent something just because there is a con-
vention that it do so. Such signs are called symbols. Linguistic signs are 
all symbols, since they represent their objects through linguistic conventions. 
I shall make only a few remarks concerning the third of Peirce's trichot-
omies before returning to the second, since this trichotomy is drawn accord-
ing to the nature of the interpretant, which makes it terribly difficult to 
understand. Further, it has not been nearly as influential as the first two 
trichotomies. 
The third trichotomy, of rheme, dicisign (proposition), and argument, 
is of utmost interest for a logician, since it deals with precisely the sorts 
of signs with which the logician is most concerned. This should come as 
no surprise, since Peirce is in the end uninterested in signs which have 
nothing to do with human cognition. To be sure, he intends his theory 
of signs to be completely universal and to apply anywhere where we 
might find significance or representation of any kind. But he is funda-
mentally most interested in propositions and arguments. 
What is most intriguing about the third trichotomy is that it purports 
to deduce the existence of rhemes, propositions, and arguments directly 
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from an application of his theory of categories to his definition of the sign 
relation. This is indeed something rather haunting and extraordinary. 
It is fairly clear that Peirce's theory of signs has begun to go haywire 
even at the level of the first and second trichotomies. Notice, for example, 
that the second trichotomy does not operate separately within each of the 
three classes produced by the first trichotomy. Specifically, as we have seen, 
linguistic signs are all conventional, and consequently they are all symbols. 
No linguistic sign can be an icon or an index, strictly speaking. Yet Peirce 
definitely wants this second trichotomy to apply to linguistic signs, and he 
frequently employs the expressions 'iconic' and 'indexical' to refer to various 
sorts of linguistic signs. 
Peirce is himself aware of this difficulty, and when he is being especially 
careful he will speak of 'hypoicons' and 'subindices.' 
A possibility alone is an Icon purely by virtue of its quality; and 
its object can only be a Firstness. But a sign may be iconic, that is, 
may represent its object mainly by its similarity, no matter what its 
mode of being. If a substantive be wanted, an iconic representamen 
may be termed a hypoicon. Any material image, as a painting, is 
largely conventional in its mode of representation; but in itself, 
without legend or label it may be called a hypoicon. (2.276) 
Subindices or Hyposemes are signs which are rendered such prin-
cipally by an actual connection with their objects. Thus a proper 
name, personal demonstrative, or relative pronoun of the letter at-
tached to a diagram, denoted what it does owing to a real connection 
with its object, but none of these is an Index, since it is not an indi-
vidual. (2.284) 
Most of the time, however, Peirce is not careful about this matter and 
speaks freely of linguistic signs as icons or indices, which is strictly speak-
ing a contradiction in terms. The ambiguity concealed in the terms 'iconic' 
and 'indexical' has bedeviled both Peirce and his many commentators. 
Peirce would have liked to have proved that every proposition must 
have an indexical part, that is, a part which is an index. But a proposition 
is a conventional sign, thoroughly of the nature of Thirdness. All of its 
parts are also Thirdnesses. So a proposition cannot contain a part which 
is an index. But how then can we guarantee that propositions link up 
with the world? 
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It would be so neat, logically speaking, if only Peirce could prove that 
propositions referred by necessity to an object (a Secondness) in the actual 
world of existent objects. But he quite simply cannot prove this. 
I certainly do not want to leave the impression that I think Peirce made 
silly mistakes or obvious blunders. I do think that once having so decisively 
arrived at his conception of Thirdness, it has so to speak taken hold of his 
thought or perhaps, to speak with my own metaphor, it has imprisoned 
him within a semiotic idealism from which there is no escape. Thought 
becomes irreducibly a matter of Thirdness alone, and the factually existent 
or sheerly possible become at best degenerate Thirdness. 
Peirce tries to reinstitute the contingently factual or brute existent and 
the qualitatively possible into his universe of real generals. But there isn't 
really any way I can see of doing this. That symbols can refer to things 
which are not also symbols remains something fundamentally unintelligible. 
If Thirdness really is irreducible to Secondness, and symbols and thought 
are essentially matters of Thirdness, then we cannot in fact rationally break 
out of the circle of language. 
Consider Peirce's dilemma in the following: 
Words alone cannot do this [provide one with an index—A.S.]. The 
demonstrative pronouns, "this" and "that," are indices. (2.287) 
Here Peirce almost desperately tries to find a way of breaking out of the 
circle of Thirdness by virtually contradicting himself in two successive 
sentences. Words alone cannot provide one with an index, and yet we 
are told that the word 'this' is an index. (He does not actually contradict 
himself, since he is thinking of a physical connection between 'this' and 
its object brought about in the context of utterance.) 
Peirce's very definition of the sign relation may I think be seen to apply, 
properly speaking, only to conventional signs or symbols. This stems 
from Peirce's requirement that the sign relation be a genuine triadic rela-
tion. A Firstness or a Secondness cannot really stand in a genuine triadic 
relation and consequently cannot really be a sign. Thus there aren't really 
any qualisigns or sinsigns, and thus the first trichotomy completely col-
lapses: only legisigns are signs at all. 
For similar reasons, there are no icons or indices either. That is, suppose 
that A represents B to C, and suppose further that the relation between 
A and B is merely one of similarity. Well if A is similar to B, then A is 
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similar to B regardless of whether A is interpreted as standing for B. If 
the relation were genuine, this could not be so. In a precisely similar way, 
if A is causally connected to B, then the relation between A and B is what 
it is regardless of whether A is interpreted as representing B. Hence in 
both cases the relation between A, B, and C is not a genuine or irreducibly 
triadic relation. The relation is genuine only when A is a sign of B only 
because of its relation to C. 
The objection I am here raising to Peirce's theory of signs is somewhat 
formal in nature. That is, it deals with some highly abstract definitions. 
Peirce's theory of signs can be criticized from an even more abstract level 
by criticizing his theory of categories, but I shall not pursue this topic here. 
The formal nature of the criticisms I have leveled against Peirce leaves 
open at least one avenue of response. Peirce may agree that Firstnesses and 
Secondnesses cannot strictly speaking be signs, but at the same time respond 
to my criticism by pointing out that we cannot even be conscious of some-
thing which is a pure or absolute Firstness or Secondness. If we restrict 
ourselves to the field of consciousness, we find that everything there is a 
matter of Thirdness. For example, a diagram may be a conventional sign, 
and hence a Thirdness, but its mode of signification takes advantage of 
its qualitative features. Similarly, a demonstrative pronoun is a symbol 
which enables us to understand its object through a dyadic relation to 
what is referred to. 
Although Peirce's theory can be 'saved' through considerations such 
as the above, the cost is very high. For if we turn Peirce's theory into an 
empirical, observational theory, we lose its quasi-necessary character. Re-
member that the startling value of Peirce's approach was that it enabled 
us to deduce the existence of the various classes of signs. From our revised 
standpoint it becomes a competitor to linguistic theory. There is nothing 
to recommend Peirce's speculative empirical theory over the work of con-
temporary mathematical linguists, who have found in the concept of phrase 
structure a far more useful tool than Peirce's trichotomies. Nor do I think 
that Peirce would hesitate a moment to adopt the methods of contempo-
rary linguistics in preference to his own. 
Peirce's theory of signs fails. I would like now to speculate a bit on 
the reasons for Peirce's failure. I think that the real explanation of Peirce's 
dilemma is the problem faced by anyone who might attempt to devise a 
general theory of signs. If the concept of the sign relation is to be rich 
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and complex enough to cover human language, it is going to leave out, 
or be inapplicable to, non-linguistic signs such as bee dances or wax 
impressions. On the other hand, if one's concept of sign is to be broad 
enough to extend to anything that might be called significant or a sign, 
it will lack the subtlety and complexity required to explain anything about 
human language. 
This fundamental dilemma is I think amply borne out by the failure 
of semioticians to provide us with a general account of signs which has any 
plausibility at all when applied to human language. One enduring value 
of reflecting on Peirce's writings, especially his writings on signs, is that 
it may help us to understand why this is so. The semiotician who theorizes 
from animal communication or simple dyadic models will not provide us 
with a theory of language. And the linguist will find his work on language 
not to apply to animal communication. 
Peirce's theory of signs may be of value in casting serious doubt upon 
the feasibility of the semiotic enterprise, at least in the present state of 
knowledge. But the moral should not be to give up inquiry into language 
and into non-linguistic signification, but to pursue these perhaps essentially 
different inquiries independently, without requiring that either be shackled 
within the confines of a non-existent general theory of signs. This is to 
say that the linguist need not be particularly concerned with the findings 
of the communication theorist or the semiotician. His aim ought to be 
to discover the nature of human language and to follow this inquiry 
wherever it may lead using whatever resources are necessary. Similarly, 
the student of literature need not concern himself with communication 
theory and semiotics, but rather with scientific linguistics. 
Suggestions for Further Reading 
All references to Peirce are to the standard edition of Peirce's philo-
sophical works, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 8 v., 1931-35, 1958). The editors have 
in my opinion done an outstanding job of selecting Peirce's manuscripts, 
many previously unpublished, and arranging them according to subject 
matter, for which they have received a great deal of undeserved criticism. 
Peirce's reflections on signs are scattered throughout every volume, but are 
especially concentrated in the second volume. References to Peirce are 
made according to volume and numbered paragraph. 
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Justus Buchler's edition of selected essays by Peirce, Philosophical 
Writings of Peirce (New York: Dover, 1955), is a very handy source which 
covers the full range of Peirce's ideas. It probably contains all of Peirce's 
thought with which any student of philosophy should be familiar. 
The best single comprehensive study of Peirce's philosophical develop-
ment is Murray Murphey's Development of Peirce's Philosophy (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961). Murphey's treatment of 
Peirce can be criticized in detail, but Murphey thoroughly understands 
the main lines of Peirce's thought, and Murphey's central thesis, that 
many of Peirce's views changed throughout his career though his termi-
nology might remain the same, is correct and important. Murphey does 
not try to simplify things, and his book is at times very heavy going. 
A very useful summary of Murphey's book is his entry in Paul Edwards' 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy under the heading Peirce. 
Recently two editions of Peirce manuscripts not contained in the Col-
lected Papers have appeared, one an edition of Peirce's mathematical papers 
by Carolyn Eisele, and the other Charles Hardwick's edition of the corre-
spondence between Peirce and Lady Victoria Welby, Semiotic and Signifies 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977). The latter contains a 
highly elaborate and late version of Peirce's reflections on signs. 
An interesting and influential work of Peirce scholarship on his theory 
of signs is Douglas Greenlee's Peirces Concept of Sign (The Hague: Mou-
ton, 1973). 
Charles S. Peirce and the Semiotics 
of Literature 
John K. Sheriff 
Ferdinand de Saussure, who provided the terms and concepts that have 
been most useful in "structuralist" linguistics, anthropology, and poetics, 
said that language is a system of signs, the most important among many 
such systems, and predicted that a science of signs (Semiology) would 
emerge which "would show what constitutes signs, what laws govern 
them." 1 Among Saussure's followers the analysis of sign systems has 
flourished but the definition of "what constitutes signs" has not gotten 
significantly beyond that provided by Saussure. The use of Saussure's basic 
concepts of langue and parole, of relations and oppositions, of signifier 
and signified for studying networks of sign relations in literature has 
become a major influence shaping literary theory and criticism. But as 
Jonathan Culler says in the preface to his Structuralist Poetics, "The type 
of literary study which structuralism helps one to envisage would not be 
primarily interpretive . . . . Rather than a criticism which discovers or 
assigns meanings, it would be a poetics which strives to define the condi-
tions of meaning."2 The semiotics of literature, then, tries "to analyze the 
system of conventions which enable literary works to have the meanings 
they do for members of a given culture. It asks what are the conventions 
that enable works to have meaning for readers."3 If, as Culler says, "the 
semiotician is one who, by profession, scrutinizes meanings already known 
to members of his culture in the hopes of discovering the conventions 
which they have mastered and have no need to know," 4 it is appropriate 
to ask why semiotics of literature is thus limited. The answer, it seems to 
me, lies with the linguistic model, particularly the inadequate definition 
of a sign. 
This essay is an attempt to show that the theory of signs developed 
by Saussure's American contemporary Charles Sanders Peirce provides a 
frame of reference which will allow semioticians to see beyond the limita-
tions of Saussure's analysis of the sign and will clarify many of the issues 
that have been problematic in the semiotics of literature. Most publica-
tions in semiotics contain an obligatory paragraph on Peirce, but few or 
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none seriously consider the implications of his theory of signs for the 
semiotics of literature. 
Peirce, near the end of his life, wrote in a letter to Lady Welby: "Now 
a definition does not reveal the Object of a Sign, its Denotation, but only 
analyzes its Signification, and that is a question not of the sign's relation 
to its Object but of its relation to its Interpretant."5 If Peirce had tried to 
put his finger on the weakness of Saussure's definition of a sign he could 
not have done it better than with this statement. In light of Saussure's 
refusal to treat signs-in-the-mind it is understandable that structuralists 
have been unable to generate and evaluate interpretations of texts. No 
wonder their criticism reads as though the conventional sign systems are the 
main actors and the characters are merely nexuses of intersecting sign 
systems. Moreover, the mindset that divides the sign into arbitrary signi-
fies and signifieds leads to a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's linguistic 
turn, a concept that has numerous implications for semiotics of literature, 
particularly in relation to reader response theory. 
In order to pursue these issues, it is first necessary to provide a review 
of Peirce's theory of signs. In doing so, I have emphasized the aspects of 
Peirce's theory that remained fundamentally unchanged during his life-
time and are most important to the present discussion, that is, his definition 
of a sign in relation tOohis categories. Peirce defines a sign as follows: 
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to some-
body for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses some-
body, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, 
or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call 
the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, 
its object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference 
to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the 
representamen. (2.228) 6 
An understanding of the italicized terms is essential. Probably the most 
ambiguous term is "ground." Peirce says that "every representamen" is 
"connected with three things, the ground, the object, and the interpretant" 
(2.229). Moreover, he says that the branch of semiotics dealing with 
"ground" is "pure grammar," which has the task "to ascertain what must 
be true of the representamen used by every scientific intelligence in order 
that they may embody any meaning" (2.229). 
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Peirce's immediate concern in the context in which we find the above 
definition is to inquire into the character o£ signs themselves. But in a 
later essay entitled "Meaning" (1910) Peirce enlarges upon the idea o£ 
"ground." He says, "If a Sign is other than its Object, there must exist, 
either in thought or in expression, some explanation or argument or other 
context, showing how—upon what system or for what reason the Sign 
represents the Object or set of Objects that it does" (2.230). The "ground" 
it turns out is nothing more nor less than the context or language-game 
within which the sign relates to its interpretant. "The peculiarity of it [a 
sign], therefore, lies in its mode of meaning; and to say this is to say that 
its peculiarity lies in its relation to its interpretant" (2.252). 
Other of Peirce's definitions of a sign describe not only the triadic relation 
within which a sign must be embodied in order to signify but also the gen-
eration of signs and the modes of being signs represent. In Baldwin's Dic-
tionary of Philosophy and Psychology (1902) Peirce defined a sign as "Any-
thing which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an 
object to which itself refers (its object) in the same way, the interpretant be-
coming in turn a sign, and so on ad infinitum" (2.303). And in his unpub-
lished "Syllabus," written about the same time as the above, Peirce states: 
A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a 
genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be 
capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume 
the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the 
same Object. The triadic relation is genuine, that is its three mem-
bers are bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any 
complexus of dyadic relations . . . . The Third . . . must have a second 
triadic relation in which the Reresentamen, or rather the relation 
thereof to its Object, shall be its own (the Third's) Object, and must 
be capable of determining a Third to this relation. All this must 
equally be true of the Third's Third and so on endlessly" (2.274). 
The triadic relation described in the first definition of a sign quoted 
above may be visualized thus: 
Sign Object 
Interpretant 
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In the last statement quoted above, Peirce inserts First, Second, and Third 
(which he undoubtedly meant to refer to his categories of Firstness, Sec-
ondness, and Thirdness, which I will define later) in a way that may be 
visualized thus: 
Peirce does not mean that Firstness is synonymous with sign and Second-
ness is synonymous with object. It is easy to become confused at this point 
because interpretants are, in fact, always Thirdness. But Peirce is defining 
here the simplest possible sign (which we learn later is a Qualisign). 
Peirce goes on to say in the last two definitions quoted above that the 
interpretant must be able to cause a second triadic connection in which 
the relation-of-the-sign-to-its-object in the first triad becomes the object of 
the interpretant (which assumes the position of a sign in the new triad). 
Again it may be helpful to visualize the process. I will abbreviate Firstness 
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The relation-of-the-sign-to-its-object in the first triad becomes the object 
of the interpretant, which assumes the position of a sign in a new triad. 
"And so on endlessly." 
"[A]nd this, and more, is involved in the familiar idea of a Sign; and as the 
term Representamen is here used, nothing more is implied" (2.274). 
When we picture this generative nature of signs, we see the increasing 
complexity of the Object: "A sign may have more than one Object. Thus, 
the sentence 'Cain killed Abel/ which is a Sign, refers at least as much 
to Abel as to Cain, even if it be not regarded as it should, as having 'a 
killing' as a third Object. But the set of Objects may be regarded as 
making up one complex Object" (2.230). Furthermore, we can understand 
why Peirce's definition of object is so encompassing: 
The Objects—for a Sign may have any number of them—may 
each be a single known existing thing or thing believed formerly 
to have existed or expected to exist, or a collection of such things, 
or a known quality or relation or fact, which single Object may be 
a collection, or whole of parts, or it may have some other mode of 
being, such as some act permitted whose being does not prevent 
its negation from being equally permitted, or something of a gen-
eral nature desired, required, or invariably found under certain 
general circumstances" (2.232). 
Peirce's theory of signs is merely an elaboration of his definition of a sign, 
and his trichotomies and classes of signs make no sense and have no 
validity unless viewed in the light of this definition of a sign. Peirce's 
method is to reason "from the definition of a Sign what sort of thing 
ought to be noticeable and then searching for its appearance."7 
Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, as the above discussion of signs 
implies, are central to Peirce's classification of signs. In fact, the three cate-
gories are the basis on which Peirce attempts "to outline a theory so com-
prehensive that, for a long time to come, the entire work of human reason, 
in philosophy of every school and kind, in mathematics, in psychology, in 
physical science, in history, in sociology, and in whatever other department 
there may be, shall appear as the filling up of its details" (1.1). Hence 
definitions and examples of these three categories abound in Peirce's papers, 
in at least as many different contexts as there are disciplines in the above 
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quotation. For example, when Peirce is writing a refutation of nominalism 
he states: "My view is that ther.e are three modes of being. I hold that 
we can directly observe them in elements of whatever is at any time 
before the mind in any way. They are the being of positive qualitative 
possibility [Firstness], the being of actual fact [Secondness], and the being 
of law that will govern facts in the future" [Thirdness] (1.23). 
Firstness is the mode of being which consists in something being what 
it is without reference to anything else, the thing in itself without relation 
to others. The qualities of phenomena have such being. "The mode of 
being a redness, before anything in the universe was yet red, was never-
theless a positive qualitative possibility. And redness in itself, even if it 
be embodied, is something positive and sui generis. That I call Firstness" 
(1.25). Firstness is very difficult to talk about, "is so tender that you cannot 
touch it without spoiling it" (1.358), because when we talk about Firstness 
we turn a sign into an interpretant and thereby lose what we are seeking 
to grasp. The Qualisign, we shall see, is nothing but Firstness. 
Secondness is the ' being of actual fact. "The actuality of the event 
seems to lie in its relations to the universe of existents . . . . Actuality is 
something brute. There is no reason in it. I instance putting your shoulder 
against a door and trying to force it open against an unseen, silent and 
unknown resistance. We have a two-sided consciousness of effort and 
resistance, which seems to me to come tolerably near to a pure sense of 
actuality . . . . I call that Secondness" (1.24). 
Thirdness, as a category of being, consists in that tendency of things 
to come together in such a way as to be predictable, "to conform to a gen-
eral rule" (1.26). 
Perhaps the most helpful treatment of the categories for a study of 
signs is Peirce's treatment of these categories in consciousness: "It seems, 
then, that the true categories of consciousness are: first, feeling, the con-
sciousness which can be included with an instant of time, passive con-
sciousness of quality, without recognition or analysis; second, consciousness 
of an interruption into the field of consciousness, sense of resistance, of an 
external fact, or another something; third, synthetic consciousness, binding 
time together, sense of learning, thought" (1.377). 
Feelings, then, comprise immediate consciousness. Immediate feelings 
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can only be contemplated In memory which "is an articulated complex 
and worked-over product which differs infinitely and immeasurably from 
feeling" (1.379). The experience of Firstness is "an instance of that kind 
of consciousness which involves no analysis, comparison or any other 
process whatsoever, nor consists in whole or in part of any act by which 
one stretch of consciousness is distinguished from another, which has its 
own positive quality which consists in nothing else, and which is of itself 
all that it is, however it may have been brought about" (1.306). 
Just as immediate feeling is the consciousness of Firstness, a sense of 
polarity or reaction is the consciousness of Secondness. Again, Peirce's 
examples clarify his general, often vague, statements: 
Besides Feelings, we have Sensations of reaction; as when a person 
blindfold suddenly runs against a post, when we make a muscular 
effort, or when any feeling gives way to a new feeling . . . . 
Wherever we have two feelings and pay attention to a relation be-
tween them of whatever kind, there is the sensation of which I am 
speaking (6.19). 
While I am seated calmly in the dark, the lights are suddenly turned 
on, and at that instant I am conscious, not of a process of change, 
but yet of something more than can be contained in an instant. 
I have a sense . . . of there being two sides to that instant. A 
consciousness of polarity would be a tolerably good phrase to describe 
what occurs (1.380). 
The consciousness of a process of change negated in the above quotation 
is the consciousness of Thirdness: 
This is a kind of consciousness which cannot be immediate, because 
it covers a time, and that not merely because it continues through 
every instant of that time, but because it cannot be contracted into 
an instant. It differs from immediate consciousness, as a melody 
does from one prolonged note. Neither can the consciousness of the 
two sides of an instant, of a sudden occurrence, in its individual 
reality, possibly embrace the consciousness of a process. This is the 
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consciousness that binds life together. It is the consciousness of 
synthesis (1.381). 
In consciousness, feelings are Firstness; reaction-sensations or disturbances 
of feelings are Secondness, and general conceptions are Thirdness. 
Having briefly defined Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, we are 
ready to ask how these categories relate to Peirce's three trichotomies. Are 
these categories ontological or phenomenological ? First let's review the 
three trichotomies. 
According to Peirce's analysis of his own definition, a sign is one of 
three kinds (Qualisign, Sinsign, or Legisign); it relates to its object in one 
of three ways (as Icon, Index, or Symbol); and it has an Interpretant that 
represents the sign as a sign of possibility, fact, or reason, i.e., as Rheme, 
Dicent Sign, or Argument. 
The answers to the questions raised can be shown easier than explained. 
I present the following in full awareness of the commonly held notion that 
Peirce is not clear about whether his categories are ontological or phenom-
Phenomenological Ontological or material categories 
or formal 
categories Firstness Secondness Thirdness 


































as a sign of: 
"possibility" 
R H E M E 
"fact" 
D I C E N T 
SIGN 
"reason" 
A R G U M E N T 
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enological. I do not find Peirce to be inconsistent on this matter. He 
shows that signs signify because of their intrinsic qualities and their rela-
tions. The material aspects are predominant in a Qualisign; the relational 
or formal aspects in a Symbol or Argument. A Saussurian linguist who 
focuses only on linguistic signs obviously sees only the relational-differ-
ential character of the sign. 
Peirce holds that the material aspects of Firstness, Secondness, and 
Thirdness are empirically observable. The material aspect of Firstness, as we 
have mentioned already, Peirce calls quality, the immediate nonconceptual 
given of sense experience. The material aspect of Secondness Peirce calls 
"Thisness," the immediate, nonconceptual experience of the dynamic inter-
action of two things. Depending on one's definition of ontological, the 
concept of a material aspect of ontological Thirdness may cause some 
confusion. What Peirce has in mind is the experience of thought or ration-
ality. Ontological Thirdness has much less the character of the immediate 
given than have the other two categories, but the material aspect of Third-
ness is analogous to that of langue as described by Saussure. 
Formally, or phenomenologically, Peirce holds that "signs may be di-
vided as to their own material nature, as to their relation to their objects, 
and as to their relations to their interpretants."8 Peirce holds that all thought 
is reducible to some combination of these three and that this triadic relation 
is irreducible. He was later to increase the number of formal categories, 
but never revised the concept of a triadic relation of sign-object-interpretant. 
"A Qualisign," according to Peirce, "is a quality which is a sign. It 
cannot actually act as a sign (be represented) until it is embodied (in a 
triad of sign-object-interpretant); but the embodiment has nothing to do 
with its character as a sign" (2.244, the parenthetical material is mine). In 
the beginning was a sign, and that sign was with a quality, and that sign 
was a quality. All signification came into being through it and without it 
was no sign made that was made. The only way a Qualisign can be repre-
sented is thus: 
Qualisign Quality 
Rheme 
60 Semiotic Themes 
Otherwise, the Qualisign becomes part of the object of another triadic 
relation, such as: 
Now it should be clear why pure Firstness and Secondness, Qualisigns and 
Sinsigns respectively, are difficult to talk about. They cannot be linguistic 
signs. No sign can be a word (written or spoken) until it has become a 
triad of Thirdnesses. A Firstness must undergo three transformations or 
generations before it can be represented by a word. By now I think the 
abbreviations for sign, object, and interpretant and for Firstness, Secondness, 
and Thirdness will be clear. 
Sinsign Relation of Qualisign to its object 
Rheme 
(interpretant) 
S 'positive qualitative possibility' 
S O 
a sign in the mind (feelings) of Firstness, 
a Qualisign 
I 
( T ) 
S (S-O) 
a sign in the mind of a sign in the mind, 
a Sinsign 
( T ) 
S. S-(S-O) 
a sign or symbol (possibly a word) in the 
mind for a sign in the mind of a sign in the 
mind, a Legisign 
( T ) 
Sheriff: Charles S. Peirce 61 
If one understands the above he already understands Sinsigns and Legi-
signs. A Sinsign is a sign that is a fact. Or in Peirce's words, it "is an 
actual existent thing or event which is a sign" (2.245). The syllable sin, 
Peirce tells us, is taken as meaning "being only once." It can be only once 
in the sense that it is always and only the second transformation, that is: 
Every Legisign is a sign that represents the relation of a sign in the 
mind to a sign in the mind. Just as the objects of Sinsigns are embodied 
Qualisigns, the objects of Legisigns are embodied Sinsigns. And just" as 
Qualisign is a sign that is a quality and Sinsign "is an actual existent 
thing or event which is a sign," a Legisign is "a law that is a Sign." "This 
law is usually established by men. Every conventional sign is a Legisign 
. . . . It is not a single object, but a general type which, it has been 
agreed, shall be significant" (2.246). Since it is a general law and not a 
quality or actual existent object, "Every legisign signifies through an in-
stance of its application, which may be termed a Replica of it." "Thus the 
word 'the' will usually occur from fifteen to twenty-five times on a page. 
It is in these occurrences one and the same word, the same legisign. Each 
single instance of it is a Replica" (2.246). But the Replica would not be 
significant "if it were not for the law which renders it so" (2.246). 
A quick reference to Peirce's definitions of Icon, Index, and Symbol 
would reveal that only a Legisign can be a symbol, i.e., "a sign which 
would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no interpre-
tant" (2.304). A Sinsign may be Index or Icon. As Index it is "a sign 
which would, at once, lose the character which makes it a sign if its object 
were removed, but would not lose that character if there were no inter-
pretant" (2.304). As Icon it is "a sign which would possess the character 
which renders it significant, even though its object had no existence" 
(2.304). Of course a Qualisign can be only an Icon. When Peirce is describ-
ing his ten classes of signs he frequently uses the adjectival form for the 
signs in his second trichotomy (e.g., Iconic) because Icon, Index, and 
Symbol are concepts (signs) that describe the relation of a sign to its 
object. 
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Interestingly, Peirce's definition of a sign is consistent with the linguistics 
of Wittgenstein. In contrast, Saussure's definition of the sign as dyadic 
and his failure to bring the activity of mind into his treatment of signs 
has been an obstacle to the use of Wittgenstein's linguistic turn in literary 
criticism and poetics. The implication one gets from Saussure's linguistics 
is that language is something arbitrarily added to pre-existing objects. 
This concept has led frequently to a misunderstanding of the linguistic 
turn as merely a reversal of this process—beginning with language rather 
than being. It is not as though we experience language and the world as 
independent entities; we come to the world through language, or more 
precisely, through language-games—"modes of activity which involve in-
tentional actions, in accord with rules and norms, directed toward pur-
poseful ends."9 This is the same argument Peirce makes for his definition 
of a sign as a triadic relation of sign-object-interpretant. Wittgenstein 
and Peirce both insist that we have no choice but to unite linguistic signs, 
objects, and mental activity (interpretants) in one notion and treat them 
as dependent rather than independent entities. 
It seems to me that the linguistic turn is very much at the center of 
Derrida's Of Grammatology and that he could have communicated several 
of his ideas more simply using Peirce's definition of a sign. Though 
Derrida gives only a cursory treatment of Peirce in Of Grammatology, he 
does make a few comments that leave one wondering why he did not 
use Peirce more extensively. In qualifying Saussure's concept of the arbitrary 
nature of linguistic signs Derrida says, "In his project of semiotics Peirce 
seems to have been more attentive than Saussure to the irreducibility of 
the becoming-unmotivated" of the sign as symbol, or linguistic sign. 1 0 
In this regard he quotes Peirce approvingly: 
Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other 
signs, particularly from icons, or from mixed signs partaking of the 
nature of icons and symbols. We think only in signs. These mental 
signs are of mixed nature; the symbol parts of them are called 
concepts. If a man makes a new symbol, it is by thought involving 
concepts. So it is only out of symbols that a new symbol can grow 
(2.302). 
He concludes that Peirce has already done much that his own work 
sets out to do. Derrida says of his own work, "To make enigmatic what 
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one thinks he understands by the words 'proximity/ 'immediacy/ 'presence' 
. . . is my final intention in this book. This deconstruction of presence 
accomplishes itself through the deconstruction of consciousness and there-
fore through the irreducible notion of the trace (Spur)"11 Therefore it is 
quite significant that he says "Peirce goes very far in the direction that I 
have called the de-construction of the transcendental signified" [i.e., pres-
ence]. 1 2 Derrida recognizes that Peirce's definition of a sign has within 
it the destruction of the metaphysics of presence. Derrida's commentary 
on Peirce's Principle of Phenomenology is that it, unlike Husserl's un-
acceptable phenomenology, is not a theory of things but a theory of signs. 
[Manifestation itself does not reveal a presence, it makes a sign 
. . . . The so-called "thing itself" is always already a representamen 
shielded from the simplicity of intuitive evidence. The representamen 
functions only by giving rise to an interpretant that itself becomes 
a sign and so on to infinity. The self-identity of the signified conceals 
itself unceasingly and is always on the move. The property of the 
representamen is to be itself and another, to be produced as a structure 
of reference, to be separated from itself . . . . 
From the moment that there is meaning there are nothing but 
signs. We thin\ only in signs.13 
It is within the context of his definition of "trace" that Derrida interjects 
this commentary on Peirce. The concept of the "trace" remains somewhat 
enigmatic in Of Grammatology because Derrida uses Saussure's concept 
of a sign to describe what he sees to be a characteristic of signs that cannot 
be accounted for using Saussure's definition of the sign. One wonders 
again why Derrida does not use Peirce's theory of signs to get beyond 
Saussure, particularly when he admits that in specific ways Peirce is 
superior. Consider, for example, some of Derrida's definitions of "trace": 
The trace is in fact the absolute origin of sense in general. Which 
amounts to saying once again that there is no absolute origin of 
sense in general. 
That the signified is originarily and essentially . . . trace, that it is 
always already in the position of signified is the apparently innocent 
proposition within which the metaphysics of the logos, of presence 
and consciousness, must reflect upon writing as its death and its 
resource.14 
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Peirce, it seems to me, makes it much clearer than Derrida in what sense 
all linguistic signs derive their meaning from "trace" or signs which are 
always already prior to consciousness. In Peircian terms, the relation of 
Firstness and Secondness to Thirdness (language and thought) is that they 
are always already a Thirdness. Moreover, a Thirdness in thought is 
always already another Thirdness. This is Derrida's major point. Linguistic 
signs are "always already in the position of the signified." Peirce would 
have said that signs conceal themselves in triadic relations of significance 
from which they cannot be separated. In that sense they are already objects 
as well as signs, or signifieds as well as signifiers. 
I do not mean to imply that there is nothing (or that there is some-
thing), in Derrida's Of Grammatology that is not already implied in 
Peirce's theory of signs, or that Derrida's concept of "trace" is nothing more 
than I have mentioned herein. However, if we are going to take Derrida 
seriously, that is in itself good reason to take Peirce seriously. Derrida finds 
Saussure's definition of sign inadequate and speaks approvingly of Peirce's, 
though he gives no evidence of careful consideration of Peirce's complete 
theory of signs. Perhaps those who take it upon themselves to elucidate 
Derrida's work will find Peirce helpful. 
What are the implications of Peirce's theory of signs for the semiotics 
of literature? First of all, his classification of signs shows us something 
I II III 
1 2 5 3 6 8 47 9 10 
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about the character of a literary text. This will become clear if we look 
at Peirce's ten classes of signs. The following graph is less complex than 
the one Peirce provides but adequate for the present purpose. Note that 
each line represents one of Peirce's classes of signs and the numbers indi-
cate the order in which Peirce presents them. 
Based upon the fact that Qualisigns and Sinsigns are Firstness and 
Secondness respectively and upon the hypothetical process of sign generation 
noted above, classes one through four cannot be linguistic signs, that is 
they cannot be words or sounds emitted from a person to signify. The 
interpretant of a Qualisign can be no more than a feeling. A Sinsign 
is already a combination of signs in that it is always an object of experience 
(actual existent) which points to another object of experience. Of interest 
here is the fact that at a more basic level of experience than the use of 
linguistic signs, we already have syntax, a combination which signifies by 
the nature of the relationship. 
The last six classes involve Legisigns, but classes five, six, and seven, 
are not necessarily linguistic. (G) I take to be an Iconic Legisign; but I 
cannot imagine a word that is an Iconic Legisign, except maybe one like 
G..d. Even when they are linguistic signs (e.g., the demonstrative pronoun 
"that" is a Rhematic Indexical Legisign), they are general laws, habits, 
conventions that as Icons and Indices picture and point, draw attention 
to objects other than themselves. 
Classes eight, nine, and ten are all symbols; they draw attention to 
themselves, to their formal properties, as much as to their referential sig-
nificance. In early formulations Peirce had called his interpretants Terms, 
Propositions, Arguments. He later changed the first two of these because 
at best they were only appropriate to classes eight, nine, and ten. Moreover, 
the class eight sign, the Rhematic Symbol can be a much more complex 
sign than "Term" implies, because it can embody a virtually unlimited 
number of objects. The difference between classes eight, nine, and ten 
lies principally in the different ways in which they represent their objects. 
"A Rheme is a Sign . . . of qualitative possibility, that is, is understood 
as representing such and such a kind of possible Object" (2.250), "a sign 
which is understood to represent its object in its characters merely; . . . a 
Dicisign is a sign which is understood to represent its object in respect to 
actual existence; and . . . an Argument is a Sign which is understood to 
represent its Object in its character as a Sign" (2.252). The peculiarity of 
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a sign, therefore, "lies in its mode of meaning; and to say this is to say 
that its peculiarity lies in its relation to its interpretant. The proposition 
professes to be really affected by the actual existent or real law to which 
it refers. The argument makes the same pretension, but that is not the 
principal pretension of the argument. The rheme makes no such preten-
sion" (2.252). 
Generally speaking, "-logy" disciplines, such as theology, biology, anthro-
pology, deal with arguments or theories, interpretants which are assured 
or verified by their "Form," their character as signs. The "-ic" disciplines, 
such as logic, ethics, physics, and linguistics, deal with existent relations, 
interpretants assured by "Experience." Saussure's conception of Semiology 
as a "science of signs" and Peirce's conception of Semiotic as synonymous 
with logic may account for the suffixes they employed. Most important 
to our present concern is the fact that all the arts, literary art included, 
are signs of qualitative possibility, interpretants assured by "Instinct" or 
conviction. 
Peirce speaks very little about art as sign, but he makes clear in various 
writings that art always partakes of the mode of being of Firstness as well 
as Secondness or Thirdness. Literary art, being inseparable from language 
of course partakes of Thirdness (i.e., is a symbol), but it creates an inter-
pretant that has the mode of being of Firstness (i.e., is a rheme). For 
example, Peirce says that if we allow his categories to form our conceptions 
of history and life, "we remark three classes of men"—men who create 
art, practical men who carry on the business of the world, men possessed 
with a passion to learn. "The first consists of those for whom the chief 
thing is the qualities of feelings. These men create art" (1.43). The artist 
is enthralled by the possible and the role of the possible. The actual inter-
ests him only to the extent that his artistic imagination can invest it with 
poetical possibilities. He is the archetypal intellectual who contemplates 
actual existence as an aesthetic spectacle, interested in it primarily as a 
possible instance of some universal or law. For these persons "nature is a 
picture" (1.43). 
The second class of men "respect nothing but power, and respect power 
only so far as it [is] exercised" (1.43). These men seek methods to control 
themselves and their environments, usually in order to better fulfill their 
own desires. 
"The third class consists of men to whom nothing seems great but 
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reason" (1.43). Those familiar with Peirce will recognize that these are 
in Peirce's view the "natural scientific men" who inquire "into truth for 
truth's sake, without any sort of axe to grind, nor for the sake of the 
delight of contemplating it, but from an impulse to penetrate into the 
reason of things" (1.44). To the degree that the literary critic has this 
motivation he is in Peirce's view one of the scientists. To the degree he 
has an ulterior motive (to get published, promoted, e tc ) , he, like the 
chemist who studies nothing but dyestuffs because of their commercial 
importance, is a businessman type. 
Peirce says "A Sign may itself have a possible' Mode of Being." 1 5 A 
literary work, then, is a sign of possibility experienced, according to Peirce, 
as rhematic symbol. Even though it may contain many propositions and 
arguments, as for example, a work of fiction frequently does, these must 
be seen in context as part of a sign of possibility. The fact that a class 
eight sign, a rhematic symbol, may be a word or an entire text is important 
to emphasize because of what that implies about the nature of literary art. 
Peirce's definitions of a rheme are meant to be applicable to all classes 
involving rhemes. Consequently he usually uses the simplest examples. 
Peirce says, "A rheme is any sign that is not true nor false, like almost 
any single word except 'yes' and 'no,' which are peculiar to modern lan-
guage." Also he says a rheme can be thought of as "simply a class-name 
or proper-name."1 6 Wittgenstein's comments on naming seems to express 
the same idea. "Naming is . . . not a move in the language-game—any 
more than putting a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess. 
We may say: nothing has so far been done, when a thing has been named. 
It has not even got a name except in the language-game. This is what 
Frege meant too, when he said that a word only has meaning as part of 
a sentence." 1 7 The literary text has the same relation to ontological Second-
ness or Thirdness that a word has to a sentence. By itself it merely stands 
as a sign of possibility. 
Martin Heidegger's treatment of the nature of art in Poetry, Language, 
Thought helps us to see what it means to think of art as a sign of onto-
logical Firstness. He says, "The art work opens up in its own way the 
Being of beings. This opening up, i.e., this deconcealing, i.e., the truth 
of beings, happens in the work." 1 8 Heidegger has several useful analogies 
to explain what happens to "being" in human consciousness. For example, 
he says that in human cognition the world is perceived as earth and sky, 
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divinities and mortals. The thing which is art gathers and unites the 
fourfold. It "stays the fourfold into a happening of the simple onehood 
of world." 1 9 This happening "cannot be explained by anything else nor 
can it be fathomed through anything else . . . . As soon as human cogni-
tion here calls for an explanation, it fails to transcend the world's nature, 
and falls short of it. The human will to explain just does not reach to the 
simpleness of the simple onefold of worlding. The united four are already 
strangled in their essential nature when we think of them only as separate 
realities, which are to be grounded in and explained by one another." 2 0 
This is of course implied in Peirce's assertion that it is impossible to talk 
about Firstness without losing it, without relating it to Secondness and 
making it the object of an interpretant that is a proposition or argument. 
Since a poem (any work of literature) is experienced as a rhematic 
symbol, it is a distortion to equate it with a proposition or argument, 
perhaps an enlightening distortion but a distortion nevertheless. The 
disdain of literary critics for moralistic and subjective interpretations of 
art is valid, but a little like the pot calling the kettle black. The nature 
of an art work as defined by Peirce's theory of signs reveals the limitations 
and pitfalls of the critical process. Many readers are unable to distinguish 
between the rhematic symbols and the arguments that are created in their 
minds by the reading of a text. Anytime one says anything about the 
rheme produced by the sign, he is unconsciously allowing the interpretant 
(rheme) to become a new sign (legisign) which determines a new interpre-
tant (an argument). In other words, he turns a sign of imaginative possi-
bility into a proposition or argument. 
Strictly speaking, the critic has only a memory of experiencing a poem, 
and his comments are inadvertently about his memory of experiencing 
the poem, that is, about his memory of the poem's interpretant. The plight 
of the critic is that the literary work, like any other sign, conceals itself 
from him. It is always already something else, an interpretant, to him. 
On this point, Roman Jakobson, Roland Barthes, Tzvetan Todorov, 
and Gerard Genette with their focus on systems and conventions, make the 
mistake Derrida describes in Of Grammatology. They seem to think that 
they are objectively treating the text itself when they are in fact interpreting 
their own interpretants with codes and language-games which are trans-
formations of the texts. This is not to say that what these writers say 
about certain texts is incorrect. Peirce says that "each Sign must have its 
Sheriff: Charles S. Peirce 69 
own peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter." 2 1 The peculiar 
interpretability of a literary text is responsible for the immediate interpretant 
(the true object of all interpretation and criticism) and is less directly but 
still responsible for the various interpretations or generated interpretants 
(each of which is different from any other). 
There is no single right reading of a literary work not only because a 
literary work is a complex sign but also because, as is true of any sign, 
it is always already an interpretant that itself becomes a sign and so on to 
infinity. The literary text as a sign is not something fixed and permanent 
that will stand still to be looked at. It is always alive, unceasingly generating 
interpretants, always concealing itself in triadic relations of significance 
from which it cannot be flushed. 
In the foregoing discussion we have considered a text as a sign in 
order to clarify the mode of being of a literary work and the mode of being 
of a discussion of that work. But we also need to come to terms with the 
fact that a poem or novel is not experienced as one sign. Although we 
attribute to it the character of being a sign of possibility, we are confronted 
with hundreds or thousands of signs of every linguistic type. Peirce gives 
an example which illustrates how many sign relations are involved in a 
very simple sentence. 
[T]he statement, "Cain killed Abel" cannot be fully understood 
by a person who has no further acquaintance with Cain and Abel 
than that which the proposition itself gives . . . . But further, the 
statement cannot be understood by a person who has no collateral 
acquaintance with killing . . . . Of course, an Icon would be nec-
essary to explain what was the relation of Cain to Abel, in so far as 
this relation was imaginable or imageable. To give the necessary 
acquaintance with any single thing as Index would be required. 
To convey the idea of causing death in general, according to the 
operation of a general law, a general sign would be requisite; that is 
a Symbol. For symbols are founded either upon habits, which are, of 
course general, or upon conventions of agreement, which are equally 
general. 2 2 
Peirce, it should be noted, does not deal explicitly with the question of 
how a literary text determines an interpretant, but his concept of the 
"ground" of a sign and Wittgenstein's concept of "language-game" are help-
ful here. 
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Peirce's "ground" (defined earlier) and Wittgenstein's "language-games" 
are similar if not exactly the same. Language-games as rule-governed 
activities provide the frame of reference for all use of linguistic signs. 
"When language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, and 
with the concepts the meaning of works change." 2 3 The truthfulness or 
accurateness of a statement about a poem or anything else is determined 
by our frame of reference or language-game. What a reader brings to a 
text are language-games, and most criticism is description of language-
games. Northrop Frye's theory of modes, Wayne Booth's rhetoric of 
fiction. Roland Barthes' codes, Tzvetan Todorov's grammar of narrative 
come immediately to mind in this respect. Though many language-games 
have been identified and described, most have been learned practically 
and without any explicit rules. 
Susanne Langer says that we have a constant need to transform all our 
experience into symbolic expression. "What he (man) cannot express, he 
cannot conceive; what he cannot conceive is chaos, and fills him with 
terror." 2 4 Apparently we will say something about the interpretant of the 
text we have experienced. Some ground or language-game will determine 
our ideas of order about the work. The French structuralists are having 
a heyday discovering the rules of many of these games. But to try to find 
the rules that control the creation of new symbols and language-games is 
like trying to fathom the black hole in space. 
In his later years, Peirce further elaborated his theory of signs. He 
distinguished two objects of a sign each of which had ontological Firstness, 
Secondness, and Thirdness. He postulated that each interpretant could be 
one of three kinds and that each of these three kinds could be any of the 
three modes of being. Thus he came up with six trichotomies and twenty-
eight classes of signs. He later suspected that there were four more trichot-
omies and hoped he would find only sixty-six classes though as many as 
59,049 were possible. His further elaborated theory of signs, had he com-
pleted it, would not have given much more specificity to his treatment 
of symbols. 
The character of symbols is to stand in some relation to other symbols. 
The possibilities of such relations are limitless. Despite Peirce's penchant 
for classification, there is no reason to believe he would have disagreed 
with Wittgenstein's demonstration of the unlikelihood of ever finding a 
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few common rules or characteristics that will be applicable to all language-
games. Below is a sample of Wittgenstein's reasoning on this matter: 
Instead of producing something common to all that we call 
language, I am saying that these phenomena [language-games] have 
no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for 
all,—but that they are related to one another in many different ways. 
And it is because of this relationship, of these relationships, that we 
call them all "language." I will try to explain this. 
Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games." I 
mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so 
on. What is common to them all?—Don't say: "There must be some-
thing common, or they would not be called 'games'"—but loo\ and 
see whether there is anything common to all . . . . And we can 
go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; 
can see how similarities crop up and disappear. 
And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network 
of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall simi-
larities, sometimes similarities of detail. 
I can think of no better expression to characterize these similari-
ties than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances be-
tween members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, 
temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. 2 5 
Peirce's definition of sign is consistent with the concepts of language 
inherent in Wittgenstein's language-games or Derrida's (and Wittgen-
stein's) 2 6 de-centering of metaphysical presence. In this regard Peirce 
provided a context that helps clarify the assertions of many modern in-
tellectuals, from Sigmund Freud to Peter Handke, that man is alienated 
from himself, an object of his own consciousness, isolated in a prison-house 
of language. 
On the other hand, the character of the sign as defined by Peirce pro-
vides a critique of the current trend in literary semiotics toward a concen-
trated focus on form. Works such as Culler's Structuralist Poetics and 
Barthes' S/Z, for example, practically ignore the question of meaning. 
The Saussurian influence with its emphasis on conventional sign systems 
seems to me to be largely responsible for this trend. 
Peirce, though no artist or art critic, saw the significance of art to be 
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its quality of Firstness, not its conventions of Thirdness. Wittgenstein, 
who did have a lifelong interest in aesthetics and used parables and fables 
in his own writing, said that there is fundamental difference between the 
use of language in mythology and art and the use of language in rational, 
discursive thought. In the former, language is used indirectly to show; in 
the latter, it is used descriptively to say. The following graph may clarify 
the distinction: 
R H E M A T I C S Y M B O L Interpretant D I C E N T SYMBOL 
I N D I R E C T C O M M U N I C A T I O N Sign DESCRIPTIVE L A N G U A G E 





Language used to "say" 
propositions 
science models 
POSSIBLE V A L U E S Object A C T U A L F A C T S 
assurance: conviction assurance: operational test 
Language (ontological Thirdness) can be used to symbolize ontological 
Firstness (to show) and Secondness (to say). It goes without saying that 
language can symbolize itself, that is, it can be a symbol that represents 
a symbol (i.e., argument, or Third-Thirdness) partaking of but not limited 
by other modes. 
Allen Janik and Stephen Toulmin in Wittgenstein's Vienna interpret 
the Tractatus as "an expression of a certain type of language mysticism 
that assigns a central importance in human life to art, on the ground that 
art alone can express the meaning of life. Only art can express moral truth 
and only the artist can teach the things that matter most in life. Art is a 
mission. To be concerned merely with form, like the aesthetics of the 
1890s, is to pervert art." 2 7 
And Peirce himself wrote, "So the poet in our days—and the true poet 
is the true prophet—personifi.es everything not rhetorically but in his own 
feelings. He tells us that he feels an affinity for nature, and loves the stone 
or the drop of water." 2 8 
Such a view of the artist and his work is rarely put forward by a 
structuralist. Saussure's concepts lead attention away from it. The person 
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who comes to semiotics motivated by an interest in the meaning of 
human experience will find very little published to date that is relevant to 
his interest. But Peirce gives a theoretical basis for such an unscientific 
position as the following: 
All arts create symbols for a level of reality which cannot be 
reached in any other way. A picture and a poem reveal elements 
of reality which cannot be approached scientifically. In the creative 
work of art we encounter reality in a dimension which is closed for 
us without such works . . . . A great play gives us not only a new 
vision of the human scene, but it opens up hidden depths of our own 
being. Thus we are able to receive what the play reveals to us in 
reality. There are within us dimensions of which we cannot become 
aware except through symbols, as melodies and rhythms in music. 2 9 
There is no contradiction between this statement by Tillich and the 
statement that man is alienated from himself and isolated in a prison-house 
of language. In fact, Peirce helps us to see that the statements are comple-
mentary. 
Saussure inspired his followers to meticulously survey the island of 
linguistic signs; Wittgenstein chose rather to survey the boundary of the 
ocean. 3 0 Peirce provides a theory of signs helpful to either endeavour. 
Saussurian linguists looked at literature and found structures; Wittgenstein 
saw in literature a manifestation of that about human experience which 
cannot be put into words. Peirce developed a theory of signs containing 
formal as well as experiential categories, and consequently is a more com-
prehensive model for literary analysis than the one presently in vogue that 
contains only formal categories. 
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The Semiotics of Poetry: Two Approaches 
Jonathan Culler 
People are attracted to semiotics for a variety of reasons. For some it is 
a powerful technique of demystification; for others an alluring mode of 
mystification. To some it offers the hope of a truly rigorous methodology 
in the human and social sciences; to others it is attractive because they can 
use its vocabulary to bring together insights and observations from the 
most disparate disciplines. For some students of literature semiotics may 
seem the long-delayed response to Northrop Frye's plea for a "coherent and 
comprehensive theory of literature, logically and scientifically organized 
. . . the main principles of which are as yet unknown to us" ; 1 for others, 
who on principle consider this an ignis fatuus, semiotics is a new source 
of interpretive tools, to be exploited in ad hoc fashion. 
Michael Riffaterre's new book, Semiotics of Poetry, has much to offer 
both of these groups. On the one hand, his theory, which he believes to be 
applicable to all Western literature, proposes "a coherent and relatively 
simple description of the structure of meaning in a poem." 2 On the other 
hand, in every chapter he tackles, by way of example, some of the most 
obscure or evasive poems of modern French literature, and he invariably 
produces a powerful, often startling interpretation. It is a theory which 
both attempts to describe how poems have meaning and seeks to produce, 
for every poem considered, a new and authoritative interpretation. 
Of course it is not difficult in itself to devise a comprehensive theory of 
poetry that will generate new interpretations for every poem. Consider, 
for example, the theory that poems are elaborate camouflage for secret mes-
sages to the elect and that, among other things, the number of letters in 
a poem is a hypothesis about the number of years until the Second Coming. 
This general theory clearly has the power to produce for any poem an 
interpretation that will surprise the critic. It is also a theory that is easy 
to master and to apply. Riffaterre, however, is not a religious fanatic and 
his interpretations, surprising though they may be, are much more likely 
to secure the assent of the critic, even though he may despair of ever 
producing similar interpretations himself, for want of the immense learning 
and the ear for echoes which Riffaterre brings to the reading of poems. 
What is the theory and how does it generate interpretations ? Riffaterre 
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begins from two well-established notions about poetry: that "poetry ex-
presses concepts and things by indirection. To put it simply, a poem says 
one thing and means another" (p. 1) and that "the unit of meaning 
peculiar to poetry is the finite, closed entity of the text" (p. ix) , which must 
be treated as a coherent and unified whole. These notions have played an 
important role in criticism, but Riffaterre takes them as rigorous and 
literal principles, and he combines them: the poem is an indirect and 
circuitous expression of something, let us call it X ; and the X which it 
expresses is the invariant of which its elements are all variants, the invariant 
which, once it is discovered, makes the poem a unity. Interpreting the 
poem is a matter of discovering this X and showing how it determines 
the sentences and images of the poem. 
Described in this way, Riffaterre's procedure sounds somewhat familiar, 
a version of the New Criticism, which also insisted on unity and which, 
if it avoided formulations such as "the poem says one thing and means 
another," nonetheless demonstrated that the poem was doing or saying 
something that was not immediately apparent. But the New Critics always 
insisted on the richness and complexity of this "total and governing atti-
tude" which unified the poem; and though they made much of the organic 
nature of the poem they would have indignantly rejected the view that 
the poem was the exfoliation of a seed or kernel which determined its 
unity. For them, on the contrary, to discover the unity of a poem was 
not to identify the single element which generated it but to build up 
a sense of the complex attitude to which all of the poem's parts contribute. 
Unity was located not in a kernel but in an overall attitude (so complex 
that many pages are required to describe it) . Contrast this with Riffaterre's 
description of the discovery of unity: 
Then suddenly the puzzle is solved, everything falls into place, 
indeed the whole poem ceases to be descriptive, ceases to be a se-
quence of mimetic signs, and becomes but a single sign, perceived from 
the end back to its given as a harmonious whole, wherein nothing 
is loose, wherein every word refers to one symbolic focus (p. 12). 
There are two things to note here: first, the stress on solving the puzzle, 
finding the secret, discovering the element which makes everything fall 
into place—an emphasis which makes Semiotics of Poetry an unusually 
daring work and compels admiration while it provokes uneasiness; and 
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secondly, the radical distinction between mimesis and another kind of 
meaning which Riffaterre calls "semiosis." This latter distinction is fa-
miliar, if not quite in this form. Critics are accustomed to showing that 
signs which claim to represent or make assertions about a state of affairs 
are in fact forming a different pattern, leading the reader to treat the 
supposed representation as a sign of another kind. Whether one sees this 
as a displacement of reference (for example, statements about landscape or 
weather usually need to be taken as an indirect way of conveying feelings, 
or, at another level, poetic images turn out to say something about poetry 
itself) or whether one stresses the formal patterns created by apparently 
referential signs, there is a redirection of signs. Once again, Riffaterre 
makes a familiar distinction more rigorous and absolute than is customary, 
producing a theory that takes risks. 
In the initial reading of a text or "heuristic reading," one is dealing 
with linguistic signs—"the reader's input is his linguistic competence, which 
includes an assumption that language is referential—and at this stage words 
do seem to relate first of all to things" (p. 5 ) . But, Riffaterre argues, the 
reader always encounters difficulties, or, as he calls them, "ungrammaticali-
ties": some signs, interpreted referentially, give bizarre or contradictory 
results. Moreover, the results of this heuristic reading are unsatisfying for 
two further reasons. First, the text characteristically displays patterns 
(metrical, phonological, semantic) which cannot be interpreted referen-
tially; these patterns are signs which need to be interpreted but can only 
be dealt with at another level. Secondly, at the mimetic level the text is 
a string of representations, yet the reader knows that the characteristic 
feature of a poem is its unity, so if he is to interpret it properly he must 
seek a level at which this unity can be identified—a level at which the 
text can become a single unit. 
These difficulties give rise to a second reading—"retroactive" or "her-
meneutic"—in which the obstacles that arose when one tried to read mi-
metically become the keys to a new reading, "the guideline to semiosis, 
the key to significance in the higher system" (p. 6 ) . It is worth quoting 
Riffaterre's description of this process: 
The ungrammaticalities spotted at the mimetic level are eventually 
integrated into another system. As the reader perceives what they 
have in common, as he becomes aware that this common trait forms 
them into a paradigm, and that this paradigm alters the meaning of 
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the poem, the new function of the ungrammaticalities changes their 
nature, and now they signify as components of a different network 
of relationships. This transfer of a sign from one level of discourse 
to another, this metamorphosis of what was a signifying complex at 
a lower level of the text into a signifying unit, now a member of a 
more developed system, at a higher level of the text, this functional 
shift is the proper domain of semiotics. Everything related to this 
integration of signs from the mimesis level into the higher level of 
significance is a manifestation of semiosis (p. 4 ) . 
Riffaterre is unusually frank in his assertion that the interest of poetry lies 
in this overcoming of mimesis, this puzzling out of semiotic unity which, 
as he says, makes poetry "more of a game than anything else" (p. 14). But 
what is truly radical is his claim about the nature of this semiotic unity. 
"The poem . . . results from the transformation of a word or sentence 
into a text" (p. 164) and the sentences which appear to be making state-
ments about the world must, if the poem is to be constituted as a unity, 
be grasped as variants of this kernel or "matrix." 
The poem results from the transformation of the matrix, a minimal 
and literal sentence, into a longer, complex, and non-literal periphra-
sis. The matrix is hypothetical, being only the grammatical and 
lexical actualization of a structure. The matrix may be epitomized 
in one word, in which case the word will not appear in the text. It is 
always actualized in successive variants; the form of these variants 
is governed by the first or primary actualization, the model. Matrix, 
model, and text are variants of the same structure" (p. 19). 
Before we consider some examples that will illustrate this process and 
these concepts, it is important to emphasize that the expansion or conversion 
of matrix to text produces a series of signs which are apparently represen-
tational, but certain of these signs are what Riffaterre calls "poetic signs": "a 
word or phrase is poeticized when it refers to (and, if a phrase patterns 
itself upon) a pre-existent word group" (p. 23). This pre-existent word 
group Riffaterre calls a hypogram; the hypogram may be a cliche, a descrip-
tive system, a quotation, a thematic complex. In any event, the hypogram 
is not located in the text but is the result of past semiotic or literary practice, 
and it is in perceiving a sign's reference to this pre-existing phrase or com-
plex that the reader identifies the sign as poetic. "For the poeticity to be 
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activated in the text," Riffaterre writes, "the sign referring to a hypogram 
must also be a variant of that text's matrix" (p. 23). In other words, poetic 
signs in a text are powerfully over-determined: they both refer to a pre-
existing hypogram and are variants or transformations of a matrix. 
These are strong claims. Let us look first at a relatively simple example 
in which Riffaterre's argument is clear and in which his revelation of the 
"secret" provides an interpretation which, if it lacks the richness critics are 
wont to seek, is nevertheless likely to be preferred to previous interpretations. 
The example is Rimbaud's "Fetes de la faim": 
FETES DE LA FAIM 
Ma faim, Anne, Anne 
Fuis sur ton äne. 
Si j 'ai du goüt, ce n'est gueres 
Que pour la terre et les pierres. 
Dinn! dinn! dinn! dinn! Je pais Pair, 
Le roc, les Terres, le fer. 
Tournez, les faims, paissez, faims, 
Le pre des sons! 
Puis Paimable et vibrant venin 
Des liserons; 
Les cailloux qu'un pauvre brise, 
Les vieilles pierres d'eglises, 
Les galets, fils des deluges, 
Pains couches aux vallees grises! 
Mes faims, c'est les bouts d'air noir; 
L'azur sonneur; 
— C'est Pestomac qui me tire. 
C'est le malheur. 
Sur terre ont paru les feuilles! 
Je vais aux chairs de fruit blettes 
Au sein du sillon je cueille 
La doucette et la violette. 
Ma faim, Anne, Anne! 
Fuis sur ton äne.3 
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Here, for convenience, is Riffaterre's translation: 
Feasts of Hunger. My hunger, Anne, Anne, run away on your 
donkey. If I have any taste, it is for hardly anything but earth's 
soil and stones. Dinn! dinn! dinn! dinn! I feed on air, rock, soil, 
iron. Turn round and round, hungers, graze the meadows of sound! 
Then the nice vibrant venom of the morning glories; the stones a 
poor man breaks, the old slabs of churches, the beach pebbles, children 
of deluge, bread loaves lying in the grey valleys! My hungers, they 
are crumbs of black air; the azure bellringer; it's my stomach that 
aches. It's unhappiness. Leaves have come out on earth! I am going 
to the flesh of overripe fruit, from the heart of the furrow I pick 
lamb's lettuce and the violet. My hunger, Anne, Anne! run away 
on your donkey. 
In commenting on this poem critics have generally tried to explain indi-
vidual images by supposing private associations on the part of the poet, 
or else have simply given up: "Rimbaud lets himself go here in free child-
ish association. The effect is fresh, innovative and naturally uneven" 
(quoted p. 77). But Riffaterre argues that the poem can be comprehended 
if it is seen as a series of images, each of which is a transformation of a 
cliche and a variant of the matrix. As he writes: 
The mimetic deficiencies that have been piling up from the first 
stanza on have the appearance—to our hindsight—of accumulating 
metonyms of hunger. Starting with the self-mocking italics (line 3 ) , 
"if I have a taste for anything (what a taste!), it is for earth and 
stones," the poem simply catalogs inedibles. More precisely, since the 
last stanza shifts to edibles, the entire poem is an expansion on two 
polar opposites, the narrative potentialities derivable from the sememe 
"hunger": a tale of unsatisfied hunger, and a tale of its satisfaction. 
Avoir jaim has two lexical facets, a negative and a positive: you 
starve, or you have a good appetite. In either case the craving for 
food can be expressed in terms of eating, hence a matrix: eating 
the inedible, eating the edible, which covers the whole story of the 
poem's given (pp. 77-78). 
At first, Riffaterre explains, "the reader does not catch on because each 
disconcerting (and linguistically established) exemplum of the uneatable 
is out of context" and because the items the poem lists at first are, pre-
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cisely, inedible, so that the reader would be producing a contradiction if he 
brought them together under the heading of eating. But, Riffaterre claims, 
and this argument must be cited at some length since the comprehensiveness 
of his mode of explanation is what is in question, 
each variant of this non-food is in fact guaranteed by, and ritual-
istically refers to, cliches. The air (line 5 ) : vivre de Vair du temps} 
a proverbial phrase applied to impecunious individuals or dieting 
ladies. The puzzling bouts d'air noir uses air as a hyperbolic substi-
tute for the famine cliche des bouts de pain noir. Whereas air noir 
is sheer nonsense referentially, it carries on the conversion by replac-
ing stale and scanty crusts with the illusion of food, and, as a variant 
on the model of the stereotype, it makes sense. Again, the deadly 
convolvulü$ brings us to familiar warnings to children about poison-
ous plants. And the revolving hungers refer to the revolving wooden 
horses of the carousel ("Tournez, tournez, bons chevaux de bois," 
Verlaine is writing at about the same time) by way of the collo-
quial manger avec les chevaux de bois [eat when the wooden horses 
eat]—that is, starve. Hence too paissez, the verb for cattle or horses 
browsing on grass. Hence sons, a pun on the two meanings, "bran," 
horse fodder, and in the plural, "sounds." Sounds, of course, because 
of the bell in line 5, the refectory bell that summons to the table. 
We need not be wildly imaginative to find this a nice instance of 
tautology, since "dinn! dinn! dinn! dinn! mangeons" sounds like 
"dine! dine! mangeons!" (as we would say, "Dinner! Dinner! Let's 
eat!") . A hollow invitation, this being a mineral dinner—wherefore 
the bitterness concerning l'azur sonneur, which unites Voir du temps 
of our aforementioned proverb with the delusive call to dinner. 
Whence also the bitterness of the allusion to the Mallarme intertext— 
the only possible explanation for this strange phrase—a poem in which 
the blue sky serves as image for a "sterile desert," a haunting empti-
ness, where "PAzur triomphe [. . .] qui chante dans les cloches 
[. . .] il se fait voix pour plus nous faire peur avec sa victoire me-
chante" [Azure triumphant sings in the bells; it turns itself into a 
voice the better to frighten us with its victorious wickedness] (pp. 
78-79). 
In sum, then, the matrix here is hunger (eating) and its expansion into 
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a text employs first a negative then a positive converter, to yield a vision 
of eating, first, the inedible, and then, with an inversion of the key features 
of the inedible, the edible. Presumably, although Riffaterre does not ex-
plicitly say so, the sentence of lines 2-3, "Si j'ai du gout, ce n'est gueres/Que 
pour la terre et les pierres," would be the model, since the subsequent 
images of eating are interpreted according to the formula made explicit 
here. Finally, though, for reasons I do not understand, Riffaterre chooses 
not to speak explicitly of external hypograms here, each representation of 
eating is determined by a cliche, quotation or a colloquial phrase to which 
it alludes or which it takes literally. 
Riffaterre sums up his demonstration as follows: 
Thus, while every single representation in the poem is well-nigh 
incomprehensible to start with, it becomes capable of metaphorization 
or symbolization as soon as it is perceived as functionally identical 
with the others, as soon as we perceive the sequence that develops 
one word of the title, or rather one seme of that word, into a text. 
And once again, maximal catachresis at the lexematic level of indi-
vidual words or phrases coincides with significance at the textual 
level (p. 80). 
At a mimetic level the poem makes, no sense, but once one shifts to the 
level of. semiosis the poem becomes "coherent:/ the poem is not an account 
of acts of eating or failure to eat but is rather organized around those 
possibilities and impossibilities of eating which are enshrined in discourse. 
The obvious objection at this point is that "Fetes de la faim" is a very 
special case—made for such a theory. Unlike most poems, it seems to be 
nonsense from the start and requires a key or revelation of a secret if any 
sense is to be made of it at all. Most poems, however, make much more 
sense at a mimetic level, do appear to be making statements about states 
of affairs, and critics can usually interpret them as coherent works of art 
without having recourse to a repertoire of cliches and commonplaces. In-
deed, the objection might run, whereas the Rimbaud poem does seem to 
be enriched and made more suggestive and powerful by this kind of read-
ing, most poems would be radically impoverished by an interpretation 
which treated them as the expansion, through cliches, of a kernel or matrix. 
It is therefore worth considering what Riffaterre does with a poem that 
critics have had less trouble interpreting and which is usually taken as a 
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powerful statement of despair rather than a puzzle to be solved. Baude-
laire's first "Spleen" poem from Les Fleurs du Mal is a good test case. 
Pluviose, irrite contre la ville entiere, 
De son urne ä grands flots verse un froid tenebreux 
Aux pales habitants du voisin cimetiere 
Et la mortalite sur les faubourgs brumeux. 
Mon chat sur le carreau cherchant une litiere 
Agite sans repos son corps maigre et galeux; 
L'äme d'un vieux poete erre dans la gouttiere 
Avec la triste voix d'un fantome frileux. 
Le bourdon se lamente, et la buche enfumee 
Accompagne en fausset la pendule enrhumee, 
Cependant qu'en un jeu plein de sales parfums, 
Heritage fatal d'une vieille hydropique, 
Le beau valet de cceur et la dame de pique 
Causent sinistrement de leurs amours defunts. 
Pluvius, annoyed at the whole city, pours torrents of dark cold out 
of his urn down onto the pale tenants of the cemetery next door, 
torrents of mortality over the foggy suburbs. On the tiling, my cat 
is looking for a litter to bed down on; he shifts his thin mangy body 
about restlessly. The soul of an old poet wanders through the rain-
spout with the sad voice of a chilly ghost. The great bell is lament-
ing, and the smoke-blackened log, in falsetto, accompanies the wheezy 
clock, the while, in a deck of cards filled with foul perfumes—fatal 
bequest of a dropsical old hag—the handsome knave of hearts and 
the queen of spades talk of their dead loves sinisterly. 
Readers will doubtless agree that what unifies this poem is a feeling of 
dismal disagreeableness expressed or implied in various ways in the different 
stanzas. If there is any constant which the poem expands or of which the 
stanzas are variants it must be something of this kind. "The matrix I 
hypothesize," writes Riffaterre, "would be something like no refuge from 
misery, but the cliche all-pervading gloom would do as well" (p. 68). The 
fact that he can offer a choice of formulations suggests that what is crucial 
is the basic theme which both express. Elsewhere, as in the Rimbaud poem, 
he makes a strong claim in treating the text as derived from a matrix 
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sentence, but here he seems to be doing no more than correctly recognizing 
a basic theme. In fact, the claim that he makes in his discussion of t h e 
poem is that the expansion of the matrix all-pervading gloom into a t e x t 
is mediated by the descriptive system associated with maison. A descriptive 
system is a system of associated commonplaces, "a network of words asso-
ciated with one another around a kernel word" (p. 39). The descriptive 
system of "home sweet home" in English involves, for example, the fireside, 
a peaceful pet, security, intimacy, perhaps a sunny green lawn, etc. R i f fa -
terre's claim is that in this poem expansion of the gloomy matrix involves 
conversion of the various elements of the equivalent French descriptive 
system into negative images. The system has by convention a positive 
orientation. "Baudelaire's first 'Spleen' demonstrates how the inversion o £ 
that orientation turns the maison system into a code of the moral a n d 
physical discomfort a home is supposed to protect us against" (p. 67) . 
Earlier in his discussion he describes more generally what is involved 
in this conversion, as he calls it, of the hypogram: 
If he is to perceive the converted verbal sequence [i.e., perceive it 
as indirection and hence as poetic], the reader must make a mental 
comparison between the sequence and a hypogram that is the text 
imagined by him in a pretransformation state. This hypogram (a 
single sentence or a string of sentences) may be made out of cliches, 
or it may be a quotation from another text, or a descriptive system. 
Since the hypogram always has a positive or negative "orientation" 
(the cliche is meliorative or pejorative, the quotation has its position 
on an ethical and/or esthetic scale, the descriptive system reflects 
the connotations of its kernel word), the constituents of the conver-
sion always transmute the hypogram's markers—in some cases the 
conversion consists of nothing more than such a permutation of the 
markers (pp. 63-64). 
Ordinarily the maison system opposes a warm, protective inside to a hostile 
outside, but here, Riffaterre argues, "the conversion dictated by pervasive 
gloom transforms this opposition inside vs outside into an equivalence." 
The disagreeable discomfort that reigns outside is also to be found inside, 
as becomes obvious in the second stanza, where the description of the cat 
inverts all the features the descriptive system would lead us to expect of a 
sleek, contented, fireside cat: "the markers' permutation derives maigre, 
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"skinny," from the ideal cat body, galeux, "mangy," from the ideal coat. 
The soft rug becomes carrcau, and carreau never generates any adjective 
but dur or froid, which negate cosiness" (p. 69), and so on. Similarly, in 
the first tercet familiar sounds become harsh or dissonant, but most inter-
esting is the transformation that takes place in the puzzling final stanza. 
Riffaterre argues that knicknacks, packs of cards, etc., are part of the 
system of maison, in which they are "common motifs in scenes of intimacy" 
and, when no one is about, "symbolize the essential continuity of living." 
A familiar hyperbolic variant of this motif gives these things a secret life: 
at night they come alive. The animation of inanimate household objects 
is an ever-present possibility in the case of playing cards, and love among 
kings, queens, and knaves is "a logical result." Riffaterre concludes: 
The whole motif, a complicated story, is verily a subsystem of the 
maison system. It has now been integrated into the overall conversion 
of "Spleen" and functions as a word—no matter how broad all its 
connotations—would function, as one constituent in a sentence, on 
a par with the other words. The conversion within the subsystem 
(adjectives and adverbs: sales parfums, heritage fatal, causent sinis-
trement, amours defunts) has no independent meaning; no sym-
bolism of their own attaches to the details of this parenthetic story. 
Their complex negativizations are just a marker like the others, an 
embedding within the syntagmatic continuum of the sonnet's con-
version. The realistic mimesis of the whole tercet has been semioti-
cized into being one word of maison's transformation into non-maison, 
that is of the transformation of maison\ systematic significance into 
a code of that significance's contrary (p. 70). 
What is remarkable here, in its deviation from the conventions of ordi-
nary critical writing, is Riffaterre's insistence on the absence of extra 
meaning, on the fact that this rich and mysterious little story has no other 
significance than its contribution to the negation of maison. Indeed, most 
readers are likely to find this confident and extreme reductionism somewhat 
objectionable; but in fact, it is possible to argue that Riffaterre is once again 
stating in a provocative way a position which critics generally slide into 
surreptitiously. The final tercet is difficult and puzzling: readers are likely 
to be fascinated precisely because the scene seems gratuitous, and sinister 
in its very gratuitousness; and though they would never say that the details 
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are unimportant (since one of our conventions is that no detail in a good 
poem can be unimportant), what they respond to and what they succeed 
in integrating into an interpretation of the sonnet is nothing other than 
this general sense of the sinister and disagreeable, 
A more pertinent objection to Riffaterre's reading might be that even 
when it does not misrepresent the way in which readers succeed in achiev-
ing unity, the method involves a predilection for the impoverishment of 
the text: it would prefer to see the strange opening stanza of this poem 
as "the conventional language of traditional allegory" (p. 67) asserting 
"Nature's hostility to man" rather than explore for as long as possible 
the strange features of this account which disrupt ordinary allegorical rela-
tionships. The emblematic figure, after all, pours cold on the inhabitants 
of the cemetery and mortality on the suburbs, in a zeugma whose symmetry 
is disrupted by the substitution of suburbs for mortals—a substitution which 
gives each thing poured a highly problematical relationship to the recipient. 
Now it may well be that readers will be unable to do anything with these 
oddities and will conclude, either explicitly in defeat or implicitly by 
passing on to the next stanza, that there is an allegory here which expresses 
Nature's hostility to man, but theories other than Riffaterre's would enjoin 
readers to dwell on these odd details and to accept this solution only faute 
de mieux, whereas Riffaterre's theory explicitly welcomes and encourages 
this reduction to a single thematic element or to a cliche. 
The charge of reductionism will be frequently levelled at Semiotics of 
Poetry, but in fact it is a criticism that is only appropriate on the assumption 
that Riffaterre is offering a method for interpreting poems. When his theory 
is viewed in this light, then one may with some justification complain that 
it encourages readers to opt for simple solutions and to see images and 
even whole stanzas as simply traditional formulations. But if one takes 
Riffaterre's theory as an account of conventions of reading and interpreta-
tion—as a description of how readers can succeed in producing unity when 
they tackle a poem—then one can reply to any charge of reductionism that 
his formulations are not a summing up or even a summary of the poem. 
They do not purport to deliver the poem but rather to reveal a structure 
which enables the reader to perceive the poem as unified. The matrix and 
hypograms cannot be equated with the poem, much less with the experi-
ence of the poem. 
Indeed, those who are worried about reductionism might wish explicitly 
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to locate the poem's value in the experience of reading, in the process of 
weighing and transforming the various elements one encounters. The 
reader, as Riffaterre describes him, is continually being confronted with 
possibilities of mimetic interpretation, and reading is not so much progress 
towards kernels of revealed significance as 
a seesaw scanning of the text, compelled by the very duality of the 
signs—ungrammatical as mimesis, grammatical within the signifi-
cance network. . . . In the reader's mind it means a continual re-
commencing, an indecisiveness resolved one moment and lost the 
next with each reliving of revealed significance, and this it is that 
makes the poem endlessly rereadable and fascinating (p. 166). 
This sudden invocation of endless fascination and rereading is, one must 
confess, the flourish with which the book closes and must be interpreted 
with that in mind, but nevertheless, this sort of emphasis on the reading 
experience is a clear option for those who fear that Riffaterre's semiotics 
devalues poems by reducing them to formulae. Once separated in this way 
from questions of value, Riffaterre's reductionism can be seen as a pro-
vocative virtue, part of that drive towards explicitness which ought to be 
one of the virtues of semiotics. 
From the perspective of semiotics, however, there is one feature of 
Riffaterre's work which is extremely puzzling, and that is the relationship 
between Riffaterre's theory and the interpretive activity of other readers. 
Semiotics generally claims that meaning is the result of the systems of 
conventions that make up a culture and that have been assimilated by the 
members of that culture who are concerned with the activity in question. 
The semiotic study of food, for example, would be an attempt to describe 
the conventions which, within a particular culture, distinguish the edible 
from the inedible, govern the order in which dishes are eaten, determine 
the compatibility or incompatibility of various dishes. It would describe 
the meaning various foodstuffs have within that culture. In short, it would 
attempt to make explicit all the implicit knowledge which members of 
that culture apply in their dealings with food. Similarly, the semiotics of 
literature would be an attempt to analyse the system of conventions that 
enable literary works to have the meanings they do for members of a given 
culture. It asks what are the conventions that enable readers to interpret 
works as they do. 
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At moments Riffaterre claims that this is his program, that his theory 
describes how readers produce or discover meaning. Yet much of the 
energy and excitement of Riffaterre's writing comes from the fact that he 
is urging us to read differently, to interpret texts in a new way. His in-
terpretations are not offered as summaries of the common view. He takes 
pleasure in proposing new interpretations and discrediting those of other 
critics. And many readers, as I have suggested, will value his book precisely 
as guide to a new sort of interpretation. They may hope to learn how to 
produce similar readings themselves, but unless they possess his immense 
learning and his ear for echoes of cliches, descriptive systems, and collo-
quial expressions, they are unlikely to succeed. 
Perhaps one ought to say, then, that Riffaterre's semiotics is not an 
account of current conventions and procedures of interpretation but that 
it is a description of the way a specialized and sophisticated group of 
readers deals with poems. That is to say, it is still an analysis of reading, 
but it focuses on one way of reading among many. This would be a plausi-
ble description of the project, did not Riffaterre explicitly rule out such a 
view. He denies that readers have this kind of freedom or may differ in 
their approach to texts. He insists that he is describing what readers must 
do. Reading is a tightly restricted, highly constrained activity. Poetic signs 
create patterns that cannot be ignored. "The reader's freedom of interpreta-
tion is further limited because of the poem's saturation by the semantic and 
formal features of its matrix; in other words, continuity and unity, that is, 
the fact that the semiotic unit is the text itself, forbid the attention to 
wander, deny the opportunities for hermeneutic deviance" (p. 165). And 
further, the reader "is therefore under strict guidance and control as he 
fills in the gaps and solves the puzzle" (p. 165). 
A theory which insists to this extent on the control exercized by the 
text, on what readers are constrained to do, must be judged first of all for 
its accuracy in describing what readers actually do. If it does not corre-
spond, then we can interpret it not as a description of what readers actually 
do, of how meaning is produced in their encounters with text, but as the 
recommendation of a new method of interpretation, an account of what 
they ought to do. 
There seems, then, to be an important distinction between two ap-
proaches to the semiotics of literature. The first takes linguistics as its 
model: just as the task of linguistics is not to propose new meanings for 
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the sentences of English but to describe the system of rules which enables 
sentences to have the form and meanings they do, so the semiotics of 
poetry attempts to describe the system of conventions which enable *poems 
to have the meaning (the range of meanings) they do. Its object, as Roland 
Barthes once wrote, is not the texts themselves but their intelligibility: 
texts as sign sequences.4 The second approach posits that there are some 
principles according to which poetic texts are constructed which, if we knew 
them, would enable us to determine the true meaning of poems. A theory 
of this kind, however frequently it may refer to the constitutive activity 
of the reader, is not a description of the interpretive process but a prescrip-
tion. Indeed, a theory of this sort is almost invariably a genetic theory in 
that it bases its method of interpretation on claims about how the text 
was constructed. It is because a poem comes into being as the expansion 
of a matrix through hypograms that readers must read it, if they are to 
read properly, in a quest for the unifying matrix. 
Indeed, Riffaterre's theory ought to be compared not with a descriptive 
semiotics or poetics which attempts to make explicit the conventions of 
meaning but rather with competing genetic theories such as that of Harold 
Bloom. Like Riffaterre, Bloom offers new and often powerful interpreta-
tions, and he grounds those interpretations on claims about how poems 
come into being. Both claim to reveal the secret of the text and do so by 
positing an act of origination (a troping on or misreading of a great prede-
cessor in the case of Bloom, a troping on hypograms or cliches in the case 
of Riffaterre). Both offer, that is to say, a theory about the nature of poems 
(grounded on an account of how poems are produced) and both recom-
mend that we interpret poems in accordance with this new account of 
their nature, arguing that this is how they ought to be read, though people 
have not realized this in the past. 
A descriptive semiotics, on the other hand, is interested not in offering 
a method of interpretation or in providing new and surprising readings 
of literary works but rather in analysing the conventions of reading and 
interpretation that seem to be current within a culture, the conventions 
that are constitutive of the institution of literature. A brief example will 
illustrate both the differences between this kind of semiotics and Riffaterre's 
approach and the ways in which Riffaterre's accounts of the reading process 
might enrich a descriptive semiotics. Since Riffaterre's theory is so much 
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concerned with unity, one might consider the problem of how readers 
achieve unity when interpreting a brief lyric poem like Blake's "London." 
I wander thro' each charter'd street 
Near where the charter'd Thames does flow, 
And mark in every face I meet 
Marks of weakness, marks of woe. 
In every cry of every Man, 
In every Infant's cry of fear, 
In every voice, in every ban, 
The mind-forg'd manacles I hear. 
How the Chimney-sweeper's cry 
Every black'ning Church appalls; 
And the hapless Soldier's sigh 
Runs in blood down Palace walls. 
But most thro' midnight streets I hear 
How the youthful Harlot's curse 
Blasts the new-born Infant's tear 
And blights with plagues the Marriage hearse.5 
If a returning tourist were to tell us what he had seen and heard while 
wandering through the streets of London, we would feel no overwhelming 
compulsion to transform these heterogeneous sights into a unified vision, 
but readers of poems do. The sights and sounds must be brought together 
according to one of our models of wholeness. Riffaterre's unvarying model 
is that of a matrix sentence of which everything is a variant. This is close 
to the model most frequently used in interpretations of London: the synec-
dochic series, where a series of particulars is taken to represent a general 
class of which they are all members. Here the class is named in various 
ways by critics: real social evils of 18th century life, woes due to artificial 
and repressive institutions which human reason has created, distant gen-
eralized cases of suffering.6 Riffaterre's model, which stresses the sentence 
rather than the fact of class membership, would force one to claim that a 
particular formulation is correct, but it seems to be a fact about interpreta-
tion that critics following the same conventions can name a structure in 
different ways. 
However, there is another model of wholeness or unity that can be used 
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in the interpretation o£ this poem, a model which one might call the pattern 
of aletheic reversal: first a false or inadequate vision, then its true or ade-
quate counterpart. By this model, which is frequently used in other cases, 
one unifies the poem by identifying a shift from one vision to another. 
With the third stanza we gain, one critic writes, "a release from the repeti-
tiveness of the preceding stanzas. The abstracting sameness of 'every . . . 
every . . . every,' the dimly realized cries and voices, give way to specifi-
cally realized human situations."7 This model of unity gives one a certain 
dramatic structure and enables one to locate the significance of the poem 
in the realization, which can be variously described, that one must go 
beyond surface marks of misery to a more comprehensive, analytical or even 
visionary account, which includes institutions and sees more. 
Whichever model of unity is employed, and there seems no reason to 
argue in this case that either is inappropriate, critics perform some complex 
imaginative operations on various details of the poem in order to fit them 
into the unified structure. Some of the most interesting occur in readings 
of the last stanza. What Riffaterre calls a mimetic reading might tempt 
one to say that the narrator sees a harlot curse her child for crying and curse 
a wedding procession, but no critic remains content with this reading, since 
structural conventions require that the final stanza be an appropriate 
conclusion. There are numerous acceptable ways a poem can end,8 but in 
a poem organized as a series of perceptions, the critic's inclination is to read 
the final stanza as the climax of the vision, its most intense and typical 
moment. 
These seem to be two strategies that account for most readings. Either 
one emphasizes the parallelism that links chimneysweep, soldier, and harlot 
as victims (each of whose cry taints an institution that is in some way guilty 
for the victim's plight), or one disregards the surface syntactical parallelism, 
giving precedence to the cultural convention which prevents an infant 
from figuring in a poem as anything but a representation of innocence, and 
one makes the victim of the last stanza the infant and the newly-weds, who 
are also the object of the harlot's cursing and blighting. The convention 
of unity, that is to say, leads critics to seek in the final stanza a prolongation 
of the pattern of victimage that has been established earlier, and depending 
on which convention (syntactical parallelism or traditional symbolism) is 
given greater weight, one makes either the harlot or the infant and marriage 
itself the principal victim. 
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These interpretations are quite different, and each can produce a social 
rationalization. By one argument, it is the institution of marriage itself, 
more particularly arranged marriages, that breeds a market for harlots, 
who become victims of a system of "charters." "If there were no marriage 
there would be no ungratified desire and therefore no harlots. Thus it is 
ultimately the marriage hearse itself and not the youthful harlot which 
breeds the pestilence that blights the marriage hearse."9 By the other 
argument the harlot is the evil rather than the victim; she "blasts the 
prospects of innocent children and blights the healthy possibilities of mar-
riage," for any of a number of reasons—e.g., because her very existence "is a 
gross parody of sanctified mutuality in love." 1 0 A descriptive semiotics is 
not concerned with the question of which reading is "correct," though of 
course it is interested in what conventions are appealed to and what 
strategies are employed in attempts to demonstrate that a particular reading 
is the right one. A descriptive semiotics is concerned with the attempt to 
understand how it is—according to what conventions of signification, struc-
tural models, and processes of inference—that this poem can be interpreted 
as it is by critics; and when there is a disagreement among critics, as there 
usually is, the task is to explain what conventions enable those disagree-
ments to arise. Interpretation is not a random process; if it were there 
would be nothing to explain, but since it is not, even the most blatantly 
contradictory interpretations are following a logic and relying on conven-
tions which it ought to be possible to make explicit. 
Because Riffaterre does attempt to be explicit about the conventions and 
interpretive strategies he is following, his book has much to contribute 
to an analysis of reading or descriptive semiotics (in particular, his discus-
sion of prose poems has much to say about how readers make sense of 
brief, laconic texts), but essentially he is concerned with devising new 
interpretations, not explaining the old. His genetic approach has much 
to offer those readers who are convinced that the purpose of literary 
criticism is to produce more refined interpretations of individual works; 
and it also has the attraction of avoiding the banality that always threatens 
descriptive semiotics.^The semiotician always risks banality since he is com-
mitted by profession to scrutinizing meanings already known or attested 
within the culture in the hopes of discovering the conventions which 
members of that culture have mastered. It is precisely this risk—that one's 
labors will, if one is fortunate, lead to an explicit account of what is already 
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implicitly known—that explains the attraction interpretation has for semio-
ticians. Why not offer a new reading instead of trying to explain the con-
ditions of interpretation ? Why not, after all, do both ? Riffaterre's rhetoric 
suggests that he has indeed tried to do both, but the result is a theory 
that is torn between its two claims: that it describes what readers do and 
must do; that it offers new and compelling interpretations. To save Riffa-
terre's theory, to appreciate what is valuable in his book, one must distin-
guish the two approaches to semiotics which he attempts to conflate. 
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Literary Language and Postmodern 
Theories of Semiotics 
Louis Oldani 
"You can't make a poem with ideas," said Mallarme to Degas, "—you 
make it with words!"1 Carlyle noted of the literary writer: "Wonderful 
it is with what cutting words, now and then, he severs asunder the con-
fusion; shears it down, were it furlongs deep, into the true center of the 
matter; and there not only hits the nail on the head, but with crushing 
force smites it home, and buries it." 2 The literary writer, fashioning, even 
wrestling with, his sometimes intractable building blocks, chooses and 
arranges words with art. For literature is, according to Tzvetan Todorov, 
following Valery, and can be nothing other than an extension and appli-
cation of certain properties of language.3 That emphasis is struck in the 
definitions of prose and poetry whereby Coleridge claimed that "prose = 
words in their best order;—-poetry = the best words in the best order."4 
Swift averred that "Proper words in proper places make the true definition 
of a style," partaking perhaps in the more general advice of Ecclesiasticus, 
"Weigh your words in a balance."5 For the Seminar I have chosen to 
focus discussion on some developments in semiotic theorists' views of the 
language of literature. William K. Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks indicate 
a rationale for such choice in the following passage. 
. . . we shall have occasion to consider the question how far a close 
verbal analysis of poetry may fall short of doing justice to the more 
massive structural features of such works as novels, epics, dramas. 
Literary criticism of the mid-20th century in America has been raising 
that question with an insistence which might even be taken . . . as a 
discouragement of our dignifying the episode of 18th-century "poetic 
diction" and the Wordsworthian condemnation of it with very much 
notice. Both "poetic diction" and the reaction against it, however, 
stand out conspicuously in critical history, and we choose to dwell 
upon them with some deliberation. The concept of "poetic diction" 
is . . . a handy one both for the theorist and for the literary historian. 
It has at least the advantage that it reduces to a nearly definable and 
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testable form a good many other problems of literary criticism. "Poetic 
diction" is a good small-scale model of the larger problems.6 
Language, the medium of literature, is a shared system of sounds and 
of written or printed letters representing sounds by which meaning is con-
veyed among people who know the system. A word begins as a blend of 
noises and tones—articulated by the throat, tongue, and lips—for which 
the written letters are a notation. The conventional part of a word's mean-
ing, its denotation, is signification as verified in common usage and as 
defined in a dictionary. (Such dictionaries as the OED and Webster's 
Third New International present a well-nigh exhaustive account of the 
conventions of meaning that undergird the system of signs which we call 
words.) [A word's connotations are imaginative associations and emotional 
charges that the word evokes beyond what it denotes) Whereas the person 
using language to communicate only information may not be attentive to 
the sounds of words and may be hampered by connotations and even 
multiple denotation, the poet, the playwright, or the novelist needs a multi-
dimensional vocabulary in which to denotations he adds connotations to 
enrich meaning and sounds to reinforce or echo meaning. In thus signify-
ing multiple and maximum meaning, patterns of diction reveal the imagined 
world, the images of the human person, the vision of a writer as an indi-
vidual artist and as a participant in, or against, a movement or school. 
Diction is the means of literature: there is no way of experiencing the work 
except through the words that express it. Hence Todorov's remark that 
the "very fact that the literary work is a 'verbal work of art' has for a long 
time moved scholars to speak of the 'great role' of language in a literary 
work." 7 
Literature is a specialized or heightened use of word symbols communi-
cating in a way distinguishable from the language of science, of philosophy, 
and even of most daily conversation, except when the speaker is, say, 
retelling a folk story or singing a song. The concern of writers of literature 
is with experience, which comes to us largely through the senses. Accord-
ingly, although literature conveys questions, statements, explanations, and 
information, its peculiar mode demands sensuous words, the representation 
in language of sense impressions, not only images but figures of speech— 
metaphor, for one, which Cassirer interpreted as "the intellectual link 
between language and myth"; symbol, the abstract or transcendent rendered 
in physical form or concrete terms; synecdoche ("Always a larger signifi-
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cance," Frost explained: "A little thing touches a larger thing") . 8 Observ-
ing that the nature of fiction, for example, is determined by the nature of 
our perceptive apparatus, Flannery O'Connor pointed out that the writer 
of fiction "appeals through the senses, and you cannot appeal to the senses 
with abstractions."9 James Joyce maintained in Stephen Hero and A Portrait 
of the Artist as a Young Man that literature consists of incarnations and 
epiphanies. 
Cognizant of the work of such scholars as Brooks and Wimsatt and 
such artists as Coleridge and Joyce, semioticians are scrutinizing literary 
language from a new coign of vantage. In contrast to the long-standing 
analytic approach to meaning, which has focused primarily on the referents 
of words—patterns of imagery, for instance, or (in Samuel Johnson's aim) 
"the grandeur of generality" instead of the lowness of particulars—and 
secondarily on source—as Wordsworth's "low and rustic" persons—and on 
rhythm and music, 3 0 semioticians' operational theories stress each word's 
derivation of meaning directly from the language system as a whole and 
indirectly from other systems linked with language. I use the term semi-
otics broadly enough to include structuralism and poststructuralist decon-
struction and offer the following definition: a general theory of signs and 
symbols as means of communication, especially the study of rules and con-
ventions governing the relationships among the elements of language, 
comprising syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics.1 1 In literary criticism, 
C. Hugh Holman comments, semiotics examines literature "in terms of its, 
use of language as dependent on and influenced by literary conventions 
and modes of discourse" and "how these conventions create meanings 
unique to such literary expression."1 2 Diverging from theorists who assess 
language as a textural element of the literary work, semiotic treatment of 
language in literature concentrates on the system of convenrIo^"",^w:Ei"ch 
control its meanings, use, and purposes as well as the system of generic 
codes which enable the reader to find order and complex significance in 
the integral work. The semiotician's goal can be stated in a paraphrase 
of "one of Frost's lines: "The theorist in me cries out for ensemble, for 
design." 1 3 
Robert Scholes' semiotics of literature can serve as a bridge from tradi-
tional ways of considering literary language. Starting with the six features 
constituting Roman Jakobson's diagram of the act of communication, 
Scholes explains that "we sense literariness in an utterance when any one 
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of the six features of communication loses its simplicity and becomes multi-
ple or duplicitous."14 This happens when, for instance, a hiatus appears 
between what the speaker of a poem says and what the author implies, as 
in Auden's "The Unknown Citizen." But, cautions Scholes, "literariness 
does not equal literature until it dominates any given utterance." The sound 
effects and patterns of syntax as well as the ironies, paradoxes, and other 
figures of speech "function not to cut the work off from the world by 
making it a self-contained object," but "function to create a literary tension 
between the utterance as communication and externally referential, on the 
one hand, and as incommunicative and self-referential, on the other." Thus 
a work of literature "tantalizes us by being a mirror and a window at the 
same time." Although Scholes agrees that the formulation that signs refer, 
not to things, but to concepts has provided a useful critique of naive 
realism, he breaks with the position of Ferdinand de Saussure and of Roland 
Barthes that between words and things, sign and referent, is an unbridge-
able gap. To Scholes, language is not a closed system, but one enriched by 
and pointing to the phenomenal world. To him, "the codes of fiction are 
tied to our perceptual system as well as to our language." And fiction 
results from "the semiotic generation of an absent context or the distortion 
of a present one." 
The world created by a fiction, then, whether a story, play, or poem, 
is one context we perceive and half create around the message that 
directs our thoughts. But behind that world or around it is our own 
phenomenal world, in which the fictional events reverberate. What 
we know from experience of love and lust, charity and hate, pleasure 
and pain, we bring to bear upon the fictional events—inevitably, 
because we seek to make every text our own. And what we find in 
fiction leaks out to color our phenomenal world, to help us assign 
meaning, value, and importance to the individual events and situa-
tions of our lives. 1 5 
Concerned also with questions of semantics, while carrying out his own 
brand of Derridean deconstruction, J . Hillis Miller has claimed that "Ulti-
mately, man finds in things nothing but what he himself has imported 
into them." 1 6 To account for what is distinctive in the signification of a 
sign, Jacques Derrida uses the term "trace," which indicates a "simulacrum" 
or semblance of foregoing meanings. The sedimentation of traces which 
Oldani: Literary Language 99 
a signifier has accumulated in the history of its use constitutes the diversity 
in the play of its present significations. The trace "appears/disappears" and 
creates the "undoing/preserving" oscillation of the sign itself. Any attempt 
to define or interpret the significance of a sign or complex of signs amounts, 
for Derrida, to nothing more than "sign-substitution"—the interpreter's put-
ting in its place another sign or complex of signs whose self-effacing traces 
defer, from substitution to substitution, the fixed and present meaning that 
the interpreter vainly seeks. Reference is interminably postponed.17 Miller's 
"innocent black marks" on the pages of a text are similarly endued with 
traces of meaning and multimeanings. Deconstruction he defines as "a 
recognition that all language, even language that seems purely referential 
or conceptual, is figurative language." 1 8 Deconstruction, he adds, "is not 
. . . nihilism or the denial of meaning in literary texts. It is, on the 
contrary, an attempt to interpret as exactly as possible the oscillations in 
meaning produced by the irreducibly figurative nature of language." 
Yet, quoting Paul de Man, Miller argues that " 'the impossibility of 
reading should not be taken too lightly.' " 1 9 He claims that a "key word," 
for instance, signifies any and all of the heterogeneous meanings it has 
conveyed in varied linguistic forms throughout its recorded history, back 
through its etymology. Because of this multiplicity of equally signified 
meanings, a key word or a passage or a text is finally "undecipherable," 
"unreadable": "All reading is misreading."2 0 Paradoxically, "any literary 
text, with more or less explicitness or clarity, already reads or misreads 
itself." 2 1 The end of interpretation is, therefore, an "impasse." M. H. 
Abrams' summary of what Miller calls "the uncanny moment"—"the 
moment in which the critic, thinking to deconstruct the text, finds that he 
has simply participated in the ceaseless play of the text as a self-decon-
structing artefact"—is an accurate paraphrase of Miller's assertion: "The 
deconstructive critic seeks to find . . . the element in the system studied 
which is alogical, the thread in the text in question which will unravel 
it all Deconstruction is not a dismantling of the structure of a text 
but a demonstration that it has already dismantled itself." 2 2 Miller notes as 
"an essential part of the procedure" of deconstruction a "hyperbolic exuber-
ance, the letting language go as far as it will take one." 2 3 For language 
is itself the determiner, not a "tool in man's hands, a submissive means of 
thinking," explains Miller. "Language rather thinks man and his 'world,' 
including poems, if he will allow it to do so." These few quotations from 
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and summaries of Miller's understanding of the nature and function of 
language evince an outlook emphasizing a system of traces that determine 
meanings over which the individual user and reader each has at once 
little and much control: much by reason of the individual's role in initiating 
the deconstructive process and in finding "nothing but what he himself 
has imported," little by reason of the function of language itself, "not an 
instrument or tool in man's hands," but "rather think[ing] man and his 
'world.' " Thus "Ariadne's thread makes the labyrinth, is the labyrinth. . . . 
[And] Criticism is the production of more thread to embroider the texture 
or textile already there." 2 4 
Some of Miller's notions were published in Critical Inquiry's spring 1977 
exchange of views on "The Limits of Pluralism," in which questions are 
raised and alternatives offered by Wayne Booth and M. H. Abrams. "Noth-
ing that anyone can say or write," Booth observes, "makes any sense unless 
we all believe that people can understand each other, sometimes, and that 
they should always try to understand."2 5 Abrams objects that Miller "leaves 
no room for taking into account that language, unlike the physical world, 
is a cultural institution that developed expressly in order to mean something 
and to convey what is meant to members of a community who have 
learned how to use and interpret language." 2 6 Abrams argues for the 
existence of a "control or limitation of signification by reference to the 
uses of a word or phrase that are current at the time an author writes, or 
to an author's intention, or to the verbal or generic context in which a 
word occurs." I dispute the fitness of Miller's "hyperbolic exuberance." 
The fact that, in the most obvious sense, a text has no meaning in itself 
does not necessarily occasion 100% subjective readings (or "nothing" but 
what the reader "imports into i t " ) . Writers can and do utter determinate 
signs to readers with means to determine significations, not often fully, 
but to a degree, as through use of the semantic system of a language to 
ascertain denotation and through examined ordinary living to discern con-
notations. Frost addressed this issue when he insisted that in composing 
a poem he was not writing on blotting paper on which the ink spreads out 
into scarcely recognizable shapes that can mean anything or nothing. 2 7 
For Tzvetan Todorov, the meaning of a word "is defined by the com-
binations in which it can accomplish its linguistic function. The meaning 
. . . is the entirety of its possible relationships with other words." 2 8 Con-
curring with fimile Benveniste, Todorov adds that meaning includes "the 
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capacity of a linguistic unit to integrate itself into a unit on a higher level." 
But whereas "in speech the integration of units does not go beyond the 
level of the sentence, in literature sentences are integrated again as part of 
larger articulations, and the latter in their turn into units of greater di-
mension, and so on until we have the entire work." Words themselves, 
Todorov notes, imply the absence of their referents: "Words are to things 
as desire is to the desired object." 2 9 As he indicated in the Kansas Faculty 
Semiotics Seminar, however, Todorov has sufficient confidence in the 
writer's ability to produce and the reader's ability to interpret an utterance, 
though it be unrepeatable, that he had developed a coherent theory of the 
genre "litterature fantastique" 
Rejecting as a means to account for meaning in literature the linguistic 
model, specifically A. J . Greimas' hypothesis that minimal semantic features 
combine in rule-governed ways to produce large-scale effects, Jonathan 
Culler calls for "mastery of various semiotic conventions which enable 
[one] to read series of sentences as poems or novels endowed with shape 
and meaning." 3 0 In Structuralist Poetics, Culler focuses attention, not on the 
author as source and the literary work as object, but on "two correlated 
networks of convention: writing as an institution and reading as an activ-
ity." 3 1 From this perspective, the meaning of a sentence is "the series of 
developments to which it gives rise, as determined by past and future 
relations between words and the conventions of semiotic systems." To 
study literary modes of writing, the reader must concentrate both on the 
conventions which guide the play of differences (as understood by Derrida) 
and on the conventions which guide the process of constructing meanings. 
One must let the work speak to him by viewing writing itself as a "period 
and generic concept." "To understand the language of a text is to recog-
nize the world to which it refers": the historical period and its differentiae 
and the literary genre plus contrasts with other genres, which includes 
identifying "what features are constitutive of functional categories." Ex-
pectations connected with the conventions of genre are, Culler remarks, 
"often violated. Their function, like that of all constitutive rules, is to make 
meaning possible by providing terms in which to classify the things one 
encounters." Thus, "to read a text as a tragedy is to give it a framework 
which allows order and complexity to appear." 
Using Barthes' terms "kernels" ("elements which link up with one 
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another to form plot") and "satellites" or "catalysts" ("which are attached 
to kernels but do not themselves establish sequences"), Culler theorizes: 
Once we have identified the dominant structure of the recit, we 
know how to deal with whatever kernels and satellites we then 
postulate. . . . 
The goals towards which one moves in synthesizing a plot are 
. . . notions of thematic structures. If we say that the hierarchy of 
kernels is governed by the reader's desire to reach a level of organi-
zation at which the plot as a whole is grasped in a satisfying form, 
. . . we have at least a general principle whose effects at lower levels 
can be traced. The reader must organize the plot as a passage from 
one state to another and this passage or movement must be such 
that it serves as a representation of theme. The end must be made 
a transformation of the beginning so that meaning can be drawn 
from the perception of resemblance and difference. . . . One can 
attempt to establish a coherent causal series, in which disparate inci-
dents are read as stages towards a goal, or a dialectical movement in 
which incidents are related as contraries whose opposition carries 
the problem that must be resolved.32 
The crucial function of words is their role in developing the structural 
pattern of a work, a role that semantics cannot play. 
Rhetorical figures, states Culler, are "instructions" about how to under-
stand the text by passing from one meaning to another. 3 3 Figures serve 
as the basis of interpretation, as, for example, synecdoche "allows one to 
move from part to whole, from whole to part, from member to class and 
from class to member." Each figure must be taken in a sense different 
from the literal and normal meaning; each requires semantic transforma-
tion. Culler's structuralist poetics, however, is not hermeneutic: "it does 
not propose startling interpretations or resolve literary debates," though it 
offers "a theory of literature and a mode of interpretation."3 4 The attempt 
to understand how we "make sense of a text," he adds, "leads one to think 
of literature not as representation or communication but as a series of 
forms which comply with and resist the production of meaning." Instead 
of a structuralist method geared for the discovery of structure in literature, 
Culler proposes "a kind of attention which one might call structuralist": 
"a desire to isolate codes, to name the various languages with and among 
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which the text plays, to go beyond manifest content to a series of forms 
and then to make these forms, or oppositions or modes of signification, the 
burden of the text." Verbal texture is not at issue here; "language" is not 
to be understood as diction, but as a system making possible the production 
of meaning. Culler's is a view from a weather spacecraft or through an 
electron microscope, not a sight glimpsed by the transparent eyeball or even 
through colored and distorting lenses. 
Maria Corti's An Introduction to Literary Semiotics investigates "the 
notion of the text as a hypersign or polysemic message."3 5 She notes that 
T. S. Eliot anticipated current theorists in recognizing the rules of the 
game, or system, of literature, which "is not the sum of its texts but a kind 
of totality both linked and linking, and in movement." 3 6 Existing works 
of art, Eliot explained, "form an ideal order among themselves, which is 
modified by the introduction of the new (the really new) work of art 
among them." The order of works, according to Eliot, was complete before 
the new work arrived; but for order to persist after the introduction of 
novelty, "the whole existing order must be, if ever so slightly, altered; and 
so the relations, proportions, values of each work of art toward the whole 
are readjusted." Fundamental to the notion of a system of literature is the 
"fact that literature is subject to structuring on various planes and levels," 
some of which are implied in "the diachronic development and the syn-
chronic articulation of a literature, resulting from the interaction of its 
institutional forms and genres . . . and the subtle relations that exist among 
literary phenomena." Levels of structuring superimposed on those just 
mentioned result from the relation between a writer and the whole of 
literature: "the individual author draws on his favorite texts . . . ; he 
effects connections and interrelations among these favorite texts in relation 
to the constitutive law of his own work" and thereby "creates the subsystem 
of his own sources." To show that the cause can come after the effect in 
this structuring, Corti quotes a paradox of Jorge Luis Borges: "The fact 
is that each writer creates his precursors. His work modifies our conception 
of the past, as it will modify the future." 3 7 Moreover, a semiological con-
ception of literature apprehends a network of relations between the signs 
of the literary series and those of other series, such as the social models of 
an era or the world view. 
Production of literary signs, of texts, entails the choice and use of words 
to span the chasm between addresser and addressee, a use motivated by 
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the writer's personal experience and by the context. But the words are 
conventional symbols in a language system and cannot be arranged into 
art, claims Corti, "unless, as Eliot maintains, there is a critical act, 'the 
labour of sifting, combining, constructing, expunging, correcting, testing.' " 3 8 
Corti views this crafting of the text as a scene in the "drama of alternatives" 
in which the selection of one plot carries the renunciation of alternate plots 
and demonstrates the writer's generative "competence" in transforming 
from the type the token. 
The polysemic "sign-life" of the literary work Corti also examines: 
Every text can support an incalculable number of decodifications or 
destructuralizations; in effect, every text is many texts in that the 
very nature of its polysemic complexity prevents identically repetitive 
readings even in the same cultural context. This explains why . . . 
in our era there has arisen the conception of readings as variations of 
a basic invariant, that is, the text. 3 9 
At the end of reading as characterized by Corti, the interpreter finds that 
the internal relationships of the text, of the words among themselves, count 
more than the relationships of words and things. The dynamic of reading 
thus corresponds to the dynamic of the text. 
In Chapter III, Corti directs consideration to the following aspects of 
literary language and its combinatorial game of words: codes and structures 
which underlie the word (A.4), generative factors and extraordinary 
potentialities of poetic language (A.2), ungrammaticality (pages 71-73), 
macro- and micropolysemy (B.3), phonic-rhythmic and semantic links in 
the language of a poetic text (B.2), development from "pre-text"—or poetic 
text in progress realized through the dynamics of variants—through the 
several stages of execution to the closure of "the last chosen version" 
(B.6) . Corti points out that the language of literature "actualizes the 
greatest number of the potentialities of language," has the status of a 
"supersign-function" (Umberto Eco), constitutes "a specific language-
system" (Teun Van Di jk) , is a form of discourse comprising lower signs 
of the sentence (connotations, figures, et cetera) and higher (a structure of 
narrative, for example, or of the poetic message) (Barthes), a priori codes 
(as literary genre) and a posteriori codes (produced with the message) 
(G. Granger), the kinds of formation and transformation proper to itself 
(alliteration, rhyme, specific lexicon, et cetera) (Van D i j k ) . 4 0 Literary 
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language, Corti explains, "does not appear . . . as a codifying system but 
as a catalyst for the potential that resides in language itself." She regards 
the writer's linguistic activity as an "oscillation" between his individual 
idiolect and literary language, which he absorbs from living at a given time 
and from reading the texts of the past. In literary language the possibilities 
of signification and communication are realized differently than in everyday 
language because literary language "is a connotative system that accumu-
lates diachronically. The word or syntagm or styleme is not only con-
notative in itself; it also has an extra semantic element, a surplus of signi-
fications which derives from the earlier artistic contexts in which it has 
occurred . . . ." Within literary language Corti distinguishes the following 
codes: 1) styles which belong to the various literary genres and to particular 
historical periods; 2) styles whose birth, growth, and death are conditioned 
by the dialectic of sociocultural phenomena (for instance, in some ancient 
literatures parataxis was a component of the plain style, whereas in the 
Bible it stands among the syntactic structures of a high style); 3) rhetoric, 
the rules and practices of which have endured through the centuries. "The 
ensemble of rhetorical markers as well as traditional rhetorical material 
and codified stylistic elements," Corti adds, "is very important for literary 
communication because it eases the encounter of the text and the addressee; 
it offers the presence of the already known alongside the newness of the 
message and favors communication on its first level." 
Corti locates the distinctiveness of poetic language from prose language 
in the writer's poetic competence and creativity and in the "generative 
pre-text." 4 1 She finds in poetic language a density of signification, an 
"ingrained polysemy" which marks it only in the poetic context, a density 
connected with pre-textual processes. Inasmuch as the poet achieves a fresh 
vision which escapes the common "grammar" of vision, his language, too, 
must violate the norms of grammar of the language deriving from ordinary 
experience. The poet is engaged not only in ungrammaticalities, but in 
generative figures and the "subtle and stubborn self-imposition of a word" 
in the pre-text. The result is that in the finished poem "everything signifies." 
Moreover, the "global meaning of the text" amounts to more than the sum 
of partial meanings that can be isolated among the signifiers: macropoly-
semy, or multivalence of the text as such, exceeds the sum of micropoly-
semies "on the level of the single word, of the syntagm, of the styleme, 
which because of a particular semantic density become polyvalent." Finally, 
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Corti maintains, the poet's utterances in a poem are "incapable of sub-
stitution." 
Thus my epitome of Corti's full-blown discussion of the language of 
literature, a discussion which has the merit of clarity, takes into account 
alternative views, is illustrated from a formidable acquaintance with world 
literature, and is qualified by reference to the positions of fellow semiologists 
and other theoreticians, some outside the semiotic circle, including a num-
ber who write literature. 
CONCLUDING COMMENT. My paper synthesizes approaches to 
the language of literature established by semioticians, approaches which 
function as part of a more encompassing goal, a full accounting not only 
of the whole system of language as a medium of communication, but of 
all systems connected with language. Such a goal is not surprising in 
view of the guiding linguistic model, in which each language is a coherent, 
homogeneous entity whose codes, conventions, and structures work to make 
meaning possible. Like other theorists of literary language, semioticians 
are occupied with the multimeanings of the word and the sundry levels 
of textual meaning. They have contributed a further dimension, however, 
in the more complex explanation of the nature of allusion by the sub-
system of sources or intertextuality, a concept summed up as follows by 
Vincent B. Leiten: 
Every text emerges out of a textual tradition. In actuality, countless 
sources, influences and epochs—both hidden and revealed, spoken 
and written—are interwoven into language itself. The very syntax 
and lexicon in the system of language carry the work of innumerable 
and often unnameable precursors. Consequently, the lineage of any 
text quickly approaches an impasse in the inevitable labyrinth of 
intertextual connections and combinations.4 2 
Not only does the concept of intertextuality affix its beam on each text's 
genealogy, but the formulation of "pre-textual" processes illumines each 
text's genesis in the individual writer. Thus semioticians attend closely to 
genre, not as a device for classifying works of literature, but as a generative 
principle whereby the writer's words become a communicable message. 
Genre serves, then, as a correlative principle of production and therefore 
of interpretation. Hence Todorov's remark that "a 'Ptolemaic' discipline 
cannot account for a 'Galilean' genre." 4 3 
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To semioticians the language of literature has yielded levels of rela-
tionship previously undiscovered or at least uncharted. The stress on codes, 
structures, and systems, on ensemble, is a constant among semiotic theories. 
The part is inspected as it performs in the larger configuration, without 
which it loses significance. In what Culler has called semiotics' "imperial-
ism," semioticians attend to the full range of areas of study directly or 
indirectly linked with the signifiers and signifieds of language—including 
animal communication, human clothing, codes such as the Morse and 
braille, and chemical symbols as well as natural and written languages.4 4 
Granted, semioticians have treated elements not excluded from earlier ap-
proaches to the study of literature. They have nonetheless metamorphosed 
the study of literary language into a discipline postmodern in its partial 
replacement of individual creativity—"what matters most" yet "must," ac-
cording to T. S. Eliot, "remain unaccountable"45—with enabling systems 
which determine individual endeavor while eluding individual control. 
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A Problem of Audience: A Semiotical 
Approach to the Deistic Elements in 
The Siege of Rhodes 
Andrew A* Tadie and James P- Mesa 
Sir William Davenant's The Siege of Rhodes was entered in the Sta-
tioners Register on August 27,1656: 
Entred . . . under the hand of Master Thrale warden, 
a maske called The Siege of Rhodes made a represen-
tation by the art of prospective in scenes, and the 
story sung in recitative music\e by Sr Willm 
Davenant, acted at ye back pte of Rutland House, at 
ye upper end of Aldersgatestreet.1 
The publisher is listed as "Hen. Herringman." 
The play, which was published in quarto a few days later, was not only 
welcomed by the English reading public who had been deprived of their 
plays by Parliamentary ban, but it also advertised that in a few days hence, 
in September of 1656, the play was to be acted. The advertisement promised 
the public even more than a play; it promised a spectacle of music and 
machinery, a spectacle with the richness of the royal masque but which 
now was no longer to be reserved for the court. William Davenant was 
able to accomplish this rather amazing feat of obtaining from the Puritan 
rulers permission to produce a public spectacle only because of his shrewd 
political and theatrical savvy. 
In some respects The Siege of Rhodes is the most epoch-marking play in 
the language because no single play has had a greater number of significant 
innovations which were subsequently adopted by English drama: it was the 
first opera produced in England; 2 it used elaborate moveable scenes and 
employed a proscenium arch for the first time on the English public stage; 
it included what is generally considered the first appearance of an actress 
on the English public stage; 3 and it was the first libretto which derived its 
plot from modern history instead of from classical history or mythology.4 
If his introduction of operatic conventions to England were the principal 
dramatic innovations that Davenant introduced, there were two other 
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innovations which could not go altogether unnoticed by his 17th century 
audience. The first is the character o£ Solyman. He is emperor of the 
Ottoman Empire and the pagan enemy of Christendom, but in this play 
he is more virtuous than Alphonso, the Christian hero. The second inno-
vation is the apparent violation of the Terentian Five-Act Structure. Not 
only was this the recognized dramatic structure for English drama since 
the 1570's, but Davenant's formulation of the Terentian Five-Act Structure 
in the introduction to Gondibert was a widely known statement regarding 
dramatic structure. Davenant's violation of this structure in not bringing 
closure to the main action, the political war, cannot have gone unnoticed. Yet 
to leave unresolved what had hitherto been regarded as the main action must 
force the reader to look elsewhere for the main action. What is thereby 
heightened is the relationship between the characters, especially the nevyly 
married lovers. 
The question arises as to why the 17th century's leading formulator of 
the Terentian Five-Act Structure would construct a play which would 
clearly violate its presumed guiding principles. There are two possibilities 
that would explain this. Either Davenant lacked the imagination and 
talent to construct The Siege of Rhodes in accordance with this structure, 
or, which is the more reasonable explanation given Davenant's dramatic 
background and political activism, he was about some purpose which 
could not be contained by adhering to that structure. 
In order to offer a plausible explanation as to why The Siege of Rhodes 
did not adhere to the Terentian scheme, our encounter with the text would 
have to yield some element which would have been discernible to Davenant's 
own audience. Now every encounter with a text, such as The Siege of 
Rhodes, is conditioned by what may be called the conceptual framework 
or semiotic set of the encountering-interpreter and the structural integrity 
of the encountered-text. The outcome of the encounter of the text and 
interpreter is the interpretant. The interpretants of different interpreters 
can be homologous only to the extent that the text is encountered with 
homologous semiotic sets. Communication between interpreters about a 
text is possible only to the extent that these "semiotic systems"5 possess a 
shared semiotic set. 
The problem identified in this paper involves semiotic systems encounter-
ing a text in two distinct historical eras. In an earlier work, "Sir William 
Davenant's The Siege of Rhodes and the Popularization of English Deism" 6 
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(portions of which are incorporated into this paper) we claimed that The 
Siege of Rhodes embodies the five basic tenets of Deism which were first 
set forth by Edward Lord Herbert of Cherbury. This claim is based on a 
critical study of the text The Siege of Rhodes, Herbert's De Religione 
Laid,7 a review of texts both contemporaneous and scholarly, and a survey 
of historical conditions in which the two principal texts arose, which is to 
say that the study utilized normal biographical, historical, and critical 
methods in the treatment of the text. 
The claim that The Siege of Rhodes embodies deistic tenets was then 
expanded to the position that the play contributed to the popularization of 
Deism in 17th century England. It is this judgment about popularization 
which gave rise to problems concerning semiotic process: the judgment im-
plies that the interpretants which resulted from our encounter with the 
text, The Siege of Rhodes, are homologous to the interpretants produced 
by the text on 17th century English interpreters, specifically those who saw 
the play when it was first performed. 
Every encounter with text is existential and as such is related to the 
interpreter's present semiotic set. However, some encounters with text can 
occur in what might be called a "diachronic" mode (not to be identified 
with Saussure's technical use of the term). The text is encountered in 
the present precisely for the reason of appropriating some past semiotic set. 
This encounter in a diachronic mode is, of course, synchronic for the 
interpreter himself. It becomes diachronic when he purports to possess as 
part of his own semiotic set a semiotic set, or at least relevant dimensions 
of it, which existed for some past interpreters. 
Thus a claim that The Siege of Rhodes relates to the popularization of 
Deism implies that a contemporary critic has possession of the relevant 
elements of the semiotic set which the original audience possessed. It 
implies something of an identification of minds from two different histori-
cal periods. It is taken as a given that such an appropriation of past semiotic 
sets is realizable to some degree. Indeed, this is the same assumption that 
lies behind the acceptance of the reality of communication. It is also taken 
for granted that there is a law-like character to the semiotic process.8 An 
account of how this appropriation or communication in general is possible 
is properly an epistemological-ontological task. 
Our purpose in this paper is more modest, namely to locate within the 
semiotic process itself the touch-points between the interpreter encountering 
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the text of The Siege of Rhodes in a diachronic mode (we as 20th century 
readers) and the interpreter encountering text in a "synchronic" mode (the 
17th century audience). This will allow for mutual interpretants produced 
by a text. In order to accomplish this we require an outline of a theory 
of interpretants which emphasizes the dynamics of the semiotic process. 
Such an outline will enable us to discern parallels and differences in dia-
chronic and synchronic encounters with a text. The model given is a 
Peircean one as utilized by James Collins in his Interpreting Modern Phi-
losophy? 
I. Interpretants: 
Proper significate effects or outcome of action of sign, 
determining an interpreter toward objects thus signified. 
II. Kinds of Interpretants: 
1. Immediate: 
peculiar interpretability of each sign, its own possibility 
of specifying an interpreting process. 
2. Dynamical: 
direct effect actually produced upon the individual inter-
preting mind or minds, distinctive actual uses of sign as: 
(a) emotional: feeling of recognition and familiarity. 
(b) energetic: action, especially mental effort with signs. 
(c) logical: development of meaning of intellectual gen-
eral concepts, telically ordered toward ultimate inter-
pretant. 
3. Final or Ultimate Logical: 
self-analytical habit deliberately formed, that effect which 
a sign would produce on any mind if the sign were 
sufficiently considered, worked out, and brought to fully 
developed meaning. Teleological unity of immediate and 
dynamic interpretants in a continuing, unrestricted com-
munity of interpreters. 
III. Semiosis: 
action of signs, their influence upon the interpreter as 
achieved through several kinds of interpretants. 
This Peircean model will help clarify the position of the two kinds of 
interpreters that we are comparing. A general account of interpretants has 
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already been incorporated in the previous paragraphs under the designation 
of the "semiotic set." The semiotic set is the total of interpretants possessed 
by the interpreter at any given time; it is the sum of effects of the actions 
of all signs that have determined the interpreter to objects signified. A 
semiotic set exists prior to the encounter with the text and so there will be 
significant differences in this regard between the critical scholar and Dave-
nant's contemporaries. For example, the respective semiotic sets account 
for the differences in the reasons why the encountering interpreters ap-
proached The Siege of Rhodes precisely as a complex sign promising in 
meaning. The authors approached the text in an academic setting which 
presented the text as an object for ongoing critical and historical study. 
Davenant's contemporaries would have approached it for completely dif-
ferent'reasons, some of which will be considered subsequently. 
Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that The Siege of Rhodes is a 
performed presentment, and the pre-eminent synchronic interpreters are 
those members of Davenant's audience who came to see the play because 
they had read it, the play being published as an advertisement prior to 
the production. As a result, the interpreter of today will be a reader whose 
interpretants are much closer to the 17th century reader who did not see 
the play than with either the auditor who did read the play or the auditor 
who did not. 
If we use the divisions of interpretants given in the Peircean model, we 
begin to get a sense of the enormity of the problems that attach to account-
ing for the possibility of comparing or reconstructing the interpretants of 
readers, auditors and reader-auditors. With respect to their respective 
immediate interpretants, there will be great differences among these in-
terpreters depending on whether they encountered The Siege of Rhodes as 
a concrete definite which is a printed text or as a concrete definite which 
is a dramatic presentment. The immediate interpretant, as the initial and 
unanalyzed possibility of further interpretants, is the encounter with sign 
precisely as a sign pregnant with as yet undisclosed meaning. The impor-
tance of the nature of the sign as a concrete definite is clearly recognized 
by contemporary semioticians in their discriminations between the semiotics 
of gestures, cinema, music, etc. 1 0 These divisions have their foundations in 
the complex unconscious physiological-psychological processes of perception, 
the study of which, with great relief, we acknowledge to be the province 
of our colleagues in psychology. 
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The interpretants of the scholar and the 17th century audience, after the 
initial encounter with The Siege of Rhodes, would ultimately have to be 
similar in some respects in order that a claim can be made that the popu-
larization of Deism is a function of the play. The respective interpreters 
would have to come to some shared non-arbitrary understandings about 
this play. These understandings would be the logical interpretants, one 
of which would have to be the proposition, uThe Siege of Rhodes promotes 
Deistic tenets." (Peirce held that logical interpretants could be concepts, 
propositions or arguments [5.491].) 
The development of logical interpretants is dependent upon factors 
which are readily identifiable by the scholar and which are to some extent 
those shared with the 17th century audience. The emotional interpretants 
of these disparate interpreters would be alike in significant respects; both 
would recognize the text as being a book containing a play written in the 
English language. There would be a sense of recognition, a feeling of 
familiarity (5.475 and 8.185). A sense of being "at home" with the text 
is born and is then nourished through energetic interpretants wherein the 
interpreter engages in activities as simple as picking up the text, leafing 
through the pages, reading random passages, and so on. These activities 
feed back on the emotional interpretants, increase the sense of recognition, 
and sustain the immediate interpretant. As the interpreter becomes more 
at home with the text and becomes increasingly aware of the interpreta-
bility of the text, the logical interpretants begin to develop. 
The relationship between the energetic interpretants of the scholar and 
those of Davenant's audience is perhaps more distant than their emotional 
ones. The reason for this is that the energetic interpretants of the scholar 
in approaching The Siege of Rhodes are all almost completely self-conscious. 
He is not at all likely to approach The Siege of Rhodes with the same 
casualness and ease as the synchronic interpreter: trips have to be made to 
the library, card catalogues must be perused, histories and commentaries 
read, notes taken, notes compared, and so on. For Davenant's audience The 
Siege of Rhodes was a topic of unusual current interest; it was an attempt 
to test the limits of governmental censorship in the name of morality, much 
as a pornographer of today incites public interest in testing the limits of 
governmental censorship in the name of freedom of the press. The ener-
getic interpretants of the reader of today are likely to be exercised for more 
scholarly or critical reasons, The Siege of Rhodes no longer being on our 
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current best-seller lists. With respect to the logical interpretants, the scholar 
may well attend to this aspect more arduously and self-consciously than 
the synchronic reader, and certainly more than the synchronic auditor. 
We are, of course, presenting in a very brief and simple fashion an 
account of what is in fact an incredibly rich and complex process. The 
dynamical interpretants are the warp and woof of a single fabric. Indeed, 
the interpreter engaged in the semiotic process of encounter with text is 
unlikely to be aware of the distinctions between the interpretants. The 
distinctions themselves are products of other semiotic processes which are 
then applied not to the encounter with text but to reflections about such 
encounters. 
The Peircean model identifies the logical interpretant as telically ordered 
to the final logical interpretant. At the heart of the matter is Peirce's belief 
that a sign, or in this case a text as sign, could be penetrated by a com-
munity of interpreters after an indefinite amount of criticism over an in-
definite amount of time. That is, that object, or objects, toward which a sign 
determines an interpreter can be realized. For every sign with cognitive 
dimensions (Peirce realized that not all signs have logical interpretants, 
5.482) there are logical interpretants upon which a community of critical 
interpreters would be fated to agree. This is not to say that such an 
agreement would in fact ever occur, but it does serve to exclude the posi-
tion of relativism, namely that one logical interpretant in relation to some 
given sign is as good as any other. The sign itself, within the context of 
the sign system in which it occurs, places constraints upon the conclusions 
of the community of interpreters; for example, it does not allow the logical 
interpretant that The Siege of Rhodes is a clarion call to capture the Kansas 
Turnpike. 
It should be noted that Peirce's final logical interpretant is not the sum 
of logical interpretants but is a "habit." The verbal formulations of propo-
sitions merely express the final logical interpretant which is itself the "living 
definition" (5.491). Peirce has in mind something comparable to the 
Aristotelian virtue of science (emcrTrjfxr}). Science is not a body of dead 
propositions collected in books which gather dust on library shelves. Science 
is not found in books; rather, science is the dynamic perfection of the 
theoretical abilities of reason. Science is an activity in conformity with the 
nature of reason. And like Aristotle, Peirce is aware that the human reason 
is bound to the conative dimensions of human nature and so the final logi-
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cal interpretant as activity cannot be separated from the emotional and 
energetic interpretants (5.476-7, 5.486-7, and 5.491). Our claim about the 
Deistic tenets in The Siege of Rhodes would be an expression of that habit 
formed in relation to that sign. 
From the point of view of the librettist, Davenant as a practical and 
accomplished poet must surely have realized that what he intended to be 
part of the meaning of his opera would not be manifested exactly. His inten-
tion would not correspond exactly to what he would write, and thus the 
diachronic reader can only understand the mind of the author imperfectly. 
Secondly, Davenant must have realized that his task at hand was more 
complex than just writing a poem or composing a libretto. With The 
Siege of Rhodes the text must work successfully as a libretto, that is, it 
must produce a good operatic performance, and it must work as a dramatic 
poem to those who read it. The Siege of Rhodes had to be constructed 
in order to be successful in two modes, and by contemporary accounts 
Davenant succeeded. Allowing for some differences in emotional and 
energetic interpretants then, some of the logical interpretants of Davenant, 
of the synchronic interpreter, and the diachronic interpreter should corre-
spond. Their views would all finally correspond if all of them were a 
part of that ideal community of interpreters. 
With this limited application of the Peircean account of interpretants 
to the historically separated interpreters of The Siege of Rhodes having 
been accomplished, we can see more clearly the ways in which the syn-
chronic reader and auditor approached the text differently than we 
diachronic readers approach it. Just what specific concepts Davenant's 
contemporaries were able to bring to their encounter with The Siege of 
Rhodes is a matter for literary scholarship; the present state of scholarship 
also defines the initial limits of the diachronic reader's understanding of 
The Siege of Rhodes. What follows is in effect an unfolding of some dy-
namical interpretants which have resulted from the authors' encounter 
with a text. 
Davenant's contemporary was likely to know that William Davenant was 
born in England some 50 years before The Siege of Rhodes and, as every 
biographer of Davenant relates, that Shakespeare was a frequent house-
guest of the Davenants. Some of them were aware that William Shake-
speare was not only William Davenant's legitimate godfather but perhaps 
his illegitimate father as well. This claim may have been initiated by 
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William Davenant himself, who, as Aubrey related, found his own poetic 
spirit more akin to Shakespeare's, than to his father's: 
Sir William would sometimes, when he was pleasant 
over a glasse of wine with his most intimate friends 
. . ., say, that it seemed to him that he writt with 
the very spirit that did Shakespeare, and seemed 
contented enough to be thought his son. 1 1 
Davenant was known as a prominent Royalist who received his early 
education in Oxford. He had left Oxford to become a page first to Frances, 
first Duchess of Richmond, and afterwards to Sir Fulke Greville. After 
Greville's murder in 1628 Davenant sought the preferment of court by 
writing plays and poems. 
Over 25 years earlier Davenant had written his first dramatic work, 
The Temple of Love, a masque which was published and produced in 
1634; this was Davenant's first important work. It was important because 
it had been acted by the Queen and her court at Whitehall; but more 
significant than the cast was the instruction which Davenant received from 
Inigo Jones, who constructed the scenery for the play and who was, with 
Davenant, a co-author. Davenant produced this play under the patronage 
of Charles I, and he remained under royal patronage until civil insurrection 
curtailed royal entertainments. 
Although Davenant's audience had never seen one, they knew that 
the masque was a favorite royal entertainment. Unlike the drama which 
they had seen, the masque was a drama based upon the Italian and French 
courtly entertainments, the Mascherata, Trionfo, Mascarade, and Ballet 
de cour and was more of a spectacle than their drama had been. The 
spoken word, the plot, and the characterization were not nearly as important 
as the spectacular effect of the formal processions, the music, the baroque 
scenes, and the stunning machinery. These entertainments were often 
enacted by players in elaborate costumes who represented mythical char-
acters rather than the more realistic characters of the Jacobean stage. The 
masque, an elaborate compliment to nobility, was an expensive and ex-
travagant private entertainment of and for the court. 1 2 
Visual and aural splendor were the special attractions of the masque, 
and it was these appeals that Davenant said he incorporated in The Siege 
of Rhodes. For this reason The Siege of Rhodes promised to be more 
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closely related to the entertainment of Charles I's court than with the 
popular drama of the earlier 17th century. In the masques the virtues 
given the greatest emphasis are civility and gentility. The dramatic conflict 
was between classical or mythological characters who represented either 
good or evil, the good or ideal characters often representing the king or 
queen or other members of nobility. Thus, in addition to entertaining the 
members of the court, the masque also flattered them. 
There was no doubt in the Puritan mind that Davenant had always 
been a royalist and needed to be watched. Davenant had successfully col-
laborated with Inigo Jones in writing several masques. The Queen herself 
had taken part in some of these, and she was so well pleased with Dave-
nant that he was afterwards allowed to title himself "Her Majesty's Servant." 
In 1639 Davenant had set down his pen and, still in the King's service, 
had taken up the sword. In this and in the following year the court had 
to face a military insurrection which the Puritan had every reason to 
believe in 1656 he had won totally. Davenant was a member of the van-
quished but valiant opposition. 
By June of 1645 military victory had been won by Parliament's new 
model army. The King made one last desperate attempt to gather strength 
by appealing to the Scots, but it was the Scots who later turned Charles 
over to Parliament for execution. With the ascendancy of Charles II, the 
royal cause had taken a new direction. Under the able advice of Lord 
Clarendon, the royal cause became less military and more political. The 
new direction allowed for compromise with Parliament. Davenant, a poet 
and a soldier, had little to do with this new tact; so, late in 1646 Davenant, 
with the rest of the Queen's entourage, began a rather sedentary life of 
exile in Paris. 
Probably much of what Davenant promised to present in The Siege of 
Rhodes he learned about in France. The new Italian art form, the opera, 
was performed there, and literary coteries were engaged in the most public 
of controversies. These French literary circles were reasserting the primacy 
of the epic as a literary form and adherence to the classical dramatic unities. 
This surely influenced Davenant in writing a new-style epic which would 
be modeled upon the Terencian five-act play. This epic poem, Gondibert, 
was well known in England. Gondibert had an elaborate moral purpose 
which Hobbes endorsed. The Siege of Rhodes promised to be a similar 
enterprise. It would have as its purpose the portrayal of a virtuous hero 
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who would serve as a model of conduct for the audience. Stories would be 
devoid of both gods and figurative language, and evil would be treated 
as some misapplication or excess of virtue. In this way even the portrayal 
of evil could be a good example to the reader. This all had the appearance 
of staunch puritan thinking, but it could not be overlooked that Davenant 
had been arrested and formally charged with treason in 1650. 
Davenant had soon set up household in Rutland House and devised a 
means to establish a legitimate drama. The Siege of Rhodes was the first 
fruit of these efforts. The published text of The Siege of Rhodes was an 
unabashed advertisement for a forthcoming performance. Davenant's first 
production was designed to test cautiously the way for full-fledged dramatic, 
or rather operatic, productions. The text promised epic-modeled enter-
tainment: The Siege of Rhodes, Made a Representation by the Art of 
Prospective in Scenes, and the Story Sung in Recitative Music. Davenant 
did much to satisfy Parliament: the performers were not actors but known 
musicians; an orchestra would accompany the singers and chorus and 
would perform between the acts; the story of the drama would not be 
spoken but would be sung throughout in recitative, and no one had heard 
such a thing in England before. 
The diachronic reader-scholar may with the aid of historical research 
discover more aspects of the details surrounding The Siege of Rhodes than 
the synchronic reader did, but almost certainly the synchronic reader 
was aware of additional meanings that the diachronic reader-scholar has yet 
to construct. He has discovered, what the original synchronic reader and 
auditor could never know, that The Siege of Rhodes would enjoy a great 
popularity throughout Davenant's lifetime. Davenant's work was, no 
doubt, popular for several reasons, and although the music has not sur-
vived, it was not the least reason for the popularity. The music of the play 
was popular in its own time as Samuel Pepys attests.1 3 
After the September, 1656, performances The Siege of Rhodes enjoyed 
several revivals. The revivals occurred in 1659, 1661, 1663 and 1667. The 
first revival, in 1659, was at the Cockpit. At this time Davenant published 
a new edition of The Siege of Rhodes, an edition based on the 1656 edition. 
Consequently, it is likely that the players followed this version rather than 
the expanded version which probably had not yet been written. 
In August, 1660, with the return of monarchy to England, Thomas 
Betterton and a small number of actors formed an acting company, and, 
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by agreement with Davenant, they acted at Salisbury Court and at the 
Cockpit. This was the company for which Davenant in 1662 acquired a 
nearly exclusive license to act. 1 4 This was the Duke's Company which 
acted at Lincoln's Inn Fields. 
The first work acted by the Duke's Company was an expanded version 
of The Siege of Rhodes. This was followed by a sequel, the second part of 
The Siege of Rhodes. Davenant's new style of theater was so popular that 
the term "opera" was soon applied by the public to any serious play which 
the Duke's Company performed. Modern English drama would have de-
veloped into a far different type of entertainment were it not for The Siege 
of Rhodes and the other similar presentments which Davenant produced 
during the Interregnum and well into the Restoration. 
Davenant resided at the playhouse in Lincoln's Inn Fields as a suc-
cessful impressario until his death on April 7, 1668. He was buried in 
Westminster Abbey. 
The elements of spectacle in the play have received critical attention, 
but the theme of the play and the way it is manifested in the construction 
and development of the plot have been given almost no critical attention. 
One of these aspects which has yet to be treated critically is the influence 
of the Deistic tenets on Davenant when he developed the plot and theme 
of The Siege of Rhodes. 
There is ample evidence for Davenant's interest in the religious and 
philosophical issues of his day. Davenant's epic poem, Gondibert, as 
already mentioned, was written to establish new epic conventions ac-
cording to the new philosophy. The "Preface" of the poem was written 
by Thomas Hobbes himself who was a close friend of Davenant and who 
had met and was well acquainted with Lord Herbert of Cherbury, the 
founder of Deism, and Davenant knew Lord Herbert's brother who was 
the censor for public entertainments. 
Although much has been said about the reason why Deism never 
enjoyed a vogue as a philosophical system, very little attention has been 
given to the influence Lord Herbert had on those who promulgated Deism 
and made its tenets popular, especially the poets and dramatists of the 
period. It is true that John Dryden, in his didactic poetic treatise, Religio 
Laid, written well over 50 years after Lord Herbert's De Veritate, argues 
against the tenets of Deism, 1 5 but the influence that is our concern here 
is not with John Dryden, the greatest English poet between Milton and 
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Pope, but with Sir William Davenant, mentor to Dryden and close friend 
to Thomas Hobbes. 
By the mid-17th century there were many attempts made in England 
to answer the religious skepticism that had for so long pervaded English 
philosophical and literary thought. Richard Hooker and the established 
Church appealed to a moderating ecclesiastical authority; the Puritans 
appealed to scripture. These two appeals were long established in Christian 
tradition. They were certainly current a hundred years earlier at the Protes-
tant disengagement. However, there was a third kind of answer to the 
skepticism of the period which was truly novel and had also a sense of 
that toleration which had made skepticism so persuasive. This third answer 
was English Deism. Its founder and original proponent was Lord Herbert 
of Cherbury, who early in his life formulated the tenets of a "true" basis 
for religious belief. Lord Herbert spent his entire life promoting these 
tenets and gathering disciples. 
Lord Herbert, who was a minor social and political figure that served 
as an English ambassador to France from 1618 to 1624, is notable not for 
any significant technical contribution to philosophical thought, but for 
perhaps being the first to insist ". . . that in order to be valid, faith (and 
faith of course implied authority, for no individual unsanctioned faith 
was recognized) must be justified by completely unhampered reason." 1 6 
Insistence for such justification is understandable given the strained 
intellectual and religious climate which was attributable to the revival 
of the classical Greek skepticism, as exemplified in the thought of Michel 
de Montaigne, and to the spectre of the religious revolution through-
out Europe. All claims to truth in science, morality, and religion were 
placed in jeopardy by the skeptical onslaught.17 Traditional ecclesiastical 
structures were challenged to provide credentials for their long presumed 
authority. Cherbury stepped into the breach with his attempt to identify 
basic religious truths and a proper attitude toward institutionalized religion. 
Cherbury 's De Veritate (1624) is a response to "skeptics and imbeciles" 
and purports to identify the kinds of truth that exist and the manner in 
which they can be obtained. The bulk of Cherbury's account is awkward 
and of little influence. What is of interest to our purpose is the class of 
intellectual, self-evident, and indubitable truths known as the "Common 
Notions." These truths are said to be in the possession of all sane and 
rational persons, and serve as the criteria for all other truths. Cherbury's 
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basic test as to whether a proposition is a Common Notion is that it has 
the universal assent of normal persons. There are immediate and obvious 
difficulties which we need not develop here, but we may note in passing 
that Cherbury has the dubious distinction of being the only thinker ex-
plicitly named by John Locke in his attack on innate ideas. 1 8 
Concerning religion there are five Common Notions which Cherbury 
calls the Catholic Articles. These constitute the heart of Cherbury's thought, 
which is in fact a philosophy of religion. 
1. That there is some supreme divinity. 2. That this divinity ought 
to be worshiped. 3. That virtue joined with piety is the best method 
of divine worship. 4. That we should return to our right selves from 
sins. 5. That reward or punishment is bestowed after this life is 
finished.19 
(1. Esse aliquod Supremum Numen. 2. Numen Mud coli debere. 
3. Virtutem cum pietate conjunctam optimam esse rationem Cultus 
Divini. 4. Resipiscendum esse a peccatis. 5. Dari Praemium vel 
Poenam post hanc vitam transactam.) 
For what teaching, purged of its obscurities and mysteries, does not 
incline that way? What mystery, indeed, has no regard to this? 
What finally is urged, because of God's mercy to mankind, but love 
and fear of God, charity towards one's neighbor, repentance, and 
hope of a better l i fe? 2 0 
(Quae enim illuc non vergit suis Ambagibus, Mysteriisque soluta 
Doctrina? Quodnam non hue spectat Mysterium? Quid tandem nisi 
Amor, Timor que Dei, Charitas in proximum, Paenitentia, Spesque 
melioris Vitae, ex Dei misericordia in humanuni Genus suadetur?) 
These Articles were first identified in the concluding section of the De 
Veritate and remained constant and insistent in the remainder of Cher-
bury's works, notably in the De Religione Laid (1645) and the De Religione 
Gentilium (1663). 
The De Religione Laid is addressed to the wayfarer or layman and 
gives counsel on how to decide what is the best religion. It encourages a 
comparative study of doctrines which yields some basic propositions that 
are evident to the intellect as true, and about which there is general agree-
ment. These are again the five above mentioned Common Notions or 
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Catholic Articles. "By these truths alone is the universe governed, and 
disposed to a better state; these therefore consider the catholic truths of 
the Church." 2 1 Any additional doctrines in any religion, and any matters 
o f ritual, are only products of "priest-craft" and custom. Since additional 
doctrines are not known to be true by reason, and since the rituals are 
accidental to the five Catholic Articles, they can be supported solely by ap-
peals to miracles and authority, and by threats of damnation. 
Cherbury does not claim that religious doctrines and practices are 
pernicious per se, but only that they are not known to be true and are 
really not necessary. He requires that they be compatible with the 
Catholic Articles. Consequently, the strident claim of religions to some 
exclusive franchise on salvation is impossible and contrary to reason. Sal-
vation must be universal. The honest and thoughtful wayfarer is not able 
t o " . . . worship a divinity which has deliberately and painstakingly 
created and permeated souls doomed to perish." 2 2 The wayfarer, the layman 
or true searcher after truth, is different than the priest who is only a pre-
server of religious mores and cultural practices. The capable wayfarer does 
not so much examine the validity of the claims of competing religions as 
devote himself to acts of virtue and piety, for worship consists primarily 
In acts of virtue and piety, and these serve as the basis for the best part 
of all religions. 
It will be argued . . . that if the people are steadfast only in the 
catholic truths something at least will be lost to religion. Perhaps. 
But nothing, certainly, will be lost to a pious life or to virtue; yet by 
virtue is God so well worshiped that I have called that religion the 
best which is best squared to its rule. 2 3 
In his Autobiography, Cherbury notes that one of the reasons that he 
insisted on these Catholic Articles was "that I found nothing that could be 
added to them which could make a man Really more vertuous and good 
when the afforesaid five points were rightly explicated." 2 4 Only a religion 
which is in keeping with the Catholic Articles can foster virtue and piety. 
It should be noted that Cherbury does not refer to virtue as being a criterion 
for the true religion but for the best religion. Thus, since all doctrines 
and all forms of worship are accidental to the tenets of the Catholic Articles, 
doctrines and rituals are matters of indifference, except perhaps for per-
sonal, social and cultural reasons. 
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One last observation is in order before moving to a further consideration 
of Davenant. In his Autobiography, Cherbury makes the following ob-
servation which is reflected in The Siege of Rhodes: 
. . . I dare say That a vertuous man [or, in the play, a woman] may 
not onely goe securely through all the Religions but all the Lawes 
in the world and whatsoeuer obstructions he meete obtayne both an 
Jnward peace and outward wellcome among all with whome hee 
shall negotiate or Converse.2 5 
Virtuous individuals, regardless of their religion, will respect one another 
and live in harmony with one another because their religion and conduct 
are grounded in the shared Catholic Articles. In The Siege of Rhodes 
Davenant fashioned his plot to promote a Deistic point of view in his 
audience. 
The plot of The Siege of Rhodes is divided into two closely woven parts. 
The first deals with the conquering of the Christian isle of Rhodes by the 
Turkish conqueror, Solyman the Magnificent. This part only provides a 
dramatic setting for the second part because the play ends before the 
military conflict is resolved. The central part of the play deals with the 
relationship of Alphonso, the Christian hero, his wife Ianthe, and Solyman 
himself. 
The play opens with the Grand Master of Rhodes and his Marshall 
debating with Alphonso, the hero. They see no reason why the newly 
married visitor should remain in Rhodes and fight what will be a losing 
battle with the Turks. In the meantime, Ianthe, Alphonso's wife and 
true model of virtue in the play, has sailed to Rhodes to assist her husband. 
However, she is captured by the Turkish fleet, the captain of which is so 
impressed with her virtue that he presents her to Solyman himself. Her 
virtue also overwhelms Solyman, who is no lusty polygamist in this play. 
He allows her to go to her husband and with a generosity inspired by 
Ianthe's virtue gives her and her new husband free passage from Rhodes 
back to their home. 
When Ianthe joyfully greets her husband with the good news, Alphonso 
has doubts about her conduct with what he considers a lecherous, pagan 
emperor. She tries to convince Alphonso of her virtue but is unsuccessful. 
In this debate neither is able to convince the other; so both resolve to die 
at Rhodes, Alphonso because he thinks he is a cuckold and is dishonored, 
and Ianthe because she has lost the love of her husband. 
Tadie and Mesa: A Problem of Audience 125 
Meanwhile, Solyman in preparing his attack on Rhodes debates with 
his two officers over the fate of the two lovers who have spurned his gen-
erosity, and he resolves that neither shall perish when he conquers Rhodes. 
The climax of the play occurs in the heat of battle. Alphonso must choose 
whether to save his former teacher or his wife who has been wounded in 
the fight. He finally decides that he has misjudged his wife's virtue, and 
he saves her. With the lovers reunited, the play ends even before Solyman 
conquers the island. 
The first act is in Rhodes. The problem is that Solyman will soon come 
and lay siege to Rhodes. Alphonso, the hero, will stay and fight because 
the pagan, barbarian infidels must be stopped. 
My Sword against proud Solyman I draw, 
His cursed Prophet and his sensual Law. 2 6 (I,i) 
The chorus ends the scene echoing: 
Our Swords against proud Solyman we draw, 
His cursed Prophet and his sensual Law. (I,i) 
In the second act there is the same hostile note, but this time in the 
opposing camp. Solyman says that Christians are 
. . . " o f t misled by mists of Wine, 
or blinder love the Crime of Peace. 
Bold in Adult'ries of frequent change; 
And ev'ry loud expensive Vice; 
Ebbing out wealth by ways as strange 
As it flow'd in by avarice. (II,ii) 
Immediately after these words Ianthe, the model of virtue, is brought 
before Solyman. He recognizes the virtue of this woman and immediately 
sees her virtuous love as transcending his previous understanding of Chris-
tianity. Ianthe comes before Solyman veiled, which shows her respect for 
Islamic customs regarding feminine modesty. Solyman responds to this 
gesture and to Ianthe's willingness to share her husband's fate in a way 
that is precisely opposed to his earlier beliefs about Christians; he responds 
to Ianthe's virtue in a virtuous way. 
In vertuous Love, thus to transcend thy Lord? 
Thou did'st thy utmost vertue show; 
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Yet somewhat more does rest, 
Not yet by thee expressed; 
Which vertue left for me to do. 
Thou great example of a Christian Wife, 
Enjoy thy Lord and give him happy Life. 
And as thy passage to him shall be free, 
So both may safe return to Cicily. (II,ii) 
As we would expect, in the second act the forces of white, that is, 
Ianthe, appear to overcome the forces of black Solyman's regard for 
virtuous conduct, and her bravery overcomes the belief that a foreign 
religion unlike one's own is inferior. Yet while Solyman recognizes 
Ianthe's inspirational virtue, in the third act Alphonso believes his wife's 
actions are hardly virtuous at all. It appears at the end of the act that, 
in spite of Ianthe's virtue, all may well come to be lost because of Alphonso's 
jealousy. Alphonso believes that it was Ianthe's physical beauty, not her 
virtue, that moved Solyman. 
It could even Solyman himself withstand; 
To whom it did so beauteous show 
It seem'd to civilize a barb'rous Foe. 
Of this your strange escape, Ianthe say, 
Briefly the motive and the way. (III,ii) 
Ianthe explains that she is free because Solyman is no barbarian at all but 
is as civil as the most gracious Christian king. 
All that of Turks and Tyrants I had heard, 
But that I fear'd not Death, I should have fear'd. 
I, to excuse my Voyage, urg'd my Love 
To your high worth; which did such pitty move 
That strait his usage did reclaim my fear; 
He seem'd in civil France, and Monarch there: 
For soon my person, Gallies, Fraight, were free 
By his command. ( I l l , ii) 
Alphonso's reply is filled with dramatic irony: 
This Christian Turk amazes me, my Dear! ( I l l , ii) 
Alphonso's assessment is that no enemy, no barbarian, no leader of the 
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Islamic religion with a carnal view of heaven could be motivated by any-
thing but lust and power. 
And Solyman does think Heav'ns joys to be 
In Women not so fair as she. 
'Tis strange! Dismisse so fair an Enemy ? 
She was his own by right of War. 
We are his Dogs, and such as she, his Angels are. 
O wondrous Turkish chastity! 
Oh Solyman this mistique act of thine, 
Does all my quiet undermine. ( I l l , ii) 
The climax does occur as expected in the fourth act. The jealous Alphonso 
orders his wife to leave him and return to Sicily while he will stay and die 
at Rhodes. Still not overcome by Ianthe's virtue as Solyman was earlier, 
he and the chorus vow to 
Drive back the Crescents, and advances the Cross, 
Or sink all humane Empires in our loss! (IV, iii) 
By the fifth act the audience knows Alphonso to be wrong, that the Turks 
are certainly as humane as the Christians. Davenant has convinced his 
audience that virtue and morality transcend all particular religions. The 
fifth act itself is a spectacular battle scene during which Alphonso learns 
that his wife has stayed to defend Rhodes, and so doing has been wounded. 
Alphonso, realizing his wife's virtue, leaves to save her from being over-run 
by the Turks. He, wounded in the process, is taken to Ianthe: 
Tear up my wounds! I had a passion, course, 
And rude enough to strengthen Jealousie; 
Who knows but I ill use may make 
Of pardons which I should not take 
For they may move me to desire to Live. (V, iii) 
Ianthe recognizes that his jealousy "was but over-cautious Love," or as 
Davenant said in Gondibert, excessive virtue. Alphonso responds: 
Draw all the Curtains and then lead her in; 
Let me in darkness mourn away my sin. (V, iii) 
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Thus the play ends with Alphonso repentant and Ianthe reconciled to her 
husband. 
Davenant has in this play created a plot that is unlike the conventions 
o£ earlier English Renaissance drama. Certainly virtuous heroines and 
jealous husbands are nothing new, but Solyman is another matter. Turks 
are not altogether unknown in English Renaissance drama: Atheists (i.e., 
irredeemable natural man), Mohammedans, and Christians engage in the 
most serious of military conflicts in the two parts of Marlowe's Tambur-
laine; and the difference between Christian and Islamic religion and custom 
contribute to the deception and downfall of Othello. 
Davenant's Solyman differs from the Turks which appear in earlier 
English dramas because Solyman comes to understand, as do the other 
major characters of the play, that the virtue and piety of a natural religion 
is superior to the intolerance and persecution characteristic of those religions 
which claim a direct and exclusive relationship with God. T o develop 
this concept dramatically, Davenant has applied Herbert's systematic treat-
ment of the five Common Notions which are, he says, the foundation of 
all natural religion.2 7 It is upon these five Common Notions that Davenant 
constructs his plot. The five tenets, again, are "Amor, Timorque Dei, 
Charitas in proximum, Paenitentia, Spesque melioris vitae. . . Both the 
Islamic and Christian religions promote love of God (Amor) and a belief 
in duty to God (Timor dei), the Moslems because of Mohammed, the 
Christians because of Christ. In the play it is Ianthe's virtue that prompts 
Solyman and Alphonso to broaden their understanding of the other's 
religion, a broadening which causes a greater sense of toleration and under-
standing between the two men (Charitas in proximum). Alphonso, after 
he realizes the error of his jealousy, feels extremely guilty and penitent 
(paenitentia). The forgiving Ianthe, alone, can give him hope (Spes) for 
a better life. Her virtue and piety have transcended the limit and even 
false beliefs which are generated by differing cultures and differing religions. 
At the end Davenant's characters Ianthe, Alphonso, and Solyman realize, 
as perhaps some of Davenant's audience have been led to believe, that 
natural virtues transcend the opposing doctrines of different religions. In 
this way Christianity can be finally reconciled with what was once consid-
ered barbarism. 
Davenant's treatment of deistic tenets in his play is not at first reading 
obvious, even to those synchronic readers who knew the works of Lord 
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Herbert. This is part of his dramatic art. Davenant could not afford to 
be too obvious about the matter because the Puritans were not to be offended 
at any cost. Secondly, Davenant prepared a libretto, not a philosophical 
treatise, and being an accomplished poet, he knew that he must keep his 
genre integral. 
If his introduction of operatic conventions to England were the principal 
dramatic innovations that Davenant introduced, there were two other inno-
vations which could not go altogether unnoticed. The first is the character 
of Solyman, who is one of the first examples of the "Good Sultan" 
motif. He is the pagan enemy of Christendom, but in this play he 
is more virtuous than Alphonso, the Christian hero. The second is the 
apparent violation of the Terencian Five-Act Structure. Not only was this 
the recognized dramatic structure for English drama since the 1570's, but 
Davenant's formulation of the Terencian Five-Act Structure in the intro-
duction to Gondibert was one of the most widely known statements regard-
ing dramatic structure, save Aristotle's, until the end of the 19th century. 
Davenant's violation of this structure in not bringing closure to the main 
action, the political war, cannot have gone unnoticed. Yet to leave unre-
solved what had hitherto been regarded as the main action must force the 
reader to look elsewhere for the main action. What is resolved is the 
relationship between the characters, especially the newly married lovers. 
Davenant with this innovative dramatic gesture implies that true reli-
gious norms for virtue reside within man himself. The recognition and 
practice of virtue is not limited to a particular culture or religion. Instead 
it is natural to man, and models for true virtue can be found anywhere. 
This rather lengthy discussion began with a presentation of the funda-
mentals upon which we make our claims about the presence of Deistic 
tenets in The Siege of Rhodes and its relation to the popularization of 
Deism. It was prefaced by the remarks that it was an unfolding of "Dy-
namic Interpretants" which resulted from the writers' encounter with text. 
The hub of our activity resided in the pragmatic dimensions of the "Dy-
namic Energetic Interpretants." These increased our sense of recognition 
and familiarity with the text, and led to specific "Logical Interpretants," 
i.e., our claims about Deism, which in turn presented signs within the 
text which further determined the interpreters toward objects thus signified. 
The domain of interpretants cannot be conceived narrowly nor statically. 
In reflecting on our findings in terms of the Peircean model, the reader 
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will no doubt be aware of the complexity of the process. The interpretants 
unfolded in the previous pages are presented as relative to the text The 
Siege of Rhodes, but within that process other signs, other texts were en-
countered to which the same Peircean model would apply. Further, 
the relation of The Siege of Rhodes as sign for the reader is a new factor 
in his semiotic process, as will be our discussion. 
The treatment of the text, The Siege of Rhodes, is given order and 
meaning within the Peircean teleological account of interpretants: signs 
determine interpreters toward objects and the relation of sign and inter-
preter is ordered to an ultimate logical interpretant. This serves to evoke 
what William James has called the "strenuous mood"; it encourages the 
reader of historically important texts to continued efforts in interpreting 
text and provides meaning to the links with the efforts of other interpreters. 
Only with the positing of something like an ultimate logical interpretant 
can the interpreter hope that his efforts make genuine contributions to 
literary criticism. 
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The Sign as a Structure of Difference: 
Derridean Deconstruction and Some of 
Its Implications 
G. Douglas Atkins 
A major force to be reckoned with in contemporary literary criticism is 
Jacques Derrida. Derrida's star has risen precipitously since his participa-
tion in 1966 in a Johns Hopkins international symposium, where he took 
structuralism, and particularly Levi-Strauss, to task and inaugurated de-
constructive criticism in America. The following year he published La 
Voix et le phenomene: introduction au probleme du signe dans la Phä-
nomenologie de Husserl, De la grammatologie, and L'ecriture et la differ-
ence, all of which are now available in English. In 1972 Derrida published 
three more books: La dissemination, Positions, and Marges de la Philoso-
phie. His monumental, and probably untranslatable, Glas appeared in 1974. 
That these books and various essays, several already available in English, 
are changing the face of literary criticism is apparent in several ways: Der-
rida and his theories have been embraced, in varying degrees, by such 
influential American critics and theorists as Paul de Man, Geoffrey Hart-
man, and J . Hillis Miller, all of Yale, where Derrida teaches each fall; 
numerous essays and books have begun to appear from others influenced 
by Derrida, including Joseph Riddel's study of William Carlos Williams, 
Pietro Pucci's recent book on Hesiod, Naomi Schor's study of Zola, and 
Howard Felperin's Shakespearean Representation; sessions on deconstruc-
tion have become prominent at the annual meeting of the Modern Language 
Association; journals devoted to deconstructive criticism, such as Glyph, are 
now published, and deconstructive criticism regularly appears in PMLA 
and Diacritics; and, not least important, frequent attacks on Derrideanism 
by traditionalist critics and scholars appear in publications ranging from 
The New Yor\ Times to The New Republic to Critical Inquiry. 
Among the charges in these attacks are the claims that Derrida and his 
followers are needlessly obscure and that deconstructive criticism is nihilistic 
and deeply antithetical to the so-called humanist tradition. Many of these 
charges stem, in my view, from a misunderstanding of Derrida. His work 
is admittedly complex, his arguments often convoluted, and his style in-
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creasingly difficult. Still, I hope to shed some light on Derrideanism and 
to clear away some of the confusions surrounding the theory that so many 
regard as threatening and dangerous. Though my effort here will be lim-
ited, I hope to provide the kind of general introduction and consideration 
that has rarely been attempted on Derrida; most discussions in which Der-
rida figures prominently assume a basic knowledge of his thought or else 
proceed to offer an alternative without themselves evincing a grounding in 
that thought. 
One cannot hope to understand Derrida apart from his undoing/pre-
serving of the concept of the sign central to modern linguistics. Modern 
linguistics is often said to begin with Ferdinand de Saussure's Cours de 
linguistique generale.Cvxohzkk] Saussure's most important argument was 
that no intrinsic relationship obtains between the two parts of the sign, 
the signifier and the signified. In his own words, "The bond between the 
signifier and the signified is arbitrary. . . . the linguistic sign is arbitrary?1 
This is due to the differential character of language. Because the sign, 
phonic as well as graphic, is a structure of difference, signs being made 
possible through the differences between sounds, that which is signified 
by the signifier is never present in and of itself. Word and thing, word 
and thought, sign and meaning can never become one. 
Derrida plays constantly with this discovery that the sign marks a place 
of difference. But whereas Saussure and Saussurian semiology rest with the 
binary opposition signifier/signified, Derrida puts such terms sous rature, 
that is, "under erasure." He writes a word, crosses it out, and prints both 
word and deletion, for though the word is inaccurate it is necessary and 
must remain legible. This idea of sous rature is an analogue of the undoing/ 
preserving play that everywhere characterizes, indeed creates, Derridean 
thought ("Neither/nor is at once at once or rather or rather"2) and so 
distinguishes it from Saussurian. 
Derrida carefully analyzes the sign and the concept of difference, noticing 
several things. He recognizes, first of all, that the possibility of the sign, 
the substitution of the sign for the thing in a system of differences, depends 
upon deferral, that is, putting off into the future any grasping of the "thing 
itself." But space as well as time bears on the concept of difference in a 
fundamental way. The temporal interval, the deferring into the future of 
any grasping of the thing, irreducibly divides all spatial presence. In other 
words, if perception of objects depends upon perception of their differences, 
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each present element must refer to an element other than itself. The never-
annulled difference from the completely other precisely opens the possibility 
of thought. As Jeffrey Mehlman has remarked, "Derrida's effort has been 
to show that the play of difference, which has generally been viewed as 
exterior to a (spatial or temporal) present, is, in fact, always already at work 
within that present as the condition of its possibility."3 
Involved in the constitution of the sign, according to Derrida, is the 
"trace" of a past element that was never fully present. That element was 
never fully present because it must always already refer to something other 
than itself. This "trace" refers to what can never become present, for the 
interval separating sign from thing must always reconstitute itself. Now it 
would seem that Derrida has unarguably gone beyond Saussurian linguistics, 
for as Alan Bass has written, "Any other alternative, any attempt to save 
the value of full presence would lead to the postulation of a point of origin 
not different from itself (an in-different origin), thus destroying the essen-
tially differential quality of language."4 Derrida coins the word differance 
to describe the structure of the sign, which is always already marked by 
both deferring and differing (both senses occur, of course, in the French 
verb differer). 
A few more remarks may be in order here on the important "trace," 
which creates the undoing/preserving that I have called fundamental to 
Derrida's thought. After defining "trace" as "the part played by the radi-
cally other within the structure of difference that is the sign," Gayatri 
Spivak proceeds to term it "the mark of the absence of a presence, an always 
already absent present, of the lack at the origin that is the condition of 
thought and experience."5 Because the structure of the sign is determined 
by the "trace" or track of that other which is forever absent, the word 
"sign" must itself be placed "under erasure." Derrida writes, "the s i g n ^ 
that ill-named t l ^ g , the only one, that escapes the instituting question of phi-
losophy: 'what is . . . ? ' " 6 The "trace" thus destroys the idea of simple 
presence, the desire of which, argues Derrida, characterizes Western meta-
physics. The idea of origin is similarly destroyed, for origin is always other 
than itself, the idea of origin depending upon the production of temporal 
and spatial difference that must precede any origin. 
Derrida would thus replace semiology with grammatology. "The sign 
cannot be taken as a homogeneous unit bridging an origin (referent) 
and an end (meaning), as 'semiology,' the study of signs, would have it. 
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The sign must be studied 'under erasure,' always already inhabited by the 
trace of another sign which never appears as such."7 The term "grammatol-
ogy" is itself expressive of Derridean strategy, for it reflects an unresolved 
contradiction. Whereas the "gramme" is the written mark, the sign "under 
erasure," "logos" is at once "law," "order," "origin," and "phone," the voice. 
What the "gramme" does, as I have suggested, is precisely to deconstruct 
the authority of the "logos" and so of the privilege always afforded to the 
spoken word, itself supposedly an indication of presence. Grammatology is, 
then, as a term an example of sous rature, of the undoing yet preserving of 
apparent opposites. The undoing is, of course, no more necessary than the 
preserving, for without the latter another term would be privileged in a new 
hierarchy, simple opposition being maintained though reversed, and the 
"trace" ignored. With the "trace," however, one thing is defined not simply 
by its difference from another but by its difference from itself, a "trace" of 
the radically other always already being present. Derrida is perhaps most 
forceful on this point in his 1966 deconstruction of Levi-Strauss, where he 
undoes yet preserves the latter's well-known binary opposition engineer/ 
bricoleur: "From the moment that we cease to believe in such an engineer 
. . . as soon as it is admitted that every finite discourse is bound by a certain 
bricolage, . . . the very idea of bricolage is menaced and the difference in 
which it took on its meaning decomposes."8 
It is fair to say, with Spivak, that Derrida is thus asking us "to change 
certain habits of mind: . . . the origin is a trace; contradicting logic, we 
must learn to use and erase our language at the same time." 9 The impli-
cations of this are numerous and radical, for they reach, attack, subvert the 
roots of Western thought, defined by Derrida as logocentric and funda-
mentally desirous of presence. The desire of presence appears, in J. Hillis 
Miller's words, as "Time as presence, the other as presence, the presence 
of consciousness to itself, language as the pure reflection of the presence of 
consciousness, literary history as a history of consciousness, the possibility 
of reaching an original presence from which all the others derive." 1 0 Since 
Miller has admirably described the way in which Derrida deconstructs this 
fundamental desire of presence at every turn, and since it should be clear 
from my own account above how differance renders presence in these 
senses impossible, I shall not dwell on the point but turn instead to others 
not so well treated in the commentary. 
We might begin with the question of truth. In brilliant analyses of 
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Plato, 1 1 Derrida associates writing, the structure of difference marked by 
the "trace," and so the disappearance of a present origin of presence, with 
the Platonic idea of epe\eina tes ousias (the beyond of all presence). Be-
cause Plato posits that which cannot be viewed directly (i.e., the sun) as the 
origin of the visible, Derrida is able to demonstrate that the presence of the 
thing itself, the unity of referent and signified, is inseparable from the 
concept of grammatical difference. If the origin of the thing itself is, as 
Plato asserts, the invisible "beyond" of all presence, the thing itself can 
obviously never be present. Truth defined as absolute presence, as presence 
of the eidos, thus becomes simultaneously possible and impossible. As the 
"trace" requires, the thing itself is doubled, true and not-true. This du-
plicity, born with the "trace," is what makes truth possible, thereby destroy-
ing truth. Contradicting logic, Derrida thus undoes/preserves "truth." I 
might point out in passing that such alogical moments in Derrida, and they 
are obviously basic to his thought, render him suspect in traditionalist minds, 
but what is too easily neglected is the exacting and rigorous nature of these 
deconstructions. Nothing could be less subjective and less arbitrary. 
An important immediate consequence of the never-annulled "trace," 
and so of truth/untruth, is the ubiquity of textuality. That "the central 
signified, the original or transcendental signified" is revealed to be "never 
absolutely present outside a system of differences . . . extends the domain 
and the interplay of signification ad infinitum."12 Bass is correct in stating, 
"Once one has determined the totality of what is as 'having been' made 
possible by the institution of the trace, 'textuality,' the system of traces, 
becomes the most global term, encompassing all that is and that which 
exceeds i t . " 1 3 According to Derrida, there is simply nothing outside textual-
ity, outside " . . . the temporalization of a lived experience which is neither 
in the world nor in 'another world' . . . not more in time than in space, 
[in which] differences appear among the elements or rather produce them, 
make them emerge as such and constitute the texts, the chains, and the sys-
tems of traces." 1 4 Derrida proposes, in fact, a "double science," a science of 
textuality. Once we rethink the metaphysical concept of "reality" in "tex-
tual" terms (there are no philosophical regulations of truth, the thing itself 
being a sign and all "facts" being in "fact" interpretations, as Nietzsche 
argued), we are left with a world of texts, all of which possess a certain 
"fictive" or "literary" quality. In this situation of the fictionality of things, 
literature seems to occupy a privileged place, though now all texts, includ-
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ing philosophical and scientific ones, come to be understood as also Active. 
In this pervasive breakdown of the relationship to truth and reality, 
literary criticism is no more exempt from textuality than philosophical and 
scientific works. Whether or not it has traditionally done so, criticism now 
decides the meaning of a text. Criticism too is a desire of presence. But 
"meaning" as a privileged term refers to something outside textuality, out-
side the system of differences: "a text's meaning is the truth that is present 
'behind' or 'under' its textual surface that criticism makes fully present by 
placing it before us." 1 5 The "trace," of course, makes meaning so conceived, 
like truth and presence, impossible. To repeat, there is no originating, privi-
leged signified outside the system of differences and so no "meaning." 
The deconstructive critic, in practice, tries to avoid the strong ultimate 
temptation to seek meaning. Such a temptation is inevitable, for we nat-
urally want to resolve contradictions and to break out of the endless chains 
of substitutions, which "condemn" us to endless interpretation. We desire 
a haven outside contingency and temporality, which "meaning," "truth," and 
an originating signified offer. Indeed, the fact of dijferance seems responsi-
ble for this situation: it generates the desire to do the impossible, to unify, 
to locate a reference outside the system of differences that will bestow 
meaning, "making equal" as Nietzsche puts it (his term is Gleich machen). 
In any case, author and critic share the desire, and the deconstructive critic 
must be acutely conscious of the desire in both the authors he studies and 
in himself. As Spivak writes, "The desire for unity and order compels the 
author and the reader to balance the equation that is the text's system. The 
deconstructive reader exposes the grammatological structure of the text, 
that its 'origin' and its 'end' are given over to language in general . . . by 
locating the moment in the text which harbors the unbalancing of the equa-
tion, the sleight of hand at the limit of a text which cannot be dismissed 
simply as a contradiction."1 6 
The deconstructive critic, therefore, aware of the differential quality of 
language and recognizing the fact of the "trace," seeks the moment in any 
text when its duplicity, its dialogical nature, is exposed. Here, as elsewhere, 
Freud anticipates deconstructive procedure. In The Interpretation of 
Dreams, for example, he suggests that the reader or interpreter should direct 
his gaze where the subject is not in control: "There is often a passage in 
even the most thoroughly interpreted dream which has to be left obscure. 
. . . At that point there is a tangle of dream-thoughts which cannot be 
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unravelled and which moreover adds nothing to our knowledge of the 
content of the dream." Derrida extends this point, modifying it: it is the 
case that such a tangle adds nothing to our knowledge of the content of 
the dream-text in terms of what it sets up by itself. "If, however, we have 
nothing vested in the putative identity of the text or dream, that passage 
is where we can provisionally locate the text's moment of transgressing the 
laws it apparently sets up for itself, and thus unravel—deconstruct—the very 
text." 1 7 The deconstructive critic thus seeks the text's navel, the moment 
when any text will differ from itself, transgressing its own system of values, 
becoming undecidable in terms of its apparent system of meaning. 1 8 "Read-
ing must always," says Derrida, "aim at a certain relationship, unperceived 
by the writer, between what he commands and what he does not command 
of the patterns of the language that he uses. This relationship is not a 
certain quantitative distribution of shadow and light, of weakness and 
force, but a signifying structure that critical reading should produce."1 9 This 
undoing, made necessary by the "trace," and so by the duplicitous quality 
of words and texts, must not be confused with the simple locating of a 
moment of ambiguity or irony that is somehow incorporated into a text's 
system of (monological) meaning; rather, it is the moment that threatens 
the collapse of that entire system. 
Nor is it enough simply to neutralize the binary oppositions of meta-
physics. Derrida insists that there is always "a violent hierarchy. One of 
the two terms controls the other (axiologically, logically, etc.), holds the 
superior position. To deconstruct the opposition is first . . . to overthrow 
the hierarchy." 2 0 But only first, for another necessary step follows in which 
the reversal just effected must be displaced and the apparent winning term 
placed sous rature. To reverse the hierarchy, then, only in order to displace 
the reversal; to unravel in order to reconstitute what is always already in-
scribed. As we have seen at every point, the "trace" creates this undoing/ 
preserving oscillation. It is an oscillation that continues endlessly, for one 
deconstructive act leads only to another, a deconstructive reading being 
subject itself to deconstruction. No text, it is clear, is ever fully decon-
structing or deconstructed. 
Having discussed some of the important implications of Derrideanism, 
I wish now to consider major charges levelled at the position. Earlier I 
mentioned three specific charges brought against Derrida and his followers 
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(obscurity, nihilism, and threatened destruction of humanistic values), and 
to these I return. 
Undeniably, Derrida's work, as well as that of his "disciples," is demand-
ing and difficult. It is also different from the prose we in America and 
England are accustomed to. I submit, however, that Derrida et al. are not 
perversely obscure. Part of the problem is that Derrida draws on authors 
we know hardly at all, notably Nietzsche and Heidegger and, moreover, 
that he deals with abstract issues alien to the Anglo-American empirical 
tradition. Another real difficulty lies, I think, in our expectations as read-
ers, for most of us, more influenced by British empiricism than we would 
care to admit, expect language, and especially literary-critical language, to 
be a mirror reflecting truly the nature and contents of the "object" being 
described. Derrida's point, as we have seen, is precisely that writing is 
never a simple means for the presentation of truth. What this means, in 
part, is that even criticism and philosophy must be read scrupulously and 
critically, teased for meaning; they must, in other words, be interpreted and 
in exactly the same way as poetry, for example. Language always carries 
the "trace," whether the text in question be poetic, critical, philosophical, 
psychological, or what have you. Language may be a medium in a ghostly 
sense (as Geoffrey Hartman puckishly suggests), but it cannot be a medium 
in the sense of a neutral container of meaning. Derrida and his followers 
not only advance this argument but they also frequently, increasingly, ex-
press these points in the form in which they write. In Glas, for example, 
Derrida consciously cultivates a plural style, ä la Nietzsche, as a way of 
confounding apparent opposites and switching perspectives. 
Sometimes linked with the charge of obscurity is the claim that Der-
rideanism leads to the abandonment of the usual interpretive procedures. 
This claim, as well as the charges of nihilism and antihumanism, is made 
by, among others, M. H. Abrams in a response to J. Hillis Miller's review 
of the former's Natural Supernaturalism. Abrams' essay, entitled "The 
Deconstructive Angel," is perhaps the most influential attack on Derridean-
ism to date. 2 1 According to Abrams, deconstructive criticism places even 
the most arbitrary reading on an equal footing with the most rigorous, 
for there appears no way of determining right from wrong readings. But 
Miller, for one, explicitly denies that "all readings are equally valid or of 
equal value. Some readings are certainly wrong. Of the valid interpreta-
tions all have limitations. To reveal one aspect of the work of an author 
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often means ignoring or shading other aspects. Some approaches reach 
more deeply into the structure of the text than others." 2 2 In practice de-
constructive criticism is certainly not arbitrary or slipshod. A look at such 
deconstructionists as Miller and Paul de Man will show just how rigorous 
and exacting such an interpretive procedure can be. The theory itself, on 
which this practice depends, insists, despite what Abrams says, on using 
customary interpretive procedures. Deconstructive criticism goes with 
traditional reading, preserving as well as undoing. According to Spivak, 
a deconstructive critic first deciphers a text "in the traditional way," and 
Derrida is even more direct on this point: "[Without] all the instruments 
of traditional criticism, . . . critical production would risk developing in 
any direction at all and authorize itself to say almost anything. But this in-
dispensable guardrail has always only protected, it has never opened, a 
reading." 2 3 Failing to understand the "trace," Abrams, like other opponents 
of Derrida, focuses on the undoing side of the undoing/preserving oscillation. 
Should deconstruction allow for the creation in a text of simply any 
meaning the reader or interpreter wished, it would, I think, deserve the 
epithet "nihilism." I am giving the name "nihilism" to that situation 
wherein the mind is regarded as the arbiter, even the creator, of all values. 
According to Miller, in a book written before he knew Derrida, "Nihilism 
is the nothingness of consciousness when consciousness becomes the founda-
tion of everything." 2 4 I wish now to consider the question of nihilism in 
Derrida, hoping that we will emerge with a better understanding of his 
position. I shall focus on nihilism in the sense given above, believing that 
the results of such an inquiry will at least suggest the way a response would 
go to other aspects of nihilism. 
As I remarked in passing earlier, the original and originating differen-
tiation seems to generate the dream of primal and final unity, which is, 
however, always deferred, never present here and now. We can never 
"make equal" or get outside the generating system of differences to locate 
a reference that will bestow order and meaning. There is no Transcen-
dental Signified, we might say, only incarnation. Myth, though, as Herbert 
N. Schneidau well argues, serves to make us think that totalization and 
meaningfulness are possible, comforting us with reassurances regarding a 
"cosmic continuum." 2 5 But still the gap remains, no matter how hard we 
try to close it. Perhaps the humanistic tradition is best described as one 
attempt at closure, positing a meaningful world. 
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For Derrida, like Nietzsche before him, this attempt reveals the force 
of desire and the will to power.. Whether we speak of a written text or 
life, to have meaning reflects the will to power. Miller puts it well in his 
review of Abrams' Natural Sup er naturalism, the oxymorons of which title 
express "the force of a desire" for unity: "The reading of a work involves 
an active intervention on the part of the reader. Each reader takes posses-
sion of the work for one reason or another and imposes on it a certain 
pattern of meaning." Miller goes on to point out that in the third book 
of The Will to Power Nietzsche relates "the existence of innumerable in-
terpretations of a given text to the fact that reading is never the objective 
identifying of a sense but the importation of meaning into a text which 
has no meaning 'in itself'." 2 6 According to Nietzsche, "Our values are 
interpreted into things"; " 'Interpretation,' the introduction of meaning— 
not 'explanation' (in most cases a new interpretation over an old interpreta-
tion that has become incomprehensible, that is now itself only a sign)"; 
"Ultimately, man finds in things nothing but what he himself has imported 
into them"; "In fact, interpretation is itself a means of becoming master of 
something."27 Man gives—creates—meaning, then, expressing a will to 
power as he attempts to improve upon the way things are. 
For Nietzsche and Derrida the question is what to do with the recog-
nition that meaning is a construct brought by the "subject," a fiction made 
by the force of our desire. Subjectivists and at least some hermeneuticists 
and Bultmannians seem all too ready to accept a situation which appears 
to privilege the autonomous consciousness, reversing previous hierarchies 
and installing fiction in the place of truth and reality. Taken only so far, 
Nietzsche himself may be viewed as agreeing with this sense of the fiction-
ality of things whereby "believing is seeing" and interpretation is all there 
is. Clearly, Derrida is not nihilistic in the sense I defined above, for he 
insists throughout that consciousness is no origin, no foundation, there 
being no foundation. He undoes the truth/fiction, reality/consciousness 
polarities but not, with the advocates of the autonomous consciousness, so 
as to set up the second term in the place of the first. Fiction can no more 
exist without truth than truth without fiction; they are accomplices, the 
system of differences and the "trace" making truth (im) possible. By the 
same token, the subject "in itself," as center, origin, and goal, is no more 
possible than the object "in itself." 
In Derrida, Miller, and others appears a radical understanding of the 
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fictionality of things, which goes beyond nihilism and.the autonomous 
consciousness to a recognition of the doubleness of what is, of the com-
plicity of truth and fiction. Deconstructionists wish to avoid the interpre-
tive mastery or closure that imports meaning into texts and the world. 
Dangers lurk, of course, including the strong possibility that "the desire of 
deconstruction may itself become a desire to reappropriate the text actively 
through mastery, to show the text what it 'does not know'." Even the decon-
structive critic forgets that his own text is necessarily self-deconstructed. He 
assumes that he at least means what he says. Indeed, even if he declares 
his own vulnerability, his statement occurs in the controlling language of 
demonstration and reference. The situation is frustrating but humbling— 
and inescapable—allowing still another glimpse of the vanity of human 
wishes. Struggling with the desire of deconstruction, Spivak describes the 
situation as follows: 
a further deconstruction deconstructs deconstruction, both as the 
search for a foundation (the critic behaving as if she means what 
she says in her text), and as the pleasure of the bottomless. The tool 
for this, as indeed for any deconstruction, is our desire, itself a 
deconstructive and grammatological structure that forever differs 
from (we only desire what is not ourselves) and defers (desire is 
never fulfilled) the text of our selves. Deconstruction can therefore 
never be a positive science. For we are in a bind, in a 'double (read 
abyssal) bind,' Derrida's newest nickname for the schizophrenia of 
the 'sous rature.' We must do a thing and its opposite, and indeed 
we desire to do both, and so on indefinitely. Deconstruction is a 
perpetually self-deconstructing movement that is inhabited by differ-
ance. No text is ever fully deconstructing or deconstructed. Yet the 
critic provisionally musters the metaphysical resources of criticism 
and performs what declares itself to be one (unitary) act of decon-
struction.2 8 
Still, deconstruction may disillusion us about mastery as it demonstrates 
just how precarious our grasp on meaning is. We are and are not masters, 
therefore no masters. But we must be careful not to fall into the trap of 
believing in linear progress, supposedly resulting from this enlightenment 
and demystification. Nor should we pine with a Rousseauistic (and hu-
manist?) nostalgia for a lost security as to meaning which we never in 
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fact possessed. Rather than with either faith in progress or nostalgia for 
"lost" presence, Derrida would have us look with a "Nietzschean affirma-
tion—the joyous affirmation of the freeplay of the world and without truth, 
without origin, offered to an active interpretation . . . . [This affirma-
tion] plays the game without security." This "interpretation of in-
terpretation," Derrida adds, which "affirms freeplay . . . tries to pass 
beyond man and humanism, the name man being the name of that being 
who, through the history of metaphysics or of ontotheology—in other 
words, through the history of all of his history—has dreamed of full pres-
ence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of the game." 2 9 
For Derrida, as for Schneidau discussing the mythological consciousness, 
the humanist tradition represents mastery, totalization, closure, nostalgia 
for a full presence, and the desire of meaning. The charge that Derrida 
threatens this tradition is, obviously, valid. Yet, as we have seen, that threat 
is by no means either nihilistic or simply negative. For many, Derrideanism 
offers a way through—if not out of—what Schneidau calls "the bankruptcy 
of the secular-humanist tradition." 3 0 Indeed, in Sacred Discontent Schnei-
dau links Derrida with a very different tradition, the Yahwist-prophetic, 
arguing that Derrida's work is consonant with the Biblical message, which 
always goes counter to the mythological sense of a "cosmic continuum." 
Derridean deconstruction, according to Schneidau, is akin to the way in 
which the Bible insists on the fictionality of things, alienating us from 
the world, which it empties of meaning, reminding us constantly of the 
vanity of human wishes. Yet the Bible's attitude is always ambivalent, at 
once criticizing and nourishing culture. Schneidau's highly suggestive, and 
somewhat surprising, argument is far too complex for me to summarize 
here. A good idea of the nature of that argument, however, may be gleaned 
from the end of the chapter "In Praise of Alienation," which presents 
differance as far from nihilistic and which sees Derrida as, like the Bible, 
a positive alternative to mythological and humanist understanding: 
we are [always] open to sudden revelations of meaninglessness or 
arbitrariness. . . . Sooner or later we are afflicted by the feeling that 
nothing matters, or "makes any difference," i.e., that we are unable 
to supply the differentiations which in primitive cultures are articu-
lated by myth, so that our lives and purposes are reduced to entropy. 
We may flee to various cults, but doubt will have its turn at these. 
Thus latent Yahwism works within us, leavening all the lump. We 
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are condemned to freedom, not because God is dead but because 
he is very much alive, as an agent of disillusionment in a basic sense. 
In this condition, it is not remarkable that we are nihilistic: what is 
remarkable is that we can become aware of it and can acknowledge in-
termittently the "nothingness of consciousness when consciousness 
becomes the foundation of everything." So with all self-deceptions: 
their extent is not as remarkable as our awareness of them. We have 
reached out for the apple of self-knowledge, and in doing so have 
alienated God, nature, and each other; but by pressing our self-
awareness to its extreme, where we become alienated from ourselves, 
we find that this is not the end of the story. The Fall is only the 
beginning of the Bible. To be thus "decentered" (and . . . to be 
acutely conscious of the fictionality of things) is the precondition of 
insight: thus it is a felix culpa, good news for modern man of a 
somewhat unlikely kind. 3 1 
Whether Schneidau is right about the ultimately Biblical and Yahwist 
nature of Derrida's thought is a most important question but beyond the 
scope of this paper to determine. What we can say here is that Schneidau 
does not come to grips with Derrida's insistence that differance "is not 
theological, not even in the most negative order of negative theology. The 
latter . . . always hastens to remind us that, if we deny the predicate of 
existence to God, it is in order to recognize him as a superior, inconceivable, 
and ineffable mode of being." 3 2 For our limited purposes in the present 
essay, whether Schneidau is right or wrong about Derrideanism (despite 
reservations I, for one, think he is in the main correct) is less important 
than the possibility he suggests of Derrideanism as an attractive, and posi-
tive, alternative to nihilism, the autonomous consciousness, and "the bank-
ruptcy of the secular-humanist tradition." 
It may be, as Schneidau suggests, that Derrida offers a long-awaited 
alternative to certain forms of nihilism. Certainly the challenge he offers 
cannot be ignored. Since it is unlikely that either benign neglect or wishing 
will make deconstruction go away, we must come to grips with it, explore 
its implications, and evaluate it fairly. There are signs that just this kind of 
thoughtful analysis is underway in religion and theology as well as in 
criticism and philosophy.33 Much remains to be done, the work will be 
difficult, but the prospects are exciting. 3 4 
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Toward a Poetics of the Ironic Sign 
Leon Satterfield 
In 1924, the American poet Edwin Arlington Robinson found out the 
hard way about the fragility of the ironic sign: he published a sonnet, 
"New England," which was generally regarded in his hometown, Gardiner, 
Maine, as an attack on his native region. A counterattack in the form of 
chauvinistic versifying and angry letters came in the local weekly news-
paper, and Robinson finally felt obliged to explain in a page-one letter to 
his townsmen that his sonnet was supposed to be ironic, an attack not on 
his homeland, but upon the "patronizing pagans" who are "forever throw-
ing dead cats at New England. . . . " He concluded his detailed explication 
of his own sonnet with this rueful observation: "Interpretation of one's 
own irony is always a little distressing. . . ." 1 
Robinson's difficulty is familiar to anyone who has ever taught a litera-
ture class. Irony gives us trouble, pervading as it does our modern liter-
ature.2 Because the ironic sign is by nature unstable, we find it confusing— 
when we find it at all. And because what it implies often opposes what it 
says explicitly, ignorance of the conventions by which it functions can be 
disastrous to anyone trying to make sense of a work. 
What I propose here, in a tentative and partial way, is the formulation 
of a poetics of the ironic sign, something like what Jonathan Culler calls 
for when he argues that "the task of literary theory . . . is to make explicit 
the procedures and conventions of reading, to offer a comprehensive theory 
of the ways in which we go about making sense of various kinds of texts." 3 
Some have denied that you can do that with irony, which D. C. Muecke 
calls "a phenomenon so nebulous that it disappears as one approaches."4 
J . A. K. Thomson traced irony to its Greek origins, but he makes no effort 
to talk about it in the abstract: "There is, in fact, no such thing as Irony 
in the abstract . . . whatever generalizations we may permit ourselves to 
make can never (to be worth anything) be based on a priori considerations. 
. . ." 5 And A. E. Dyson, in his introduction to a collection of essays on 
irony, writes: "My main contention is that no embracing theories or criteria 
are possible and that the attempts to seek for them are invariably mis-
placed."6 
One more misplaced attempt will probably do no permanent harm. I 
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propose, then, to consider the following questions: What is an ironic sign ? 
How can the reader or listener know when he's in the presence of one? 
How does one go about decoding the ironic sign? What are its typical 
forms? And finally, a qualitatively different kind of question: What is 
signified by the use of irony ? 
While the questions may not have been phrased as they are here, they 
have been dealt with implicitly if not explicitly by any number of critics 
and theorists. Two of the most important and most recent book-length 
treatments of the subject are Wayne Booth's A Rhetoric of Irony (Chicago, 
1974) and Muecke's The Compass of Irony (London, 1969), both of which 
I lean heavily upon here. Booth's book in particular engages the issue in 
the way that Culler calls for (while also engaging it in ways beyond 
Culler's call); that is, it attempts "to make explicit the procedures and con-
ventions" of irony and to explain "the ways in which we go about making 
sense" of it. 
I do not propose to deal with all kinds of ironic signs, but rather with 
those which are a part of the world of discourse, the kind which always 
imply an ironist. To poke at the scab of a psychic wound by way of a 
personal example of what I'm not going to deal with: Recently I dug a 
grease pit in my garage (or rather I had my son dig a grease pit in my gar-
age) in order to save on automotive expense by working on my car myself. 
A few months later, I accidentally drove my car into the grease pit, thereby 
incurring additional automotive expense to extricate it, and thereby vastly 
amusing my son. Clearly, there are ironic signs there, but they are in the 
real world, not the world of discourse. 
Nor do I intend to deal with the kind of ironic sign talked about by 
New Critics like I. A. Richards, Cleanth Brooks, and Robert Penn Warren. 
That group has broadened the meaning of the term "irony" to the point 
that it is seen as a mark of all good literature. The term, as Richards uses 
it, means "bringing in of the opposite, the complementary impulses. . . ." 7 
Brooks and Warren admit that they have perhaps been "guilty of wrenching 
the word from its usual context,"8 and Brooks even sees irony in Words-
worth's Lucy poems.9 That kind of ironic sign has very little to do with 
more traditional kinds and it will not be discussed here. 
And at the risk of offending those who are quick to be offended by the 
intentional fallacy 1 0 and the affective fallacy, I will insist here upon con-
sidering both the ironist's intentions and the effect of the ironic sign on 
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the reader who perceives it. Irony so private that nobody save the ironist 
sees it is none of my concern here. And without authorial intention, there 
is no irony as I am using the term. The writer who is unintentionally ironic 
is not ironic at all, Muecke tells us: 
a work can be ironical only by intention; being ironical means delib-
erately being ironical. It is only events and situations which may be 
unintentionally ironic (a man may say something which we see as 
ironic though he does not; but this is not being ironical; it is an 
ironic happening of which he is a victim. 1 1 
Irony as I am using the term here is discourse which appears to be mov-
ing in one direction while really moving in another. It is "the art of saying 
something without really saying it," a kind of dissembling, a "double-
layered or two-storey" kind of discourse in which the surface is opposed 
or warped by the subsurface in such a way that some innocent is taken in. 1 2 
It is "the sport of bringing about a conclusion by indicating its opposite."1 3 
It is destructive of easy meaning, no part of any effort to make things 
perfectly clear. 
None of that, of course, means much until we emerge from clouds of 
abstraction to specific cases. But first, a division so obvious that it comes 
to mind almost immediately: the distinction between verbal or rhetorical 
irony and situational irony. By the first, I mean irony of manner, irony 
that lies in the language of the ironist; by the second, I mean irony of 
matter, irony that lies in the ironist's created situations and responses to 
situations. In the first kind, words do not mean what they appear to mean; 
that is, their meaning is undone by the ironic configuration of the text. 
In the second the language itself is non-ironic, a "straight" account of events 
which are ironic; here meaning is not subtracted from the words (as in 
the first variety), but is added on to the events in the sense that they are 
understood by the initiated as having more significance than is explicitly 
given them. 
What the two have in common is "duality, opposition of the terms of 
the duality, and real or pretended 'innocence.' " 1 4 In verbal irony, the oppo-
sition is between what the author seems to be saying and what he really 
says (or intends that the reader understand). In situational irony, the oppo-
sition is between what is expected by the innocent victims (which may 
include the reader) and what actually occurs, the opposition thus residing 
in the events rather than in the language of the recounting of the events. 
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The Rhetorical Ironic Sign 
What Roman Jakobson says of poetry, that it is "organized violence 
committed on ordinary speech,"1 5 may also be said of the rhetorical ironic 
sign. Such a sign is a word or cluster of words to be taken literally by 
the innocent while discounted by the initiated who understand that the 
intended meaning is in some kind of opposition to the literal meaning. 
It is in that class of discourse (along with lies, errors, and hallucinations), 
Tzvetan Todorov tells us, "in which a discrepancy appears between refer-
ence and referent, between designatum and denotatum. . . , " 1 6 The ironic 
sign, Michael Riffaterre says, represents "but one special case of marker 
permutation" whereby the "set of representations represent something else 
than it does in common usage." 1 7 The ironic sign occurs "when we speak 
from one point of view, but make an evaluation from another point of view," 
in Boris Uspensky's formulation.1 8 
Those statements make sense enough to a reader who has already 
detected a given ironic sign, but they don't help much in the detection. That 
job would be simpler, though the effect would be hideous, had anyone 
taken seriously a proposal made in 1899 by one Alcanter de Brahm that 
ironists let their readers know where in the text they were being ironic by 
making the sign explicit—that is, by inserting a punctuation mark like a 
question mark turned backwards ( ? ) which he called "le petit signe 
flagellateur."19 Simply labeling a writer or a work as ironic does not help 
much, since the ironist is not consistently ironic. How do we separate the 
ironic signs within a work from the others, the straight ones ? How do we 
recognize, in Booth's words, "an ironic invitation when we see one"? 2 0 
Culler tells us that "we are in a position to detect irony whenever the 
text appears to offer judgements with which we would not concur or when-
ever, with apparent disinterestedness, it does not pass judgement where 
we think a judgement would be appropriate."21 
We begin to detect the ironic sign, Booth says, when we notice elements 
in a text which cause us to make the following inference about the author's 
intentions: "If the author did not intend irony, it would be odd, or out-
landish, or inept, or stupid of him to do things in this way" (52-53). He 
gives us five categories of "clues" to the presence of the ironic sign: 
1. "Straightforward warnings in the author's own voice"—through titles 
("Gullible's Travels," "The Hollow Men," The Dunciad are examples), 
prefatory epigraphs, or postscripts—each such direct statement being "at best 
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only a hint" and not sufficient evidence in itself of the ironic sign (53-57). 
2. "Known Error Proclaimed"—a betrayal by the narrative voice of 
ignorance or foolishness that is "simply incredible," through botched cliches 
("You could a heard a bomb drop," James Thurber has his narrator say of a 
moment of silence in "You Could Look It Up") , misstated historical "facts," 
or stupid or outmoded conventional wisdom (57-61). 
3. "Conflicts of Facts with the Work"—for example, Anatole France's 
"Les Pingouins avaient la premiere armee du monde. Les Marsouins aussi" 
("The penguins had the most powerful army in the world. So had the 
porpoises" [61-67]). 2 2 
4. "Clashes of Style"—sudden departures from normal style, as in parody 
of some other writer, or Jane Austen's narrator of "The History of England" 
saying "It was in this reign that Joan of Arc lived and made such a row 
among the English," or Twain's description of the Greek chapel in Inno-
cents Abroad as "the most roomy, the richest and the showiest chapel in 
the Church of the Holy Sepulchre" (67-73). 
5. "Conflicts of Belief"—conflicts between beliefs the text expresses and 
those "we hold and suspect the author of holding"; an example from 
Twain's "Baker's Bluejay Yarn": "I know that he could [talk with animals] 
because he told me so himself" (73-75). 
Booth understands that even with such clues, detection of the ironic 
sign is uncertain; he would agree with Culler's statement that "irony always 
offers the possibility of misunderstanding . . . for a sentence to be properly 
ironic, it must be possible to imagine some group of readers taking it quite 
literally." 2 3 One reader's clues to the ironic may be another's clues to the 
sublime, especially in the following circumstance: 
Every reader will have the greatest difficulty detecting irony that 
mocks his own beliefs or characteristics. If an author invents a speaker 
whose stupidities strike me as gems of wisdom, how am I to know 
that he is not a prophet? If his mock style seems like good writing 
to me, what am I to do? And if his incongruities of fact and logic 
are such as I might commit, I am doomed. None of us can tell how 
many ironies we have missed in our lives because we share ignorance, 
stylistic naivete, or outlandish beliefs with the ridiculed mask. For this 
reason all of the tests I have described are highly fallible. No complex 
piece of irony can be read merely with tests or devices or rules, and 
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it would be a foolish man who felt sure that he could never mistake 
irony for straight talk (p. 81). 
Later he cautions against seeing irony where it does not exist, and talks 
about "five major kinds of crippling handicap" that get in the way of our 
perception of the ironic sign: "Ignorance, Inability to Pay Attention, 
Prejudice, Lack of Practice, and Emotional Inadequacy" (222). 
But assuming that the reader and the writer are sufficiently attuned to 
one another's sensibilities and that the reader is sensitive enough to the 
clues that he detects the ironic sign, how does he proceed? How does he 
decode the ironic sign? What is the process necessary to its provoking in 
the reader's mind what was in the writer's mind? Ironology—Booth and 
Muecke both use the term a little self-mockingly, I think—begins where 
accounts of the function of non-ironic signs leave off. The latter tell us 
how the language-user encodes what he wants to say and how his reader 
or listener decodes in order to get at what was intended. With the ironic 
sign, another step is necessary: after decoding, the reader must re-decode. 
That is, he decodes the straight sign or apparent meaning of the ironist, 
then because he finds it unsatisfactory, sets about to get at the meaning 
that is under that meaning. Culler's account of the process: 
The perception of verbal irony depends upon a set of expectations 
which enable the reader to sense the incongruity of an apparent level 
of vraisemblance at which the literal meaning of a sentence could be 
interpreted and to construct an alternative ironic reading which 
accords with the vraisemblance which he is in the process of con-
structing for the text. 2 4 
Booth elaborates on that process and calls it "reconstruction." What is 
transformed, of course, is not the text, but the reader who moves from an 
innocent or naive understanding to a sophisticated understanding. As 
Booth renders the process, there are four different steps involved, and they 
may occur nearly simultaneously: 
1. Rejection of the literal meaning, not just because the reader may 
disagree with it, but because "he is unable to escape recognizing either 
some incongruity among the words or between the words and something 
else he knows" (10). 
2. Testing alternative interpretations or explanations: "I missed some-
thing earlier, or that word must mean something I don't know about," etc., 
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accepting the alternative that the writer was simply "careless or stupid or 
crazy" only as a last resort in the absence of more plausible explanations 
(ii). 
3. Making a decision about the knowledge or beliefs of the author— 
not the flesh-and-blood author, but what Booth calls the "implied author" 
whose identity resides only in the work itself, "the creative person responsi-
ble for the choices that made the work" (11). 
4. Choosing a new interpretation, reconstructing the meaning so it 
will harmonize with "the unspoken beliefs that the reader has decided to 
attribute" to the author, the end result being something like this: "In 
contrast with the statement Voltaire pretends to be making, which implies 
beliefs that he cannot have held, he is really saying such-and-such, which 
is in harmony with what I know or can infer about his beliefs and in-
tentions" (12) . 
The reconstruction process has neither the laboratory's "modes of proof" 
nor its certainty, but Booth finds in the activity an "astonishing communal 
achievement" of complexity shared between reader and author: "The 
wonder of it is not that it should go awry as often as it does, but that it 
should ever succeed" (13). 
I do not intend to offer an exhaustive classification of the forms in 
which the rhetorical ironic sign might be manifested. Muecke's The Com-
pass of Irony does that in an- admirably comprehensive and erudite way. 
Instead, I offer some typical forms of the ironic sign and its function within 
them. 
The simplest form of the rhetorical ironic sign, that kind we most likely 
think of first, involves inversion ("antiphrasis" the old rhetoricians called 
i t ) ; the sign denotes one thing and means the opposite. Reconstruction 
simply consists of seeing that the literal statement is so drastically opposed 
to the context that its opposite is what is really meant. It usually, but not 
always, blames through apparent praise, and at its most heavy-handed be-
comes sarcasm (the 16th century term for it was the "dry-mocke") . 2 5 
Antony's repeated references to the conspirators as "all honorable men" 
taken in context with the rest of his funeral oration is an example. Even 
Antony's audience (as opposed to Shakespeare's) understands after about 
the third use of the term that he means the conspirators are anything but 
honorable. 
Almost as common a form as inversion is understatement ("meiosis") in 
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which the ironic sign expresses not the opposite of the intended meaning, 
but an exaggerated reduction of the intended meaning. Ezra Pound's com-
ment that "Mutton cooked the week before last is, for the most part, un-
palatable"2 6 is an example, as is what David Worcester cites as Artemus 
Ward's "grave meditation": "The wick of an unlighted candle may safely 
be manipulated, but if you light the wick and thrust your hand into the 
blaze and keep it there half an hour a sensation of excessive and disagreeable 
warmth will be experienced."27 Reconstruction begins when the reader 
sees that "for the most part, unpalatable" and "excessive and disagreeable 
warmth"—even though they are not the opposite of the intended meaning— 
are woefully inadequate to the context in their level of intensity. 
Another kind of ironic sign results when the writer adopts a pose of 
someone whose skill or values or understanding differ considerably from 
those of the implied author. Chaucer, for example, portrays himself in The 
Canterbury Tales as a laughably inept poet whose "drasty rymyng is nat 
worth a toord!" in the pungent phrase of Harry Bailly. That he appears 
in a masterpiece of which he is himself the author makes our reconstruction 
easy. The method is similar to the one Socrates used—or is reported by 
Plato to have used—for purposes of argument. The ironic sign in the 
Socratic method is well known: with disarming admissions of ignorance 
and a great show of humility, Socrates asks his opposition a series of simple 
questions, the answers to which refute the opposition's contentions. The 
method is, as Worcester puts it, a kind of mental "jiu-jitsu" by which "the 
expert presses gently and the victim ties himself into knots." 2 8 By pre-
tending ignorance, Socrates disguises his strength as weakness. 
An increasingly popular form of the ironic sign—and one closely related 
to the form just discussed—occurs when the author temporarily disappears 
and lets his characters, who differ from the author in the same ways the 
voice of the author-as-poseur differs from the voice of the implied author, 
unwittingly reveal themselves. Muecke gives an example from Carson 
McCullers' The Heart is a Lonely Hunter: wrongdoers are being discussed 
and one of the characters wishes aloud that "I could round up some people 
and kill those men myself." 
"That ain't no Christian way to talk," Portia said. "Us can just 
rest back and know they going to be chopped up with pitchforks 
and fried everlasting by Satan." 2 9 
The reconstruction process is simple enough there. All the reader need 
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assume is that the implied author cannot believe such things, that he there-
fore is implicitly condemning—or at least being amused by—Portia's reli-
gious hypocrisy. But reconstruction becomes more difficult when the author 
disappears completely and turns the telling of the story over to one of his 
characters. When the narrator s skill or values or understanding are not 
those of the author, there must be what Booth calls "a secret communion 
of the author and the reader behind the narrator's back." 3 < ) When the gap 
between author and narrator is great, there's not much difficulty. For 
example, when Huck Finn, Twain's narrator, decides to go to hell rather 
than betray Jim, his judgement that not betraying a runaway slave is 
punishable by eternal damnation is a judgement so clearly undercut by 
the rest of the novel that we know the implied author does not share it. 
But we are less certain of the irony when Gulliver tells us in Book IV that 
after his return from Houyhnhnmland, the sight of his wife and children 
"filled me only with hatred, disgust, and contempt," and "when I began to 
consider that by copulating with one of the Yahoo species I had become 
a parent of more, it struck me with the utmost shame, confusion, and 
horror." Those views are not so different from those that could reasonably 
be imputed to the implied author throughout the rest of the book. Whether 
the gap between narrator and author is immense or slight, reconstruction 
of the ironic sign consists of the reader's rejecting the identity of the narra-
tor's views with the author's, then plunging ahead in the four-step process 
to finally determine what the latter's views are. 
The Situational Ironic Sign 
While the rhetorical ironic sign is a word or group of words, the situa-
tional ironic sign is an event, a group of events, or a condition. Just as 
rhetorical ironic signs have double meanings—one for the naive and one 
for the sophisticated—so situational ironic signs have double meaning, al-
though reconstruction, as Booth uses the term, is not necessary because the 
language describing the ironic event is non-ironic and can be taken at face 
value. But there is a sense in which ironic events as signs are more difficult 
than ironic words as signs. That's because we are used to thinking of 
words as signs, but we are not so accustomed to thinking of events as signs. 
What are they signs of? Certain events or conditions—a policeman's hold-
ing us back or motioning us on at an intersection—are clearly signs, as are 
columns of smoke rising in the distance. It follows that if an event can be 
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seen as a straightforward sign, it may also function as an ironic sign. A 
policeman motioning us into the intersection just in time to be struck 
broadside by a firetruck—that could be considered an event constituting an 
ironic sign. The sign appears to be telling us that now is the time for safe 
passage through the intersection; the firetruck gives the lie to that expecta-
tion. The event seems to be signalling (that is, it establishes an expectation 
that a certain outcome, safe passage, is at hand), but the anticipated referent 
of the sign is replaced by one in opposition to the expectation (being struck 
by the firetruck, an event in opposition to safe passage). One can argue 
that if there is no irony without ironic intentionality, I need to show that 
the policeman, the originator of the ironic sign, intended that the expecta-
tions it aroused would be thwarted. I would argue, however, that if the 
policeman is a literary creation, that is, if he is a puppet whose strings are 
being pulled by the author who has created him, his intention is not vital 
to the irony. The author's volition will do to satisfy Muecke's need for 
intentionality: he sends out the ironic sign through the policeman. 
The situational ironic sign then is a condition, an event, or series of 
events that establishes an expectation that is thwarted; one outcome is 
signalled, another in opposition to the expected one occurs, and victims 
(who may include certain readers as well as certain characters) are taken in. 
For example, in Stephen Crane's "The Open Boat," four men—a corre-
spondent, a ship's captain, the ship's cook, and an oiler who tended the 
ship's machinery—are drifting about in a life boat after the ship has sunk. 
The ironic sign is the physical condition of the men: the oiler is clearly 
the strongest; the captain is injured and both the correspondent and the 
cook are unaccustomed to hard manual labor. When the life boat is 
swamped a few hundred yards off shore and they must swim for their lives, 
the expectation is that the oiler is least likely to drown. But he is caught 
in the tide and is the only one who does not make it safely ashore; the 
others are washed up on the beach, as Crane shows us a nature that is 
arbitrary and unfeeling, caring not at all for human notions of the predicta-
bility or fitness of things. 
What is called dramatic irony differs only in that the audience, because 
of prior knowledge, is aware of the outcome long before the victimized 
characters. We watch as the characters interpret an event in one way while 
we know that the event is leading to an opposing conclusion. Often the 
characters act in a way they think is leading to the conclusion they see in 
Satterfield: Poetics of the Ironic Sign 159 
the offing, while we see that they are really helping to bring about a condi-
tion they do not expect. A standard example is Oedipus' vowing at the 
beginning of Sophocle's play to exile the murderer of Laius before he can 
do Oedipus harm, while we, knowing as Oedipus does not that he is 
talking about himself, groan in anticipation of the final scene in which the 
self-mutilated king leaves his kingdom to live out his life in exile. Some-
times dramatic irony involves superior knowledge that comes from what 
we know of history, as in Anatole France's portrait of Pontius Pilate as an 
old man who says "Jesus? . . . Jesus the Nazarene? I don't recall." 3 1 
In what is called cosmic irony, the writer posits the notion that the 
unexpected or inappropriate does not just happen, but that there is a Prime 
Mover who is having a sardonic laugh at the expectations and puny efforts 
of his puppets. The author of cosmic irony in effect creates an ironic creator. 
Hardy indulges in cosmic irony at the end of Tess of the d'Urbervilles when 
he has the President of the Immortals making "sport" of the human ruin 
below. Frost is implying the same kind of irony in his couplet: 
Forgive, O Lord, my little jokes on Thee 
And I'll forgive Thy great big one on me. 
In romantic irony, the author deliberately destroys Coleridge's "willing 
suspension of disbelief" by self-mockery. The ironic sign is the verisimili-
tude of the narrative itself, a series of events which signal "This is reality," 
thus setting up the expectation that what follows will be real. But what 
follows clearly is a demonstration that "This is artifice." It is, A. R. 
Thompson tells us, "fundamentally a simple and trivial thing: the hand 
of the manipulator, as Tieck expressed it, thrust into the puppet stage." 3 2 
That is, the romantic ironist "creates a serious mood and then deliberately 
pokes fun at himself for doing so" 3 3—as Sterne does in Tristam Shandy 
when he tells us of the lamentable death of Parson Yorick, then includes 
as a tribute a page that is completely black, or when he leaves out a ten-
page chapter because the writing in it is "so much above the style and 
manner of anything else . . . in this book, that it could not have remained 
in it, without depreciating every other scene." 
Having looked at ironic signs, some typical forms and contexts, we 
can now examine an altogether different kind of question: What is irony 
itself a sign of? That is, what metaliterary sign does the ironist send out 
about himself? To answer that question is to answer by implication sev-
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eral others: What risks does the ironist run when he uses irony? What can 
he hope to gain by its use? What are its effects? Those are large questions; 
I offer only partial answers. 
The sign emanating from the use of irony imitates the ironic sign 
itself—that is. it is two-layered and the two layers are in opposition. One 
such manifestation of that double sign is what the ironist seems to be 
saying about his degree of commitment. Another is what he seems to be 
saying about his relationship to the reader. 
The ironist signifies himself, at least on the surface level, as cool and 
detached. His utterances are not those of the emotionally involved. "Hey, 
Hey, L.BJ./How many kids did you kill today?" is not the chant of the 
ironist, but the outraged invective of those caught up in apparent (but not 
necessarily unreal) commitment, so intense they lose all emotional distance, 
all dispassion, as they surrender their language wholly to direct and naked 
expression of their outrage. The ironist, by contrast, signifies himself as 
always in control of his expression, always distant in his scorn, always 
penurious with his emotion (hence, irony is, as someone has pointed out, 
an effective inoculation against sentimentality). He is unflappable, almost, 
one might believe, uncommitted. And he thus runs the risk of alienating 
his reader. He may appear a nihilist, his mood "attuned to ridicule, rejec-
tion, mockery, even despair," Dyson tells us. 3 4 Because of his indirection, 
he may seem to be using his irony as a shield, a prudent device to avoid 
exposing his own position to attack. 3 5 When the reader gets that impression, 
the ironist is seen as a cynic committed, William Van O'Connor writes, only 
"to the view (although rarely, if ever, in an absolute way) that everything 
is wrong, in the worst of all possible worlds." 3 6 Such cynicism does not 
wear well; as Worcester writes of this particular danger of irony, "No one 
grows more trying than the acquaintance whose shoulders are set in a per-
petual shrug, whose superior smile flows in hateful tolerance around every 
idea " 3 7 
But of course the reader who picks up only signals of disengagement 
needs to go further. He needs to see that the act of writing itself—even of 
writing ironically—is an act of commitment, that the true nihilist signifies 
himself only by his silence. He needs, in effect, to "reconstruct" what the 
ironist seems to be signifying about himself in order to see that the existence 
of the text itself negates the "literal" message. Even though Twain has 
Huck respond to Aunt Sally's "anybody hurt?" with "No'm. Killed a 
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nigger," the thoughtful reader does not assume that the author sees slavery 
as an issue only to make jokes about any more than he assumes from the 
passage that Twain is racist. And even from the savagery of "A Modest 
Proposal," Swift sends out veiled signals of commitment to the welfare of 
the Irish whose children his narrator proposes to use for food. Only in what 
Booth calls "unstable" irony, the kind which is not reconstructable because 
the ironist himself occupies no solid ground of affirmation and invites the 
reader to occupy none, is there no yea-saying beneath the surface nays. And 
even here, Booth asserts, there is an oblique commitment to something 
besides complete negation: 
novelists, dramatists, and poets inevitably draw back from complete 
silence and in fact write works that embody their intentions and 
therefore have "meaning" of a kind—works of resignation, of lament, 
of complaint, of dark laughter at the chaos, of defiance, of pathos. 
And in doing so they usually provide—sometimes it seems almost 
with a sense of shame—some handle or other for interpreting their 
works at whatever level of instability or negation they have elected 
(245). 
A second double sign the ironist transmits involves his relationship with 
his reader. On the surface level, the sign is a hostile one that seems to mock 
the reader. The ironist says what he does not mean, he talks out of both 
sides of his mouth at once, he is two-faced. He sets verbal traps for the 
reader to fall into; his indirection tempts the reader to risk foolish mis-
readings. There is a sense in which, as Northrop Frye tells us, the ironist 
"turns his back on his audience" 3 8 and there is a sense in which the ironist 
victimizes his reader: John B. McKee argues that the only constant in 
irony is the presence of a victim 3 9—and that the victim is often the reader. 
But that apparent hostility is undercut by the veiled signal the ironist 
sends out to his reader, a sign that tells him the writer has been growling 
bogus growls. The use of irony signifies a camaraderie with the reader 
that all the surface hostility cannot undo. The ironist flatters the reader 
by asking him to collaborate, to become a participant in the literary experi-
ence, what Coleridge called "an active creative being," rather than a mere 
spectator. Booth says that Swift pays us "the compliment of assuming 
that we can be trusted to work as a kind of assistant in building the final 
complex edifice" of "A Modest Proposal" (119). When rhetorical irony is 
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at issue, the reader collaborates by the reconstruction process. With situa-
tional irony, the reader collaborates by bringing to the text information 
(in the case of dramatic irony) or the ability to see beyond conventional 
expectations produced by the ironic sign. The compliment the ironist pays 
the reader is reciprocated by the respect the reader pays by giving the ironist 
a fair hearing, by not assuming what he might assume if he were reading 
a text by, say, a student in Freshman English—that it's "odd, outlandish, or 
inept, or stupid." Thus, Booth argues, one of the effects of irony is 
the building of amiable communities. . . . Often the predominant 
emotion when reading stable ironies is that of joining, of finding 
and communing with kindred spirits. The author I infer behind 
the false words is my kind of man, because he enjoys playing with 
irony, because he assumes my capacity for dealing with it, and— 
most important—because he grants me a kind of wisdom; he as-
sumes that he does not have to spell out the shared and secret truths 
on which my reconstruction is to be built (28) . 
By way of illustration, Booth reconstructs the irony of a friend who 
comes into a room dripping wet and asks "Think it'll rain?" What his 
friend really means, he decides, is 
"hello my good friend who understands me is it not a rainy day that 
we are enduring together by making something mildly humorous out 
of what might otherwise have been reason for grousing it is good to 
see you who thank God understand ironic joshing when you hear it 
and are not too critical even if it is rather stale and feeble" (12). 
The effect of our collaboration is to make the communication both more 
economical—if the reader provides some of the message, the writer need 
provide less of it—and more forceful. Having collaborated in the meaning, 
we have a vested interest in it. Having earned our reading by working for 
it, we are more committed to it. Antony's Roman audience came away 
from his funeral oration with not just the message that the conspirators are 
ignoble, but with an appreciation for Antony's self-effacing skill in helping 
them arrive at their own conclusions. They are convinced by Antony's irony 
in a way that they would never have been had Antony used only straight 
language in its simple referential function. 
Irony thus thought of demonstrates, if demonstrations are still needed, 
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that the referential function is only one of the ways in which language 
works. Understanding the ironic sign forces us to realize, in Todorov's 
words, "the fragility of that conception according to which the signification 
of a discourse is constituted by its referent." 4 0 It forces us to remember again, 
if we are ever tempted to forget, that the only meaning a sign has is in the 
mind. Saying "the mind" obscures the complexity, implying as it does 
something monolithic. What we mean, of course, is that the various 
meanings a sign has exist only in the various minds that come in contact 
with it. We can stand with Booth in wonder that two or more minds 
ever get together about the ironic sign. 
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Bakhtin's Theory of the Utterance* 
Tzvetan Todorov 
Bakhtin formulates his theory of the utterance on two occasions: once 
during the late twenties, in the texts signed by Medvedev and especially by 
Voloshinov; and in several works published at the end of the fifties, some 
thirty years later. I will present these two syntheses separately, although 
there is no great difference between them (in fact, the only changes involve 
accentuations of various aspects of the utterance). 
The first general formulations concerning the utterance are already to 
be found in Freudism (1927); one page of The Formal Method in Literary 
Studies (1928) evokes this problem from a similar viewpoint, with an insist-
ence on the social rather than the individual nature of the utterance; but 
Bakhtin introduces here a new notion, which is not reiterated in subsequent 
writings: that of a discursive strategy. 
Discursive strategy plays a particularly significant role in daily verbal 
communication by determining its form as well as its organization. 
It gives form to everyday utterances by establishing both the style 
and the genre of the verbal expression. Strategy is to be understood 
here in a broad sense: politeness represents but one of its moments. 
This strategy can pursue different directions, moving, as it were, 
between two poles—the compliment and the insult. The strategy is 
determined by the set of all social inter-relations between the speakers, 
by their ideological horizons, and finally by the concrete situation of 
the discussion. Whatever may be its particular nature, such a strategy 
determines our every utterance. There is no discourse without stra-
tegical consciousness.1 
In Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (1929), Bakhtin accom-
plishes a major step by forsaking his general theories to propose instead a 
detailed description of the utterance: this will constitute Chapter 3 of the 
second part, entitled "Verbal Interaction." 
* This paper is an excerpt from an over-all presentation of Bakhtih's work. The Soviet 
scholar M. M. Bakhtin (1895-1975) has published under his name three books and a number 
of articles; three more books and other articles were written or inspired by him but published 
under the name of Medvedev or Voloshinov. I quote the Russian editions. In English trans-
lations, Bakhtin's name is sometimes spelled Baxtin. 
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One may recall the criticism which Bakhtin voiced about the "indi-
vidualist subjectivism" school (Vossler and his disciples) : although superior 
to that o£ Saussure insofar as it does not ignore the utterance, yet it mis-
takenly believes that this utterance is individual. 
Any moment of the expression-utterance one may observe will in-
variably be determined by the real conditions of the speech-act, 
primarily by the nearest social situation.2 Verbal communication will 
never be understood or explained without a reference to its lin\ with 
the concrete situation? 
In other words, the difference between an utterance and a proposition 
(or a sentence), a unity of language, is that the former is necessarily 
produced within a particular context which is always social. This sociality 
has a dual origin: first of all, the utterance is addressed to someone (this 
implies the existence of a micro-society comprising two people, the speaker 
and the addressee); secondly, the speaker himself is always a social being 
to begin with. These are two primary elements of the speech-act context 
which we need to consider in our interpretations of an utterance. 
Let us first observe the role of the addressee. The utterance is estab-
lished between two socially organized people: should there be no 
real interlocutor, then he is presupposed, in a certain sense, as a nor-
mal representative of the social group to which the speaker belongs. 
The discourse is oriented towards the interlocutory towards what the 
interlocutor is.4 
Instead of the individual interlocutor we can thus imagine a certain 
type of addressee or, in other words, a certain horizon of reception; a notion 
we shall again encounter in an article published the following year (1930): 
From the daily primitive utterance to the achieved poetic utterance, 
each one invariably comprises, as a necessary ingredient, an "im-
plied" extra-verbal horizon. We can analyze this living and concrete 
horizon in terms of three components: spatial, semantic, and of values. 
The value horizon assumes the most important role in the organiza-
tion of a literary work, especially in its formal aspects.5 
As we shall see, Bakhtin later returns to this question of values (although 
the suggestions formulated above will not be pursued). 
The sociality of the speaker is equally important, albeit less evident. 
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After taking certain precautions (acts of acoustical phonation and perception 
are indeed individual but they do not concern the essential aspect of lan-
guage: its significance; a biological and individual "I-experience" does 
indeed exist, however, unlike the "we-experience," it remains inaccessible), 
Bakhtin states that the expression of an individual is not individual in 
the least. 
There can exist no experience beyond its incarnation in signs. This 
immediately precludes the possible principle of any qualitative dif-
ference between interior and exterior. ( . . . ) Expression is not or-
ganized by experience, but on the contrary, experience is organized 
by expression which, for the first time, imbues this experience with 
form and direction.6 Aside from material expression, there is no such 
thing as experience. Moreover, expression precedes experience; it is 
the cradle of experience.7 
A footnote to the last sentence declares that this "assertion was in fact 
originally drawn from certain statements of Engels" which are to be found 
in Ludwig Feuerbach; beyond this, we can perhaps perceive a more distant 
and common source in the work of Humboldt (the inspiration for "indi-
vidualist subjectivism"): an experience is pre-formed by the possibilities of 
its expression. Once we have located the formative traces of an expression 
at the very core of the expressible, then whatever its sources may be, there 
can no longer exist any sphere which is entirely devoid of sociality (since 
words and other linguistic forms do not belong to the individual). 
Only the inarticulate animal cry is truly organized within an indi-
vidual physiological system. ( . . . ) But even the most primitive 
human utterance, produced by the individual organism, is already 
organized in external terms, through the inorganic conditions of a 
social milieu which shapes its content, significance, and meaning.8 
The very howls of an infant are "oriented" towards its mother. 9 
We might formulate this observation by saying that every utterance 
can be perceived as part of a dialogue, in the general sense of the word; 
only in his subsequent writings will Bakhtin define this more specifically 
(as a dialogue between discourses). 
Verbal interaction is the fundamental reality of language; and dia-
logue, in its narrow sense, is a single form, though clearly the most 
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important one, of verbal interaction. But dialogue can be interpreted 
in a much broader manner, as referring not only to the direct verbal 
communication which is voiced between interlocutors, but also en-
compassing every form of verbal communication.1 0 
As a first important consequence of this new framework, we must 
radically distinguish between meaning in language from meaning in dis-
course or, to use the terminology adopted by Bakhtin at the time, to dis-
tinguish meaning from theme. In and of itself, this distinction is nothing 
very new; however, it will quickly become so, due to the increasing 
importance Bakhtin attaches to the theme. Indeed, the standard oppositions 
of that period between current and occasional meaning, between funda-
mental and marginal meaning, or between denotation and connotation, 
are equally fallacious in that they favor the first term, while in fact dis-
cursive meaning, or theme, is never marginal. 
Thus we will strictly reserve the term "meaning" for language ("lan-
gue") ; meaning is recorded by dictionaries, and any one meaning is always 
identical to itself (since it is merely potential): in other words, like all other 
linguistic elements, it can be repeated. 
Meaning in opposition to theme, will represent those moments of 
an utterance which can be repeated and yet remain identical to them-
selves}1 Meaning actually signifies nothing except for the potentiality, 
the possibility of meaning within a concrete theme. 1 2 
In contrast, the theme—like the utterance as a whole—is unique and 
cannot be repeated, since it arises from the interaction of meaning with the 
equally unique context of the speech-act. 
Let us call the significance of an entire utterance its theme. ( . . . ) In 
fact, like the utterance itself, the theme is individual and cannot be 
repeated. It is an expression of the concrete historical situation which 
engendered the utterance. ( . . . ) It must then follow that the theme 
of an utterance is not only determined by the linguistic forms which 
compose it—words, morphological and syntactical forms, sounds, 
and intonation—but also by the extra-verbal aspects of the situation. 
And if we should lose these aspects, we will not be able to under-
stand the utterance, as if we had lost the most important words them-
selves.13 
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One essential feature of a theme, and therefore of an utterance, is that 
it is endowed with values (in the broad sense of the term). Vice versa, 
meaning, and therefore language, do not share this relation with the world 
of values: 
Only an utterance can be beautiful, just as only an utterance can be 
sincere, delusive, courageous, or timid, etc. These value determina-
tions are linked to the organization of utterances and literary works 
insofar as they involve the functions assumed by the latter within the 
unity of social existence and, above all, within the concrete unity of an 
ideological horizon. 1 4 
The idea of an evaluative dimension in the utterance is further pursued 
by the article already referred to, "On the Boundaries Between Poetics and 
Linguistics." Bakhtin investigates the possible formal embodiments of this 
value judgment; and first considers the use of non-linguistic means. 
Let us say that any evaluation which is incarnated through the 
(verbal) material is an expression of values. The human body itself 
will provide the original raw material for such an expression of 
values: gesture (the signifying movement of the body) and voice 
(outside of articulated language). 1 5 
Within language itself, phonetic means are naturally to be distinguished 
from semantic means; and somewhat more remarkably, these are classified 
according to a dichotomy between selection and combination; this division 
is familiar today, but was unpublished at the time (although one may seek 
its origin in the work of Kruszewski). 
We must distinguish two forms of value expression [in poetic crea-
tion]: 1) phonic and 2) structural [tektonicheskuju], whose functions 
can be separated into two groups: first, elective (selective), and 
secondly, compositional (organizational). The elective functions of 
the social evaluation emerge through the choice of lexical material 
(lexicology), the choice of epithets, metaphors, and other tropes (the 
entire range of poetical semantics), and finally, through the choice of 
a "content"). In this way, most stylistics and certain elements of 
thematics belong to the elective group. 
The compositional functions of the evaluation determine the level 
and hierarchical positioning of each verbal element in the work as a 
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whole; they also determine its general structure. This involves all 
problems of poetic syntax, of composition in its literal sense, and 
finally of genre.16 
In the first book signed by Bakhtin himself, which is devoted to the 
work of Dostoevsky, the utterance will assume a new dimension, whose 
importance will steadily increase: every utterance can be linked to preceding 
utterances, thereby giving rise to intertextual relations. In this first edition, 
Bakhtin does not concern himself with general theories but rather with a 
typology of the utterance, thus he merely states: 
No member of the verbal community will ever discover any words 
in language which are totally neutral, devoid of another's aspiration 
and evaluations, or free of another's voice. No, a word is appre-
hended through the voice of another which will remain forever 
imbedded within it. A word reaches one context in terms of another 
context, penetrated by the intentions of another; its own intentional-
ity encounters a word which is already inhabited. 1 7 (In the second 
edition of the work, 1963, the instances of "intention" will disappear 
to be replaced by osmyslenie, interpretation, and mysV, thought.) 
In a previously cited article, signed by Voloshinov, these contentions, as 
well as several others, are paraphrased with one curious variation: "intona-
tion" here replaces "intention": 
For the poet, language is permeated with living intonations; it is 
entirely contaminated by social considerations and by the embryonic 
phases of social orientations. The creative process must continually 
struggle with such elements; it is from among their midst that one 
must choose one linguistic form or another, one expression or another, 
etc. . . . An artist never receives any word in a linguistically virginal 
form; it has already been 'impregnated' by the practical circumstances 
and poetic contexts in which it is encountered. (. . .) 
This is why the work of a poet, like that of any artist, can only 
accomplish certain transvaluations, or certain displacements of intona-
tion; these will be perceived by the artist as well as his public through 
the perspective of previous evaluations and intonations.1 8 
Let us now turn to the second synthesis which appears in the notes 
written during the fifties, and published after Bakhtin's death, under the 
title "The Problem of the Text"; the "Methodological Remarks" of the 
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second edition Dostoevsky presents a summary of these issues. The frame 
of reference is no longer sociology, as it was thirty years earlier, but now 
involves translinguistics, the new discipline Bakhtin intends to found, whose 
primary object will be the utterance. Three factors are immediately set 
forth to distinguish an utterance from a sentence: an utterance has a 
speaker and an object, moreover it partakes in a dialogue with previous 
utterances. 
The utterance is determined not only by its relation to the object and 
the speaking subject—the author (and by its relations to language 
as a system of potential possibilities, or givens) but, most importantly 
from our perspective, it is directly determined by other utterances 
within the framework of a certain field of communication.1 9 In 
simpler terms: purely linguistic relations (that is to say the object 
of linguistics), comprise the relations between one sign and another, 
or several others (in other words all systematic or linear relations 
between signs). The relations an utterance may have with reality, 
the real speaking subject, and other real utterances, that is to say, 
those relations which render the utterance true, false, or beautiful, 
etc., can never become an object of linguistics.2 0 
We must make a slight digression at this point concerning the speaking 
subject, the speaker. He is viewed as a constituent element of a speech-act 
and thus of an utterance; at the same time, one refers to the image of the 
author which is deduced from the utterance; and one naturally tends to 
project the second onto the first. However, a clear distinction between the 
two must be maintained. An author produces an entire utterance which 
does comprise the "image of the author" but he himself is a producer and 
never a product, natura naturans instead of natura naturata. 
Even if an author-creator could create the most truthful autobiography 
of confession, he would still remain excluded from the universe he 
has portrayed simply insofar as he has produced it. If I should 
recount (or write) an event I have just experienced, then the mere 
act of narrating (or writing) this event will place me outside the 
time-space in which it has occurred. It is impossible to be absolutely 
identified with one-self, to reconcile one's veritable " I " with the " I " 
of his narration, just as it is inconceivable to lift oneself up by his own 
hair. However realistic and authentic a represented universe may be, 
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yet it can never be chronotopically identical to the real representing 
universe in which the author-creator of the representation is located. 
For this reason, it seems to me that the term "author's image" is 
quite unfortunate: what has become an image of the work and 
thereby entered its chronotope, is a product, not a producer. "The 
author's image," when perceived as the image of the author-creator, 
is a contradictio in adjecto; each image represents something which 
has been produced and cannot be a producer. 2 1 
Let us return to the general scheme of the utterance. We have seen that 
language ("langue"), the speaker, the object, and other utterances are all 
to be taken into consideration; we must not forget the addressee. 
Discourse (like any sign in general) is inter-individual. All that is 
said or expressed exists outside the "soul" of the speaker; it does not 
belong to him. Discourse cannot be attributed to the speaker alone. 
He clearly holds inalienable rights over the discourse, but the auditor 
has certain rights as well, as do those, whose voices reverberate in 
the words chosen by the author (since there are no words which do 
not belong to somebody). Discourse is a drama with a cast of three 
characters (not a duet, but a trio). It is performed outside the author, 
and one may not introject it (introjection) back into him. 2 2 
Meaning, a property of language, will be opposed here to significance; 
this more familiar term replaces theme and links the utterance to the world 
of values which language does not know. 
Isolated signs, and linguistic or textual systems (insofar as they 
represent a unity of signs) can never be true, false, or beautiful, etc. 2 3 
Only an utterance can be exact (or inexact), beautiful, just, etc. 2 4 
We can summarize the preceding observations by reconstituting a com-
munication model according to Bakhtin, and by comparing it with the 
currently more familiar model which Roman Jakobson has presented in his 
article "Linguistics and Poetics." 
Ba\htin 
object 





addresser message addressee 
contact 
code 
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Two kinds of differences are immediately apparent. Jakobson isolates 
"contact" as an independent factor. This is absent from the Bakhtinian 
model, yet the relation to other utterances (which I have designated here 
as the "intertext") is absent from Jakobson's schema. There are then a 
series of differences which would seem to involve minor questions or termi-
nology. Jakobson uses rather general terms (semiotic as well as linguistic) 
and they reveal the influence of his frequent associations with communica-
tion engineers. "Context" and "object" both correspond to that which other 
language theorists would call the "referent." 
But after a more careful scrutiny, it is clear that the differences are much 
more important, and that the terminological discrepancies betray a deeply-
rooted opposition. Jakobson sets forth these notions as a description of "the 
constitutive factors in any speech event, in any act of verbal communication." 
While for Bakhtin, there exist two radically distinct events, so distinct 
that they necessitate the use of two independent disciplines, linguistics and 
translinguistics. In linguistics, words and grammar rules provide the initial 
basis for the formation of sentences; in translinguistics, one starts off with 
sentences and the speech-act context eventually to obtain utterances. From 
Bakhtin's point of view, any attempt to formulate a proposal concerning 
"any speech event," that is to say, of language as well as discourse, would 
be futile. In the very schema I have drawn above, the "language" factor 
is not to be considered on a par with the others. 
Moreover, it is no accident that Bakhtin says "utterance" instead of 
"message," "language" rather than "code," etc.: he quite deliberately rejects 
the use of engineering language to speak of verbal communication. This 
language could all too easily lead us to perceive a linguistic exchange in 
terms of telegraphic work: in order to transmit a certain content, one 
telegrapher first encodes it with a key and then broadcasts it; once contact 
has been made, the other uses the same key to decode the message and 
recover the initial content. This image does not correspond to discursive 
reality: in fact, prior to the speech-act, the speaker and the addressee 
literally do not exist as such; it is only the discursive process which thus 
defines them in relation to each other. For this reason, language is not to 
be considered as a code; for this reason as well, Bakhtin cannot possibly 
isolate one "contact" factor amidst the others: the entire utterance is con-
tact, but in a stronger sense of the word than the "contact" of radioteleg-
raph^ or electric work. 
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It is quite curious to find a page in the book signed by Medvedev which 
criticized the Jakobsonian model of language, thirty years before it was ac-
tually formulated; however one must note that the critique was written as 
a reply to certain theories of the Formalist group—to which Jakobson 
belonged. 
That which is transmitted cannot be separated from the forms, the 
means, and the concrete conditions of the transmission; whereas the 
Formalist interpretations tacitly presuppose an entirely predetermined 
and immutable communication, as well as an equally immutable 
transmission. This might be explained schematically in the following 
manner: let us take two members of Society, A (the author), and B 
(the reader); for the time being, the social relations between them 
are unchangeable and immutable; we also have a prepared message 
X, which A must simply deliver to B. In this prepared message X, 
the "what" ("content") is distinct from the "how" ("form"), since 
literary discourse is characterized by the "set toward the expression" 
("how") [this is a quotation from the first published text of Jakob-
son]. 
(• • •)• 
The schema set forth above is completely wrong. In actual fact, the 
relations between A and B are in a state of continual formation 
and transformation; they are further modified during the very process 
of communication itself. There is no prepared message X ; it is estab-
lished by the communicative process between A and B. Moreover, 
it is not transmitted from one to the other but is built between them 
like an ideological bridge through the process of their interaction.2 5 
Thus, in 1928, we can discern a rather precise prefiguration of certain 
recent French language theories which are sometimes based on the work 
of Benveniste (for example those of Oswald Ducrot or Francois Flahault). 
As we now turn from the model of the particular utterance to the set 
of utterances constituting the verbal life of a community, we should note 
the fact which would appear to be most striking in the eyes of Bakhtin: 
there exists a large, but nonetheless limited, number of utterance or discourse 
types. One must indeed beware of two possible extremes: first, to recog-
nize the diversity of languages and ignore that of utterances; secondly, to 
consider this variety as being individual and therefore limitless. Besides 
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which, Bakhtin accentuates difference rather than plurality (one need not 
attempt to conceive of any common denominator which would reconcile 
various discourses; the argument here runs counter to the idea of unifica-
tion). To designate this irreducible diversity of discursive types, Bakhtin 
introduces a neologism, raznorechie, which I translate (literally but in 
Greek) as heterology; this term is flanked by two parallel neologisms, 
raznojazychze, heteroglossy, or diversity of languages, and raznogolosie, 
heterophony, or diversity of voices (individual). 
We will recall that every utterance is oriented towards a social horizon 
which comprises semantic and value elements. The number of these verbal 
and ideological horizons is quite high but not unlimited; and every utter-
ance necessarily falls within one or several of the discursive types determined 
by a horizon. 
There are no longer any words or forms in language which are 
neutral and belong to no one: it appears that language has been 
pillaged, pierced through and through by intentions, and accentuated. 
For a consciousness which exists within language, it is not an abstract 
system of normative forms but a concrete heterological opinion of 
the world. Each word evokes a profession, a genre, a trend, a party, 
a particular work, a particular man, a generation, an age, a day and 
an hour. Each word evokes a context and the contexts within which 
it has experienced an intense social life; every word and every form 
is inhabited by intentions. Contextual harmonies found in a word 
(of the genre, of the trend, of the particular individual) are in-
evitable.2 6 
Through the preceding enumerations we can already see that the strati-
fication of language in discourse is not restricted to one dimension. In the 
course of the most detailed study which he devoted to heterology (in "Dis-
course in the Novel," text of 1934-35), Bakhtin discerns up to five types of 
stratification: genres, profession, social levels, ages and regions (dialects 
strictu sensu). Let us merely note that social class does not play a different 
role from that of profession or age group: it is simply one diversifying factor 
among several others. 
In a certain sense, heterology is inherent to society; it is engendered 
spontaneously by social diversification. But just as the unique state attempts 
to contain this social diversity by means of its laws, so do the authorities 
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fight the diversity of discourse by aspiring to a common language (or rather 
idiom). 
The category of common language is a theoretical expression of the 
historical processes of unification and centralization—an expression 
of the centripetal forces in language. A common language is not a 
given; in actual fact it is always ordered, and opposes genuine heterol-
ogy at every instant throughout the life of a language. Yet at the 
same time, this common language is perfectly real when seen as a 
force which overcomes this heterology, constrains it within certain 
limitations, assures a maximum mutual comprehension, and is crystal-
lized in the real, albeit relative, unity of literary and spoken (every-
day) language, which is the "proper language." 2 7 
Bakhtin will refer, as one can see, to this tendency towards unification as 
a "centripetal force" and by the same token, to heterology as a "centrifugal 
force." Different types of discourse themselves favor one force over the 
other for varying reasons. For example, the novel (or what Bakhtin defines 
as such) reinforces heterology, while poetry does not; for heterology is 
linked to the representation of language, which is a characteristic feature of 
the novel. 
While the principal sorts of poetic genres develop within the flow 
of the centripetal unifying and centralizing forces which inform 
yerbal and ideological existence, the novel, as well as other related 
genres of literary prose, emerged historically within the flow of de-
centralizing, centrifugal forces. 2 8 
Therefore, the high periods of the novel correspond to those which 
witnessed a weakening of centralized power. 
The embryonic forms of novelistic prose appear in the heteroglossic 
and heterological world of the Hellenistic epoch, in imperial Rome, 
also in the decomposition and decadence of the verbal and ideological 
centralism of the medieval church. Similarly, the period of fruition 
of the modern novel is always tied to a general decomposition of 
verbal and ideological systems, to a process, of reinforcement and in-
tensification which opposes linguistic heterology in the literary dialect 
but also outside i t ! 2 9 
On the other hand, as Bakhtin remarks, the different theories or philoso-
Todorov: Ba\htin's Theory 177 
phies of language are always born in the wake of unifying movements; 
this moreover explains their helplessness when confronted by heterology. 
Thus, for example, the sad fate of stylistics when it tackles the novel: a 
"Ptolemaic" discipline cannot account for a "Galilean" genre. 
Traditional stylistics ignores the kind of combination whereby lan-
guages and styles merge in a superior unity; it has no means of 
approaching the particular social dialogue of languages within a 
novel. This is why stylistic analysis is not oriented towards the novel 
seen as a whole but only towards one or the other of its subordinate 
stylistic aspects. The specialist bypasses the distinctive characteristic 
of the novelistic genre; he transforms the object of his study, and 
instead of the novelistic style he in fact analyses something completely 
different. He transposes an orchestrated symphonic theme in the 
place of a piano. 3 0 
Bakhtin enumerates several other examples of such helplessness in the 
face of heterology: 
The poetics of Aristotle, the poetics of Augustine, Medieval reli-
gious poetics of the common language of truth, the Cartesian poetics 
of Neo-Classicism, the abstract grammatical universalism of Leibniz 
(the idea of universal grammar), the concrete ideologism of Hum-
boldt—whatever may be the distinguishing nuances—these all express 
the same centripetal forces of sociolinguistic and ideological existence; 
they all serve the same objective: the centralization and unification 
of European languages. 3 1 
The rather surprising name in this roster is Humboldt, a distant source 
of inspiration for Bakhtin, as we know, and an advocate of linguistic diver-
sity, that of languages as well as that of individuals (language expressing a 
national spirit, the utterance—an individual one). However, Humboldt 
forgets a crucial gap between these two: social diversity. Beyond the unicity 
of Classicism and the Romantic infinite variety, Bakhtin seeks a third path: 
that of typology. 
Translated from French by Claudine Frank. 
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Prefigurements of Art* 
Thomas A. Sebeok 
0. Preliminaries. 
That language is a biotic property specific to man is a truism even in 
the sense that no other species encountered so far is, in the technical accep-
tation of this term, language-endowed. Language is a cognitive structure 
which, like the behavioral extension of any organ of man's body, may be 
studied along several more or less agreed upon semiosic/ethological dimen-
sions,1 including the characters of its initial state (ontogenesis), mature 
state, and end-state (gradual breakdown, partial reconstitution, and eventual 
termination). 2 With regard to the phylogenesis of language, there has been 
much random conjecture and some empirical stumbling, but scarcely even 
translucent enlightenment so far. Verbal sign configurations have been 
elaborated throughout history into many complex forms of message oriented 
constructs, encompassing both spoken and literary genres, which are best 
called jointly—as I had suggested nearly a quarter of a century ago3—the 
"verbal art." Furthermore, language, being "absolutely distinct from any 
system of communication in other animals," and thus "also the most diag-
nostic single trait of man," 4 has as its corollary, by definition as it were, 
the tautologic proposition that- man has a monopoly on all manifestations 
of the verbal art. These statements and their implication, while hardly 
contestable, are surely trivial, owing to the equally unchallengeable fact 
that the communication system of every other species stamps it with a 
unique hallmark, much as language conspicuously segregates out our 
humanity.5 They do, however, suggest one interesting question which I 
propose to explore, if tentatively, in what follows, namely, whether the 
optimal design of certain animal communication systems can allow, given 
certain contextual conditions, for a superimposed aesthetic function. In 
other words, how reasonable is it to search for prefigurements of aestheti-
cally charged averbal sign configurations in man's animal ancestry? What, 
for instance, could Julian Huxley have meant when he asserted, in passing, 
* The entire text, supported by 27 Figures, including nine color plates, has appeared in 
Semiotica, XXVII (1979) , pp. 3-73; the definitive version is scheduled to be published as 
Ch. 9 in the author's forthcoming book, The Play of Musement (Bloomington: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 1981). 
180 Semiotic Themes 
during a Darwin Centennial panel discussion, that in the behavior of the 
Satinbird (Ptilonorhynchus violaceus)—a remarkable bowerbird living in 
the coastal forests of Eastern Australia, and a species certain members of 
which paint the inside of their bower efficiently, even, to echo Huxley's 
word, "deliberately"—there is "definitely the beginning of aesthetics"?6 
This seemingly bizarre habit, Marshall surmised, "may be an aesthetic exten-
sion of a basic drive,"7 namely, the birds' courtship feeding phenomenon— 
or just the sort of displacement activity of sexual behavior that some 
Freudians have posited in men. Gannon, 8 the discoverer of bower painting 
in this species, also observed that the male appeared to employ a tool—a 
wad of bark, like a brush or sponge, held in the tip of the bill—to apply 
the paint, which is composed of saliva mixed by the bird with charcoal 
dust, dark berries, or wood-pulp. It was subsequently noted that the paint, 
washed away by the heavy tropical rains, is replaced daily during the height 
of the sexual season and fibrous bark, often still saturated with charcoal 
and saliva, is commonly to be found on the avenue floor between the two 
painted walls and where fallen leaves are always quickly removed. This 
bird, when constructing its social signals, exhibits a decided preference 
for blue, less so for yellowish-green, shunning red altogether, a bias mani-
fested, moreover, in such like-colored ornamental objects as feathers, flowers, 
leaves, berries, snail shells, cicada integument, and, near human habitations, 
pieces of blue-colored glass beads, strands of wool and tinsel.9 Generalizing 
about the entire family Ptilorhynchidae, of which about nineteen species 
occur, Dobzhansky remarks that "it is impossible to deny that a well-
adorned bower may give the bird a pleasure which can only be called 
aesthetic."1 0 Recall in this context Nicolas Poussin's maxim—a 17th 
century evocation of the mediaeval doctrine of delectatio as a sign—that 
"la fin de l'art est la delectation," apropos of which Panofsky insists that 
"a work of art always has aesthetic significance,"1 1 regardless of whether 
it serves some practical—let me qualify: biological—purpose at bottom. 
We must likewise concede the possibility that "animals perform some of 
the behavior patterns we observe because they enjoy the resulting experience," 
regardless of whether such patterns are adaptive, or virtually so, "but result 
in a pleasantly satisfying feeling" on the animal's part. 1 2 Whether or not 
bowers are built, painted, and decorated for the makers' pleasure, the fact 
remains that the constructions take place, as a rule, during the breeding 
season and serve as the sites where territorial displays are performed. The 
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key issue, what the differential effect of the bowers may be on the females, 
remains unresolved, because this has not been systematically tested.13 
Contrary to Barthes' contention, that the semiotician is entitled to treat 
writing and pictures in the same way because what he retains from them 
both is "qu'elles sont toutes deux des signes"1^ in all living systems that 
I know of the characteristics of the signs employed are inseparably joined 
to the kind of information they carry. Similarly, the concept of "secondary 
modeling system," 1 5 which is assuredly among the more salient features of 
Soviet semiotics, posits a superstructure that persistently confounds two 
diverse artistic realizations which, I would argue, demand radically different 
treatment: on the one side, the products of the verbal art and its deriva-
tives, being inescapably built up from signs that are the operands of a 
natural language, plus certain traditional or newly invented rules for 
combining them in possible, impossible, contingent, or imperative ways to 
advance human cognition and communication; and, on the other side, the 
artistic products of averbal semiotic systems into which verbal signs may, 
to be sure, encroach in varying degree. The performances we call the 
verbal art and those that we call the averbal arts generate, respectively, in 
the dominant and the minor hemisphere, although the specializations nor-
mally have a complementary relationship. As Eccles has recently pointed 
out, "the minor hemisphere is specialized in relationship to pictures and 
patterns, and it is musical." 1 6 This separation of hemispheric functions, 
by the evidence to date, is genetically coded. The minor hemisphere is 
best envisaged as "a very superior animal brain," 1 7 a conception which points 
precisely in the direction in which future researches are most likely to prove 
fruitful. The two repertoires of signs may, and often doubtless do, "enter 
into subtle semantic relationships," as Veltrusky emphasizes,18 the resulting 
meaning being compounded by a process called codified contiguity. This 
is achieved by the immense and incessant traffic in the corpus callosum 
linking the two cerebral hemispheres of the intact human brain, for "prob-
ably everything that happens in the minor hemisphere leads to a kind of 
reverberation in the major hemisphere." 1 9 There is, however, no ground 
that I know of for belief that would compel the conclusion that the in-
terpretant of every artistic sign must have a verbal component; and should 
a semiotic system of the second kind be identified in the infrahuman bio-
sphere, it would certainly be altogether delusive to postulate a verbal 
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infrastructure for the sort of hemispheric specialization intimated is, after 
all, "unique to man." 2 0 
The authentic singularity of man consists of this, that he alone disposes 
over a pair of communicative codes: "along with our wholly new and 
wholly distinct system of true language," 2 1 the verbal code, we retain an 
older system that, for want of a better name, 2 2 is frequently, contrastively, 
and hence negatively designated as a human manifestation of a cross-
specific averbal code. The latter comprehends a trio of subcodes recently 
differentiated into separate categories by Uexküll: 2 3 first, endosemiotic aver-
bal sign systems, or the metabolic code, 2 4 involving humoral and nervous 
factors that convey information within the bodies of all animals, including 
man; 2 5 second, somatosemiotic averbal sign systems, that function to com-
pact the unity of every organism,2 6 a notion kindred to Leibniz's concept 
of apperception (as expressed in his 1714 paper, Principes de la nature et de 
la grace, fondes en raison), which is our conscious reflection of the inner 
state of the monad; and third, outspreading averbal sign systems, such as 
are used for communication between organisms and between any organism 
and its external environment. In man, the output of this entire array of 
subcodes, but particularly of the third kind, is exquisitely harmonized in 
performing with his outpouring of verbal messages, although the diverse 
repertories each serve separate ends substantially at variance one from the 
other—a point worth reemphasizing with Bateson,2 7 who rather clearly saw 
how wrong it is to assume that, in hominid evolution, verbal semiosis has, 
in any sense, replaced "the cruder systems of the other animals," 2 8 that is, 
averbal semiosis. Had this been the case, our averbal skills and the organs 
that execute them would inevitably have undergone conspicuous decay. 
Obviously, they have not; on the contrary, while the verbal art flourished, 
we have perfected our averbal arts as well—they too "have been elaborated 
into complex forms of art, music, ballet . . . and the like, and, even in 
everyday life, the intricacies of human kinesic communication, facial ex-
pression and vocal intonation far exceed anything that any other animal is 
known to produce."2 9 
The ideal of semiosic analysis is to combine causal with functional ex-
planation—to show how sign form interrelates dynamically with sign func-
tion, both in synchrony and in diachrony. But an evolutionary sequence 
is hard to come by in an area so complex and multiply amphibiological 
as art. Instances may be temporally ordered but are not necessarily in 
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linked sequence. Guthrie offers some interesting ideas, in a semiotic frame, 
"about how some aspects of our aesthetic sense evolved,"3 0 but the part 
he was concerned with was that which underlies our appreciation of human 
physical beauty, the valuation of which he traced to two major elements, 
copulatory lures and status badges. One perhaps insuperable difficulty all 
investigators have to face is to identify ineffable "signs of artistic enjoyment 
in other species," 3 1 all of them being creatures that are speechless. 
The only general survey I can find in the entire literature of the life 
sciences of basic aesthetic principles possibly shared by man with at least 
the higher animals was drafted in the late 1960s by another ethologist, 
Rensch, in an essay that was published only much later in the U.S. (1974) 
and Great Britain (1976) . 3 2 This authoritative but still, unfortunately, all 
too inconclusive review, based in large part on the author's well-known 
experiments aimed to demonstrate the reality of protoaesthetic phenomena, 
the results of which were found to be in good conformity with those of 
psychologists33 who studied the elements of aesthetic preferences in human 
subjects, is devoted in the main to scribblings and paintings by monkeys 
and apes, with but a laconic page on "auditive aesthetic sensations."34 In 
1958, Rensch had investigated the efficacy of aesthetic factors in vertebrates, 
testing preferences for different patterns in a jackdaw, a carrion crow, and 
six fishes. He showed that, while the fishes always preferred irregular 
patterns, both species of birds preferred the more regular, more symmetrical, 
and more rhythmical patterns, doing so in statistically significant numbers. 
In a color choice test, these birds exhibited a preference for gray and black, 
being the colors of their own plumage. However, "they preferred patterns 
with two or four different colours to simpler patterns of one colour or two 
colours respectively."35 A student of his, Tigges, 3 6 later found that jack-
daws preferred pure colors (red, blue, yellow, green) to equally bright 
mixed ones (orange, brown, violet, lilac). 
Although painting experiments were conducted by N. N. Ladygin Kohts 
with a chimpanzee named Joni, in Moscow, as far back as 1913, and 
Shepherd 3 7 reported that a chimpanzee drew lines with a pencil, and many 
an anecdotal story found its way into the literature since then, there are 
only three serious studies of primate aesthetics: the series of papers by 
Rensch, 3 8 a posthumous publication by Schiller, 3 9 and the engaging book 
by Morris, 4 0 especially showing, on the basis of a detailed analysis of one 
young chimpanzee, Congo, that the splashes of paint or the pencil marks 
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made by apes are not at all random. The immature Congo, given an in-
complete pattern, often made marks which tended to complete it. Alpha, 
the first-born chimpanzee of the Yerkes Colony, if given a piece of paper, 
with a cross placed on three of the corners, would put a cross in the fourth 
corner: "she would also in her crude way try to complete designs and 
pictures which had been given to her deliberately unfinished or unbal-
anced." 4 1 One is thus forced to assume the presence, in advance, of a 
representation in the animal's nervous system that corresponds to the picture 
displayed. 
The most recent survey of ape creativity may be found in the psycholo-
gist Andrew Whiten's excellent account.4 2 Rensch, who had worked with 
a capuchin monkey and a green monkey as well as chimpanzees, observing 
their drawing or painting with pencil, colored chalk, or brush, professes 
to have been astonished "to find also aesthetic factors having a positive 
effect with apes, monkeys and [even] crows comparable with the effect 
in man." 4 3 He believes that our feelings of aesthetic pleasure, as we look 
at different black and white patterns are, in the main, .attributable to three 
basic conditions: symmetry, rhythmic repetition of similar component parts, 
and consistency of curvatures. His results demonstrate that, with these 
animals, as with man, "the greater facility to apprehend a design, the 
details of which are rhythmically repeated or otherwise more easily appre-
hended, the £complexibility' is connected with positive feelings and arouses 
aesthetic pleasure."4 4 Rensch tells of incidents where "competent art ex-
perts, on being shown monkeys' paintings without being told who had 
painted them, sometimes enthusiastically praised the dynamism, rhythm 
and sense of balance." 4 5 In so doing they have not made fools of themselves, 
but simply confirmed what the experimental biologists had already also 
established. 
Rensch further supposes that the tendency of apes, including orangutans 
and capuchin monkeys, to put scarves, ribbons, chains, and the like, around 
their neck, and to romp about with them on, is to be interpreted as enjoy-
ment of dressing up; hence, in his view, aesthetic factors would be involved 
in this behavior as well. "It is even more likely," he adds, "that birds find 
aesthetic pleasure in repeating tunes they hear from other birds or from 
humans, and in 'composing' new melodies from phrases either learned or 
already known." 4 6 
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Following these brief prefatory observations, I would like to reexamine 
in some detail the question of the putative aesthetic propensity of animals, 
with specific (although uneven) attention to four semiotic spheres: (1) 
kinesthetic signs, (2) musical signs, (3) pictorial signs, and (4) architectural 
signs. Sketchy as such a review must be, no such comprehensive literature 
survey has been attempted before, probably for several reasons. One of 
these may be due to the fact that cultural anthropologists who have sought 
to inquire into the biological roots of art have typically set out to do so 
with a preconception common to many members of the profession. Alland, 
for one, opens his chapter on "The Evolution of Art" with this uncompro-
mising sentence: "The creation and appreciation of art in its many forms 
are uniquely human activities,"4 7 adding, a few pages later: "True [sic] 
artistic behavior is seen in no species other than Homo sapiens. Not even 
a hint of it occurs in the natural behavior of other species."48 His brief 
exploration of its origins, sensitive as it is, suggests that this lies in play as 
a biological property, leading him to a debatable definition of art as "play 
involving rules." 4 9 This same notion was earlier advanced by Ellen Eisen-
berg, 5 0 subsuming art in a more inclusive class of behavior patterns, one 
which includes all forms of exploration; and earlier still, by Dobzhansky, 
who felt that at least some forms of art "are related to play." 5 1 (The union 
of the play-impulse with aesthetic feelings and sentiments, as linked with 
superfluous activities and corresponding pleasures, was first propagated by 
Spencer eighty years ago ; 5 2 he argued that the aesthetic sphere in general 
may be expected to occupy an increasing part in human life owing to 
greater economization of energy resulting from superiority of organization 
bringing a growing proportion of the aesthetic activities and gratifications.) 
Dobzhansky, however, perceived even in artistic activity an adaptive value, 
for he saw in it a wellspring of social cohesion, thus raising once again a 
utilitarian interpretation of the role of art. This viewpoint is most fruitfully 
developed by Jenkins, a thoroughgoing evolutionist for whom art has its 
"ultimate source in the human effort to adapt to the environment," and 
who insists, more generally, that any inquiry into the origins of art must 
move, as he emphatically puts it, "toward an analysis of the adaptive situa-
tion."^ Klopfer, who means by aesthetic preferences simply "a liking for 
objects or activities because they produce or induce particular neural inputs 
or emotional states, independently of overt reinforcers," answers his own 
question, whether we can attribute aesthetic impulses to animals other than 
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man, in the affirmative. The inquiry entails the belief that there must be 
a biological basis to aesthetics, and thus shifts to a search into the basis 
thereof: "what are the historical or ultimate reasons for the development 
of an aesthetic sense; by what mechanisms is the development of the species-
characteristic preferences assumed?" 5 4 Klopfer, too, comes up against the 
predicament posed by the traditional view that aesthetic preferences are those 
for which no immediate functional advantage can be perceived; conse-
quently, he strikes out in a different direction, seeking for guidance from 
sensory physiology, while also redefining play as a kind of exploratory 
activity by which the organism "tests" different proprioceptive patterns for 
the goodness of fit.55 
When ethnologists search for the sources of art, they more often than 
not mean the verbal art; play thus comes to mean wordplay, which Alland, 
for one, connects with poetry,56 and which must then be excluded per 
definitionem from the rest of the animal kingdom. Archaeologists tend 
especially to dwell on representative art; as Marshack puts it, "art and 
symbol are products that visualize and objectify aspects of culture. . . . " 5 7 
Although, on balance, the neuroanatomist Young is undoubtedly right 
when he says, in the course of his synthesis tracing the sources of human 
activity from their biochemical basis to the highest levels of consciousness, 
that "there is no body of facts that yet enables us to understand the origins 
of aesthetic creation . . . ," 5 8 the issue remains a tantalizing one, for, as 
another distinguished biologist put it, "in some situations it becomes really 
difficult not to impute to animals some sort of aesthetics."59 The dialectic 
seems to have begun between Darwin, whose theory of sexual selection is 
based on the assumption that female birds, for example, are able to appre-
ciate the beauty of male plumage,6 0 and his contemporary, Wallace, who 
disputed this view precisely in semiotic terms. Wallace argued that what 
is involved here is an instinctive interpretation of certain strings of signs 
emitted by the male. However this may be, it would be unreasonable to 
expect a perfunctory and iterative scrutiny of the literature of animal be-
havior to shed much illumination; a deeper search, on the other hand, 
might at least highlight some fundamental issues—such as the often mis-
understood dichotomy of analogy vs. homology, and the even less under-
stood distinction between phyletic homologies and homologies of tradition. 
1. Kinesthetic signs. 
The kinesthetic art—as the multisensory dance when viewed in a semi-
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otic frame is sometimes reductively termed after its most distinctive feature, 
because in dance (contrasted, particularly, with mime) "movement is often 
an end in itself' 6 1—is seldom alluded to in the context of animal behavior. 
Sachs adduced several striking cases of bird displays he and others in his 
field, including recently Royce, 6 2 explicitly dubbed "dancing." One of his 
examples is cited after Maclaren, 6 3 who witnessed this dance of the stilt 
birds, or cranes, in Cape York in Northeastern Australia: 
The birds . . . were long-legged creatures, tall almost as storks, and 
white and gray of feather; and the dance took place in the center of 
a broad, dry swamp. . . . There were some hundreds of them, and 
their dance was in the manner of a quadrille, but in the matter of 
rhythm and grace excelling any quadrille that ever was. In groups 
of a score or more they advanced and retreated, lifting high their 
long legs and standing on their toes, now and then bowing gracefully 
to one another, now and then one pair encircling with prancing 
daintiness a group whose heads moved upwards and downwards 
and sideways in time to the stepping of the pair. At times they 
formed into one great prancing mass, with their long necks thrust 
upward; and the wide swaying of their backs was like unto the 
swaying of the sea. Then, suddenly, as in response to an imperative 
command, they would sway apart, some of them to rise in low, en-
circling flight, and some to stand as in little gossiping groups; and 
presently they would form in pairs or sets of pairs, and the prancing 
and bowing, and advancing and retreating would begin all over 
again. 6 4 
His second example, which comes from British Guiana, cited after Ap-
pun, is, as Royce underlines, "even more interesting since it describes what 
is essentially a performer-spectator situation" : 6 5 
[A] group of some twenty mountain chickens of a brilliant orange-
yellow color, gathered together in a kind of dance characteristic of 
these beautiful birds. In the center one of the cocks executed the 
dance-like movements, as he hopped about the open place with wings 
extended and tail outspread. On the branches of the bushes round 
about, the others sat and expressed their admiration of the dancer 
with the strangest sounds. As soon as one cock was exhausted, he 
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joined the spectators, uttering a peculiar cry, and another took his 
place. 6 6 
These parallels immediately raise several problems, the most obvious 
being whether the animal's behavior is "merely" analogous to man's, 
whether, that is, shifting to a more familiar parlance, the label "dance" 
is "just" a colorful and suggestive metaphor—as it must surely be in Frisch's 
designation of the kinetic component of the communication system of the 
honeybee as a "dance" 6 7—or whether something deeper is implied, perhaps 
indeed a remote phyletic homology. 6 8 Even if only an analogy is meant, 
this is far from valueless, since its study would throw light upon "the laws 
of function that rule the evolution of a behavior pattern." 6 9 It is, in fact, 
highly productive to compare biological constructs with cultural ones if 
only to ascertain whether seemingly similar signifiers trigger comparable 
interpretants, in the sense that the wing of an insect (developed from an 
epidermal fold), the wing of a bird (developed from a vertebrate extrem-
ity), and a wing of an airplane (manufactured, say, of metal), are all shaped 
in response to the universal laws of aerodynamics. Armstrong, who devoted 
an entire chapter to drawing parallels between the dances of birds and 
men, feels that he is justified in employing the identical label for both sets 
of motor signs because of "a natural recognition of the remarkable simi-
larities which actually exist between the dances of birds and men and the 
identity of the emotional sources from which both take their origin. The 
resemblances between avian and human dancing," he claims, "are the 
outcome of emotional drives which underlie the behaviour of all the higher 
animals; and the natural corollary is that we can use the terpsichorean 
activities of men to interpret those of birds, and vice versa. Let us not be 
scared," he concludes, "by the bogey of anthropomorphism into the arms 
of the spectre of Cartesian mechanism. It is not anthropomorphism to 
believe that man and the higher animals have much in common so far as 
instinct and emotion are concerned, but an acknowledgment of truth 
scientifically demonstrated."™ 
Sachs' questions, by distinguishing—to recast in modern ethological 
terminology what he says—phyletic homologies, or those that are transmitted 
via the genome, from homologies of tradition, that is, those that are passed 
on via memory, whether animals in fact do dance as man does. The 
traditional distinction between innate vs. acquired characteristics is not at 
all as clear-cut as Sachs implies, however, and becomes increasingly in-
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appropriate when one considers the alloprimates. One reason for this is 
that, for research dealing with homologies, "it is only necessary that informa-
tion emanating from one common source is passed on. It is not necessary 
for reproductive relationships to be involved." 7 1 What we know about 
dancing in apes is, while doubtless fascinating, unfortunately far from 
abundant, and even here a further discrimination demands to be promptly 
introduced, namely, as between studies of animals in captivity, some of 
which Sachs knew of, and observations of groups in the wild, which are of 
much more recent vintage. Both sets of data concern chimpanzees—the 
latter all but exclusively from the popular writings of Lawick-Goodall.72 
Lawick-Goodall repeatedly refers to a display, which she reports having 
seen but three times in ten years, as a "rain dance." These group perfor-
mances lasting almost half an hour, involved adult males—with females 
and youngsters in watchful attendance—although often individual males 
were also observed to "react to the start of heavy rain by performing a 
rain dance." 7 3 It is not at all clear from Lawick-GoodalFs description of 
these spectacles what the chimpanzees' behavior pattern could possibly 
signify. In the human context, what is commonly called a rain dance is 
performed in many societies as a fertility rite in order to produce rain; 
it belongs to a class Royce calls metaphorical dances.7 4 By contrast, feral 
chimpanzees, to all appearances, "dislike the rain," reminding the observer 
of "primitive men . . . defying the elements." 7 5 Their carnival display 
is in reaction to a sudden downpour. What we have here is a striking 
resemblance in form—sufficiently so, it seems, to account for the labeling— 
but a dearth of information about referential sign function, and therefore 
a gnawing question mark about the meaning of the convergence between 
man and chimpanzee in this arena of expressive movement. 
Reports of chimpanzees dancing in the laboratory—including what Sachs 
claimed to be the "most valuable document"7 6—come from the psychologist 
Köhler, who was for six years in charge of a research establishment in 
Tenerife. 7 7 Köhler frequently observed couples moving in dance-like 
fashion. He depicted a particular configuration about which he remarked 
that "Die ähnlichkeit mit einem Tanz war besonders gross," 7 8 a characteriza-
tion Sachs wholly concurred with. Nor was this all. Stylized group dances 
took place, such as the following, which Sachs insisted "was a genuine 
round dance": 
In mock fighting two of them drag each other about on the ground 
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until they come near a post. Their frolicking and romping quiets 
down as they begin to circle about, using the post as a pivot. One 
after another the rest of the animals appear, join the circle, and finally 
the whole group, one behind another, is marching in orderly fashion 
around the post. Now their movements change quickly. They are 
no longer walking but trotting. Stamping with one foot and putting 
the other down lightly, they beat out what approaches a distinct 
rhythm, with each of them tending to keep step with the rest. When 
two posts or boxes stand close to each other, they like to use these 
as a center, and in this case the ring dance around both takes the 
form of an ellipse. In these dances the chimpanzee likes to bedeck 
his body with all sorts of things, especially strings, vines, and rags 
that dangle and swing in the air as he moves about. 7 9 
Sachs identifies here the prefigurements of a series of basic human 
dance motifs: "as forms, the circle and ellipse around the post, the forward 
and backward pace; as movements, hopping, rhythmical stamping, whirling, 
and even ornamentation for the dance." 8 0 Köhler further tells us that the 
sympathetic observer would gladly join in this dance, and that when he 
initiated the movement around the post "in der besonderen Schrittart, 
welche für die Tiere dazugehörte," he was immediately followed by a 
couple of chimpanzees; but when he quit, because of fatigue, his dancing 
companions would squat and sulk. 8 1 What Sachs is concerned with here 
ought to be taken very seriously, but remains as yet unresolved, for, as he 
summarizes: "If the dance, inherited from brutish ancestors, lives in all 
mankind as a necessary motor-rhythmic expression of excess energy and 
of the joy of living, then it is only of slight importance for anthropologists 
and social historians. If it is established, however, that an inherited pre-
disposition develops in many ways in the different groups of man and if 
its force and direction is related to other phenomena of civilization, the 
history of the dance will then be of great importance for the study of 
mankind." 8 2 
If one defines dance, in the stark fashion of Boas, as "the rhythmic 
movements of any part of the body, swinging of the arms, movement of 
the trunk or head, or movements of the legs and feet," 8 3 then clearly the 
chimpanzees' behavior can legitimately be bracketed with ours. It is plausi-
ble, moreover, to regard both underlying structures as homologous, implying 
that they owe their similarity to a common origin, much as laughter and 
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smiling fit into the phyletic scale. 8 4 The postulation of a homologous rela-
tionship does not, however, necessarily imply a distinction between char-
acteristics that are innate vs. those that may be acquired, for homologies 
may be passed on either via the genome or via memory, that is, by cultural 
or quasi-cultural mechanisms, in the manner, say, of song traditions in 
the parasitic weaver finches (Viduinae), which were discovered to even 
transgress species boundaries: these birds learn not only the songs but 
also the calls of their host species, and close mimicry of the vocalizations 
of the step-father results in parallel development which may, in turn, lead to 
eventual species genesis. Whether dance behavior is innate or acquired is 
not known, but it is important to be mindful that information may be 
communicated to a succeeding generation in several different ways, and 
therefore, since form depends on the function, convergence can hardly be 
excluded. In studies of expressive movements, the investigation is particu-
larly complicated by the fact that the specific adaptations are not simply 
responsive to the environment, but involve subtle selective pressures which 
cannot yet be formulated in terms of physiological or biochemical corre-
lates—for instance, a concept such as "aesthetic pleasure." Nonetheless, I 
find myself concurring with Griffin, when he exclaims that "this does not 
seem to [him] to be a sufficient reason for avoiding the concepts themselves, 
as though they were a dangerous plague." 8 5 This view, moreover, accords, 
I think, with the line taken by such specialists in the dance as Hanna, who, 
while she feels "that the configuration of human behaviour that is called 
dance is significantly different from the behaviour of other animals, in-
cluding that which has also been labelled dance," at the same time affirms 
"that human dance has its roots in phylogenetic and ontogenetic evolution, 
firstly in predisposing psychobiological processes and secondly in social 
experience." 8 6 
2. Musical signs. 
"Music," Merriam tells his readers, "is a uniquely human phenomenon 
. . ." 8 7—but his generalization begs the very question that needs exploring. 
I would therefore prefer to start journeying backward in time from the 
Janus-like portal that is the sole rational means of access from nature to 
culture that Levi-Strauss sagaciously threw open when befittingly noting 
that "la musique opere au moyen de deux grilles. L'une est physiologique, 
done naturelle; son existence tient au fait que la musique exploite les 
192 Semiotic Themes 
rythmes organiques, et qu'elle rend ainsi pertinentes des discontinuites qui 
resteraient autrement ä l'etat latent, et comme noyees dans la duree. L'autre 
grille est culturelle; eile consiste dans une echelle de sons musicaux, dont 
le nombre et les ecarts varient selon les cultures." 8 8 
Boas made two fundamental observations concerning music: first, that 
the only kind of music that occurs universally is song, "and the source of 
music must therefore be sought here;" and, second, that two elements, and 
only two, are common to all song: rhythm and fixed intervals.8 9 It is in 
the class of birds that the rootstock lies to which these remarks must in-
evitably lead the unprejudiced investigator, fortified by the opinion of so 
experienced an ornithologist as Thorpe, who, in repudiation of a typically 
naive remark of Suzanne Langer's, 9 0 proclaims his own stand: ". . . in-
creased familiarity, from long study, certainly for me, increases my convic-
tion that our judgment that bird songs, in some instances and in some 
degree, represent music is not mistaken." 9 1 
Within the last decade, several competent and thoughtful studies have 
appeared appraising a field that in the course of its recent development has 
even won a name of its own: ornithomusicology.92 One such survey, on 
the aesthetic content of bird song, was compiled by Hall-Craggs, a British 
ornithologist.93 Another, a book-length global reinterpretation of bird song, 
was undertaken by Hartshorne, a prominent philosopher (perhaps best 
known to this readership as the senior editor of the Collected Papers of 
C. S. Peirce). 9 4 As for the controversial but hardly verifiable central thesis 
of ornithomusicology—an idea first articulated, I believe, by Montaigne— 
it is argued that birds evolved elaborate musical utterances long before the 
appearance of man, who may be supposed to have derived his primitive 
music under the instigation or, at any rate, influence of their song: men 
certainly heard it and some may have imitated it. (It should be mentioned 
here that man often mimics different aspects of animal behavior, 9 5 and 
particularly that the imitation of bird dances is quite widespread. One 
example from Europe is the incorporation of a figure, the Nachsteigen, 
from the behavior of the mountain cock, into the Bavarian Schuhplatter\)m 
The process of adoption would have been facilitated by the undeniable fact 
that man and bird share certain requisite physiological foundations: both 
of us sense the world most consequentially by optical means, and both of 
us address it most saliently by acoustic means. 9 7 Indeed, in a number of 
crucial respects, and particularly as to the predisposition of some song birds, 
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manifesting critical periods in their lives for song-learning, to master certain 
sounds rather than others in a manner reminiscent of the kind of con-
straints on first language acquisition detectable in human children, and in 
several other important respects, "these birds are closer to man than any 
nonhuman primate " 9 8 
Were the ornithomusicologist's contentions demonstrable, then one could 
postulate a true homology of tradition, if not a phyletic one: human song 
would thus be as homologous to bird song as, say, a genetically unrelated 
second language acquired by a foreign speaker is homologous to the first 
language learned by a native speaker of that same language. Failing that, 
we must fall back on the principle of convergent evolution, justified by 
adequate evidence for formal correspondence. But Szöke's line of argu-
mentation is by no means abrogated or contradicted by the prodigiously 
erudite Armstrong's chapter on "Bird Song as Art and Play," where this 
English life-long student of bird behavior repeatedly remarks that "As evi-
dence increases it becomes more difficult to deny that birds possess some 
aesthetic sensitivity," and that, "whatever else our aesthetic taste may be, it 
is an extension and refinement of animal abilities." He quotes an apt 
observation by Paracelsus, the early 16th century physician and alchemist, 
who admonished: "Man need not be surprised that animals have animal 
instincts that are so much like his own. . . . Man may learn from the 
animals, for they are his parents." 9 9 
The most elusive problem in demonstrating "that birds have aesthetic 
taste is the difficulty of proving that any characteristic of bird song is non-
utilitarian." 1 0 0 Hartshorne's book is in part addressed to this predicament, 
which he formulates thus: "To say 'aesthetic' is to say 'not merely or too 
directly utilitarian.' But we must be careful to balance this consideration 
against the seemingly contradictory one that unless an aesthetic activity has 
some connection with utility it will be unlikely to survive evolutionary 
change." 1 0 1 Hartshorne speculates that there may be an optimum here 
between irrelevance to survival needs of the species—notably, as an expres-
sion of its territorial requirements (the birds with the "best" songs are 
usually the ones with the most marked territorial behavior)—and too close 
or immediate a connection with such needs, as represented by the individual 
singer in a given context. He postulates "a safety factor," a sort of emer-
gency valve for the outlet of surplus energy, a luxury activity that can 
always be nullified in exigent circumstances. 
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Rhythm is the basis of form in bird song, as in all music, much as 
symmetry is in space or equilibrium in matter. Hall-Craggs discusses its 
prevalence in some detail, as well as of the transposition of fixed intervals 
that Boas deemed the second all-important element of music, comparable 
with melody. 1 0 2 Armstrong remarked earlier that "it can hardly be for-
tuitous that some birds do sing and transpose in accordance with our 
musical scale." 1 0 3 An important series of experiments bearing on this point 
was carried out by Reinert with jackdaws (Corpus monedula).104 After 
being conditioned to distinguish certain rhythmic acoustic signals, the jack-
daws were able to identify them even when played by different instruments, 
that is, with a different timbre, or when the tempo, pitch, or interval are 
transposed. They could also distinguish between two-four time and three-
four time. The birds could perceive acoustical patterns differing in intensity 
and duration of tone, and recognized a great many variations. In sum, 
they did not depend on absolute clues only but, as we ourselves do in the 
perception of phonemes, on relative ones. Ultimately, I suppose, this is a 
mathematical matter, and eventually Nelson, in fact, undertook a sophisti-
cated quantitative comparative study of this kind, showing similarities of 
structuring in several taxa, including behavioral organization in bird and 
man, with respect to acoustic signals. 1 0 5 
Many birds, moreover, possess the ability to follow a train of changing 
pitches, as a scale, and to distinguish it from another train proceeding 
simultaneously but at a different speed or in a different direction. In other 
words, these birds appear to have solved what Cherry had designated in 
man as the "cocktail party problem," 1 0 6 the essence of which I take to consist 
of the capacity to select one particular acoustic string, viz., a tune, out from 
its accompaniment or to distinguish it from another string proceeding at 
the same time (polyphony). A single individual veery (Hylocichla fusces-
cens) is, for example, able to produce complex polyphonic patternings; nor 
need there be, in this species, an interval between primary patterns, although 
it may be present in one voice but not in the other. "At the end of most 
songs, the two voices come together to cooperate in a characteristic extended 
trill of overlapping arpeggios (song A); sometimes this 'cadence' appears 
to be left to the lower voice alone (song B ) . " 1 0 7 Thorpe, on the basis of 
his distinguished fieldwork, supplemented by laboratory studies, has clearly 
confirmed the existence of "something like musical appreciation, albeit on 
an elementary scale, existing in a good many birds," 1 0 8 derived, in part, 
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from discoveries of antiphonal singing, especially in the compulsively 
duetting African shrike {Laniarius aethiopicus) . 1 0 9 The notes of the duet 
constitute polyphonic singing, such that the pitch, timing, and phrasing can, 
to a large extent, be controlled very exactly, but can also be varied by the 
singers. Either sex can start and the other finish, either bird can sing the 
whole pattern alone if the partner is absent, and, when the partner returns, 
the two birds can either duplicate in perfect time or resume antiphonal 
singing. 
The organized singing patterns of birds have long attracted our atten-
tion. In some, the singing is organized to conform with strict sequencing 
rules; the structure is hierarchical, the levels comparable with the build-up 
of the human mode of vocal display. Ethologists tend to interpret bird 
song in terms of the adaptive advantages it confers on the performers and 
their conspecific audience, while keeping an open mind on the ramifying 
consequences of the display, which may well surpass a single function and 
come to encompass the aesthetic dimension. To summarize: "That birds 
'sing' is a notion applied popularly to vocal performances that people 
find aesthetically pleasing, but singing lacks a fully accepted and rigorous 
descriptive meaning in ethology." 1 1 0 
The ornithomusicological hypothesis becomes muddled when one con-
siders that other animals than birds have variously been alleged to "sing": 
"Cicadas [i.e., locusts] are noisy, daytime musicians, the male alone singing. 
The sound is produced by snapping a special structure, the tymbal, with 
a muscle." 1 1 1 As with birds, singing is emulative, and this, as Darwin had 
noted, sometimes gives rise to antiphonic duets or trios. 1 1 2 This application 
of "song" is, however, likely to be metaphorical just like "dance" is in 
application to the honeybee. Then there is the California singing fish 
(Porichthys notatus), whose song, which varies in tone pitch and quality 
from specimen to specimen, produced under conditions of colonial activity, 
was carefully described by Greene, 1 1 3 The striking vocalizations of frogs 
and toads have also been termed "songs," 1 1 4 often in reference to the 
existence of duetting throughout some nineteen genera, or more complex 
chorusing behavior, the biological function of which has hitherto eluded 
all investigators. The bellow of the alligator, assumed to convey an asser-
tion of dominance and a challenge to other males within earshot, is like-
wise often called "song" in the reptile literature. I personally doubt if 
phenomena of this sort can be considered as prefigurements in any interest-
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ing sense. However, there are at least two groups of mammals in which 
singing has been reported, and these may be worthier of our regard. 
First, there is the case of the humpback whale (Megaptera novaengliae), 
a species whose phonograph recordings have received considerable publicity 
in the media and on at least American college campuses during this decade; 
(George Crumb's exotic composition, "Vox Balaenae For Three Masked 
Players," was directly inspired by the voice of the whale). Mysticete sounds 
have for some decades been recognized to be varied and complex, but the 
humpback is the baleen whose rich sonic repertoire has been most thorough-
ly studied so far. 1 1 5 The animals certainly "emit a series of surprisingly 
beautiful sounds," 1 1 6 including a long train, called a "song," that recurs in 
cycles lasting up to 30 minutes and perhaps longer. This song is often 
produced in continuous soliloquy, very loudly, by a single whale for a -full 
eight minutes; there is no evidence of duetting. But its purpose is not really 
understood; "we can only guess what function this remarkable series of 
vocalizations serves." 1 1 7 This being so, no one can yet say whether the 
performance has, for the whale—in contrast to the human listener—any 
sort of aesthetic significance, and thus whether the designation "song" is 
biologically justified. 
The climactic question whether song-like behavior has been observed 
in the order of Primates can be answered affirmatively, but, among the 
monkeys, it seems, only for some platyrrhine (New World) species, notably, 
Callicebus moloch (titi monkey). In the case of this monkey, Moynihan 
applies the term song "in a very broad and general sense, to include all 
series of notes uttered in more or less rapid and regular succession and 
distinctly set off, by relatively long pauses, from both preceding and suc-
ceeding notes." 1 1 8 Moynihan characterizes such passages as only moderately 
rapid throughout all or most of their length, and these he calls "ordinary" 
songs. He describes four or more other types and calls these "compound" 
songs. Among the ordinary songs, he identifies nineteen, but says that this 
list is certainly not exhaustive. He terms two of the most common com-
pound sequences "full" songs; in these, the normal sequence of pitch is 
from higher to lower, irrespective of the actual notes involved. 
In general, the vocalizations of catarrhine (Old World) monkeys, and 
especially those of tailless apes, deserve much closer study. Marler and 
Tenaza have recently stressed that "a comprehensive acoustical description" 
of the chimpanzee—which has been studied far more than any other ape— 
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"has yet to be published." 1 1 9 With respect to singing behavior, the gibbon 
may be the most interesting animal of all: as long ago as the 1890s, Blanford, 
a well-known authority on South Asian mammals, wrote about the hoolock 
(a species of gibbon found in Assam and Upper Burma), that its powerful 
voice, at a distance, "much resembles the human voice; [its song] is a 
peculiar wailing note, audible afar, and . . . one of the most familiar forest 
sounds. The calls commence at daybreak, . . . several of the flock joining 
in the cry, like hounds giving tongue . . . . [They] remain silent through-
out the middle of the day, but recommence calling towards evening, though 
to a less extent than in the earlier part of the day." 1 2 0 This is an example of 
the diurnal rhythm that so frequently characterizes song displays. The 
same term, "song," is also used for the hoolock and several other varieties 
of gibbon by Marler and Tenaza, who distinguish three kinds of choruses 
based upon the sex of the singers: those consisting entirely of males singing; 
those consisting entirely of females singing; and those consisting of duets 
sung by mated pairs of gibbons. 1 2 1 They describe individuals engaged in 
dyadic countersinging with adjacent neighbors in several species. Predawn 
chorusing occurs very frequently, with choruses beginning as early as five 
hours before sunrise. This separates them temporally from dawn bird 
choruses, and it is assumed that the timing is an evolutionary consequence 
of interspecific competition for the auditory environment. "Captivity seems 
to have no effect upon the song structure or the nature of duetting in 
gibbons," according to these authors. 1 2 2 In conclusion, Marler and Tenaza 
supply a long list of unanswered questions about pongid signaling behavior, 
insisting that, "Above all, new approaches should be sought to characterize 
the functions of different vocalizations, so that more subtle interspecies 
comparisons of the proportions of a signal repertoire devoted to different 
kinds of adaptive tasks may be possible." 1 2 3 Considering, therefore, the 
uncertain state of knowledge about the biological uses of what is neverthe-
less persistently called "song" in the alloprimates, it seems premature to 
probe for its aesthetic function, if any. 
In concluding this section, and before turning to the representational 
arts, I should mention that there are birds, among some sixty species of 
the family Pipridae, that both sing and dance, each species according to its 
own ritual. Even the earliest explorers of South and Central America noticed 
them because of their unique dances and the music connected with these 
dances, as in this entrancing description by Nutting (in 1884): "Upon a 
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bare branch which overhung the trail at a distance of about four feet from 
the ground, two male 'Bailadors' were engaged in a 'song and dance' act 
that simply astounded me. The two birds were about a foot and a half 
apart, and were alternately jumping about two feet into the air and alighting 
exactly upon the spot whence they jumped. The time was as regular as 
clock-work, one bird jumping up the instant the other alighted, each bird 
accompanying himself to the tune of 'to-le-do—to-le-do—to-le-do,' sounding 
the syllable 'to' as he crouched to spring, 'le' while in the air, and 'do' as 
he alighted." 1 2 4 In Costa Rica, where this enchanting bird is known as 
el toledo, people tell the same story in almost exactly the same words while 
alternately raising each index finger to illustrate the quaintness of the 
performance. The bird is technically known as Chiroxiphia linearis (one 
of the four so-called Chorus species), or the Long-tailed Manakin, whose 
antics were recently described, with some variations, anew by Slud. 1 2 5 All 
observers agree that the males do dance and that the toledo call is a constant 
accompanying feature, although their views differ as to some other details. 
J . Pictorial signs. 
You have already been introduced above to bowerbirds, a group about 
whose "artistic" productions no less a scientist than Karl von Frisch has 
said that it has "much similarity with human behavior in comparable situa-
tions: those who consider life on earth to be the result of a long evolu-
tionary process will always search for the beginnings of thought processes 
and aesthetic feelings in animals, and I believe that significant traces can 
be found in the bowerbirds." 1 2 6 He goes on to quote a wondrous observa-
tion by the naturalist Heinz Sielmann about the decorating behavior of a 
New Guinea species, the Yellow breasted bowerbird (Chlamydera lauter-
bachi): "Every time the bird returns from one of his collecting forays, 
he studies the over-all color effect. He seems to wonder how he could 
improve on it and at once sets out to do so. He picks up a flower in his 
beak, places it into the mosaic, and retreats to an optimum viewing distance. 
He behaves exactly like a painter critically reviewing his own canvas. He 
paints with flowers; that is the only way I can put it. A yellow orchid does 
not seem to him to be in the right place. He moves it slightly to the left 
and puts it between some blue flowers. With his head on one side he then 
contemplates the general effect once more, and seems satisfied."1 2 7 Even 
though Marshall, who, after more than two decades of study, became the 
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foremost authority on bowerbirds, had indicated, or tried to, a utilitarian 
basis for all such seemingly artistic manifestations, he summed up his find-
ings thus: " . . . I see no reason, provisionally, to deny that bower-birds 
possess an aesthetic sense although, it must be emphasized, we have as 
yet no concrete proof that such is the case. Some bowerbirds certainly 
select for their displays objects that are beautiful to us. Further, they discard 
flowers when they fade, fruit when it decays, and feathers when they become 
bedraggled and discoloured. . . . The fact that some bower-birds select 
objects that appeal to man's sense of beauty is no proof that such articles 
have a similar effect on the bird. If all bower-birds made collections of 
bleached bones, less would be written of aestheticism. Yet nobody would 
suggest that its pile of dry bones and dead snail-shells is less beautiful to 
[the Great Gray bowerbird] than is the 'beautiful' array of blue and red 
berries to [the Yellow-breasted variety]. It would, of course, be unthink-
able to suggest that bowerbirds—or any birds for that matter—do not get 
pleasure from the vocal, architectural, and other activities they perform 
but whether such pleasure has much in common with that of Man, engaged 
in comparable pursuits, has yet to be proved." 1 2 8 At any rate, a scientist 
of the stature of Haldane was convinced that "a few animals, such as 
bowerbirds, show sundaradharma, behaviour satisfying aesthetic needs. 
This is most marked in the bowerbirds . . . " 1 2 9 Nor does it seem surpris-
ing, in the light of conclusions such as this, that Odoardo Beccari, the first 
naturalist to discover the display of a bowerbird, should have believed that 
he had stumbled upon a playhouse built by native children! 
Over and over, we keep encountering the same pivotal aesthetic paradox: 
this emerges from a profound confusion about purpose; it drives us to 
compulsively ferret out any semblance of utility, usually defined as adap-
tive value. 1 3 0 We find it difficult to conceive of art as a coherent part of 
animal life and can scarcely imagine it as an adornment of their leisure. 
All researches in this field are stamped by a tension between a deeply felt 
conviction on the part of many distinguished and sensitive biologists that 
artistic activity indeed exists in the animal world and the inability to face 
its presumed lack of importance, even uselessness. More generally, Jenkins 
has argued that the position assigned to the aesthetic life in Western culture, 
from Plato onwards, is imbued by an uneasy fluctuation between these two 
attitudes, "that art is at once useless and fraught with significance, purpose-
less and yet important." 1 3 1 The two poles Jenkins speaks of are perhaps 
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reconciled in a casual comment of Vygotsky's: "Apparently the possibility 
of releasing into art powerful passions which cannot find expression in 
normal everyday life is the biological basis of ar t . " 1 3 2 Viewed thus, art 
becomes a kind of cybernetic device for keeping the organisms' milieu 
interieur, or, to use UexkülFs corresponding concept, lnnenwelt}zz in 
balance with its surroundings {milieu exterieur, or Umwelt). 
Art, in this homeostatic sense, is surely recognizable in many other bio-
logical systems than man. Birds that construct elaborate nests, such as the 
weavers, build improved nests in their second season, after having practiced 
during the previous one, now opting for habitations which are "better" in 
the sense of tidier, neater, more elegant, but not at all demonstrably more 
useful. One may well ask with the late Waddington, "is it then or is it not 
an aesthetic 'better'?" Spiders will repair damage made to their webs, but 
"it is debatable whether this repair is governed solely by utilitarian consid-
eration." The webs of certain drunken or drugged spiders appear both, 
one assumes, to them, and certainly to us, very unappealing. And chim-
panzees and gorillas, when offered the materials used by human artists, 
"which are obviously exceedingly unnatural and exotic in relation to a 
normal primate life, produce paintings and drawings in which some aesthetic 
qualities may perhaps be discernible." 1 3 4 This is the topic of a recent over-
view article by Whiten, himself a practicing painter. 1 3 5 Before, however, 
turning to ape aesthetics, I should at least mention Dücker's interesting 
work on color preferences of forty-two specimens of birds of different fami-
lies, in eleven species, especially spotted weaver finches.136 Animals have 
an innate positive and/or negative feeling-tone for particular colors or 
patterns; commonly this is related to species-characteristic signs that serve 
as releasers triggering their responses to each other. 
Schiller's study of more than 200 of Alpha's drawings was a landmark 
among researches of visual composition in apes. 1 3 7 Her drawings, Schiller 
found, in no case yielded representations. He compared them, in this 
respect, to scribblings of the human infant from twelve to eighteen months. 
Nor did he find any evidence of imitative drawing. 
Morris discusses the results obtained with Alpha, and compares them 
with those of his mascot Congo, the second ape artist to be studied in 
depth. 1 3 8 Congo's responses were found to be comparable, when given like 
tests, with those of Alpha; similar behavior has also been observed in 
other great apes, and in a capuchin monkey who drew lines on the floor 
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of his cage when he was presented with color chalks. 1 3 9 Several gorillas, 
from Rotterdam and Basel to Palo Alto, have been known to draw and 
paint very successfully, as have occasional orangutans. In the mid-1950s, 
an ape known as Baltimore Betsy became famous from her fingerpaintings. 
Her work, and those of two other apes, were shown, without identification, 
to child psychiatrists. "One of the psychiatrists interpreted them as coming 
from an aggressive seven- or eight-year-old boy who had paranoid tenden-
cies. Baltimore Betsy's drawings were said to be from a fiercely belligerent 
ten-year-old schizoid girl. A second picture by the same animal was also 
said to be by a ten-year-old girl who was paranoid and showed a strong 
father identification." 1 4 0 Eventually, twelve paintings by Betsy as well as 
twenty-four Congos were exhibited—and practically all sold—in London. 
Julian Huxley, who had opened the exhibition, later made the following 
comments: "The results show conclusively that chimpanzees do have 
artistic potentialities which can be brought to light by providing suitable 
opportunities. One of the great mysteries of human evolution is the sudden 
outburst of art of a very high quality in the upper Paleolithic period. This 
becomes more comprehensible if our apelike ancestors had these primitive 
aesthetic potentialities, to which was later added man's unique capacity for 
symbol-making." 1 4 1 
Morris recapitulates in his justly famous book half a century's picture-
making with twenty-three chimpanzees, two gorillas, three orangutans and 
four capuchin monkeys. Alpha and Congo, who produced some 600 pic-
tures in all, were studied most intensively. The principle that Morris 
stresses and elaborates is the fact that painting involves actions which are 
self-rewarding activities, that is, they "are performed for their own sake 
rather than to attain some basic biological goal. They are 'activities for 
activities' sake,' so to speak." 1 4 2 In human art, this sort of motivation has 
appeared in many guises. Jenkins' roll-call includes such celebrated aesthetic 
doctrines as "detachment, catharsis or purgation, isolation, obj ectification, 
emotion remembered in tranquility, psychic distance, self-surrender, passiv-
ity, pure perception, will-less knowing, reposefulness, equilibrium, synthesis, 
impersonalness, contemplativeness, empathy, pleasure objectified, disinter-
ested pleasure, receptivity," and many others echoing the same meaning. 1 4 3 
For Morris, the category of self-rewarding activities is essentially biological, 
of course: "Most of them are basically physical, meteoric outbursts and are 
fundamentally similar to human gymnastics and sports, except that they 
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lack any ulterior motives such as the obtaining of health, money, or social 
standing. They may inadvertently keep the animal mentally and physi-
cally healthy and thus indirectly assist in its struggle for survival, but the 
actual driving force behind these self-rewarding activities appears to be 
simply the unleashing of surplus nervous energy." 1 4 4 This immediately 
suggests a central question: why, if they have such a strong picture-making 
potential, have apes neither developed nor utilized it in the wild? This 
question corresponds closely to a second one, far more widely debated these 
days: why if, as alleged, apes have the cognitive prerequisites for the 
acquisition of language competency haven't they elaborated it in nature? 
No satisfactory answer to the latter question has been put forward thus far; 
even the rankest activist hasn't proposed that they have done so, outside of 
science fiction of the likes of Jules Verne and on the planet of the apes. 
Morris' answer to the former rests on his claim that, as soon as man "had 
a real language which described objects as well as moods, the gateway 
was open to the pictorial representation of these objects," 1 4 5 or, in other 
words, that the emergence of this averbal art required the antecedence of 
verbal signs. This suggestion may appear likely to some, although I per-
sonally doubt it and, in any case, it is entirely speculative.1 4 6 More to the 
point, it sheds no light at all on the previous conundrum. The holistic 
interpretation of pictures is a function of the right hemisphere, an operation 
normally exercised in conjunction with the left hemisphere; but the minor 
hemisphere, which seems specialized for dealing with things all at once, 
has an extremely limited verbal capacity, even though its performance is 
said by Eccles to be "superior to that of the brains of the highest anthro-
poids," 1 4 7 while the dominant hemisphere, which tends to deal with things 
in sequence, is "almost illiterate in respect to pictorial and pattern sense." 1 4 8 
Morris adduces five further biological principles of picture making be-
side the basic one, that the accomplishment is in and of itself rewarding. 
His second principle is that of compositional control, the power of which 
is illustrated by Alpha's and Congo's adherence to the simple rules of 
filling a space and keeping within it, balancing, and cadenced repetition. 
This was previously evidenced from Rensch's investigations with a capuchin 
and a guenon monkey, and found, as well, in jackdaws and crows. As 
Morris notes, the vital words here are: "steadiness—symmetry—repetition— 
rhythm." 1 4 9 His third principle, "calligraphic differentiation," is a develop-
mental one, referring to a slow progress of pictorial growth, which, how-
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ever, is less strikingly exhibited by apes than by children. It is closely 
related to the fourth principle, thematic variation, or, as we might say in 
semiotics, the concept of invariance with allowable reformulations. 
Whiten rightly regards the last two principles—which the proponent 
himself had put forward merely as a working hypothesis—of dubious status: 
"optimum heterogeneity," Morris suggests, governs the composition and 
point of completion of each picture, meaning by this the stage at which 
the picture is considered to be finished. Congo, it seems, had a very distinct 
concept of when a drawing or painting of his came to an end. By contrast, 
Alpha continued to cover the whole sheet with scribble if the paper was 
not removed. "Universal imagery" is what gives ape pictures as a whole 
a recognizable character, Morris finally maintains, but the only image 
which seems to recur with any regularity (also in capuchin art) is the "fan." 
Whiten moves beyond the problems of artistic creation 1 5 0 that had 
preoccupied Morris to those of aesthetic appreciation, relying in the main 
on several papers by Humphrey. 1 5 1 Humphrey's initial series of tests was 
designed to determine if monkeys had favorite colors and preferences for 
certain brightnesses. The four monkeys tested for color gave the same 
result: the order of preference in each case was blue, green, yellow, orange, 
and red. Brightness preference, which was tested by pairing the standard 
white slide with white slides of differing brightnesses, turned out to be 
monotonically related to brightness over the range used. 
Next, Humphrey tested preferences for pictures, using thirty colored 
photographs classified as "men" (e.g., a portrait of the keeper), "monkeys" 
(two infants playing), "other animals" (cow), "foods" (banana), "flower" 
(daisy), "abstract painting" (a Mondrian). This order of preference turned 
out to be: other animals/monkeys/men/flowers/paintings/food. 
One may well ask, with Whiten, "whether such preferences have any-
thing at all to do with aesthetics." 1 5 2 Humphrey posits two different pat-
terns which reflect a dichotomy as to the ways both we and monkeys may 
exploit our senses: we may, he affirms, look at a stimulus "purely for 
pleasure" or "purely for interest." The pleasure dimension, corresponding 
to a pure aesthetic, can be either positive or negative, but is little affected 
by novelty, whereas the curiosity dimension is positive and changes only 
toward indifference as the novelty of the stimulus wanes. In Humphrey's 
view, the two types of responses operate quite independently, although they 
often coalesce as to timing, in which case their combined effects will yield 
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a summative expression of preference. Humphrey resumes his findings in 
five simple principles, to wit: 
1. Two independent kinds of relationship obtain between the monkey 
and the stimulus, called 'interest' and 'pleasure/unpleasure.' 
2. When there is a choice between two stimuli, the monkey ranks 
them according to their relative interestingness and relative pleas-
antness. 
3. If one stimulus is 'appreciably more interesting' than the other, 
the probability that the monkey will prefer it is 1. 
4. If one stimulus is 'appreciably more pleasant' than the other, the 
probability that he will prefer it is 1 unless the other stimulus is 
appreciably more interesting. 
5. If neither stimulus is either appreciably more interesting or pleas-
ant, the probability that he will prefer each is 1/2. 
Unfortunately, these principles were derived from monkeys, not apes, 
but Humphrey was able to predict from his quantitative model with a high 
degree of accuracy preferences for a stimulus which combined the two 
distinctive features of interest and pleasure. Visual feedback, we may 
safely surmise, is an important part of painting for apes, but we can't be 
sure—and the question still abides why their desire to create visual art 
remains latent, to surface, if at all, only in captivity, whether spontaneously 
or under instigation. 
Another puzzle which continues to perplex has been well posed by 
Whiten, who wonders, "why has nature equipped the chimp and the 
human with such ability? The interest or curiosity dimension of art can 
be seen as an offshoot, functionless in terms of survival value . . . But if 
a pure aesthetic sense is a functional offshoot of some other functional 
attribute, what is th i s? " 1 5 3 Humphrey has wrestled with this difficult 
question himself, and I find this animal behaviorist's suggestions particularly 
intriguing because he believes, as I do, "that a structuralist approach is the 
key to the science of aesthetics," 1 5 4 and because he has so fruitfully employed 
semiotic concepts. Like Levi-Strauss's, whom he cites, his starting point is 
a conceptualization of an artistic product as a system of signs, but from 
this obvious notion he goes on to ask how such works acquire their artistic 
charge. The answer he proposes is that, "considered as a biological phe-
nomenon, aesthetic preferences stem from a predisposition among animals 
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and men to seek out experiences through which they may learn to classify 
the objects in the world about them. Beautiful 'structures' in nature or in 
art are those which facilitate the task of classification by presenting evidence 
of the 'taxonomic' relations between things in a way which is informative 
and easy to grasp." 1 5 5 This argument, of course, presupposes that the ca-
pacity for effective classification is important for survival, perhaps on a par 
with eating and sex. If so, techniques of classification were bound to evolve 
so as to be a source of pleasure to the animal and thus to shape the non-
random differential reproduction of its genes (natural selection). After all, 
as Humphrey remarks, both animals and men can be relied on to do best 
what they most enjoy doing. This point of view, coupled with the idea 
that no work of art is arbitrary, suggests where an animal's feeling of beauty 
may come from. In the terminology of Rene Thorn, "the work of art acts 
like the germ of a virtual catastrophe in the mind of the beholder." In 
other words, although art is always unpredictable, "it appears to us to have 
been directed by some organizing center of large codimension, far from 
the normal structures of ordinary thought, but still in resonance with the 
main emotional or genetic structures underlying our conscious thought." 1 5 6 
Humphrey carries his taxonomic metaphor much farther, enriching it 
with the notion of rhyming, or, as I would prefer to denominate the 
phenomenon more generally, parallelism. He brings experimental evidence 
to bear from a rich array of studies of exploratory behavior, and from his 
own investigations of "stimulus novelty" in monkeys. Parallelism involves 
the psychological notion of "stimulus discrepancy," or, what in the early 
1950's was called "discrepancy theory," ugly coinages for a fundamental 
concept with wide applications in the animal world and among human 
babies. 
The propensity to classify seems to have acquired, through evolution, 
diminishing survival value, but then so did sex: humans can enjoy either, 
but most to\ens} though pleasurable per se, are not biologically relevant. 
Only the type of activity has a clearcut biological function. 
Finally, let it be noted that Humphrey's pleasure principle seems equiv-
alent to Morris's principle of composition. Pleasure, more likely than 
curiosity, tends to motivate compositional control, but the reverse holds 
for calligraphic differentiation and thematic variation. To some extent, 
all of these principles are likely to involve both types of preferences; these 
components, acting together, may manifest themselves in a principle of 
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optimum heterogeneity. The prefigurements of visual art in our species 
can thus be understood a little better against its simian backgrounds. This 
should surprise no one who is even superficially acquainted with D'Arcy 
Thompson's classic book, On Growth and Form,1*"1 where this great zoolo-
gist, so far ahead of his time, dealt with the basis for beauty in numberless 
exquisite structures produced by the plant and animal worlds, and showed 
that it is possible to construct an abstract, purely geometrical theory of 
morphogenesis, independent of the substrate of forms and the nature of 
the forces that create them. 1 5 8 
4. Architectural signs. 
"A building is not only an object but also a sign," Bogatyrev noted in 
1936, 1 5 9 and Jakobson later elaborated on this dictum by stressing that 
"[a]ny edifice is simultaneously some sort of refuge and a certain kind of 
message." 1 6 0 The utility—i.e., technological interest—of different architec-
tural configurations is thus generally taken for granted. What remains in 
question is their correlation with the corresponding universe of signifieds, in 
particular as regards its aesthetic dimension, and the direction of the artistic 
movement: is it from external form, considered as a signifier, toward in-
ternal organization, which becomes the signified, or is it the converse? The 
architectural work of art, everyone seems to agree, is devoted to the realiza-
tion of several ends. It stands at the confluence of multiple interests. Its 
character is syncretic par excellence. 
In looking at the endlessly manifold abodes constructed by animals— 
that serve perhaps to trap prey, to protect or comfort the architect or its 
kind, especially the young, or to attract the attention of a potential mate— 
we must look for the artistic value that may be involved, although subordi-
nated to the principal interest of the "survival machine," as Dawkins calls 
the temporary receptacles housing the colony of genes inhabiting every plant 
and animal. 1 6 1 If there is such a subsidiary purpose, falling passively under 
the sway of "mere" biological advantage, or supplementing it, an effort 
must be made to ferret out this aesthetic component. Such a quest is far 
from trivial, for, in the end, it is tantamount to asking: what is art? 
The sources for the materials utilized by animals to erect their dwellings 
are twofold: either the substances are produced from within their own 
body, or they are assembled from the environment surrounding them. In 
the latter case, members of some species may exhibit subtle preferences, 
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which may justly be termed aesthetic, in their very selection of particular 
habitats. Indeed, Klopfer even supposes that "the most convincing evidence 
for the existence of esthetic preferences come from the literature on habitat 
selection . . . " 1 6 2 This discerning ethologist has consistently allowed for 
constraints due to psychological factors, the most intriguing cases of which 
are posed by those situations in which the preferences cannot be related to 
physical abilities, "as when a particular color of flower or shape of leaf or 
complex of factors is preferred to any other." 1 6 3 It is difficult enough to 
isolate the relevant feature of a complex Gestalt; to provide an explanation 
for the underlying sensory or neural basis for preferences that are termed 
aesthetic remains generally a difficult research problem for the future. 
In the process of building, animals employ essentially the same techniques 
that we do: digging, masonry, plaiting, weaving, and so on. For Vitruvius 
—the failed Augustinian architect and engineer later turned influential 
writer—the universal homo faber was the architect, to whom the Romans 
assigned the art of building as well as the craft of fabricating machinery 
(i.e., secondary tools) . 1 6 4 Vitruvius, in spelling out what architecture is, 
maintained that "two considerations must be constantly kept in view" in 
the execution of his art and craft, "namely, the intention, and the matter 
used to express that intention. . . . " 1 6 5 Whatever one's opinion may be 
about the intrusion of intention, volitional control, or, more broadly, of 
teleological considerations, into the domain of semiotics,1 6 6 there can scarcely 
be any doubt that man fully shares the second attribute mentioned by 
Vitruvius with the speechless creatures. 
In respect to the concept of animal laborans, the animal "which labors 
and 'mixes with'," or "which with its body . . . nourishes life," but which 
"still remains the servant of nature and the earth," 1 6 7 it is, in truth, hard 
to perceive essential differences among the species. Such discriminations 
as may exist must be sought in Arendt's redefined and refined view of the 
classic homo faber, an anthropocentrically utilitarian figure she nonetheless 
so insistently, although eloquently, opposed to animal laborans—homo faber, 
"who makes and literally 'works upon'," whose production is tantamount 
to what she calls reification, the creation, that is, of a uniquely human 
world in the face of nature. Only homo faber, she claims, "conducts himself 
as lord and master of the whole earth." 1 6 8 For her, homo faber, "in his 
highest capacity," assumes, of course, the functions "of the artist, of poets 
and historiographers, of monument-builders or writers, because without 
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them the only product of their activity, the story they enact and tell, would 
not survive at al l . " 1 6 9 This bleak and in the end still narrowly parochial 
view implies that none of the works of nature, which manifestly come 
into being without man's intervention, let alone his midwifery, can have 
aesthetic or even economic value. As Karl Marx has put the same idea in 
Das Kapital: "Der Wasserfall, wie die Erde überhaupt, wie alle Naturkraft 
hat keinen Wert, weil er keine in ihm vergegenständlichte Arbeit dar-
stellt." 1 7 0 This attitude to nature and to natural productions degrades objects 
into means, where animals are always presumed to be building something 
not for its own sake but for the sake of instrumentality, or expediency to-
ward the realization of some putative biological end. The absurdity of 
this Sophistic devaluation of nature was despised by many Greeks, as Arendt 
noted, 1 7 1 and its inherent anthropocentrism perhaps most persuasively 
resolved in Plato's celebrated argument against Protagoras, whose subjective 
idealism fails to accord, as I have tried to show elsewhere, 1 7 2 with the most 
elementary lessons of the modern life science. 
The field of "natural architecture" is exceptionally fortunate in that there 
exists a splendid recent book devoted to that subject in its entirety ranging 
from the invertebrates, particularly the arthropods, to the birds and on to 
the highest mammals, inclusive of apes. This compendium, which requires 
no specialized knowledge for its enjoyment, was written by Karl von 
Frisch, 1 7 3 in collaboration with his son, Otto. It bore the original title, 
Tiere als Baumeister—which translates into "Animals as Master Builders" 
—both more powerful and more suggestive, as well as less overburdened 
or presumptuous, than the English rendering on the title page. 1 7 4 
The architectural activity of animals is best regarded as a manifestation 
of tool-using behavior—a sophisticated way of manipulating objects and 
exploring their uses to adaptive advantage. According to Frisch, the use 
of tools that are not parts of their bodies is rare among animals: "They 
mostly use the organs of their bodies, chiefly their mouth parts and their 
legs." 1 7 5 Rare though the use of extrinsic artifacts may be over-all, statisti-
cally speaking, newly discovered instances continue to be published. A case 
in point is a learned behavioral sequence recently detected in Northern 
blue jays (Cyanocitta cristata), which involves tool-making, to wit, by the 
tearing and alteration of pages from a newspaper, and employing these as 
tools to rake in food pellets which otherwise lay out of reach. 1 7 6 
Even the larva of the green lace wing (Chrysopa slossonae) uses a tool 
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in the climax of a complicated sequence that has been inelegantly dubbed 
"trash-carrying behavior." 1 7 7 This insect form disguises itself as, i.e., mimics, 
its own prey by plucking some of the waxy "wool" from the bodies of the 
alder aphids amidst colonies of which it lives and feeds, and then applies 
this material to its own back. The exogenous shield thus constructed pro-
tects the larva from assault by the ants that ordinarily "shepherd" the aphids. 
Some social insects, notably, several species of Aphaenogaster—none of 
which are mentioned by Frisch, despite the relatively large amount of space 
he otherwise devotes to the constructions of eusoeial insects178—use pieces of 
leaf, mud, and sand grains as tools for carrying soft foods from distant sources 
to the colony, a maximally efficient way of exploiting available resources.179 
I recite these random examples of recently uncovered cases of tool-using 
activity to adumbrate my hunch that such forms of behavior anticipate 
the more advanced forms of animals' building activities. In ethological 
jargon, the question becomes: how does tool-using behavior become ritual-
ized? 1 8 0 Or, in semiotic parlance: how does a tool, with a primary ampli-
fying function, acquire a superimposed sign-function? 1 8 1 The answer to 
this question, at this stage in the development of both ethology and dia-
chronic semiotics, is precisely the same as to the deceptively innocent one, 
"What passes in the mind of a bowerbird when he builds and decorates 
his bower?" Frisch replies, "Naturally, I cannot answer [my own] question. 
No one can." His denial notwithstanding, Frisch proceeds to declare his 
conviction that in these birds, no less than in chimpanzees, "not only insight 
into the consequences of their actions but also evidence of aesthetic feelings 
can be found." 1 8 2 
No purpose would be served by rehearsing here even a sampling from 
among the host of striking examples of exterior and interior designs master-
fully adduced by Frisch. The multitalented bowerbirds figure prominently, 
as does a large variety of other kinds of birds, including those consummate 
nestbuilders, the weavers, and especially Malimbus Cassini, noted for the 
care and precision of the working male, reminiscent in his technique of a 
human basket weaver or one with a loom. Among the many mammals 
whose imposing labors are illustrated, the impressively productive accom-
plishments of the beaver {Castor fiber, or the American kind, C. cana-
densis), however, do deserve to be singled out. The fantastic edifices of this 
"architectural mute"—the evocative epithet was coined, in 1868, by Lewis 
H. Morgan 1 8 3—are exemplified by the construction of dams, lodges, bur-
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rows, and canals. The opinion that "there is no other animal that can by 
its labor transform the landscape in the same way as can the beaver and 
man" 1 8 4 is shared by all informed observers. This pre-eminent master 
builder, particularly busy in the mountains, checks turbulent brooks and, 
with its dams, protects the fields and pastures below from becoming silted 
up with sand and gravel. The artificial reservoirs thus created are soon 
stocked with trout and other fishes, and turned into a refuge for water 
birds. The very magnitude of some beaver projects is stupefying—the 
largest dam is that on the Jefferson River, near Three Forks, Montana: 
one can follow it for some 2,300 feet. Although the beavers' basic engineer-
ing skills are innate—"the principles of their art are theirs by inheritance" 1 8 5 
—their brain is exceptionally well-developed in comparison with that of 
other rodents, and their correspondingly superior adaptability to changing 
ecological situations is emphasized by knowledgeable ethologists. Morgan 
even felt "at liberty to infer an intention on the part of the beaver," 1 8 6 and 
others believe that beavers profit from example or experience. 
By contrast, there is nothing remarkable about the building activities of 
the Great Apes. Adult chimpanzees, in some regions, are known to fashion 
fresh nests up in the trees nightly, as do orangutans and gorillas, although 
heavy males among the latter tend to sleep on the ground. Köhler's experi-
ments with chimpanzees that solve the problem of getting fruit situated 
beyond the reach of their arms by manufacturing a suitable tool for bridg-
ing the distance from themselves to the food—by fitting two bamboo rods 
together, for instance, or by erecting a tower from packing cases—are 
widely known, although his interpretation is still debated. While the 
actions of Köhler's chimpanzees were portrayed as conveying an impression 
of deliberation and purpose, the animals seem to have but a very modest 
sense of either statics or balance. 1 8 8 Some never managed to solve the 
problem at all. 
The penumbra of an absorbing lifelong research commitment is de-
lineated in two arresting sentences at the end of Frisch's study: "The 
evolutionary roots of human behavior reach far back into the behavior 
patterns of animals. Those who are fascinated by these connections need 
only fasten on one such puzzle, the architecture of animals perhaps. . . . " 1 8 9 
The prefigurements of architecture, however, are but one detail in the 
mosaic of the much vaster, much deeper, mystery of the precultural emer-
gence of the averbal arts. 
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5. Concluding remarks. 
At the outset of this essay, I drew a sharp distinction between the verbal 
art and the averbal arts, proclaiming my conviction that, while it seems 
unavailing to search for the prefigurements of language-based sign systems, 
a scrutiny of the roots of the four other semiotic spheres discussed might 
prove illuminating. Differences in the neurological processing of verbal 
vs. averbal patterns of input and output are solidly and rationally grounded 
in separate dominions of the human brain. The evolutionary antecedents 
are also assuming shape, although they remain blurred at the edges. 
The late Bronowski wondered whether "any animal language [has] 
figures of speech," 1 9 0 by which he appeared to question whether an animal 
ever -uses the same sign-vehicle corresponding to two or more different 
significates. The answer to the latter must unequivocally be in the affirma-
tive, since the context in which any gesture is delivered decisively shapes 
its "correct" interpretation. But Bronowski's "figures of speech," as he 
used the expression in his exploratory article on "Human and Animal 
Language," is itself merely a figure of speech—a rhetorical device of his 
own. It has little to do with verbal art. To be sure, it has been widely 
reported that the creation of signed metaphors as well as metonyms was 
recorded in different home-raised chimpanzees. In 1976, I recounted that 
both sorts of tropes were alleged to have occurred: "whereas Washoe 
created 'water-bird' for duck, a metonymic or indexical expression, being 
a sign in real reaction with the object noted . . . , Lucy generated 'candy 
fruit' for watermelon, a metaphoric or iconic term, possessing the qualities 
signified. . . , " 1 9 1 Lately, however, I—and others (e.g., Martin Gardner, 
personal communication)—have come to feel that such interpretations must 
be reviewed if not with suspicion at least with caution. Both chimpanzees 
were getting a steady stream of unconscious feedback from their trainers. 
Thus only her handler was present in the canoe when Washoe glimpsed 
her first duck and made a sign for "water" followed by a sign for "bird." 
There was no awareness of the possibility that Washoe, dragging her hand 
in the water, didn't sign "water," next noticed the bird, and only then 
signed "bird." The behavior of the trainer, who (for all we know) re-
peated the two signs, could easily have taught Washoe a new sign, namely, 
the "water-bird" sign which she would associate from then on with ducks. 
The circumstances were, mutatis mutandis, similarly indeterminate for 
Lucy's "candy fruit," "cry fruit" (for onion) and for every other such case 
212 Semiotic Themes 
that I am aware of. All of these are subject to other, less portentous, con-
struals, the simplest among which is the pervasive emission of subthreshold 
involuntary cuing of the destination by the source, or the "Clever Hans" 
experience.1 9 2 In sum, there is no hard evidence whatsoever for the existence 
of figures of speech, in the literal sense, among the speechless creatures—a 
prototypal contradictio in adjecto! 
A second leitmotif of my article skirted the profound problem of 
aesthetic significance—particularly in opposition to or juxtaposition with 
utility—viz., purposiveness of directedness, tantamount, in some contexts, 
to the Aristotelian art of chremastisti\e, or the amassment of wealth with 
no limit in respect of its end, but in this context simply to the preservation 
and improvement of the gene pool, or the long-term environment of the 
gene. The question whether animals are endowed with "consciousness" 
has remained wide open, 1 9 3 being no doubt poorly posed, but many distin-
guished life scientists concur that some animals on some occasions behave 
toward some objects as if the organisms were motivated by a recognizably 
aesthetic incentive. This much is clarion clear, for instance, as regards the 
bowerbirds. 
The essence of the aesthetic impulse surely lies in the structures organ-
isms extract and reconstruct from among salient features of their environ-
ment. Albrecht Dürer, among a host of commentators, believed this to be 
so; according to him, "Denn wahrhaftig steckt die Kunst in der Natur, 
wer sie heraus kann reissen, der hat s ie ." 1 9 4 Others make a separation 
between natural or organic beauty and artificial or aesthetic beauty, con-
trasting the realm of living things with that of "living" forms. But the two 
are obviously bonded, since all the percipients themselves are a part of 
nature. The spectacles through which we see the world are partly an appa-
ratus for bringing into focus certain aspects of our existence (Umwelt), but 
they are, at the same time, a means for relating harmoniously varied facets 
of the universe to each other. To paraphrase a saying of Henri Poincare, 
aesthetic sensibility plays the part of a delicate sieve. The challenge, of 
course, is to explicitly define what those relations—of balance and order 
that delight—are in the characteristic idiom of each art, as well as in the 
all-embracing architectonics of the living megacosm. The concept of delight 
thus undergoes a radical transmutation: it is elevated into a function that 
biologists can recognize, objectify, cope with in familiar terms. The 
"artistic animal" is not defined by a heightened sensitivity to movement, 
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sound, color, shape, but by its innate and/or learned capacity to elicit a 
stable dynamic structure from the fluid environment, whether inorganic, 
organic, or a subtle blend of both. The sign systems thus created, which 
serve an underlying semantic function, take in time an aesthetic turn. How 
this happens is magisterially brought out in an 1865 Platonic dialogue on 
the origin of beauty that Gerard Manley Hopkins had composed for his 
tutor at Oxford. 
The dialogue between the Professor of the newly founded chair of 
Aesthetics (no doubt Walter Pater) and a student takes place in the tranquil 
setting of a college garden, and the dialectic "battledore" quickly comes to 
concentrate on "one of the most finely foliaged of trees," the chestnut. The 
Professor points to the leaves of the tree to illustrate the principle of sym-
metry, or, mere generally, of the structural relations inherent in nature. 
The Professor asks: 
". . . now what is symmetry? Is it not regularity?" 
"I should say, the greatest regularity. . . 
"So it is. But is it not that sort of regularity which is measured by length 
and breadth and thickness? Music for instance might be regular, but not 
symmetrical ever; is it not so?" 
"Quite so. . . ." 
"Let us say regularity then." 
The Professor next draws attention to the oak, "an unsymmetrical tree." 
"Then beauty, you would say perhaps, is a mixture of regularity and 
irregularity." 
"Complex beauty, yes. But let us inquire a little further. What is regu-
larity? Is it not obedience to law? And what is law? Does it not mean 
that several things, or all the parts of one thing, are like each other?" 
The Professor continues: 
". . . regularity is likeness or agreement or consistency, and irregularity 
is the opposite, that is difference or disagreement or change or variety." 
But do these distinctions apply to all things? Beauty is certainly a rela-
tion, but what is this relation? The sense of beauty in fact is a comparison. 
The conversation now moves on to the subject of poetry: rhythm, meter, 
and rhyme. 
"Now you remember I wished beauty to be considered as a regularity 
or likeness tempered by irregularity or difference: the chestnut-fan was 
one of my instances. In rhythm we have got the regularity, the likeness; 
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so my aim is, as rhythm is agreed to be beautiful, to find the disagreement, 
the difference in it. . . . Rhythm therefore is likeness tempered with 
difference. . . ." 
"What is rhyme? . . . Is it not an agreement of sound—?" 
"With a slight disagreement, yes. . . . In fact it seems to me rhyme 
is the epitome of [our] principle. All beauty may by a metaphor be called 
rhyme. . . . " 1 9 5 
If rhyme is taken as the poetic paradigm for beauty, consisting of com-
parison for likeness's sake (metaphor, simile) as well as for unlikeness's 
sake (antithesis, contrast), what is the convenient word which gives us the 
common principle for all such kinds of equations ? Hopkins proffers paral-
lelism, and moves on to analyze parallelism "both structural and unstruc-
tural," parallelism of expression and parallelism of sense, and finally to 
illustrate his dictum that "The structure of poetry is that of continuous 
parallelism."1 9 6 
Now it is evident—to recapitulate briefly—that the conspicuous use of 
reiteration, of a statement of a theme with variations, of the creation of 
suspense and countervailing tension, of the arousal of expectation and its 
denial, in short, of parallelism, is also the pervasive pivotal device common 
to all manifestations of the art of animals discussed in this essay: what is 
criterial of their kinesthetic art is rhythmic somatic motion; at the heart 
of their music are "les rythmes organiques" and the transposition of fixed 
intervals; the cardinal substantives that characterize their picture making 
are "steadiness—symmetry—repetition—rhythm"; and the mark of their 
virtuoso architecture is surely geometrical symmetry—broken in multiform 
ways—that transmutes the ulterior modularity of physical reality into macro-
scopic projects of utility as well as beauty. 
Hopkins' insight about the source of beauty was amplified by Humphrey 
a little over a century later. He asked: "What is the biological advantage 
of seeking out rhyming elements in the environment?" The answer he 
proposed was this: "Considered as a biological phenomenon, aesthetic 
preferences stem from a predisposition among animals and men to seek 
out experiences through which they may learn to classify the objects in the 
world about them. Beautiful 'structures' in nature or in art are those which 
facilitate the task of classification by presenting evidence of the 'taxonomic' 
relations between things in a way which is informative and easy to grasp." 1 9 7 
This proposition demands a tripartite justification. 
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One must explain, to begin with, why the knack for classification should 
be important for biological survival. If the function of categorization is to 
sort out sensory experience—to identify, with essential economy, good, bad, 
and indifferent forms, or, in semiotic phrasing, to sift out the presence of 
such forms "endowed with signification" that trigger appropriate long-term 
releasers—then the evolution of efficient classificatory techniques is bound 
to be of survival value. Humphrey argues that "just as with eating or with 
sex, an activity as vital as classification was bound to evolve to be a source 
of pleasure to the animal. Both animals and men can, after all, be relied 
on to do best what they enjoy doing." 1 9 8 
Second, it is necessary to show why a maneuver such as Hopkins called 
parallelism should be optimally advantageous to the classificatory animal. 
It seems clear that the fundamental role of the central nervous system is 
precisely to provide the creature with a local map simulating its position 
in the environment, to enable it to sort out, among other vital intelligence, 
the images of biologically and/or socially important organisms, viz., to dis-
tinguish prey from predator. This is surely best accomplished by an ar-
rangement of such images into a distinctive feature matrix, or in terms of 
"likeness tempered with difference." Parallelism is the organizing principle 
employed in many of the most successful taxonomical procedures, including 
the Linnaean; (more generally, it imbues set-theory). "If it is helpful for 
the taxonomist to look for 'rhymes' in his materials," Humphrey continues, 
"so it is helpful for the animal to do so. It is for this reason that we have 
evolved to respond to the relation of beauty which rhyme epitomises. At 
one level we take pleasure in the abstract structure of rhyme as a model 
of well-presented evidence, and at another we delight in particular examples 
of rhyme as sources of new insight into how things are related and divided." 
The third step is to seek evidence, beyond the prevailing propensity of 
man and animals to classify their surroundings, for the surmise that animals 
also are attracted in particular to parallelism. To amass a modicum of such 
testimony was, in fact, the main objective of this study: to adduce instances 
of parallelism in the animal world that have no demonstrable natural value 
but which nevertheless give people as well as the animals involved some-
thing akin to aesthetic pleasure, even when the process or the product is 
disunited from its proper biological context. 
The universal propensity to classify dictates that animals generate units 
of signification, or significata, by stipulating redundancies. Several arrange-
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merits are possible, such as non-dimensional (taxonomic*) classification or 
dimensional (paradigmatic) classification, in both of which classes are 
formed by means of intersection. 1 9 9 When classes and sub-classes are created, 
they may be defined by features which are either inherent in nature as the 
sole feasible solution or, as in man and his tamed creatures, arrays that are 
arbitrary to a degree (cultural categories, individual idiosyncrasies). Yet 
even certain human populations may be "forced to meet nature on its own 
terms and to categorize those aspects of the natural environment which 
are relevant to it in a biologically realistic way." 2 0 0 The conception of class, 
whether based upon naturally imposed or arbitrarily chosen qualities, some-
times acquires a certain elegance and power elevating it beyond a mere 
organizational tool, and we can then say that the production carries an 
aesthetic charge. 
Levi-Strauss and Piaget have both been concerned with primordial ques-
tions of human classification. The inquiry of Levi-Strauss, instigated by a 
linguistic model, postulates a proclivity in all of us to think in opposites 
and contrasts, to pry perceptual information from the environment con-
strained by certain predetermined structures, and to consolidate and combine 
these percepts in classifying, naming, and mythic systems. Through a series 
of ordered transformations, these systems relate themes and variations upon 
them that are effable, for instance, in artistic products which themselves 
are embodiments of mind. 
Animals create a taxonomy appropriate to their species and ecological 
niche. Thus predators, for instance, distinguish different categories of prey— 
by size, appearance, odor, and other signifiers—thus forestalling wastefully 
indiscriminate attacks. Vice versa, many potential prey distinguish among 
different kinds of predators, as we observe from their use of sundry warning 
signs, variations in their flight-distances and flight-reactions, e.g., depending 
on whether the enemy is up in the air or down on the ground. It is less 
well known, however, that animals assign to one another and carry proper 
names,2'0 1 which individuate each from every other. As Hediger, who 
devoted a perceptive and semiotically sensitive study to the use of proper 
names in the animal kingdom, pointed out: "Its proper name is part of its 
[the animal's] personality. Therefore it distinguishes between its own self 
and the nonself." 2 0 2 Hediger also pleads for research on the appearance of 
proper names in evolution, for this may "open a new door to the delicate 
problem of selfconsciousness in animals." Concern with naming, moreover, 
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focuses attention on parallelism as a special case. Parallelism of this kind 
evokes a sort of pleasure familiar to all observers of children's behavior. 
Humphrey comments on this pronounced tendency in children, which is 
promoted, among other devices, through picture books designed especially 
for them. The passion for collecting, he feels, is yet another manifestation 
of the pleasure both mature children and men take in classification.2'03 
Among the animals, it is no accident that bowerbirds are among the most 
sedulous of collectors, each species according to its predilection. Thus the 
display-ground of the Great Gray "may contain an almost inconceivable 
accumulation of pale or reflective rubbish"—but sometimes also bright speci-
mens of gold or pieces of precious opal—yet every bit of their harvest of 
treasure "is chosen with great discrimination." 2 0 4 
Piaget has demonstrated that young children are limited in performing 
internally consistent classificatory tasks. Shown an aggregate of diverse 
objects and asked to place together those that go together, the child will 
come up with a range of volatile groupings of phenomena that are not 
yoked by a simultaneous awareness of a whole and its parts, either physi-
cally or conceptually. A sense of hierarchy comes later, at a mature stage 
of operational intelligence; accordingly, sophisticated art usually emerges in 
human ontogeny as an accessory only to adult cognitive capacity. Compari-
sons of animal artistic productions with those by children were made as 
early as 1935, when Nadie Kohts juxtaposed drawings by her chimpanzee, 
Joni, with those by her son, Roody. She showed that early scribbles by Joni 
and early scribbles by Roody resembled each other greatly. However, while 
later drawings by Joni evidenced greater complexity but no imagery, those 
by Roody exhibited, in addition, mimetic qualities, to wit, the recognizable 
icon of a face. 2 0 5 
When Mukafovsky delivered his seminal 1934 lecture, on "L'art comme 
fait semiologique," he meant his study to underline and exemplify certain 
aspects of the dichotomy—which he never questioned—between the natural 
sciences and the humanities, as well as to bring out the importance of 
semiotic considerations for aesthetics and for the history of art . 2 0 6 Referring, 
in conclusion, to this programmatic paper, I should like to note the para-
doxical aspect of the proposed enterprise: a consistently carried out char-
acterization of every work of art as an autonomous sign composed of an arti-
fact (the signifier), an aesthetic object (its signification), and an abstract, 
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context-oriented relationship to the thing signified, tends precisely to 
obliterate the factitious schism it is supposed to uphold. 
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General Semiotics and Biosemiotics 
Rudolf Jander 
Semiotics, in its widest sense, comprises all explicit and implicit knowl-
edge about signs and users o£ signs (semiotic systems) as accumulated and 
transmitted to us since the time o£ ancient philosophy. Some of this 
history is reviewed in Percival's contribution to this volume (pp. 1-132). In 
this essay, only incidental references are being made to the historical origins 
and transformations of ideas discussed. 
Given the plain fact that absolutely all human knowledge is stored, 
transmitted and processed by means of signs, one would expect semiotic 
theory to be well-developed and to pervade all the sciences and the humani-
ties as a unifying set of concepts and laws. Quite surprisingly, this expec-
tation is still nothing but a vision, and as such, frequently expressed by 
competent writers and thinkers, such as John Locke, Charles S. Peirce, 
Charles W. Morris and Thomas A. Sebeok. Having studied some semiotics, 
I not only share these visions but am fully convinced that, ultimately semio-
ticians are able to develop their theory toward a state that can be called 
scientific and encyclopedic. By the latter, I mean the capability of linking 
up and penetrating all disciplines of human knowledge. To forestall possi-
ble misunderstandings, being all-pervasive in this sense does not imply be-
ing all-encompassing. Given the deplorable fact that as of today no such 
theoretical semiotic foundation exists,1 it will take multiple efforts, countless 
discussions and years of time to reach this visionary goal. 
In the body of this essay I advance the outline of a scientific semiotic 
theory which is to constitute some first step toward the goal mentioned. In 
order to endow this theory with clarity and rigor, I merge elementary set-
theoretical and information-theoretical ideas with semiotic reasoning. All 
fundamental and crucial concepts are italicized at passages that contribute 
to their definition and clarification. Some of these concepts are newly 
conceived, some of them will be highly abstract, but all of them are pre-
sented in their simplest adequate form, to minimize potential errors in 
factual representation, deductive arguments and in communication. 
Semiotic laws, deduced from central and fundamental concepts, and 
factual knowledge constitute the core of the proposed scientific theory. 
These laws shall serve several eminently important purposes. First, they 
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are to establish the scientific nature of the theory. Second, they are to inter-
connect rigorously the fundamental concepts, thus clarifying their mutual 
relations and thereby strengthening the coherence of the whole. Third, and 
most important, they are to serve as powerful mental tools for discriminating 
between truth and falsehood in semiotic reasoning by ruling what infer-
ences are possible or impossible, necessary or unnecessary, and sufficient or 
insufficient. Thus, skillful use of semiotic laws shall streamline and econo-
mize semiotic reasoning. To give an example of this claim: Once a thinker 
absorbed the Fourth Semiotic Law, he would no longer waste his time 
puzzling over "knowledge a priori" because such genuine knowledge is 
absolutely impossible, in principle, according to this semiotic law. 
Despite its potential universal importance, semiotics is still not widely 
acknowledged or even known among scholars. Among the various ex-
planations for this, two are prominent. First, there are the charlatans who 
pretend to command deep insight by employing fuzzy, seemingly learned 
semiotic concepts, which, moreover, they do not even bother to define. 
More concretely, for instance, absolutely no new insight is gained, or any 
purpose served, if someone sees similarities of any kind between two other-
wise different cultural creations, two novels for instance, and then simply 
relabels such similarities pretentiously as semiotic relations. On the other 
hand, if critically designated semiotic concepts were used to gain access to 
semiotic laws which, in turn, would allow new inferences or insights, then 
the cause of semiotics would be well served. 
Second, a detrimental historical accident occurred when Morris in his 
still much too influential book married semiotics with behavioristic doc-
trine, thus excluding all references to mental systems, references that are 
essential for the construction of any semiotic theory of true depth.2 Fortu-
nately, increasing numbers of psychologists turn away from radical be-
havioristic doctrine, and some already have no qualms studying mental 
processes even in animals within the framework of cognitive theories.3 
Given this about-face, resistance should not be too great if progressive 
semioticians reintroduce references to mental systems of animals and man 
into their theories and reasoning, which is done below. 
Modern semiotics comprises a vast body of knowledge which I propose 
to organize conceptually into four major categories. General Semiotics deals 
with fundamental concepts, generally applicable theories, and laws which 
all confer unity and coherence to semiotics as a whole. Biosemiotics is 
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concerned with living semiotic systems. Cultural Semiotics is largely 
restricted to the semiotics of human social interactions, and has been singled 
out from biosemiotics because of its volume and specific concern to all of 
us. Finally, there is a newly emerging field of endeavor, artificial intelli-
gence, which may also be referred to as Computer Semiotics. 
This essay, in view of these four categories, is mainly concerned with 
general semiotics. Added to this is a brief introduction into biosemiotics. 
A. GENERAL SEMIOTICS 
I. Monosigns, Polysigns and Semiotic Systems 
Sign is the central and crucial concept in semiotics and therefore requires 
thorough definition and analysis. Loosely and vaguely first, a sign is some-
thing that stands for something else. More precision is gained if we intro-
duce set-theoretical concepts as mental tools. In this framework we define 
"sign" as a discriminatory subset that has to be explained. "Subset" implies 
the existence of a whole set, the object set, which is identical to the "object" 
or the "signified" in traditional semiotic terminology. 
An object set may be realized by any circumscribed collection of abso-
lutely any types of identifiable items, ranging from concrete objects to 
abstract ideas, or from permanent states to fast operations; even collections 
of signs are potential object sets. Except for the instance of a single object 
set, subsets that function as proper signs have to be discriminatory, that is, 
have to be peculiar to their particular object set. A given object set may be 
labeled by any one of several such discriminatory subsets. Supersets of mu-
tually indiscriminate object sets, or several object sets that need not be dis-
criminated, but belong to one class, may be labeled by a generic sign. The 
relationship between a generic sign and its superset is the same as that be-
tween the proper sign and the object set. 
Signification is the deterministic process that changes a subset into a 
sign. Signification is always necessary since no subset has sign properties 
all by itself. The following two sets of numbers will help to clarify the 
important distinction between passive, active and mixed signification: 
[2 ,3 ,6 ] [1 ,4 ,6] 
If the respective second two elements in these two sets are thought to 
be kept out of sight, the respective first elements still distinctly identify 
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or signify each individual set. The respective third numbers, however, 
could not serve this function. Recognizing such passive signification is of 
universal importance for the survival of all living organisms. 
On the other hand, we humans may actively assign the given object 
sets some arbitrary labels, such as calling them "first set" and "second set." 
Such active signification is of crucial importance in the process of building 
a language. Finally, in a mixed process of signification, two numbers within 
each set may be combined by some logical operation. For instance, multiply-
ing the respective first two above numbers produces two new distinctive 
signs; summing, however, would fail to do so. 
For any rigorous semiotic analysis it is also necessary to discriminate 
between inclusive and exclusive signification. If we see a familiar face 
(sign), we consider it as an inseparable part of the whole person (object 
set) that it signifies. Contrary to such inclusive significations which are 
characteristic for the interpretation of natural signs, conventional signs 
typically are generated by exclusive signification. Thus, a word and its 
meaning (the idea behind it) are two nonintersecting, complementary sub-
sets. In such instances of exclusive signification, I reserve the term "object 
set" to the set complementing the sign rather than to the overall set which 
includes the sign. 
Signification is a relation or function of the type "many-to-one," as 
follows directly from the definition of signs as subsets (parts of wholes). 
In concrete reality, all such functions have to manifest themselves as some 
physical process, from which, however, the semiotician normally abstracts 
without loss of semiotic understanding in most instances. More specifically, 
physical signification is a causal process that somehow reduces complexity 
within a physical system; conceptually (abstractly), signification can be 
viewed as a nontautological (proper) logical operation. In this sense, any 
sign is the result of either a causal or a proper logical process depending 
on the level of abstraction. At the abstract level, any simple or complex 
logical operation produces a sign or signs. Abstraction, obviously, always 
produces signs. Thus, universals are signs for universes. 
Signals are signs that have been generated by the physical separation 
(in space or time or both) of the sign (subset) from its original context 
(object set) for the purpose of long distance communication. This definition 
leads to a paradox which is the source of much confusion. Semiotically, a 
signal (as a sign) is part of a conceptual whole, comprising a subset and 
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a complementary set; physically, the two sets are spaced apart. How is this 
paradox to be solved ? 
There are two directly incompatible modes of reasoning, in both of 
which, and in their mutual translation, semioticians have to be well versed. 
Physical (causal) reasoning takes time and space fully into account, and 
nonphysical reasoning is abstracting both from time and from space. Blind 
mixing of both these modes is bound to result in nonsense. Whenever we 
switch between these two modes, time and space has to be properly rein-
troduced or abstracted, if paradoxical results are to be avoided. More on 
these two modes of reasoning will be found in a later section. 
Signification as a many-to-one central semiotic process is embedded 
into higher order and lower order semiotic processes which share some 
properties with it and which are of equal general importance. The higher 
order process shall be referred to as "symbolization" and the lower order 
process as "specification." Both are explained in turn. 
Symbolization is a process akin to signification, except that it is many-
to-few instead of many-to-one. In other words, an act of symbolization can 
always be decomposed into several acts of signification. Thus, symboliza-
tion is polysignification and its product is the polysign. Polysigns are 
sufficiently different from signs proper or monosigns. The following com-
parison will demonstrate the justification of this distinction. 
Monosigns are semantic atoms; that is, they are the smallest subunits 
of sign-systems that can be associated with object sets and thus "carry" 
meaning. The internal structure of a monosign tells us absolutely nothing 
about the object set it stands for. In virtue of this property, all monosigns 
are potentially arbitrary; that is, a specific monosign could be replaced by 
any other similar structure irrespective of what the referred-to object set 
(meaning) is like. Semantically equivalent signs (synonyms) that are at 
least partially the product of some chance events, like biological evolution 
or cultural tradition, therefore greatly differ from one another, whenever 
they have been created independently, as is the case with bird songs or 
human languages. The linguistic monosign is the morpheme which fre-
quently constitutes a single word. Some words, like "metaphysics," are 
polysigns, being composed of several morphemes, in this case "meta" and 
"physics." 
Polysigns differ from monosigns in the important attribute that their 
internal structure represents some features of the internal structure of the 
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super-object-set they stand for. This representation is nonarbitrarily defined 
by the objects for a given collection of signs. Poly signs, in contrast to 
monosigns, mimic, simulate or model aspects of the reality they represent. 
Spoken sentences, written mathematical expressions, photographs or the 
communication dances of the honey bees are some arbitrary examples of 
polysigns. The proposed distinction between monosigns and polysigns is 
of such fundamental importance because we, as humans, as any other 
semiotic system, can learn something new only by polysigns because indi-
vidual monosigns are either meaningless or represent knowledge we already 
have, due to some pre-instruction with polysigns (the term "pre-instruction" 
is further explained below). Any polysign can be substituted by a monosign 
once it has served its instructive function; e.g., "semiotics" stands for every-
thing we have been pre-instructed in by polysigns on the pertinent subject 
matter. 
Peirce, around the turn of the century, already felt the need to label 
a concept closely related to that of the polysign. His label was "icon." 
Whereas in Peirce's system, the "icon" is one of several coordinated cate-
gories, the polysign in this new theory is a specific concept to which related 
concepts are subordinated. 
Specification in the semiotic process takes place at the subsemantic 
level and is responsible for the specific substructure of monosigns. Linguists 
call "phonemes" the structural elements that constitute monosigns (mor-
phemes). By analogy, I propose "signeme" as the general term for all ele-
ments that constitute monosigns of any type. 
In summary, the three functional hierarchic levels discussed are organized 
in such a way that specification is a constituent of signification and significa-
tion a constituent of symbolization. All three are necessary components of 
any semiotic process. In complex semiotic systems each one of these func-
tional levels is further highly organized in itself. This interesting topic, 
however, is beyond the scope of this brief essay. 
At this point it is expedient for a discussion of more complex semiotic 
processes to introduce a symbolic notation for the process of symbolization. 
Let "s " stand for any many-to-few functions, no matter how simple or 
complex it is. The many-to-one function should be included. Similarly, 
"S" shall stand for mono- or polysigns, and "O" for the object to be 
signified. Symbolization and signification can then be represented by the 
expression 
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S = s ( 0 ) . 
Several acts of symbolization may be concatenated. For two we have 
S — S 2 ( s i ( 0 ) ) . This takes us straight to the still valid Aristotelian triad 
(Percival, p. 2-3). 
Things (O) of the outside world are symbolically represented (si) as 
mental events which are in turn represented (S2) as words ( S ) . The 
possible number of links in such a chain of symbolizations is only limited 
by the complexity of the original object and the degree of simplification 
per step. Several such chains may join. 
One-to-one transformations or isomorphic transformations are common 
semiotic processes. Because of their theoretical simplicity not much need 
be said about them. Dissemination and conservation of collections of signs 
require one-to-one processes like replication, transliteration, literal transla-
tion, and transduction. The latter is the change of the physical substrate 
or vehicle that carries signs. When we speak, our brain produces nerve 
impulses that are transduced into muscle contractions which are in turn 
transduced into soundwaves and so on. In such a chain of transductions 
no signification or symbolization takes place. Signs and symbols maintain 
their identity as signs despite radical physical transmutations. 
Prior to discussing few-to-many semiotic functions, I have to confess 
to a trick I used in order to simplify the line of arguments. Signs and 
polysigns after their emergence due to symbolization are not proper signs 
and polysigns (potential ones, only) unless there is a receiver or interpreter. 
To get around this fundamental requirement, I simply took advantage of 
the fact that you, the reader, function as an unwitting perfect receiver. 
Now we have to introduce the receiver as an object of our discussion. 
This is done by means of a definition. A semiotic system is a system that 
is capable of receiving, processing and emitting signs and polysigns. There 
are different types of semiotic systems that differ markedly in complexity. I 
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call these different types species of semiotic systems. Each individual of a spe-
cies semiotically interacts at least with its heterospecific environment but 
there is also intraspecific interaction or communication. Such intraspecific 
communication establishes semiotic hypersystems, a prime example of which 
is human culture. 
Once a sign or a polysign is received by a semiotic system, the system 
finds out its meaning, that is, interprets it. Interpretation is nothing but 
the inverse function of symbolization, that is, a few-to-many semiotic 
function. Remembering the definition of a sign as a subset of the original 
object set, inverse symbolization is finding the complement (meaning) to 
the subset, so that the original set can be restored.4 
Semiosis can now be defined with the concepts at hand: It is the se-
quential linkage between symbolization and inverse symbolization, or, in 
set theoretical terminology, the linkage between decomplementation and 
recomplementation of a subset ( S ) . If we label the two terminal sets object 
sets (O) and symbolization and inverse symbolization "s" and "s~", respec-
tively, a simple diagram illustrates the idea of semiosis. 
If semiosis is perfect, the two terminal sets are identical sets because a 
function and its inverse restore, by definition, the original state. In reality, 
however, we expect semiotic systems, acting as receivers, to be only partially 
capable of complementation or inverse symbolization, with the result that 
the meaning or restored set in the receiver is only a homomorphic model 
(instead of an isomorphic one) of the original set. 
The semiotic triad (not to be confused with the Aristotelian triad), the 
original set, the symbolizing subset, and the terminal set (Figure 2 ) , is the 
source of the central conceptual dilemma of traditional semiotics: What in 
the final analysis is a sign in itself? Disregarding time and space, it is 
nothing in itself but a subset. This is relatively unproblematical. In reality, 
however, a sign is an isolated entity that travels in space and time. It has 
no physical identity as sign since the physical vehicle can change (trans-
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duction), yet the sign maintains its identity. Only in sloppy language do 
we say that the sign conveys or carries meaning. Strictly, "meaning" is 
added by the receiver (complementation), and the sign itself is completely 
devoid of meaning (of which we are fully aware when listening to a speaker 
of an unknown language). Thus we conclude: the sign is a nonphysical 
and meaningless entity; a nothingness? Yet, after all, it must have some 
reality! 
Before we discuss the kind of nonphysical reality to be attributed to a 
sign in scientific semiotics, let us see how other semioticians approached 
this dilemma. Peirce, as I understand it, negated the independent existence 
of signs and made them integral constituents of the semiotic triads which 
he considered as indecomposable "thirdness."5 Morris avoided the issue by 
explicitly not defining "sign." 6 Saussure, I have the impression, just labeled 
the physical carriers of signs without concern about the abstract nature of 
a sign independent of its carrier. 
The main topic of this section was to develop an understanding of the 
central semiotic concepts—-sign, polysign, semiotic system, and semiosis— 
as clearly as possible with the help of set-theoretical concepts. Against this 
background, semiotics is defined as the science of signs and semiotic systems. 
The intriguing question, what the nature of the nonphysical reality is, with 
which semiotics deals, was left open and shall be investigated in the follow-
ing section. With the central concepts now established, we have to turn 
to the fundamental concepts and/or premises on which scientific semiotics 
is to be grounded. Fundamental and central concepts together are the 
conceptual framework within which general semiotic laws can then be 
formulated. 
Special attention has to be drawn to the fact that I introduced the central 
concepts of general semiotics by purposely ignoring one extraordinarily 
important aspect of absolutely all real semiotic processes: None of them 
are neatly and fully deterministic as presented, but they are all disturbed 
throughout by chance events. The degree of such disturbance varies from 
barely visible to magnitudes that destroy any order, thus generating pure 
noise or chaos. It is only by taking the interplay of chance and necessity 
into account that is is possible to gain a deep and useful understanding of 
semiotic systems and processes. In the following three sections, such inter-
play is taken into account. 
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IL Communication and Information 
The starting point in this section is the simplest conceivable semiotic 
hypersystem, one semiotic system (SS) communicating with another one. 
You can think in this context of two human minds. In order to communi-
cate, the two semiotic systems have to have a communication channel which 
has as its basic constituents two transducers ( T ) and the channel proper or 
transmission line. The function of the transducers is simply to "load" signs 
on physical carriers so that they can travel as signals through the channel. 
Air is the channel when we talk, a wire is the channel for the telephone. 
Whereas the complex events inside the two semiotic systems are still largely 
a mystery and inaccessible when we are dealing with human brains, the 
communication channel is fully open to scientific investigation. We dissect 
the channel out of the semiotic hypersystem (as in Figure 3 ) , study it in 
isolation, and forget, for the time being, everything about semiosis. 
The theory of the communication channel has been developed over the 
past decades by communication scientists and engineers. The culmination 
point is Shannon's Mathematical Theory of Communication1 which every 
serious semiotician has to understand at least intuitively. The following is 
an attempt to provide you with such an understanding (largely nonmathe-
matical, intuitive). The necessary reasoning is highly abstract, and consid-
erable effort is necessary to understand the basic terms in such a depth 
that they can be easily and correctly applied in all relevant contexts. 
What is it that is carried through the communication channel that is 
the leftover of the message from which the meaning has been stripped? 
Shannon calls it information, and it will be this term that shall occupy our 
attention through the following pages. 
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"Information" is the most fundamental concept of semiotics if not of 
human knowledge in general. This fact rules out a definition, and it is only 
by examples that the contents and uses of this eminently important concept 
can be developed. 
A salient aspect is quantification. Shannon's central question was how 
much information can be transmitted through a given channel. If the 
signals are words, you might propose: count the number of words in the 
string of signals. This is too simple, though. If the same sentence is said 
twice, the repetition definitely is without information content. This leads 
to our first rough definition: We quantify information by determining the 
minimal number of words that are necessary for the unambiguous repre-
sentation of a given passage (string of words). Even though this measure 
roughly grows with " H , " (which is the symbol that stands for Shannon's 
exact measure for amount of information), general application of this 
prescription is hampered by the arbitrary use of a given alphabet. Shannon 
eliminated this arbitrariness in his theory of information (which is the core 
of the theory of communication) by resorting to the simplest possible 
alphabet, that of two letters, or binary digits which, in principle, can be 
rendered in any form: (0,1), ( + , — ) , (yes, no), and so on. We will stay 
with the first form in the following. Taking notice of the fact that abso-
lutely any well described sign or polysign can—in principle—be coded into 
binary digits, the amount of information ( H ) within one symbol is exactly 
equal to the minimal number of binary digits that are necessary to code 
that symbol. This number is referred to as the information content in bits. 
Finding such a minimal number and designing the proper binary code 
frequently poses formidable mathematical problems that need not concern 
us here. Some simple aspects will be discussed below. 
Next we will increase our intuitive understanding of "information con-
tents" by comparing this concept with other concepts. It is fairly easy to 
see that the information content ( H ) of a system of signs increases with the 
complexity of that system. Therefore H is a useful measure for "complex-
ity." Next suppose we managed to write down a string of the minimal 
number of binary digits necessary to code a system of signs; then a sur-
prising discovery can be made: The digits in the string follow each other 
randomly; that is, completely disordered or unpredictable. It is easy to 
understand this. If there were some order left such as repetition of the 
same sequence, further condensation would be necessary in order to meet 
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the above requirement for a minimal number of binary digits. From this 
the important conclusion follows: Information content is also a measure 
of disorder, randomness, or unpredictability, which all mean the same. The 
converse is also exactly true: The greater the disorder in a system, the 
greater its information content. At first this appears counterintuitive, but 
makes sense if you ponder a bit. If the same message keeps coming to you 
over and over again, you have the intuitive feeling that no new information 
is arriving, redundant information is the same information, and only the 
unpredictable, the nonordered, is truly new information. 
From above we also have the impression that "information" grows with 
"uncertainty," which in turn is related to "disorder" but has a somewhat 
different meaning. Three simple coding examples shall clarify this point 
and a few additional ones: 
I ) 1-0 II) 1-00 III) 1-000 







Here we coded the decimal digits 1-2, 1-4, and 1-8 with the help of binary 
digits (bits). In each of the three examples the information content of the 
decimal digits and that of the binary digit is exactly the same and equal 
to the number of binary digits necessary for coding. In the three examples 
the information content of one decimal digit is one, two and three, respec-
tively. Much can be learned from these three examples. Notice that the 
decimal digits are monosigns; that is, their internal structure is arbitrary, 
stands for nothing and, therefore, need not be coded specifically as it would 
be necessary if the digits were polysigns. What we are coding here are not 
the intrinsic but the extrinsic informational quantities. What is immediately 
obvious is the fact that the more signs there are for us to choose from, the 
greater is the information content of the individual sign. If we assume 
for the sake of simplicity that in each of the three cases the decimal digits 
are used with equal frequency in some relevant context, then the relationship 
between the number (N) of signs to be chosen from and their individual 
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or extrinsic information content ( H ) is particularly simple. For our three 
selections of N decimal digits, N can be expressed with exponents: 
I) N = 2 = 2 X I I ) N = 2 X 2 = 2 2 I II) N = 2 X 2 X 2 = 2 3 
This demonstrates that if we express the number ( N ) of digits from which 
we select as powers of base two, then the exponent is the information con-
tent in bits: N = 2 H . If we solve this equation for H, we have 
H = log 2N. 
In words: The information content of a sign is equal to the logarithm 
(base 2) of the number of signs within the collection of signs under con-
sideration. 
N, the number of signs, acquires interesting meaning if we generate 
information, that is, a random sequence of these N different signs. Then N 
stands for the uncertainty that one particular of these signs will occur as 
we scan the sequence. Going back to the equation above, we can see that 
information content H is a logarithmic function of uncertainty. Uncer-
tainty ( U ) , in turn, is the reciprocal of probability (P) U = 1/P. Thus the 
concept of information is also linked up with the concept of probability. 
All this again makes good intuitive sense: The greater the uncertainty of 
an event and the smaller its probability, the more informative it is. Con-
versely, highly certain and probable events are not very informative, hardly 
ever draw our attention. 
The conceptual relationships between information and logic play an 
important role in semiotic theory and semiotic reasoning. It was probably 
MacKay who first pointed out that the binary choice, which is equivalent 
to one bit of information, is also equivalent to what can be called a logical 
quantum, the most elementary logical operation, such as the yes-or-no or 
the true-or-false decision.8 This relationship can be used in interesting ways. 
For instance, if a semiotic system creates a certain pattern of a definable 
information content (complexity), then this content allows inferences about 
the number of decisions that went into this production. 
A convenient property of quantities-of-information is their additivity. 
Add up the minimal number of digits necessary for coding and you quanti-
fied the information content of some string of signs. However, finding this 
minimal code is frequently difficult, as mentioned above. Fortunately for 
many semiotic arguments, it is not necessary to calculate exact information 
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contents; simple ranking is frequently sufficient. For instance, if you add 
a second nonrepetitive sentence to a first one, then you can be sure that 
the total information content roughly doubled, and you can be absolutely 
sure that you have more information than before. 
Additivity of information contents is a highly useful property, and the 
concept has been designed specifically for this purpose. For the informa-
tionally naive, "additivity" is thoroughly counterintuitive and easily a source 
of confusion. Common sense, and specifically the Gestalt psychologists, 
keep telling us that the whole, like a piece of art, a perceptual impression, 
or an organism, is more than the sum of its parts. How then is wholeness 
related to information content? Knowing the fact that the information 
measure has purposely been made additive, we can utilize this insight in 
order to quantify wholeness; that is, find out exactly how much more 
"wholeness" is than the sum-of-its-parts. 
We conceive of "wholeness" as a property of a system in which all the 
parts are interacting with each other or are in some way related. The total 
number of ways this is possible defines wholeness. In other words, in order 
to quantify wholeness of a given system, we have to find out how many 
alternative systems of equal complexity could be thought of. Information 
( H ) quantifies complexity. Knowing H, we calculate the number N of 
alternatives with the formula explained above, N = 2 H . In words: Whole-
ness grows as an exponential function of H which in turn grows with the 
sum-of-parts; or shorter: Wholeness grows exponentially with the sum-of-
its-parts. Such growth is so phenomenal that intuition certainly is satisfied 
with this measure. Note, with a complexity of merely 20 bits, wholeness, 
thus quantified, already amounts to more than one million. 
III. Informational and Causal Reasoning 
This is the point to take up again the two basic modes of reasoning 
mentioned in a previous section: reasoning in physical terms, in time and 
space, or in brief, causal reasoning; and abstract reasoning, after elimination 
of time and space. This nonspatial and nontemporal reasoning can now be 
characterized and defined as informational reasoning. Information is the 
"stuff" we are processing in informational reasoning, and information is 
the nonphysical "stuff" signs and polysigns are made of. Thus, informa-
tional reasoning resolves the central dilemma of traditional semiotic reason-
ing when combined with causal reasoning. Signs and polysigns, divorced 
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in time and space from the sets to which they belong, are pieces of quanti-
fiable information. 
The recognition of the need and usefulness of the distinction between 
causal and informational reasoning is by no means novel. It is as old as 
human thinking. A few examples shall illustrate this. Aristotle, in his 
famous classification of causes drew a conceptual line between causal 
reasoning (causa materialis and causa efficiens) and informational reasoning 
(causa formalis and causa finalis). With the advent of modern philosophy 
came Descartes' consequential dichotomy between res extensa and res cogi-
tans. The notion of the res extensa explicitly refers to the dimensions of time 
and space which are absent in the res cogitans, a concept which refers to 
what we now call semiotic systems and information. Unfortunately, Des-
cartes failed to recognize that res cogitans are constituents of all living 
systems, not just of human systems. Much of modern humanistic reasoning 
and teaching is still based on this fundamental misconception of Descartes. 
Even before modern information theory became known, philosophizing 
scientists also felt the need to refer to what we now call information. 
Schrödinger refers to it as "aperiodicity,"9 and Simpson refers to informa-
tional reasoning as "compositionism."1 0 
Next, by combining informational and causal reasoning, we are defining 
some further concepts that are crucial for the semiotic theory and semiotic 
argumentation. Imagine two signals that are occupying different places in 
space and in time such as the signal entering and the one leaving a com-
munication channel, or two books, or the following example of two pieces 
of information: 
I ) SMETSYS CITOIMES ERA SMETSYS G N I V I L L L A 
II) SMETSYS CITOIMES ERA SNAMUH Y L N O 
Vertical comparison shows that these two pieces of information partially 
share information content. If this is to be visualized as the information at 
the input and the output of some communication channel, the shared infor-
mation is the information correctly transmitted, and it is therefore called 
transinformation. If you think of the two pieces of information above as 
occupying different places in space at the same or different moments in time, 
then, abstracting time, the shared information is referred to as syninforma-
tion. Two copies of a particular book contain the same information in 
purely informational terms, and they contain syninformation in the com-
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bined informational and physical terms. Copying amplifies information 
but does not increase it. Our knowledge about all life contains syninforma-
tion. This syninformation defines our general notion of life. There is more 
syninformation between man and the great African apes (chimpanzee and 
gorilla) than between man and any other group of animals. Syninformation 
thus establishes biological relationships. Syninformation is invariant under 
transcoding. A book and its correct translation essentially contain syninfor-
mation. Semiosis, by definition, implies and establishes syninformation. 
Discovering the style of a piece of art is finding syninformation, and in 
general, art criticism, such as literary criticism, is the discovery of syninfor-
mation between a piece of creation and the rest of the world. 
After this brief introduction into information-theoretical thinking, we 
return to semiotic systems and semiosis. Factual knowledge together with 
the concepts so far developed will be utilized to formulate basic semiotic 
laws and a series of useful, derived concepts. 
I V . The Basic Semiotic Laws 
It is a peculiarity of semiotic systems and the very reason for their 
existence, that they accumulate \nowledge about their environment and 
also some about themselves. Knowledge is syninformation that is the same 
information that has been amplified, and then resides at different locations 
in space and time. The information storing capacity of all semiotic systems 
is finite, yet the information content of their environment is infinite. From 
this, we deduce the first semiotic law: 
FIRST LAW: All knowledge about the world contained in semiotic sys-
tems is symbolic \nowledge. 
It is easy to see that a semiotic system as part of the universe cannot be as 
complex (remember: complexity = information content) as the whole 
universe. Yet, could it be that a minute section of the universe is non-
symbolical, that is fully known? Can there truly be exact syninformation? 
Informational reasoning proves this impossible. Take, for instance, the 
width of this paper. You can measure it in centimeters, or in millimeters, 
or in tenths of millimeters, etc., without any theoretical limit. And as the 
number of digits grows with the refinement of measurement, so does the 
information content of this string of numbers ad infinitum. In general, 
everything there is in time and space does contain an infinite amount of 
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information, hence knowing something about some real thing always has 
to be a many-to-few relation which has been defined as symbolization. 
Given the fact that there is always a limit of refinement in the knowl-
edge a semiotic system contains, we can formulate the second semiotic law: 
SECOND SEMIOTIC LAW: All knowledge in any semiotic system is 
ultimately discrete, that is, composed of signs that cannot be further de-
composed. 
The second law thus establishes theoretical or logical atomism, which we 
have to distinguish sharply from physical atomism. The atomism the 
ancient philosophers Leucippus and Democritus propounded was logical 
(metaphysical), not physical atomism because relevant physical facts were 
not known to them. It is a common mistake not to recognize this. The 
physical fact more relevant to logical atomism is reflected in Heisenbergs 
uncertainty principle which he derived from quantum physics and not from 
atomic physics. This principle sets an absolute and exact limit to the 
accuracy with which we can collect physical information. 
Knowledge in a semiotic system can be true or false and therefore a 
semiotic definition of truth is needed. By definition, all semiotic systems 
are informationally connected with their environment. Incoming streams 
of signals are compared (correlated) with stored signs. If there is a corre-
lation (matching), similarity, or syninformation between the incoming and 
the stored signs, truth is established, and the stored signs can be used to 
predict what kinds of future signals will come in. Existence of correlation 
entails order. And this leads us to the third semiotic law: 
THIRD SEMIOTIC LAW: Any semiotic system has true knowledge 
about something only to the degree that there is order. Acquiring knowl-
edge implies being able to discover order. 
This third semiotic law has many interesting implications. One applies to 
Kant's philosophy (Critique of Pure Reason). Is it possible for a semiotic 
system to have knowledge a priori, that is, prior to any experience? Kant 
and many of his followers to this day naively affirmed this question and 
wasted much time, even on follow-up questions, such as whether synthetic 
a priori knowledge is possible. There is absolutely no way any semiotic 
system can have any knowledge about its outside but through experience. 
A semiotic system, all by itself, cannot even know whether or not knowledge 
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is possible. In a world totally chaotic in space and time, having knowledge 
of any type is impossible. Without experience, no semiotic system can ever 
know whether the world has some order or not. Therefore: 
FOURTH SEMIOTIC LAW: No semiotic system has \nowledge a priori. 
K. Lorenz made the proposal that Kant's so-called knowledge a priori 
might in reality be innate (instinctive) knowledge. 1 1 It has to be pointed 
out, however, that this interpretation in no way rules out experience in a 
more general sense. It substitutes individual experience with evolutionary 
experience, and this is definitely not what Kant had in mind. The problem 
of innate knowledge belongs to biosemiotics and not to general semiotics. 
The above statement, that finding true knowledge implies the ability 
to discover order, raises two important questions. How much do or can 
we (as semiotic systems) know about the orderliness in the world outside, 
and second, what kind of knowledge do semiotic systems have to have in 
order to find order. 
Experience tells us that there is at least some order outside ourselves. 
But could it be that the world is fully ordered or predetermined as Leibnitz 
proposed in his vision of a pre-established harmony in the world, thus 
permitting Pascal's demon to predict everything in the future from knowing 
the exact present? We have to be careful not to confuse wishful thinking 
with actual experience. As semiotic systems we have to be biased toward see-
ing order in the world in order to find order (that is then true knowledge). 
Is is a common experience of psychologists that we frequently see order 
where in fact there is none. Psychological tests, like the Rorschach test, take 
advantage of this propensity. Scientists, the professional seekers for order, 
are frequently inclined to consider the world fully determined. As "re-
ductionists" they want to find a causal explanation for everything. Einstein 
reputedly said: God is not throwing dice. Is this realistic? Without going 
into further details, finding out whether the world is fully determined or 
not would entail an infinite amount of information which no conceivable 
semiotic system can process. Therefore: 
FIFTH SEMIOTIC LAW: It is impossible for any semiotic system to 
find out whether the world in which it exists is fully ordered (fully de-
termined ) . 
In brief, discovering absolute or full truth about the world is impossible. 
How is it possible for semiotic systems to discover order in the barrage 
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of incoming signals? We defined "having true knowledge" means to be 
able to match successfully future real signals with future anticipated signals. 
Let us call these matches touchpoints with reality. But what happens in 
the intervals between touchpoints ? A simple example will clarify. A pigeon 
in a Skinner box is fed with some grain every two minutes. Soon the 
pigeon discovers the order in time and approaches the food dispenser 
shortly before the food actually appears. Now the pigeon has true knowl-
edge; but what happens between touchpoints with reality which are spaced 
in intervals of two minutes? The pigeon has to have some internal timer 
for measuring intervals and with this timer a hypothesis is established: 
Food appears whenever the timer approaches a certain point. There is no 
need and no likelihood that the mechanism of the pigeon's timer matches 
that of the apparatus. Thus hypothetical knowledge is useful and necessary 
knowledge, but in its internal structure it is most likely not true. Let us 
call the body of such hypotheses which includes much of what we call 
scientific hypotheses and theories hypophysics. For hypophysical knowledge 
Occam's razor has to be applied: It should never contain more information 
than absolutely necessary to interconnect the touchpoints with reality. In 
conclusion: 
SIXTH SEMIOTIC LAW: In order to establish \nowledge about the 
outside world it is necessary for any semiotic system to develop a hypo-
physical system that interconnects the touchpoints with reality. 
This new insight calls for a new classification of knowledge. Traditionally, 
and since Aristotle, philosophers discriminate between physics and meta-
physics. In this theory we discriminate between straight sensory experience; 
hypophysics, the minimal knowledge necessary to interconnect experience; 
and metaphysics, which is all other knowledge that transcends the first two 
categories. This raises immediately the question, where does hypophysical 
and metaphysical knowledge (information) come from? Or more generally, 
what are all the sources of information available to a semiotic system ? First, 
sensory input processes. This is unproblematical. How about logical proc-
esses ? Think of any one logical operation. It will maintain the information 
content whenever it is tautological or else it will reduce information. From 
premises you can derive a conclusion, but from a conclusion you can never 
reconstitute all the premises. In general: 
SEVENTH SEMIOTIC LAW: Intrinsic deterministic processes, li\e logi-
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col operations, never increase the internal information content (knowledge) 
of semiotic systems, and usually reduce it. 
If deterministic processes are ruled out as sources of new internal informa-
tion, what is left? It can only be random or chance events. Hence: 
EIGHTH SEMIOTIC LAW: Any semiotic system can internally increase 
its knowledge or information content exclusively by means of chance events. 
For the semiotically naive this law appears counterintuitive. Don't we have 
intuition, inspiration, sudden flashes of apparently novel insight? Yes, but 
this is deceptive. Much of what happens in the human brain is independent 
of our conscious experience, but nevertheless has to comply with all semiotic 
laws just as our conscious experiences have to. It is easy to see how the 
semiotically inexperienced can honestly believe in supernatural inspiration 
when the nonconscious part of the brain communicates with the conscious-
ness. Seemingly something comes out of nothing, like a miracle. 
The probability that chance events generate true knowledge about the 
world decreases with the total amount of information thus accumulated. 
Hence: 
NINTH SEMIOTIC LAW: If a semiotic system autonomously develops 
a new body of "knowledge" the probability that this knowledge is false 
increases with the complexity (information content) of this \nowledge. 
This law rules out Leibnitz' monads. 
Someone might object, by pointing to the impressive body of mathe-
matical truths. However, this is fallacious. There are two types of truth 
between which we have to discriminate sharply: truth proper, or truth 
about the world as discussed before; and self-truth, or consistency within 
a system of signs. Pure mathematics is only concerned with self-truth, as 
is pure philosophy. 
Important new insight is gained by applying semiotic laws to semiosis. 
Symbolization and signification are both true logical or deterministic opera-
tions that eliminate large chunks of information (complementary informa-
tion). How can this information be reconstituted by the inverse process? 
Strictly speaking, it cannot. Semiosis as defined at the outset cannot function 
by itself. Whenever a sign or a polysign travels from some origin to some 
destination, origin and destination are required to share all complementary 
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information, to have syninformation. This syninformation must have been 
imparted by some common source prior to semiosis. Hence: 
TENTH SEMIOTIC LAW: All semiosis requires pre-instruction, the 
setting up of syninformation (shared knowledge) about all signs and their 
complements. 
Pre-instruction need not pass through the same channel as used by semiosis 
and always predates semiosis. Thus, a double link or semiotic loop is estab-
lished between origin and destination of signals. Honey bees, for example, 
innately understand their dance language. The semiotic loop between two 
individuals is thus formed by a genetic communication channel and a 
behavioral one. 
Finally, we have to come back to the problem of self knowledge, the 
knowledge a semiotic system can have about itself. Is it possible that a 
semiotic system has complete knowledge about itself? In an absolute sense 
this is of course impossible as discussed in the context of the first semiotic 
law. A more modest self knowledge down to the smallest functional unit, 
down to logical atoms, would still satisfy anyone. In order to succeed even 
in this modest sense we have to violate informational laws. Such knowledge 
would entail that we load all information about ourselves into our memory 
for inspection. A memory, however, is only part of a whole system and 
no part of a system can be as complex (contain as much information) as 
the whole system. This establishes the 
ELEVENTH SEMIOTIC LAW: It is impossible for any semiotic system 
to have complete functional \nowledge about itself. 
This last semiotic law is a simplified and special version of the much more 
general incompleteness theorem of Gödel (1931) which was first established 
for mathematical systems and then generalized around 1965 by Chaitin with 
the help of information-theoretical arguments. 1 2 This theorem implies that, 
for finding out how complex a given system is, you always need another 
system that is more complex than the one under study. 
B. BIOSEMIOTICS 
Bio semiotics is the application of general semiotics to living systems. All 
living systems or organisms are capable of responding to signs in their 
environment. From this fact we infer that they all contain semiotic systems 
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that mediate the observed semiosis. A seedling responds to gravity as a 
sign, "knows" to grow downward with its roots, in order to find soil and 
moisture, and upward with its shoot to find light. A chicken flies into a 
tree on hearing another one giving the alarm call for a terrestrial predator. 
Living systems are more than just semiotic systems. All the subsystems 
that one can identify within an organism can be subdivided into two classes: 
semiotic subsystems or informational subsystems, and trophic subsystems. 
The latter handle materials and energy and are disregarded. Semiotic laws 
tell us that for semiosis to occur we need pre-instruction, a learning process 
that establishes the information to be used to complement the information 
from incoming signs. There are two major semiotic systems in living 
organisms that we can discriminate by this criterion: the genetic subsystem 
and the mental subsystem. The learning process of the genetic system is 
usually called "evolution" and is very slow. That of the mental one we can 
call "behavioral learning," and it is fast. 
Before discussing evolutionary learning, it is best to understand how 
evolutionary or genetic knowledge is stored symbolically in genetic systems. 
This storage system is fairly well known, down to the molecular level. By 
contrast, the storage mechanism for mental information is still virtually 
unknown. The genetic storage of information on linear macromolecules 
is surprisingly similar to information storage in human spoken language. 
It is because of this similarity (syninformation) that we can talk about a 
genetic language. 
Exactly four types of molecular subunits (A, G, C, T ) are comparable 
to the phonemes that constitute words. Like phonemes, these subunits 
have no meaning in themselves. Always three of the subunits (say A, G, T ) 
make a genetic word, a triplet, which is the smallest unit that has meaning, 
hence a sign. The meaning of a word is one particular amino acid which is 
a molecular constituent of a protein. Among the triplets there are many 
synonyms, that is, different triplets that stand for the same type of amino 
acid. Analogous to human language, the formation of the genetic words 
is arbitrary. There is no chemical or biological reason why any particular 
triplet should stand for a particular amino acid; any other would function 
equally well. A chain of several hundred triplets makes a "sentence" which 
is normally the next higher functional unit, the gen. A genetic sentence 
stands for particular protein. Sometimes genetic sentences are subdivided 
into phrases that stand for subunits of protein molecules that are later linked 
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up. Genetic sentences are combined into still larger functional units which 
are not discussed. The way genetic information is realized (epigenetics), 
is more of chemical than semiotic concern and need not be discussed. The 
replication (informational amplification) is semiotically interesting. It is 
a process comparable, in principle, to printing of books, or better still, print-
ing of photographs: a negative copies a positive, a positive a negative, and 
so on. A surprising feature of the genetic system is its fundamental identity 
in all living organisms from bacteria to man. From this syninformation we 
conclude that this language and this semiotic system are as old as life, that 
is, some 3.5 billion years. 
As already mentioned, the mechanism by which genetic systems acquire 
new meaningful information closely resembles learning, as Pringle orig-
inally recognized. 1 3 First, for a change to be made, an organism has to 
die and a new one has to be born. Thereby random processes (mutations)— 
analogous to creative behavioral learning—produce a new genetic informa-
tion (say, a new word at a particular place). Another source of novel 
genetic information is due to sexual processes which establish new genetic 
combinations. All novel genetic information will then be tested by a process 
comparable to induction: The more accurate the interpretation of signs from 
the outside world by genetically providing the appropriate complementary 
information to the signs, the greater the reproductive success. And so evo-
lution carries on. 
Much of what nervous systems of animals do in organizing their be-
havior is still due to implemented genetic information. Such nonlearned 
behavior is called instinctive. Man still has instinctive behavioral knowledge. 
Exactly how much is hard to determine and therefore sometimes hotly 
debated, especially when the question comes to the ratio between genetic 
and nongenetic specification of intelligence. 
A truly new semiotic system develops with the ability of individuals to 
learn. I call this newly emerging semiotic system mental because it devel-
oped gradually into the human mental system. The learning abilities of 
most insects are modest with the exception of a few, like bees. Some birds 
and mammals have learning (mental) capabilities of surprising complexity. 
The raven, for instance, has been shown to learn and use abstract numbers 
between one and seven. The experiment goes like this: If the raven sees 
three objects of any kind, he goes to the box with three points and finds 
food. If he sees seven objects, he goes to the box with seven points, etc. 
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And not surprisingly, the great apes learn to solve more complex problems 
than any other animal, even the making and using of simple tools. 
One of the most difficult problems the genetic system had to solve in 
gradually evolving the genetic blueprint for a mental system was not only 
learning per se, having a memory and a logical operator, but taking care 
that from all that could be learned the right things are learned. This 
problem has been solved by building a positive and negative reward system 
into the semiotic system which learns. 
What is biologically useful, like nutritious food and reproduction, is 
made pleasant. What is biologically deleterious is made unpleasant or 
painful. Experiences of this rewarding and punishing type would not make 
any sense in an organism incapable of learning. Yet there are many learning 
problems that cannot be solved with reward systems of the simple type 
mentioned above. A mouse, exposed to a cat, has not enough time to learn 
the shortest path to its mouse hole. A satiated ape is well advised to search 
and learn where to find more food in anticipation of future hunger. Indeed, 
learning for its own sake, or anticipatory learning which may or may not 
be useful later, is widespread among higher animals. Such learning appears 
to be self-rewarding in both higher animals and man. Novelty is a strong 
eliciting stimulus for it. It appears that much of what we call human 
values is based on our genetically determined reward system that encour-
ages biologically useful learning. 1 4 
Mental semiotic systems finally develop into semiotic hypersystems. The 
most impressive examples from animals are the dance language of the 
honey bee and communication between apes and their human keeper by 
means of sign language. 
Honey bees communicate in their dances the location of some resources 
such as nectar, water or a nesting site. 1 5 Places are specified by polar co-
ordinates: direction and distance. The knowledgeable bee performs a 
figure-eight dance on the comb (see diagram). 
The sign for distance is the speed of the dance. The greater the distance, 
the slower the dance. If, for instance, the food is one kilometer away, it 
takes three seconds to complete one circle of the figure-eight. For four 
kilometers, it takes six seconds. 
The direction is indicated according to the following key: If the food 
is in the direction of the sun, then the straight section of the dance points 
vertically up. If the food is away from the sun, then the straight section 
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of the dance points vertically down. If the food is some angle to the right 
of the sun, say 30°, then the bee dances with the straight section 30° to 
the right of the vertical (x in Figure 4 ) , and so on for all angles to the 
right of the sun, and it all holds, respectively, for angles to the left of the sun. 
Now to the apes. Their mental abilities are of particular interest to us 
because of our close biological relationship to them. Moreover, the evolution 
of life from its beginning to the level of the apes took 3.5 billion years. The 
evolution from ape to man was completed in less than 10 million years and 
most likely in only three million years. In this period, the brain approxi-
mately tripled its weight. Since the genetic changes that are possible in 
such a relatively short evolutionary time cannot be very complex, one can 
suspect that the differences between man and ape are more quantitative 
than qualitative. Hence the question, is an ape smart enough to communi-
cate with us if properly taught? All attempts to teach apes spoken human 
language have failed. Yet both gorillas and chimpanzees have been trained 
in the use of American Sign Language (ASL) of the deaf mute. These 
apes can learn to use correctly more than a hundred different signs to name 
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objects and compose simple sentences of the type: "give apple," "open 
door." They answer questions of the type: "? color apple," with "red color 
apple." Exposed to the first cucumber in her life, a chimpanzee labeled it 
"banana with green." Koko, a gorilla, is the most "brilliant" one known. 
He masters more than 400 signs (ASL) , it is said. Very little is known 
about how apes intercommunicate in the wild. 1 6 
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The Cybernetics of Cultural 
Communication 
F. Allan Hanson and Louise Hanson 
This essay is an investigation of the applicability of semiotics in anthro-
pology. Specifically, we are concerned with the relation between the world 
and people's culturally derived perceptions of the world. While semiotics 
is an essential part of our investigation of this problem, it is not the only 
part. The communication of world-view does not appear amenable to 
analysis in terms of any single approach. We will attempt to demonstrate 
the crucial role that semiotics, in conjunction with other theoretical orien-
tations, may play in the elucidation of one vexing set of issues in anthro-
pology. 
The Mind-Affected World 
Several years ago one of the authors set out to discuss the German phi-
losopher Wilhelm Dilthey's distinction between the natural and the "mind-
affected" world in a seminar, and he wanted to show the class an example 
of each. To find a representative of the mind-affected world was simple: 
for the sake of drama he chose a Yanomamo arrow point which a friend 
had recently brought back from Brazil. Its sharp point, shiny coat of curare 
poison and deep incisions where it would break and splinter upon impact 
all eloquently testified to its lethal purpose. To find something from the 
natural world was far more difficult. Nothing in the house would possibly 
do—everything there was either man-made or else an objet trouve like a 
piece of driftwood, brought in for some decorative purpose. Even on the 
mile or so walk from our house to the university finding an authentic 
example of the natural world proved troublesome. "Stones" turned out to 
be chunks of concrete, or to have been artificially broken by quarrying 
and then transported to their present site for use as borders for flower beds 
or in paving someone's driveway. Blades of grass were special lawn strains 
developed and modified by human intervention. Finally he settled for an 
irregularly shaped piece of walnut bark pilfered from the yard of a philoso-
phy professor. But probably even that was hedging, for doubtless the tree 
from which the bark had come had been planted by someone (or at least 
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not cut down because it did not conflict with the functional or aesthetic 
landscaping design), and for all we know the black walnut species may have 
been brought to eastern Kansas by human beings, or perhaps modified by 
long cohabitation with and use by humans. 
By now, what Dilthey meant by the mind-affected world is obvious. 
He was referring to those material objects which, being made or modified 
by humans to serve certain purposes, have intentions or meanings fixed in 
them by design. Innumerable cultural artifacts that populate the mind-
affected world immediately spring to mind: the meanings built into the 
shape of chairs, coffee cup handles, airplane wings, automobile bodies, pencil 
sharpeners, gilded picture frames, and so on ad infinitum. Dilthey also 
recognized the arrangement of objects as part of the mind-affected world. 
"Every square planted with trees, every room in which seats are arranged, 
is intelligible to us . . . because human planning, arranging and valuing— 
common to us all—have assigned its place to every square and every object 
in the room." 1 
What is truly remarkable, when one stops to consider it, is the degree 
to which the environment in which we spend our lives is dominated by 
the mind-affected world. Inside any building, or in any city, literally every-
thing we see, hear, touch, taste or smell except the air itself (considering 
air-conditioning or pollution, that too) is part of the mind-affected world. 
We humans have gone so far that even extremely "natural" environments 
like Capability Brown's design for Blenheim Park at Woodstock, or Japa-
nese gardens, are highly contrived. 
Dilthey's concept of the mind-affected world should be extended far 
beyond material objects and their arrangements. Ritual and magic also 
mold reality. As Mary Douglas has demonstrated, these are human means 
of shaping things that actually happen so as to make them more consonant 
with things as they should happen, according to the expectations of culture. 
So, among the Dinka, peace-making rituals include denials that the quarrels 
being reconciled ever took place, and the sacrifice to atone for incest involves 
the negation of kinship between the guilty parties. Rites like these shape 
experience in accordance with a culturally-defined image of reality. Events 
which do not conform to that image are ritually redefined or simply 
negated.2 
Nor should the extension of the concept of the mind-affected world stop 
here. Every person's environment contains other people organized by mind-
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affected categories of kinship, friendship, economic or political ties. It is, 
moreover, an environment defined by and constructed in accordance with 
innumerable beliefs, values and symbols. In other words, the mind-affected 
world is a concept closely allied to what anthropologists call culture. We 
have, of course, long been accustomed to thinking about the world as mind-
affected in the relatively weak sense that culture grafts meaning onto inde-
pendently-existing reality. The Maoris, for example, designated New Zea-
land's North Island as Maui's fish (Te Ika a Maui) ; their myth recounts 
how the culture hero Maui drew it up from the depths of the ocean. Other 
myths account for the movements and present location of major mountains 
according to their attractions and antipathies for each other, while a myriad 
of place names denominates locations according to mythical or historical 
events which occurred there. New Zealand itself thus became a paysage 
moralise, a mind-affected world thick with human significance.3 The par-
ticular advantage of juxtaposing Dilthey's concept of mind-affected world 
with the anthropological concept of culture, however, is that it enables us 
also to conceive of culture in the far stronger sense as something that, to a 
degree which is astonishing the first time one realizes it, actually creates 
the ideological, social, architectural and even geographical environments 
that people inhabit. To the very considerable extent to which our world 
is mind-affected, we may assertively (but justifiably) contend that reality 
as experienced is a cultural artifact} 
Yet to speak of the world as mind-affected is to tell only half the story. 
The world is also mind-affectirag. This becomes obvious as soon as one 
asks how it is that people come to know about the world they live in. It 
is, of course, via learning. And the learning process can be understood in 
terms of the repeated exposure of the learner to reality. Thus, the indi-
vidual's experience of reality (nature, architecture, other people, things they 
say and do, etc.) repeatedly takes certain forms. That experience leads the 
individual to develop certain expectations about the world, to organize his 
activities accordingly, and these expectations and actions are reinforced by 
subsequent experience. 
Consequently, reality as experienced is both mind-affected and mind-
affecting. We made the world according to our image of reality; we learn 
our image of reality from our experience of the world that we (especially 
our predecessors and contemporaries) have made. It is a cybernetic process, 
in which the reality people actually experience is linked in a feedback loop 
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with the culturally derived image of reality in their minds. This essay will 
suggest a model for how the process works. 
Consequential and Semiotic Relationships 
In what follows, any bit of human behavior which is conventional or 
patterned will be called a cultural component. This includes stock greetings 
like "how are you?", customs such as tipping the waiter or producing a 
healthy belch to show your host that you enjoyed the meal, beliefs such as 
that the earth orbits the sun or that long hair wastes the body's finite store 
of vital energy, attitudes about higher education or about people from other 
races, forms and styles in art and architecture, and so on through the 
interminable list of conventions that mold the behavior of people in society. 
Cultural components are leveled phenomena, so that the American family 
or legal system may be seen as higher-order components composed of nu-
merous more specific components such as conventions of behavior between 
husband and wife, mother and daughter, or between lawyers representing 
opposed clients, judge and defendant, and the like. 
From the characterization just given, as well as from common knowledge 
about human culture, it becomes clear that cultural components do not 
occur in piecemeal fashion but are systematically related. At least two 
major classes of relationships among components are discernible—conse-
quential and semiotic—and each of these can be further divided into two 
sub-types. Our model of the cybernetic process linking (1) reality as a 
cultural artifact experienced by people with (2) people's culturally derived 
mental image of reality, depends on the clear recognition of the differences 
among these kinds of relatedness. 
Consequential relationships are those for which it is possible to dis-
tinguish independent and dependent variables, such that the dependent 
variable in some sense- is a result or consequence of the independent variable. 
One variety of consequential relationship is causal. This occurs when the 
independent variable physically renders the dependent variable necessary 
or highly probable. A causal relationship among cultural components exists 
where, for example, in arid conditions such as the Kalahari or Central 
Australia, a hunting and gathering technology taken as the independent 
variable may be said to cause the dependent variable of a nomadic way 
of life. 5 
The other variety of consequential relationship is termed logical. This 
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occurs when the independent variable is an idea or belief. We place this 
in a category separate from the causal because, while it is not universally 
accepted that ideas may cause actions or institutions, there is little argument 
that ideas are often reasons for them. 6 A logical consequential relationship 
is demonstrated by the belief that a source of illness is an excess of blood 
as the independent variable and the use of leeches or blood-letting in therapy 
as the dependent variable.7 
Semiotic relations are those for which it is not possible to establish 
dependent and independent variables. In this case one item is not a con-
sequence of the other; instead, their relationship is one of signification. It 
may be that one member of the relationship signifies another, so that we 
may speak of signifier and signified (as in the relationship between a family 
and its coat of arms). Or two or more items may be related because they 
are signifiers of the same thing (as in the relationships among a coat of 
arms, a name, a hereditary title and a hereditary estate, all of which may be 
signifiers of a family). 
Again it is convenient to divide semiotic relationships into two categories. 
This may be done on the basis of Hume's distinction between ideas asso-
ciated by resemblance and contiguity.8 Semioticians have recently produced 
a number of variations and elaborations on this contrast, distinguishing 
between syntagm and association, syntagm and paradigm, syntagm and 
system, or metonymy and metaphor.9 Here, however, we will continue to 
use Hume's simpler terminology. Things are related by contiguity if they 
commonly appear together, or if one is part of the other. Hence the rela-
tionship mentioned above among a family, its coat of arms, its name, its 
title and its estate is contiguous. A contiguous part-for-whole relationship 
(synecdoche) may be found in the nickname of the jazz drummer Nesbert 
Hooper, otherwise known as "Sticks" Hooper. 
The other category of semiotic relationship is resemblance. Here things 
are related because of some kind of similarity between them. Depending 
on the context, it may be similarity of color, shape, odor, sound, use, or 
anything else. Most of the transformations or homologies upon which 
Levi-Strauss' perceptive analyses rest are semiotic relationships based on 
resemblance, where the similarity is in structure or form. Indeed, while 
we will not pursue the issue here, Levi-Strauss' work is valuable for its 
demonstration that systematic contrast is a sub-category of resemblance. 
His analyses of Northwest Coast masks and the relation between totemism 
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and caste indicate that reversal of form can link institutions as effectively 
as similarity.10 
Resemblance and contiguity cannot be completely separated. In fact, 
they are in a fundamental sense mutually dependent, in that each provides 
a necessary context for the other. This point becomes clear if we consider 
a common means of distinguishing between the closely allied concepts of 
syntagm and paradigm: the different elements in a conventional sequence 
or constellation are linked syntagmatically, while possible replacements for 
any one of those elements are related paradigmatically. Thus the words 
in the sentence "I want to buy a car" are related to each other syntagmati-
cally or by contiguity, while "car" is related paradigmatically or by resem-
blance to other words that could replace it in the sentence, such as "doll," 
"dog," or "house." Again, soup, salad, beef, potatoes, green beans and-pie 
are related contiguously or syntagmatically as items that typically make up 
an American meal, while a paradigmatic or resemblance relation exists 
between beef and its possible replacements, like pork, chicken, or fish. 
Notice that resemblance relationships exist in the context of particular 
relationships of contiguity. Beef is replaceable by fish in the context of a 
meal but not in other syntagmatic or contiguous contexts, such as the treat-
ment of a black eye. Similarly, contiguity is grounded in resemblance. It 
is no immutable law of nature that a meal consists of soup, salad, and the 
other foods listed above. That is a matter of social convention which is 
that way largely because it has been that way for some time: meals of soup, 
salad, and the rest have been served in the United States for years. The 
reason those foods are contiguously related to form a meal is largely due 
to the conventional repetition of their conjunction. And these reiterated 
repasts are related to each other by resemblance: they are similar to each 
other. Indeed, it is only on the basis of their similarity that we can recog-
nize them as related. So, while it is helpful to distinguish between resem-
blance and contiguity, it is important also to recognize their fundamental 
interdependence.11 
How Minds Affect the World 
The distinctions that have been drawn are helpful in modeling the 
cybernetic process whereby the world is both mind-affected and mind-
affecting. Briefly, our claim is that, in general, minds affect the world by 
consequential relationships while the world affects minds via semiotic 
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relationships. This can be demonstrated most clearly by means of an 
example. Marie Jeanne Adams has postulated a common form for several 
cultural components on the Indonesian island of Sumba. She terms this 
form the "dyadic-triadic set." It consists of two symmetrical, opposed poles 
and, between them, a central element which has the same relationship to 
either pole. Decorated men's textiles are an example (See Fig. 1 ) . These 
handsome rectangular cloths are worn or flown as banners on various ritual 
occasions. Their design consists of an odd number of bands which form a 
dyadic-triadic set in that the bands on either side of the central one form 
two symmetrical end fields reflecting each other across the central, bifacial 
band. The dyadic-triadic set is recapitulated in village lay-out, where two 
equally-ranked warrior clans reside at the ends and the center is occupied 
by priestly clans which mediate disputes between the warrior clans and 
serve them equally in religious matters. Formal negotiations also manifest 
the dyadic-triadic form with the two parties grouped on either side of a 
hall and, between them on a mat, speakers for each side who both make 
points for their own group and relay points made by the other side to 
their group. 1 2 
We can diagram the relation between the structural principle and three 
of its manifestations as follows: 
I. Dyadic-triadic organization 
A. Men's decorated B. Spatial plan C. Seating arrangements 
textile designs of the village in formal negotiations 
Figure 2. 
A, B, and C are examples of cultural components: artistic style, use of 
space, and conventions of inter-group behavior. They are parts of the real 
world as it is experienced by the Sumbanese. And they are logical con-
sequences of the cultural presupposition of dyadic-triadic organization. 
Hence we suggest that a major way in which minds affect the world is 
that the components which represent reality as experienced are logical 
consequences of cultural principles. Innumerable examples are at hand: 
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religious symbols, objects and practices are logical consequences of theo-
logical postulates; good manners are logical consequences of canons of 
proper and graceful social interaction; conventional behavior patterns 
among various types of relatives, friends, acquaintances and adversaries are 
logical consequences of principles of social organization; musical composi-
tions and performances, paintings and sculpture are logical consequences 
of canons of style. 
How the World Affects Minds 
If A, B, and C in our example are each a logical consequence of I, their 
relationship to each other is semiotic. Sumbanese textile designs, formal 
negotiations, and village lay-out are similar in form, and are thus related 
by resemblance. Our claim is that the world affects minds through such 
semiotic relationships. The distinctive feature of semiotic relations is that 
they communicate messages by means of signs. This is why semiotic rela-
tionships participate in the character of the world as mind-affecting— 
because that process is one of people learning about the world, and that 
requires the communication of messages from the world to people. The 
concepts of information and redundancy, as these have been developed in 
information theory, can elucidate how this communication process works. 
The technical sense of "information" is quite different from its ordinary 
meaning. In information (or communication) theory, information is the 
measure of the unpredictability in a message, while redundancy is a meas-
ure of its predictability. Hence, information and redundancy are related 
inversely. For example, the stock message, "I'm fine" in response to the 
inquiry "How are you?" is predictable and thus has a high degree of 
redundancy and a correspondingly low degree of information. "I have 
a bad earache" in response to the same question is far less predictable and 
hence the message has much more information (and much less redundancy) 
than the first. 
Perhaps the simplest way to state the relationship between the technical 
and ordinary senses of information is to say that the greater the information 
(technical sense) in a message, the greater its potential to convey informa-
tion (ordinary sense). 1 3 Obviously one does not learn much from a message 
which one could have predicted in the first place, while one can gain a 
good deal of information (ordinary sense) from a message which one could 
not have predicted. But this holds only to a point. To learn anything from 
a message one must understand it, and some messages may be so rich in 
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information as to be unintelligible. "Much everything for conclusions awake 
story McGovern" is a group of words chosen randomly from a book. It 
is very high in information in that, given any part of it, it is extremely 
difficult to make any prediction regarding the rest. About the only re-
dundancy in it rests in the fact that all its signs belong to the English 
language. And yet one derives no information (ordinary sense) at all from 
this message, because it is unintelligible. Redundancy renders messages 
intelligible, and hence natural communication systems have a great deal 
of it. Redundancy, for example, is what enables us to understand messages 
like those outside Owl's door in Winnie the Pooh: 
Underneath the knocker there was a notice which said: 
PLES RING IF AN ANSER IS REQIRD. 
Underneath the bell-pull was a notice which said: 
PLEZ C K N O K E IF AN RNSR IS N O T R E Q I D . 1 4 
Messages which communicate successfully have enough information for 
the receiver to learn something from them and enough redundancy to be 
intelligible. 
Now let us apply the concepts of information and redundancy to semiotic 
relations. Resemblance, as stated earlier, refers to relationships in which the 
relata are linked by similarity of some sort. It seems fair to say that the 
degree of similarity between relata is the redundancy of resemblance rela-
tions, in that the intelligibility of the message communicated by the rela-
tionship depends on that similarity. That is, the message of a relationship 
can be intelligible only if the relata are perceived as related, and in the 
case of resemblance relationships that is a function of the similarity between 
the relata. Because information is inversely proportional to redundancy, 
we could then state that the information in a resemblance relationship is 
the degree of difference among the' relata. Coleridge's famous simile, for 
example, holds the Ancient Mariner's becalmed ship to be: 
As idle as a painted ship 
Upon a painted ocean. 
The meaning is immediately grasped because of its high degree of redun-
dancy: the obvious similarity between a painted ship on a painted ocean 
and a real ship on a real ocean. The information in the simile—what we 
learn from it—is in the differences between these relata. Our conception 
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of the absolute stillness of the ship, so complete that time itself seems to 
have stopped, is enhanced by the comparison to a painted ship. 
The simile at the beginning of T . S. Eliot's "The Love Song of J. Alfred 
Prufrock" is somewhat more difficult: 
Let us go then, you and I, 
When the evening is spread out against the sky 
Like a patient etherized upon a table. 
This relationship is less readily grasped than Coleridge's because it has less 
redundancy: the similarity between an evening and an anesthesized patient 
is not so immediately apparent as that between a ship and the picture of 
a ship. Because the differences between relata are greater, Eliot's compari-
son has more information: as one ponders it one gains an increasingly vivid 
image of a peculiarly pallid evening, and in this way the simile effectively 
sets the stage for the anemic, flaccid tone of the poem. 
In relationships of contiguity we take the redundancy—that which 
enables one to perceive the relata as related, and therefore renders the 
message intelligible—to be the degree to which the relata naturally (or, 
far more likely, conventionally) belong together. Conversely, the informa-
tion in the relationship is the degree to which the juxtaposition is unantici-
pated. The room in which these lines are written, for example, contains a 
writing table, bookshelves, typewriter, and a globe. By convention these 
objects occur together very commonly, and hence the message conveyed 
by their juxtaposition is highly redundant and therefore readily intelligible. 
The room fairly shouts: "This is a study." In contrast, some friends had a 
room which they termed the "Gold Room." It was rather small, with 
yellowish walls, one of which supported shelves for a larder of canned 
foods while, opposite, there stood a toilet. These associations are quite 
unanticipated. The denomination "Gold Room" leads one to expect a 
spacious and richly furnished manor house drawing room, shelves of canned 
goods put one in mind of a pantry, while a toilet belongs in a bathroom. 
The contiguity relationships in this particular room were so rich in infor-
mation (unpredictability), and conversely so low in redundancy, as to 
render the room essentially unintelligible. Ushered into the Gold Room, 
one looks around and wonders "What kind of place is this?" A contiguity 
relation with more information than our study but less information than 
the Gold Room is found in the sculpture "Et toujours et jamais" by Pierre-
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Eugene-Emile Hebert that stands in the Spencer Museum of Art at the 
University of Kansas. It depicts a voluptuous nude in the embrace of a 
shrouded figure. The redundancy lies in the fact that pairs of human 
figures are commonly joined in embraces, while the information is found 
in the unanticipated fact that in this case one of the figures is a skeleton. 
Now let us apply these concepts to our example from Sumba. Textile 
design, village lay-out, and formal negotiations are related by resemblance 
in that they share a common dyadic-triadic form. That similarity establishes 
the redundancy among the relata. What of the information? This consists 
in the differences among the relata. There are doubtless several, such as the 
fact that the dyadic-triadic form is more systematically presented in textiles 
than in village lay-out. One important difference is the obvious one that 
the relata are themselves quite different phenomena: designs in textiles, 
seating patterns in meetings, arrangement of houses. That is, the semiotic 
relationship Adams has postulated has more information than would have 
been the case had the relata been confined to different examples of decorated 
men's textiles. There is more difference between textiles and village lay-out 
than between two or more examples of textiles, and hence more information 
in the relationship among them. 
Our claim has been that semiotic relationships communicate messages. 
What, then, is the message in this case? It is, we maintain, precisely a 
message about the original principle (I on the accompanying diagram): 
that an important and widespread structural form of reality is the dyadic-
triadic set. In other words, the message communicated by the semiotic 
relationship among A, B, and C closes the feedback loop in the cybernetic 
process. 
Now we are in a position to specify the cybernetic process whereby the 
world as experienced is both mind-affected and mind-affecting. Minds 
affect the world via the logical consequential connections between cultural 
principles and the components derived from them. The world in turn 
affects minds by communicating messages to people about those cultural 
principles, such messages being communicated by the semiotic relationships 
among the components.15 
One might note in this model that the connection proceeding from A, B, 
and C to I is different from the links passing from I to A, B, and C. Why 
could messages about I not be transmitted simply by retracing, in reverse, 
the logical consequential routes from I to A, B, and C—in effect permit-
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Figure 3 
ting the arrows to point in both directions? Our response is that this pro-
cedure would not yield intelligible messages about I. The reason is that the 
logical consequential relationships I—>A, I - *B , I—>C are independent of 
each other. (That is, the fart that textile design is a logical consequence 
of I is not linked directly with the fact that village lay-out is a logical con-
sequence of I. Either could exist without the other.) None of these rela-
tionships can communicate a message because it has no redundancy and, 
as we have seen, redundancy is necessary if the message is to be rendered 
intelligible. To achieve the necessary redundancy we need to look else-
where than to the independent logical consequential relationship between 
I and A, or B, or C. We must look instead at the relationship which 
directly connects A, B, and C. But that, as has been seen, is a different 
kind of relationship. It is a semiotic relationship (in this case, of resem-
blance). The similarity between A, B, and C, on the basis of which we 
may claim that a resemblance relationship exists among them, is simul-
taneously the redundancy which enables that relationship to communicate 
an intelligible message. Hence if the communicative element of the cyber-
netic process is to be realized—if the world is to be mind-affecting—it is 
necessary that a semiotic relationship be present in the process. 
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To illustrate this point, consider the circumstances under which many 
societies were introduced to firearms. European explorers would arrive, 
find themselves threatened by the people they met, and would shoot one or 
more of them. Typically the witnesses to such an event were completely 
bewildered. The causal link between the firing of a gun and the wounding 
or killing of a man was not apparent to them on the basis of just one 
event. It was perceived only after several demonstrations of the power of 
guns. Nor was this conclusion reached by mentally retracing, in reverse, 
the causal route from the firing of a gun to the impact of a bullet. Instead, 
the semiotic relationship between those events (one stemming from their 
resemblance) communicated the message to them (led them to get the 
idea) that the firing of a gun and the impact of a bullet are causally linked. 
The message was not successfully communicated until more than one epi-
sode had occurred, because it became intelligible only after repetition 
endowed it with redundancy. 
Although it involves a digression from the main line of argument, it 
is perhaps of some interest to indicate the relevance of these remarks 
to the process of hypothesis formation in science. Bochenski's claim is that 
this process, which he labels "regressive reduction," entails the movement 
of thought from a known consequent (an observation) to an unknown 
antecedent (the hypothesis from which the observed phenomenon is logi-
cally derivable). 1 6 His diagram of the process shows arrows passing directly 
from observation statements to hypotheses. We maintain that the path of 
thought in regressive reduction is more accurately depicted by the diagram 
presented above when I is considered as the hypothesis and A, B, and C 
as observation statements. That is, thought moves not directly from observa-
tion statements taken individually to the hypothesis, but from a semiotic 
relationship among several observation statements to the hypothesis. This 
point is very much in line with philosophers of science such as Mary Hesse 
and Rom Harre who hold that analogy is a major conceptual tool in scien-
tific hypothesis formation and theory building.1 7 Scientific thinking, they 
claim, often proceeds by the notion that if a relatively unknown phenome-
non is similar to a better known phenomenon in some ways (molecules 
and billiard balls, the flow of electricity and the flow of water), then it 
may be fruitful to pursue the possibility that they are similar in other ways 
also. This is closely allied to the picture of scientific thinking given here, 
in that recognition of an analogy between phenomena such as molecules 
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and billiard balls is nothing other than the recognition of a semiotic rela-
tionship (in this case resemblance) between them. Hypotheses are then 
formed on the basis of messages communicated by those semiotic rela-
tionships. Returning now to the main thread of the argument, the same 
processes are at work in human culture. People learn about the presuppo-
sitions of their culture from semiotic relationships among institutions, and 
in this way the mind-affected world affects people's minds. 
The Message is the Thing 
The primary mandate for research from the perspective of these remarks 
is of course to ascertain what the messages communicated by semiotic 
relationships are, what they mean. Herein lies a caution and admonition 
for those who would concern themselves with semiotic relationships. One 
of course cannot even begin semiotic analysis without identifying what the 
relevant signs are. But the message may be quite different from the signs. 
So if investigation exhausts itself in the intricacies of resemblance and 
contiguity, or in refinements on the taxonomy of icons, indices, and symbols, 
then the forest may be obscured by the trees. Homeric scholars for example, 
have detected a semiotic relationship between eighth century B.C. Greek 
ceramics and epics of the same period. Cedric Whitman argues that the 
Iliad has a symmetrical structure or "ring composition." Of the epic's 
twenty-four books, the events of Book I correspond with those of Book 
X X I V ; Book II with Book XXIII , and so on (with varying degrees of 
precision) throughout the entire poem. Reflective symmetry is also evident 
in the designs on ceramics of the Geometric Period, especially the Dipylon 
ware of eighth century Athens. (See Fig. 4.) Lines of inward-facing figures 
flanking a central scene on ceramics can readily be seen as a visual homology 
of the ring composition of the Iliad. 1 8 But the message communicated by 
this resemblance between pottery and poetry is not just about ring composi-
tion or symmetry. For Whitman, the significance of symmetry of design 
in eighth century Greece was a "rational concern with total patterns . . . 
total design, not particularly of motif, is the end in view." 1 9 And this 
artistic concern was part of the ascent of Greek civilization toward its 
classical period: "it was a symptom of the spirit of the age which saw the 
rise of the city state, and the foundation of those principles of rational order 
which the Greeks imposed upon themselves."2 0 Thus the interpretation of 
semiotic messages often involves going well beyond the identification of 
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Figure 4: Detail from an Attic Geometric (Dipy-
lon) amphora, mid 8th century B. C. National Mu-
seum, Athens. Drawing prepared by Myra Colbert. 
the signs and the nature of their relationships. Perhaps this is what Geertz 
had in mind when, with reference to a semiotics of art, he wrote: 
Semiotics must move beyond the consideration of signs as a means 
of communication, code to be deciphered, to a consideration of them 
as modes of thought, idiom to be interpreted. It is not a new cryp-
tography that we need, especially when it consists of replacing one 
cipher by another less intelligible, but a new diagnostics, a science 
which can determine the meaning of things for the life that sur-
rounds them. 2 1 
Testing Semiotic Relationships 
Any mode of analysis which claims to be objective or scientific requires 
some means of corroborating or falsifying its hypotheses. That is, if we are 
to claim that certain institutions are related in particular fashions, we need 
some way of testing our claim. The matter is relatively straightforward in 
the case of consequential relationships. There we can follow the procedures 
of natural science (which has traditionally also been concerned with con-
sequential—specifically causal—relationships.) We interfere with the inde-
pendent variable and then observe whether the dependent variable is af-
fected in the predicted way. (E.g., if the belief that an excess of blood 
causes disease is discredited, bloodletting in therapy will be discarded.) Of 
course, in social science such testing procedures may be difficult to carry 
out practically, due to ethical, political and other constraints on experi-
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mentation with human subjects. This is why cross-cultural comparison 
and social change are of such methodological significance to social science: 
they often provide us with ready-made experimental conditions. But what-
ever the practical complexities, at least the logic of testing hypotheses about 
consequential relationships is clear. 
It is very different in the case of semiotic relationships. Indeed, uncer-
tainty about means of testing semiotic relationships is a major reason why, 
in American anthropology at least, the last few years have witnessed a 
regretable turning away from the once immensely influential structuralism 
of Levi-Strauss. Although many of his postulated transformations are bril-
liantly insightful, if means are lacking to test whether the hypothesized 
relationships are true of the culture under study, there is little people can 
do with them other than to acknowledge and appreciate a certain genius 
in the mind vyjiich came up with them and then turn their attention to 
more objective ways of doing anthropology. This situation is unfortunate, 
particularly for studies that concentrate on world view, because semiotic 
relationships are of primary importance in the establishment of cultural 
constructions of reality. They are, as we have seen, a major means whereby 
knowledge of the world as it is construed in a particular culture is com-
municated to the members of society. 
If, however, one examines the question of testing hypotheses about 
semiotic relationships from the perspective of the model developed above, 
it becomes much less problematic. For one thing, that model specifies what 
semiotic relationships do in culture, and, for another, it shows how they 
do it in conjunction with consequential relationships. Both factors are rele-
vant to testing procedures. 
Semiotic relationships, as has been maintained, communicate informa-
tion about the world to members of society. Care has been taken to point 
out that the intelligibility of messages communicated in any natural lan-
guage is directly proportional to their redundancy. One important means 
of testing hypotheses about semiotic relationships is to check for redundancy. 
If that is not found, it is unlikely that a semiotic relationship has in 
fact been discovered because, lacking redundancy, it could not effectively 
communicate messages to members of society. As an example, consider 
again the hypothesized link between the Iliad and Dipylon vases. Certainly 
this is a curious similarity among elements of ancient Greek culture, but 
does that similarity really mark a semiotic relationship? Or is it simply a 
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fortuitous coincidence into which Whitman and other Homeric scholars 
have read rather too much? If redundancy were lacking—if symmetrical 
or ring composition were discernible only in the Iliad (or certain parts of 
the Iliad) and in only a few Dipylon vases—we might well judge that the 
similarity between them is just coincidental rather than marking a semiotic 
relationship. But if we do find a high degree of redundancy we can be 
confident that we have indeed isolated a semiotic relationship of significance 
for the culture. In the present example this would involve detecting sym-
metrical composition in epics other than the Iliad, determining it to be a 
common structure of design in ceramics, and discovering further transfor-
mations of it in yet other segments of the culture. Whitman is able to 
demonstrate a good deal of redundancy in support of the hypothesis: he 
shows that not only the Iliad as a whole but also many of its component 
parts are organized according to ring composition, that the same structure 
is visible in the Odyssey (although less systematically than in the Iliad), 
and that for both the Iliad and Dipylon ware the symmetry is most strict 
at the edges of the composition (the borders of ceramic design, the begin-
ning and ending books of the epic)—as might be expected with a framing 
device.22 
Hypothesized semiotic relationships can also be tested by tracing through 
the cybernetic processes in which they participate. The investigator at-
tempts to formulate the message communicated by the semiotic relationship, 
and then searches in the culture for other components which might also be 
seen as members of the set which communicates that message. Insofar as 
this investigation is a fruitful one, yielding insights and suggesting associa-
tions among cultural components that had not been previously perceived, 
confidence increases that a real semiotic relationship has been identified 
and its message correctly interpreted. But if the analysis leads to a dead 
end it is likely that what was hypothesized to be a semiotic relationship was 
only a fortuitous and nonsignificant association, or else that the interpreta-
tion of the message communicated by the relationship is faulty. 
Native Awareness and the Reality of Cultural Principles 
The fulcrum of the model presented here is the notion of cultural 
principles. These have a determining effect on reality as experienced in 
that cultural components are logical consequences of them. Conversely, the 
messages communicated by semiotic relationships among institutions are 
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messages about those cultural principles. Hence it is important that we be 
clear about the nature of such principles. One thing can be stated un-
equivocally at the outset: cultural principles of the sort we are discussing 
are rarely verbally articulated by members of the society under study. In-
formants cannot provide the anthropologist with a neat list of the axioms 
upon which their culture is predicated. The anthropologist must infer 
them, and this is done by the same process that we have described for the 
manner in which the world affects people's minds. That is, the anthropolo-
gist observes or experiences patterns of institutionalized behavior and, from 
semiotic relationships among them, receives messages about the cultural 
principles underlying them. The main difference between this and the 
native's experience of living in and learning about his culture is that the 
investigator makes the entire process explicit. 
The inability of members of society to articulate the principles raises a 
serious question about their reality. Instead of claiming, as we have been, 
that they really exist, one view is that they have no reality in the culture 
under study but are heuristic abstractions created by the investigator to 
assist in anthropological analysis.2 3 If this were true, our model with its 
contention that cultural components are logical consequences of such ab-
stracted principles would be highly vulnerable to the criticism that it reifies 
abstractions and then considers those abstractions to have a determining 
influence over the very things from which they were originally abstracted.24 
Our position, however, is that the principles are far more than just the 
analyst's abstractions. They are objective characteristics of culture. One 
way to account for the fact that members of society cannot articulate them 
is to locate them in their unconscious minds. Gregory Bateson has explained 
this in terms of the economy of mental resources.2 5 The conscious mind 
has a finite capacity: there is a limit to the number of things you can think 
about, appreciate, plan or decide in any given span of time. Habits con-
tribute immensely to the economy of mind in that they enable us to do 
certain things "automatically," allowing attention to be focused on other 
matters. For instance, you can think about what you will eat for breakfast 
or what you will say in a lecture while you are tying your shoe, because that 
operation has become so habitual that it no longer requires your attention 
to accomplish it. That task, as Bateson would say, has been "sunk" in your 
unconscious mind or "primary process." A child of four, on the other hand, 
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has not yet accomplished this sinking and must devote the full resources of 
conscious mind to getting the shoe tied properly. 
Only those procedures which are invariably the same can be sunk in 
primary process. You can think about other things while you tie your shoe 
but not while you select which of several pairs of shoes to wear. The latter 
task has variable outcomes, and so the flexibility of consciousness is required 
to deal with it. Hence the mind approaches maximum economy and 
efficiency when those things which are unchanging and deemed to be per-
manently true are sunk in primary process (and so drop out of awareness), 
thus freeing consciousness to focus its attention on the contingent and 
variable elements of experience. People are not aware of their most basic 
cultural principles because, as the firm foundations upon which their be-
havior is predicated, they are sunk in primary process.26 "The premises 
may, economically, be sunk," Bateson wrote, 2 7 "but particular conclusions 
must be conscious." 
This is a useful way to conceive of the nature of cultural principles as 
long as we keep in mind a pair of provisos. For one, it must not be taken 
as an implication of the terminology Bateson uses that all things which are 
"sunk" in primary process were originally on the surface, available to 
consciousness. Sometimes, indeed, they have been. Our example of learning 
to tie one's shoe is a case in point: initially a child laboriously learns and 
repeats rules about loops or "bunny ears," but as the skill is mastered the 
rules are "sunk" and the act alone remains on the surface. (Of course, in 
this particular case the rules are not sunk so deeply as to be irretrievable 
if, for example, one wishes to teach the skill to someone else.) But a great 
deal of culture is acquired with the rules never having been explicit. T h e 
rules governing gestures, facial expressions, body positioning in social inter-
action, and language are clear examples. To say that these rules are sunk 
in primary process does not entail that during the learning process they 
were conscious. 
The second proviso is that we must resist the common assumption that 
the inhabitants of mind (conscious or unconscious) are first and foremost 
propositions. It is very easy to fall in with this assumption. Bateson speaks 
of premises which may be sunk and conclusions which remain conscious; 
we have repeatedly used terms like principles and rules, and all of these 
are conventionally stated in the form of propositions. But a statement or 
description of something is not that thing; as Korzybski was careful to 
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point out, the map is not the territory. 2 8 The unarticulated cultural princi-
ples which are sunk in native primary process are not a bunch of shadowy 
propositions that never quite get said. They belong more to the realm of 
action than to the realm of speech. Wittgenstein, who characterized cultural 
principles as rules which are simply accepted without grounds, wrote: "As 
if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime. But the end is not an 
ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting." 2 9 
In their own right, cultural principles provide the ground for conven-
tional behavior. The principles which appear in proposition form in our 
analyses are statements of those principles. While not identical with them, 
to the extent that they are accurate descriptions or maps, our analytic 
principles are vital tools for understanding the structure and working of 
human cultures. 
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